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 i 
Abstract 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate whether a switch from exchange-rate 
targeting (de-facto a fixed exchange rate) to inflation targeting will facilitate a more 
appropriate monetary policy and a more stable macroeconomic environment in 
developing economies. To achieve this objective, the thesis starts by developing the 
argument that the exchange-rate peg, as a nominal variable, might be unimportant for 
affecting long-run growth performance, but detrimental to short-run output stability, 
particularly in times of real shocks. By using a dynamic system-GMM panel estimator, 
the research finds that the exchange-rate regime is not significant in explaining growth, 
either overall or in developing countries. Next, the Hausman-Taylor panel method is 
used to investigate whether the exchange-rate regime is important in determining output 
volatility. To overcome the spurious-regression problem arising from the potentially 
persistent rolling-standard-deviation based measure of output volatility, a new measure 
is defined; namely, the difference between the potential and the actual output, which 
might arise from either economic policies or external disturbances. The empirical 
evidence suggests that, for the overall sample and for the developing countries, a terms-
of-trade shock larger than 7 percentage points under a fixed, and larger than 9 
percentage points under limited-flexible and flexible exchange-rate regimes, will give 
higher output volatility compared to a float. These findings are in line with the 
expectation that pegs provide early gains in terms of inflation stabilization, but longer 
pegs begin to develop into a threat for output stabilization in the aftermath of an 
aggregate-supply shock and as the economy becomes more financially integrated. Given 
these findings, the thesis suggests the exchange rate be made flexible and a new nominal 
anchor established. The thesis argues that the direct targeting of inflation is a rational 
choice in the aftermath of peg exit. To investigate whether monetary-policy responses 
change and produce a more stable macroeconomic environment under regime 
switching from exchange-rate targeting to inflation targeting, allowing for the possibility 
of an endogenous switch, the thesis adopts the framework of a fairly classical Taylor 
rule, augmented by the exchange rate. Two modelling approaches are used to undertake 
the empirical research: a panel switching regression; and a Markov-switching VAR. 
Results from both suggest that inflation targeting represented a real switch in 
developing countries and is characterized by a more stable economic environment, by 
more independent monetary-policy conduct, by policy geared to strict observation of 
inflation and by marginal consideration of the real fluctuations of the economy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
I.1. Stylised facts and figures 
―Throughout the world, monetary-policy regimes have changed dramatically 
over the decade of the 1990s. … The biggest transformation has been the move away 
from focusing on intermediate objectives, such as money and exchange rates, toward 
the direct targeting of inflation.‖ (Cecchetti and Ehrmann, 1999, p.1). New Zealand was 
the pioneering economy to adopt inflation targeting in the early 1990s. Since then 
twenty nine countries1 adopted this monetary strategy as a flexible way to conduct 
monetary policy with ―constrained discretion‖ and oriented toward domestic objectives. 
This group includes advanced and developing economies, countries with different 
starting levels of inflation and with different prior monetary strategies.  
There has also been a move towards exchange-rate regimes with greater 
flexibility: the percentage of countries with an intermediate exchange-rate regime 
doubled from 23% to 50% between 1972 and 2007 (Reinhart web site, 2010). Similarly, 
for developing economies, the preferred exchange-rate regime has evolved over the last 
two decades. Targeting the exchange rate to a strong anchor currency (often the dollar 
or the deutsche mark) was popular in the early 1990s — especially for transition 
economies that were seeking to stabilize their economies after their initial price 
liberalizations. However, the 1990s also saw a spate of currency crises in developing 
countries, with sharp reversals of capital inflows leading to collapsing currencies and 
underscoring the fragility of such fixed exchange rate regimes. 
By the end of the 1990s, the received wisdom was that simple pegs (including 
soft and crawling pegs and bands) were too prone to crisis and that countries should 
adopt either ―hard‖ pegs — such as monetary unions or currency boards — or, at the 
other end of the spectrum, free floats in which the market determines a currency‘s value 
without government intervention (Ghosh and Ostry, 2009). This bipolar view became 
                                                 
1 The current number of inflation targeters is 26, since Finland, Spain and Slovakia joined the Euro area, 
but no country has left inflation targeting for other reasons. 
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known as the ―hollowing-out‖ hypothesis (Fisher, 2001). The bipolar prescription for 
developing countries proved short lived, however. The pressures on the Czech, Polish 
and Thai hard pegs in the late 1990s and the collapse of the Argentinean currency board 
in early 2000 cast doubt on the hard end of the bipolar spectrum. The other end, 
although less ‗visited‘ by developing economies, also proved weak: many de-jure floaters 
were intervening in the foreign-exchange market, because they were ―fearing to float‖ 
(Calvo and Reinhart, 2004). Intermediate regimes came into fashion again. Hence, as 
many countries, including developing economies, decided to abandon a preannounced 
peg, they faced the need to adopt a new nominal anchor. Fourteen exchange-rate 
targeters embarked on a new monetary strategy of inflation targeting. Nine out of those 
were developing economies. 
 
I.2. Context of the research 
It has been theoretically argued and empirically supported that the result of 
exchange-rate pegging is anchoring inflation at low, sustainable levels by imposing a 
credible but tied monetary policy (Chang and Velasco, 2000). However, under increased 
international capital mobility ―the traditional trade-off [between a fixed and floating 
exchange-rate regime] has narrowed down to a price stability – growth dilemma‖ (Levy-
Yeyati-and-Sturzenegger,-2001, p.63). This poses the question of whether pegs, which 
introduce and maintain low inflation, continue to be desirable because they are deemed 
to hinder growth. A consensus on the effect of the exchange-rate regime on growth has 
not been reached at the theoretical level; hence, the issue becomes an empirical 
question. At the empirical level, though, agreement is also lacking (Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger, 2002; Huang and Malhotra, 2005; Bleaney and Francisco, 2007).  
Goldstein (2002) argues that the exchange rate, as a nominal variable, similar to 
inflation, might not be related to the long-run growth performance of the economy at 
all, but to the short-run deviation of output from its long-run trend, i.e. to output 
volatility. For small, open economies, an exchange-rate peg might transmit external 
shocks to output volatility. Increased capital mobility in modern times makes such 
external shocks more likely, by raising the exposure to capital flight and making the peg 
a less desirable option (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995; Tavlas, 2003). Moreover, large-
enough external shocks are argued to force even a peg exit, which is frequently 
converted into the exchange-rate-system demise and severe recession (Aizenman and 
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Glick, 2008; Frankel and Rose, 1996). Over time, therefore, the initial gains of the 
exchange-rate peg in terms of credibility and low inflation may become exhausted. In 
consequence, relaxing the exchange rate may help by mitigating vulnerability to external 
currency disturbances and by allowing an independent monetary policy to focus to a 
limited extent on other domestic considerations as well as inflation. There is a range of 
flexible exchange rates, which can potentially serve as output-variance smoothers and 
reduce the vulnerability to shocks. However, peg exit necessitates the need for new 
nominal anchor for inflation (Mishkin, 1999).  
Given that the link between broad money and inflation weakened in the 1970s, 
making monetary targeting impractical, and that an implicit nominal anchor has proven 
feeble in constraining inflation expectations in small, open economies (Jonas and 
Mishkin, 2003), twenty six countries in the world today apply the strategy of direct 
inflation targeting (hereafter IT). New Zealand was the pioneering country among ITers 
and the group now encompasses many developing economies. An IT central bank 
commits to a numerical target for a measure of inflation over a given time horizon and 
the inflation forecast over that horizon serves as an intermediate target (Svensson, 2000, 
2007). Some (Mishkin and Scmidt-Hebbel, 2001, p.33) argue that the advantage of IT 
over other strategies and its success in ―controlling inflation and improving the 
performance of the economy‖ has made it a commonly used framework for conducting 
monetary policy. Indeed, no country yet has been forced to exit IT. However, several 
objections can be made to the general move to favour IT. To name a few: the general 
switch toward IT coincided with the ‗Great Moderation‘, i.e. a period of global growth 
and macro-economic stability, making it important to disentangle the two effects; the 
evidence is usually exposed to an identification-strategy problem, given both explicit 
ITers and implicit targeters; the analyses have largely ignored the possibility that 
switchers were self-selected into IT, i.e. that the switch might have emerged 
endogenously; and that the IT effect on output volatility has not reached a consensus 
(Lee 1999a; Ceccheti and Ehrman, 1999; Arestis et al. 2002). In addition, while IT has 
been well documented in advanced economies, its analysis in developing economies has 
been scarce and largely descriptive. An important question is whether these countries 
achieved better monetary policy responses and more stable macroeconomic 
environments once they left the peg and embarked on IT. In addition to the usual 
discussion about the trade-off between inflation- and output- volatility, the literature 
argues that the exchange rate is important for these economies for various reasons: large 
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shocks or capital flows cause significant volatility in the exchange rate in small, open 
economies; because of its complex macro-interactions, like exchange rate pass-through; 
and because of the high level of currency substitution and foreign-denominated debt in 
those economies. 
Given the above discussion, the vulnerability of the peg in times of aggregate 
shocks and the favoured role of IT in the last decade or so gives rise to an important 
issue: can IT be an alternative strategy for former exchange-rate targeting (ERT) 
developing economies? In other words, can IT, as compared to ERT, enable central 
banks in developing economies to achieve better policy responses in terms of inflation 
and output volatility, accounting for the exchange-rate considerations? To progress 
knowledge on this question is the main aim of this thesis. 
 
I.3. Objectives of the thesis 
The thesis has the following specific objectives: 
 To critically assess the theoretical and empirical literature on the manner in 
which the exchange-rate regime affects output growth and volatility; 
 To design a modelling framework and investigate if and how an exchange-rate 
peg affects growth and output volatility, with special emphasis on the role of 
shocks hitting the economy; 
 To survey the literature on inflation targeting and to explain why inflation 
targeting may be seen as an alternative strategy for former exchange-rate 
targeters; 
 To critically assess the literature on the policy responses and economic 
outcomes under IT, with special reference to developing economies; 
 To develop and implement empirical models for analysing monetary-policy 
responses in developing economies that switched from ERT to IT, while taking 
into account the changed, international macroeconomic environment.  
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I.4. Structure of the thesis 
In order to pursue these objectives, the thesis is organized as follows.  
Chapter one presents a critical literature review of the economics of exchange-
rate regimes and particularly of the effects of exchange-rate pegging on growth. The 
chapter explains the channels through which the exchange-rate regime might influence 
growth. Then the empirical literature on the topic is summarized and critically assessed. 
Given that the literature on the topic is not in agreement on if and how the exchange-
rate regime affects growth, the chapter argues that, according to the Natural Rate 
hypothesis, the exchange-rate regime as a nominal variable might be not be important in 
affecting long-run growth but instead affects its short-run fluctuations.  
Chapter two is the second stage of the review of the theoretical and empirical 
literature, focusing on the relationship between a peg and output volatility. This chapter 
retrieves the older debate on fixed versus flexible exchange rates and, in particular, the 
un-sustainability of the exchange-rate peg under the increasing inclusion of an economy 
in the international capital markets. As an economy becomes increasingly involved in 
the global financial markets, real exogenous shocks become increasingly apparent, hence 
supporting the adoption of a flexible rate to serve the function of absorber of such 
disturbances. Then, the chapter critically assesses the current empirical literature on this 
topic and sets the background to empirical investigation of the issue. 
Chapter three empirically investigates whether and how the exchange-rate 
regime affects growth and output volatility, and aims to address drawbacks in current 
empirical studies. A minimally specified growth model, based on core variables found in 
the literature, is defined together with a framework for analysing the exchange rate 
regime‘s impact on output volatility, whereby shocks hitting the economy play a crucial 
role. The chapter also addresses other important issues, which are - partially or entirely - 
missing from the current exchange-rate regimes literature. The investigation: contrasts 
use of the de-jure (IMF) versus a de-facto (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) exchange-rate 
classification; discusses the measure of output volatility; draws attention to the Lucas 
critique; and discusses and addresses possible endogeneity bias. The empirical 
investigation covers the post-Bretton-Woods era (1976-2006), includes 169 countries 
and uses IV methods. From the viewpoint of monetary policy, the chapter aims to 
answer if flexibilization of the exchange-rate policy is beneficial in giving a reduced 
volatility of output. 
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Chapter four analyses at the theoretical level the options that the central bank 
has in the aftermath of a peg exit. The chapter discusses preconditions that a country 
needs to fulfil in order to become a successful inflation targeter. In the second part, the 
chapter gives a broad, but rather technical, definition of IT. It describes IT as a pre-
emptive monetary strategy that uses an information-inclusive framework in order to 
achieve the pre-announced numerical target in a given time horizon. The chapter 
explains that an IT central bank would be interested in curbing inflation and bringing it 
immediately on target, except that this may sacrifice a large portion of output. 
Pragmatically, hence, the IT central bank may opt for a not-so-fast inflation decrease, at 
the same time considering the reducing of output fluctuations and exchange-rate 
volatility. Therefore, IT appears to be able to produce the desired inflation outcomes, as 
ERT does, but also takes into account the effects on the real economy in times of 
foreign shocks, contrary to ERT.  
Chapter five is a deeper examination of some of the issues raised in Chapter 4. 
The crucial question raised in this chapter is whether IT, in the manner in which it is 
defined, contradicts the theoretical consensus and empirically established regularity of 
the existence of a short-run trade-off between inflation- and output volatility. Since 
inflation and its volatility declined after IT was introduced (Nadal-de-Simone, 2001b) 
and since we argue in Chapter 1 that both ERT and IT anchor inflation expectations, 
the emphasis is on the aspects in which these two monetary regimes differ – output 
volatility and exchange-rate issues. However, this does not mean that our discussion will 
not consider the issues related to inflation. We put the discussion in a context of 
developing economies. The chapter argues an IT central bank of a developing country 
would be interested in managing the exchange rate, but would not want to prevent the 
exchange rate reaching its market-determined equilibrium over the long-run horizon. In 
that light, considering the exchange-rate volatility, the exchange-rate pass-through to 
prices and the level of euroization gains in importance within an IT framework and is 
highlighted in this chapter.  
Chapter six is an empirical analysis of whether the conduct of monetary policy 
has significantly changed with the switch from ERT to IT in developing countries, i.e. 
we investigate if the switch from ERT to IT represents a real switch in policy. We argue 
that the literature examining the issue for developing countries is basically descriptive. 
The available literature for the advanced economies usually suffers from the 
identification-strategy problem, the problem that the switch is pre-determined and 
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largely ignores the possibility that switchers are self-selected into IT, i.e. the switch 
emerged endogenously. We construct a treatment group of all developing switchers 
from ERT to IT and a control group of comparable countries that, in the same period, 
continued to target the exchange rate. The economic model we use is a classical Taylor 
rule, augmented with the exchange rate, to capture its specific role for developing 
countries as small and open economies. The sample period is 1991:1-2009:12. Firstly, 
the analysis uses a panel switching regression whereby the switch is observable; we 
allow for all covariates in the regression to switch and address the possible switch 
endogeneity. Given that this approach cannot potentially capture episodes geared 
toward IT that were followed even before IT was officially introduced and/or explain 
how overall international monetary environment under both regimes changed, we 
employ another modelling approach, whereby the regime switching is an outcome of an 
unobservable random variable – the Markov-switching regression. The economic model 
is in a reduced-form VAR format for each of the nine countries-switchers, allowing the 
intercept, autoregressive terms and variance to switch between regimes.  
The final chapter gives an overall summary of the main findings and 
conclusions, recommendations, limitations of the investigation and the modelling 
strategy and, based on that, offers some grounds for further research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Macroeconomic effects of  fixed exchange 
rate 
 
1.1. Introduction 
The assessment of the macroeconomic implications of the exchange-rate regime 
continues to evoke heated debates and ―remains perhaps one of the most important 
questions in international finance‖ (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2001, p.62). 
Consensus over exchange-rate regime effects on important macroeconomic variables 
has not yet been reached. There is no exchange-rate regime which is superior to the 
others in all respects: stabilizing prices and interest rates; easing short-term fluctuations 
and supporting long-term output growth and stability (Caramazza and Aziz, 1998). 
However, in a world of increased international capital mobility ―the traditional trade-off 
[between fixed and flexible exchange-rate regime] has narrowed down to a price 
stability–growth dilemma‖ (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2001, p.63). To start 
investigating whether a country can rethink its exchange-rate and monetary policy, we 
start developing this thesis by observing how exchange-rate pegging potentially affects 
growth and volatility of output. The main objective of this chapter is to look at the first 
stage of the theoretical background, which is the macroeconomic effects of a fixed 
exchange rate with particular focus on the growth effects, and to review the empirical 
approaches used to study these effects. Also, the chapter clarifies the distinction 
between monetary- and exchange-rate regimes, as these are often not clearly 
distinguished in the literature. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the different exchange-
rate and monetary-policy regimes. Section 1.3 reviews the exchange-rate targeting 
literature, concentrating on the macroeconomic effects of the chosen exchange-rate 
regime. In particular, after defining ERT, this section reviews the channels and the 
empirical work of the effects of ERT on inflation and growth. Section 1.4 concludes. 
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1.2. Exchange-rate and monetary-policy regimes 
In exploring the exchange-rate and monetary-policy regimes, defining price 
stability and the role of a nominal anchor is a good starting point. A consensus has been 
reached in recent years that price stability is the principal long-term goal of monetary 
policy. This, in turn, implies at least two things: i) operationalising a set of monetary 
instruments with which monetary policy will be implemented, and ii) anchoring 
inflation expectations in an appropriate manner for attaining the desirable stable prices. 
Whereas the first aspect is related to which central-bank techniques and prerequisites 
are used to conduct monetary policy, the second aspect is more oriented towards 
central-banking policymaking. In the light of the latter, the role of a nominal anchor and 
of a monetary-policy regime is of importance. 
A nominal anchor is a variable or its forecast which is held under control in order 
to act as a constraint on the domestic money supply and hence to anchor inflation 
expectations (Mishkin, 1999). A nominal anchor is necessary to mitigate the time-
inconsistency problem, whereby in a dynamic context monetary policymakers have 
different preferences, i.e. preferences that change over time. A nominal anchor will 
prevent overly expansionary monetary policy that aims at higher output and 
employment in the short run; without the anchor, economic agents accommodate their 
price and wage expectations and in the long run prices are higher but output is not. 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Calvo (1978) argued that pursuing short-run 
objectives without taking into account long-run outcomes leads to the time-
inconsistency trap, because economic agents are rational as their actions ―depend in part 
upon their expectations of future policy actions‖ (Kydland and Prescott, 1977, p.474). 
These future policy actions then affect current decisions, an issue that is addressed by 
the Lucas critique (Lucas, 1976). These issues are revisited later in the study. 
A monetary-policy regime2 refers to a framework in which monetary policy is 
conducted by specifying a clear definition of the ultimate goal, a nominal anchor and a 
set of operational measures and instruments to achieve the goal. Frederic Mishkin 
(1999, 2000b) classifies them into five basic types: exchange-rate targeting; inflation 
targeting; monetary-supply targeting; nominal-income targeting; and a monetary policy 
with an implicit nominal target. However, the literature also offers a more detailed 
                                                 
2 The adjectives ―monetary-policy‖ and ―monetary‖ and the nouns ―regime‖, ―framework‖ and ―strategy‖ 
will be used interchangeably, referring to the subject in this definition. 
PhD Thesis 
Chapter 1 – Macroeconomic effects of fixed exchange rate 
 
 29 
classification. For instance, Lindsey (1986) categorizes monetary strategies by looking at 
two characteristics: monetary-policy structure or systematic operating procedure (e.g. 
instruments used and type of feedback) and policy mode or the level of discretion 
exercised by the central bank. Figure 1.1 gives an illustration of the possible monetary 
regimes when these two dimensions are considered and will be further used in 
explaining the different regimes. 
Figure 1.1. Monetary-policy regimes  
Source: Adopted and supplemented by the author from Lindsey (1986) 
Exchange-rate targeting (hereafter ERT) is a monetary regime whereby the nominal 
exchange rate serves as a nominal anchor of monetary policy; it is the intermediate 
target for achieving the final goal of price stability. In that respect, monetary 
policymakers target a level of the exchange rate (in the form of a currency board, 
irrevocable peg or exchange-rate band) or some growth rate of it (crawling peg or 
crawling band). Point A on Figure 1.1 indicates an irrevocable peg which could come in 
the form of a currency board or even giving up of the domestic currency and accepting 
a credible one (dollarization/euroization), hence reflecting a completely subordinated 
monetary policy (no discretion) and no feedback from other economic variables 
Intermediate 
non-monetary 
targeting with 
feedback 
Intermediate 
monetary 
targeting with 
feedback 
 
Direct targeting 
with continuous 
feedback 
Level of 
discretion 
Simple rule 
with no 
feedback from 
instrument 
variables 
Simple rule 
with feedback 
from 
instrument 
variables 
 
non-
discretionary 
highly 
discretionary 
Policy 
structure A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
ERT: Hard peg 
(Euroization, currency 
board) 
or 
Friedman-type 
monetary targeting 
 
ERT: ER band, 
Crawling peg, 
Crawling band 
or 
Non-Taylor type MT 
McCallum-type 
monetary targeting 
 
Nominal income 
targeting 
 
Monetary targeting 
with feedback 
 
Implicit nominal target 
 
Inflation targeting 
 
PhD Thesis 
Chapter 1 – Macroeconomic effects of fixed exchange rate 
 
 30 
(Masson et al. 1997). Using discretion in this context implies one-time devaluations of 
the central parity or a crawling rate/band, i.e. point B. All these cases fall within the 
broader category of exchange-rate targeting and, as such, will be further analysed in this 
chapter.  
Within an inflation-targeting regime (hereafter IT), the ultimate goal is targeted 
directly; more precisely, the medium-term inflation forecast serves as an intermediate 
target. Mishkin (2001) argues that this is an information-inclusive strategy, as it uses the 
entire available arsenal of the monetary policy to achieve the target, thus providing full 
instrument feedback. However, the central bank faces ―restrained discretion‖, as 
missing the target invokes considerable economic and political costs (point F). Further 
analysis of inflation targeting follows in Chapter 4. 
Within a monetary-targeting regime, the central bank announces a target for the 
domestic money supply, targeting either its level or (more naturally) its growth rate. 
Whereas the former is not present in practice, the latter, which became known as the 
Friedman rule, was adopted by many central banks in the 1970s. Monetary targeting 
enables the central bank to pursue an independent monetary policy by choosing the 
desired inflation rate and to possibly over output variances. However, fixing money 
growth at k-percent leaves no room for manoeuvre for the central bank, thus leading to 
point A; still in practice, these rules became flexible enough enabling k+x percentage 
accommodative function of the regime, as shown at point B (Masson et al. 1997). 
Further, point C refers to the so-called McCallum rule (McCallum, 1999) which derives 
its value from the Quantity Theory equation. This rule targets nominal income using the 
monetary base as its instrument whilst making an allowance for any on-going changes in 
money velocity. Finally, point E refers to the monetary-targeting frameworks usually 
observed in practice, i.e. those mainly pursued in the 1970s with the typical deviation 
from the pattern of the standard Taylor rule: it is a monetary regime whereby 
communication with the public is emphasized with a focus on long-run considerations 
and the control of inflation. 
In general, the monetary-targeting strategy is coupled with relative transparency, 
as figures for monetary aggregates are typically published periodically with short lags 
(Mishkin, 1999). Money targets send immediate signals to the public and markets, 
enabling them to evaluate the stance of monetary policy and thus build it into their 
inflation expectations. In this manner, monetary targeting could be a solid monetary 
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strategy for anchoring inflation expectations. Yet the latter will be the case only if a 
strong relationship between the targeted variable (the particular definition of money) 
and the ultimate goal of monetary policy (prices) exists. The literature offers 
considerable evidence (for instance, Estrela and Mishkin, 1997; Mishkin and Savastano, 
2002) that over time this linkage became increasingly feeble. With a fragile link, this 
strategy is powerless to anchor inflation expectations, hence leading to poor inflation 
outcomes. This compromised the monetary-targeting role in the conduct of monetary 
policy and forced the majority of central banks to substantially deviate from the 
Friedman-type strategy and ultimately to abandon it. Moreover, a possible drawback of 
the strategy is the ability of central banks to actually control monetary aggregates. 
Two other monetary strategies attract attention. One is the nominal income 
targeting, a strategy exemplified by considerably high discretion (point D), which 
implicitly entails central banks targeting real output and inflation at the same time. As 
this is difficult and frequently leads to conflicting policy responses, no country has so 
far adopted this approach. However, nominal income targeting avoids the problem of 
velocity shocks and the time-inconsistency problem and allows for a completely 
independent monetary policy (Mishkin and Posen, 1998). Implicit nominal targeting is short 
of an explicit target of monetary policy, but instead is based on a forward-looking and 
pre-emptive monetary-policy rule and uses a broad information-inclusive approach 
towards achieving the target. Mishkin (2004) evaluates this ―just do it‖ strategy as 
sufficiently flexible, but lacking in transparency thus adding confusion to financial 
markets as to the central bank‘s future steps. Moreover, accountability within this 
framework remains arguably feeble, as no criteria for judgement are announced. The 
lack of an explicit nominal anchor can however be compensated with the credibility, 
skills and trustworthiness of the governor, hence providing the maximal discretion to 
the strategy, concurrently using some advantages of inflation targeting (point G). 
In summary, monetary targeting proved problematic in anchoring inflation 
expectations as the link between money supply and inflation became increasingly feeble. 
Use of an implicit nominal target is argued to be associated with the credibility and 
trustworthiness of the central-bank governor, which is unattainable for economies with 
institutional weaknesses. The latter is usually a characteristic of developing and 
transition economies, which are the ultimate focus of the thesis (see Chapter 6). Thus, 
the theoretical debate reduces to the remaining two monetary frameworks. Therefore, 
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this thesis thereafter focuses on these two strategies: exchange-rate targeting and 
inflation targeting. 
Before concluding this section, it is useful to make the distinction between 
exchange-rate regimes and monetary-policy regimes. It follows from the categorisation 
in Figure 1.1 that ERT could come in a variety of forms: euroization, currency board, 
irrevocable peg, exchange-rate band, crawling peg or crawling band. Whereas ERT is a 
monetary-policy regime, all the latter types of exchange-rate targets are referred as 
exchange-rate regimes. However, the list of exchange-rate regimes goes beyond ERT - 
managed floats and free floats, which are usually exercised under the umbrella of 
another monetary-policy regime. These two exchange-rate regimes are freed of any 
exchange-rate anchor: managed floats come in a framework whereby the official 
reserves can be used for attaining exchange-rate stability; whereas within a freely 
floating framework the exchange rate is entirely market-driven. Table 1.1 illustrates 
these ideas. 
Table 1.1. Monetary-policy regimes vs. exchange-rate regimes 
Monetary-policy regimes 
(in order of discretion: from the 
least to the most discretionary) 
 Exchange-rate regimes 
(in order of flexibility: from the 
least to the most flexible) 
Exchange rate targeting 
→ 
Define the form of exchange-
rate targeting (choose the 
exchange-rate regime) 
Hard pegs: 
Euroization 
Currency board 
Soft pegs: 
Conventional peg 
Exchange rate band 
Crawling peg 
Crawling band 
Money-supply targeting  
Define the nominal anchor 
(choose the monetary-policy 
regime) 
Managed float 
Inflation targeting 
Nominal income targeting 
Free float 
Implicit nominal target 
Source: Drafted by the author and based on IMF recommendations 
In light of this discussion, a question arises how ERT differs from a fixed 
exchange rate. It follows from Figure 1.1 that the former is a broader concept than the 
latter. Namely, a country could announce an exchange-rate target, but still not commit 
to a fixed exchange rate, i.e. announce a wider or moving band around the target. It is 
important to acknowledge that throughout this thesis, we will treat exchange-rate 
targeting as announcing a target for the exchange rate within very narrow defined 
bands, usually of up to ±2%, because this is the way in which it has been used in the 
countries that are the ultimate concern of the thesis (see Table 6.1 in Chapter 6). 
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Defined in this manner, exchange-rate targeting is close to a fixed exchange rate. 
Moreover, it is useful, at this point, to accentuate the differentiation between de-jure 
and de-facto exchange-rate regimes, i.e. between what authorities assert to be an official 
exchange-rate strategy and what they actually do in practice (more on this in Section 
3.2.4). Namely, a country can announce that the exchange rate will be determined by the 
market forces solely, but in reality it will heavily intervene on the foreign-exchange 
market to maintain a chosen parity or to stick to some (narrow) bands. Hence, the de-
jure exchange-rate regime is managed floating, but the de-facto one is conventional peg 
or exchange-rate band. However, note that the reason for pegging might matter in this 
respect: countries with high inflation might be more dedicated to tightly maintain a 
chosen parity, even though they declare a different exchange-rate peg regime. A parity 
defense occurs by a heavy intervention in the foreign exchange market. When just the 
stable nominal rate and the volatile reserves are considered, then taking the criteria of 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), the de-facto regime will be considered a peg (refer 
to p.101 for details of their classification). However, when pegging is made for 
competitiveness purposes, then pressure on the exchange rate will likely result in one or 
a series of parity changes. Hence, the changing nominal rate and the stable reserves 
result in a de-facto regime distinct from a peg, despite that the country declares an 
official peg. As we will see in Section 3.2.4, in this thesis, we argue in favour of and use 
a de-facto classification of the exchange-rate regimes, since using the de-jure one might 
blur the real picture. 
The next section introduces the economics of fixed exchange rates. Later on, in 
Section 3.2.4, we will introduce the de-facto exchange-rate regimes and there the 
primary interest will be in the first category - the narrow ERT. Given this discussion, 
part one of the thesis (Chapters 1-3) entirely deals with exchange-rate targeting: 
explanation; macroeconomic effects in theory; empirical evidence and analysis of its 
effect on growth and output volatility. Part two (Chapters 4 and 5) explains the 
necessity for a new nominal anchor once ERT is abandoned; then explores inflation 
targeting as a strategy that might arguably provide better monetary-policy outcomes. 
Part three (Chapter 6) empirically analyses monetary-policy conduct when the regime 
switches from ERT to IT for a set of developing/transition economies. 
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1.3. Economics of fixed exchange rates  
1.3.1. The scope of exchange-rate targeting: definition 
Exchange-rate targeting (hereafter ERT) is exemplified by a long history and a 
growing body of literature analyses this strategy in different contexts. It is a monetary 
strategy whereby the exchange rate is used as an intermediate target of monetary policy. 
In general, ERT could come in a variety of forms, which are depicted in Table 1.1, but 
its original definition relates to a fixed exchange rate and this is the viewpoint from 
which it is interesting in this thesis3. Hence, from the aspect of an exchange-rate regime, 
it refers to a fixed exchange rate, whereby the central bank stands ready to buy and sell 
the domestic currency in terms of a foreign currency at a predetermined rate (Obstfeld 
and Rogoff, 1995). By doing so, the central bank subordinates the entire monetary 
system to that of the anchoring country, i.e. no room for independent monetary policy 
exists. Thus the use of monetary policy for stabilization purposes is forgone. However, 
by putting monetary policy on autopilot, this regime directly mitigates the time-
inconsistency problem discussed earlier; it prevents the use of expansionary monetary 
policy that will result in real short-run gains, but will impair nominal long-run outcomes 
(Mishkin, 1999). For a small, open economy, the exchange rate serves as an important 
economic indicator and there is considerable evidence that it is the core transmission 
channel of monetary policy (for instance, Flamini, 2007). Within such an environment, 
targeting the nominal exchange rate would provide a reliable indicator of future price 
movements, given that in a small-open economy, import prices are a crucial 
determinant of the overall price level. 
In order to analyse ERT, at an outset the price level is described as a weighted 
average of prices in the tradable and non-tradable sectors: 
tnd PPP )1(          (1.1) 
According to Krueger (1997), the price of tradable goods can be expected to follow the 
time path of the exchange rate fairly closely, while that of the non-tradable sector 
depend on real wages: 
mt ePP  ;  nn wP       (1.2) 
                                                 
3 And, this implies that, at least in this thesis, exchange-rate targeting, pegging and fixing are synonyms 
and will be used interchangeably. 
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If (1.2) is substituted in (1.1), it yields: 
 mnd ePwP )1()(         (1.3) 
In (1.1)–(1.3), P  refers to the price level, subscripts d, t, n and m refer to the domestic, 
tradable and non-tradable sectors and the international price of imported goods, 
respectively; nw  stands for the real wage (nominal wage minus inflation) in the 
non-tradable sector, e  is the nominal exchange rate, and   the share. In a small, open 
economy  1 , i.e. the share of tradable sector is greater than the share of non-
tradable sector. Since with ERT the exchange rate is held fixed and hence 0e , the 
domestic price level is mainly determined by the foreign price level. 
When the exchange rate is fixed, a negative external demand shock would have 
an amplified effect on domestic output and employment; the peg provides no vehicle 
for a short-run adjustment in relative prices, thus leading to deteriorating real outcomes 
in the economy. Within a financially integrated world, the impossible trinity rule (see, 
for instance, Mundell, 1961; Mohsin, 2003) implies that the domestic interest rate could 
not be set to compensate for the shock and to help the demand recover. Instead, inside 
a triangle of a peg, dependent monetary policy and capital mobility, the domestic 
nominal interest rate must equal the foreign one4, which is another way of expressing 
the tied hands of monetary authorities. Hence, any attempt to expand money supply will 
invoke pressures on the foreign-exchange market from the demand side, by agents‘ 
supplying domestic money and demanding foreign currency at the promised rate 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). Hence, the attempt to increase money supply will fail; 
under a fixed rate, the central bank exercises no control over domestic money supply; 
the latter is endogenous in the framework. Let us look at the money-demand function, 
whereby money demand (
P
M
) is a function of real income (Y ) and the interest rate 
( r ): 
),( rYf
P
M
         (1.4) 
By taking log-linear form, it follows (lower-case letters refer to logarithms): 
 rypm 21          (1.5) 
                                                 
4 Hypothetically, abstracting from the country risk. 
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Where 1  and 2  are parameters and the parameter on p  is assumed to be unity. 
Following purchasing-power-parity theory, the following equations for the exchange 
rate ( E ) can be written: 
 
fP
P
E          (1.6) 
 fppe          (1.7) 
Whereby, the subscript f  refers to foreign (world) variable and the exchange rate is 
expressed as units of domestic per unit of foreign currency. From the earlier discussion, 
increased capital mobility implies the same domestic and foreign interest rates, i.e.: 
 frr           (1.8) 
If we express (1.5) by p  and substitute in (1.7), we obtain: 
fpryme  21        (1.9) 
Assuming an analogous pattern for the foreign money demand fff rymp 21   , 
we obtain the determination of the exchange rate ( 21 ;  referring to the parameters in 
the foreign money-demand function): 
fff rymryme 2121     
)()()( 2211 fff rryymme       (1.10) 
If the central bank fixes the exchange rate in (1.10), 0e , it will have to face 
the limitation to changes in money supply and interest rates. The former is entirely 
subordinated to the money supply in the anchoring country, i.e. m  can be changed only 
if fm  changes, given that the income and the interest-rate differentials stay constant. If 
the central bank pursues an expansionary monetary policy (expands m , without income 
being changed), at the predetermined exchange rate agents will supply domestic 
currency and demand a foreign one; official reserves, as a first-line defender of the peg, 
will decrease. In such a scenario, the peg is under pressure, which will cease either when 
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interest rates increases sufficiently to balance (1.10) (so that 0e )
5
; or when 
devaluation or a switch to more flexible option occurred (so that no longer 0e  
and/or reserves decreased). 
Arguably, fiscal policy can be fully effective under a real shock (that would 
otherwise put the peg under pressure). For instance, rising import prices of some 
commodities or oil that threaten to convert into inflation and wage pressures, may be 
combated by fiscal policy before these pressures are transmitted to the foreign-exchange 
market (due to expectations of devaluation). Fiscal policy, in such conditions, might 
subsidize agriculture or reduce the tax burden on some products to reduce the 
inflationary effect. However, given that the focus of this thesis is on developing 
economies, two caveats apply here: i) such use of fiscal policy might be limited due to 
these countries‘ limited capacity to borrow on international markets and to raise taxes as 
well as due to their likely high levels of public indebtness; and ii) even when the peg is 
not under pressure, fiscal authorities in those countries might be reluctant to coordinate 
with the monetary-policy authority to support the business cycle, i.e to favour 
immediate gains. The latter would create a burden on monetary-policy conduct under a 
peg which, in the long run, will be likely to be more detrimental than under other 
exchange-rate strategies. Given these considerations, the thesis focuses on what can be 
done on the monetary-policy side, leaving the fiscal behaviour aside. 
Getting back to the earlier discussion, despite ERT‘s limitation stemming from 
the surrender of monetary independence, it appeared to be a firm vehicle for curbing 
inflation, as the potentially damaging volatility implied by a float is forgone. This is 
especially the case for transition and developing economies, which have typically faced 
accelerating inflation rates. Moreover, the uncertainty imposed by exchange-rate 
flexibility is thought to be damaging for the real economy, reducing international trade 
and discouraging investment. However, at a theoretical level, it is hard to establish firm 
relationships because of the many channels through which the exchange rate affects the 
economy and is being affected by the other macroeconomic variables. These issues are 
analysed in the next two sections. 
 
                                                 
5 Note that under such a nominal shock, in practice, the condition 
frr  will no longer hold. The fact 
that the peg is under threat will imply that the domestic interest rate will embed a risk premium over the 
foreign interest rate. 
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1.3.2. Theoretical insights and empirical evidence on the effects of a fixed 
exchange rate on inflation 
When the macroeconomic implications of the fixed exchange rate are discussed, 
nominal variables in the economy are first considered to be influenced, i.e. the peg‘s 
effect on inflation is expected to prevail. Mishkin (1999) articulates that by anchoring 
the domestic currency to a credible foreign currency prices of the internationally traded 
goods are fixed, hence directly contributing to lowering domestic inflation. In light of 
the exposition in Section 1.3.1, Xu (2004) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) 
argue that peg‘s effect on inflation is achieved through the domestic money-creation 
process which is determined by the same process in the anchoring country (equation 
[1.10]). That is why, ―the typical association of fixed exchange rates with lower inflation 
rates is based primarily on the belief that a peg may play a role of a commitment 
mechanism for monetary authorities … and that the failure to comply with the 
commitment entails some political cost to the authorities‖ (Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger, 2001, p.6) and, hence, ―the need to maintain fixed exchange-rate parity 
ensures that governments do not expand their money supplies at inflationary rates‖ (Xu, 
2004, p.219). In that manner, a peg commits governments by denying negligent 
monetary behaviour (Rogoff et al. 2004). In addition to the money-creation limitation, 
inflationary expectations are reduced which, in turn, stabilizes money velocity and 
reduces interest rates. Also, in considerably euroized economies, a credible peg will 
reduce inflation inertia and lower the probability that devaluation could occur. This core 
effect of a fixed exchange rate is referred to as ensuring monetary discipline.  
Closely related to monetary discipline is the concept of the credibility of 
monetary policy imposed by pegging to a hard foreign currency (Chang and Velasco, 
2000). Credibility is important for anchoring inflation expectations (Tavlas, 2003) and 
works in the following way. Assume an economy without an exchange-rate anchor; if 
the labour market is not freed of frictions, then wage-setters will bargain for a higher 
wages, which are not optimal compared to the market-clearing wage within a frictionless 
labour market, thus resulting in lower output. However, the authorities desire the 
optimum output level and the central bank with such an implicit objective will increase 
inflation in a world of sticky nominal wages, once these have been set, in order to 
reduce real wages and increase output. However, this falls in the time-inconsistency trap 
– it sacrifices the long-run objective in favour of the short-run one. Hence, in turn, the 
central bank will have to promise a low inflationary environment, as it is conducive to 
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growth in the long run and to anchor inflation expectations. But time-inconsistency 
might persist and the central bank might again pursue inflationary policy to boost 
output (Moreno, 2000). However, as discussed in the context of the Lucas critique on 
p.28, once agents understand the central-bank‘s game, they will build this behaviour into 
their expectations. Ultimately, higher inflationary expectations lead to higher ex-post 
inflation, with no corresponding output gains. The remedy for such a poor scenario is 
to anchor the exchange rate. In doing so, the central bank will help restoring lost 
credibility. Since the peg enhances non-inflationary monetary credibility, it will anchor 
inflation expectations, prevent inflation escalating and will aid its reduction. Moreover, 
the more firm the fix, the more successful it will be in providing credibility (Edwards 
and Magendzo, 2003). Canavan and Tommasi (1997) add that the credibility effect is 
deepened as that peg additionally provides greater transparency. Garofalo (2005) and 
Ghosh et al. (1997) add a confidence effect of the peg, which leads to an eagerness to 
hold the domestic currency, as a vehicle for reducing inflationary effects of a given 
monetary expansion.  
The academic literature agrees that the main benefit from anchoring the 
exchange rate is reducing inflation and interest-rate variability. For instance, Ghosh et al. 
(1997); Moreno (2000) and Fisher et al. (1996) review the experience of transition and 
developing economies that became trapped in accelerating inflation and conclude that 
the exchange-rate anchor has been the core component of the disinflation packages that 
resulted in low and stable inflation. For instance, at the beginning of the 1990s, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland introduced stabilization programs whose core was 
the exchange-rate peg; Estonia and Lithuania established currency boards (Coricelli et al. 
2006); Slovenia mainly targeted M3, but tightly managed the exchange rate; while 
Macedonia embarked on a de-facto6 fixed exchange-rate regime after monetary targeting 
became unreliable as an anchor for inflation expectations. In all cases, inflation was 
immediately curbed following the introduction of the new regime. 
In an attempt to reveal the extent to which an exchange-rate regime affects 
macroeconomic variables, empirical studies often employ a dummy variable in reduced 
form equations for inflation. The effect of the exchange-rate regime on the dependent 
variable is then measured by the estimated dummy coefficient. For instance Levy-Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger (2001) investigate a sample of 154 countries over the post-Breton-
                                                 
6 A discussion of de-facto versus de-jure regimes is offered in Chapter 3. 
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Woods era, engaging in cross country exchange-rate regime – inflation analysis. Their 
analysis is based on the de-facto behaviour of the exchange rate, whereas the identified 
pegs are distinguished between long (over five-year duration) and short pegs. This is 
consistent with Willett (1998) who argues that the distinction between permanent and 
temporary pegs matters in respect to disinflation and stabilization efforts, thus inducing 
an economic and political price to be paid for abandoning the peg. Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2001) model the exchange-rate target effect on inflation within a money-
demand function and use panel-data estimation, whereby broad money, output, the 
nominal interest rate and money velocity are included as explanatory variables. Trade 
openness is added to control for the potential disciplinary effect of peg and lagged 
inflation is included to take into account the possibility of backward-looking indexation 
in the economy. Findings suggest a robust negative relation between pegs and low 
inflation, as well lower real interest rates under a peg. However, the former is for long 
pegs only and for non-industrial countries. Garofalo (2005) applied the same 
examination to Italy in the period 1861-1997 and found that under a hard peg Italian 
inflation was 2.9 percentage points lower that under a floating regime. However, it is 
argued in the empirical literature that not only could a credible peg impose a low 
inflationary environment, but that countries with greater price stability have better 
chances to implement sustainable pegs. Both Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) and 
Garofalo (2005) adjust for the possible endogeneity and the conclusions are maintained. 
However, a problem with such estimation might continue to exist if there is a 
correlation between the choice of the regime and the error term, and this is not 
investigated in these studies. Moreover, other regression coefficients do not change 
under regime change, which is not investigated in the studies and exposes them to the 
Lucas critique. 
 Given the problems associated with the above approaches, Domac et al. (2004a) 
analysed the relationship using a switching regression, by specifying separate regression 
for each regime. The variables employed are those in Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2001), along with the fiscal balance. Findings are in line with previous research: 
inflation is lower under more a rigid form of the exchange rate. However, by specifying 
separate regressions, the study again does not consider the possibility that the regime 
evolves endogenously. Furthermore the sample and period are small (22 countries and 
less than 10 years). Similarly, De Grauwe and Schnabl (2005) use a panel regression of 
10 CEE countries to analyse how inflation and has been affected by the exchange-rate 
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regime in the period 1994-2002. Findings conform to the negative link exchange-rate 
target – inflation for the 10 CEE countries, however only when the de-facto regime is 
considered.  
In general, the theoretical insights, practical cases and empirical analyses suggest 
that the relationship between the fixed exchange rate and inflation is negative: the peg 
curbs inflation and maintains low inflation and interest-rate volatility. In particular, 
durable exchange-rate targeting ensures stable prices. Also, the conclusion is particularly 
robust for developing and transition economies, which lack monetary discipline and 
credibility of their central banking systems. Still, there are views that challenge this 
general conclusion. For instance, Tornell and Velasco (2000) take rather radical view 
that inflation reduced by pegging is only an illusion, since neither exchange-rate regime 
could stand in place of sound macroeconomic policies. Chang and Velasco (2000) state 
that the peg might restrict credit extension in the economy and produce harmful 
consequences for financial stability. Moreover, Edwards and Magendzo (2003) argue 
that, as the economy becomes increasingly dependent on international capital flows, ―a 
larger fraction of the monetary aggregates needs to be backed to maintain the peg‖ 
(p.13). Increased capital mobility might expose the peg to intensified speculative attacks 
and ultimately lead to its demise. However, both Chang and Velasco‘s (2000) and 
Edwards and Magendzo‘s (2003) arguments refer to a period when the economy has 
achieved substantial price stability and might have oriented towards growth objectives. 
This could be an issue to be concerned with and we revisit it in Chapter 2. Still, its 
consideration does not render invalid our conclusion that a peg reduces inflation. 
 
1.3.3. Exports, investment and productivity: Does having a fixed 
exchange rate matter for growth? 
A narrow part of the academic literature (Domac et al. 2004b; Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger, 2002; Moreno, 2000; 2001; Edwards and Levy-Yeyati, 2005; Husain et al. 
2005; De Grauwe and Schnabl, 2005; Eichengreen and Leblang, 2003; Bailliu et al. 2003) 
investigates the exchange-rate regime‘s effect on economic growth. However, 
investigation of the relation between peg and growth has evoked considerably less 
research than the material presented in the previous section, ―probably due to the fact 
that nominal variables are typically considered to be unrelated to longer-term growth 
performance‖ (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2002, p.2). In that vein, Goldstein (2002) 
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argues that the natural-rate hypothesis implies that the best that macroeconomic policy 
can hope to achieve is price stability in the medium-term. The nominal exchange rate 
can not be used to keep the unemployment rate away from its natural level on a 
sustained basis. An attempt to over-stimulate the economy, by expansionary monetary 
policy or currency devaluation will result in a higher rate of inflation, but no increase in 
real economic growth (Barro and Gordon, 1983). Hence, as a nominal variable, the 
exchange rate (regime) might not affect long-run growth. There is no unambiguous 
theoretical evidence on the impact of the exchange-rate regime on growth. Economic 
theory does not noticeably articulate if and how the exchange-rate regime might affect 
growth. Instead, arguments typically focus on its effect on investment and foreign trade, 
but still remain ambiguous in terms of the direction of influence. At least, some studies 
(Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2002) agree that a relationship between the exchange-
rate regime and economic growth exists, but argue that the sign of the influence is 
unclear.  
De Grauwe and Schnabl (2005) argue that there will be higher output growth 
under a peg because of two factors. First, the exchange-rate risk is eliminated and this 
stimulates foreign trade and international division of labour. Also, fixing the exchange 
rate may enable faster growth in the medium and long run by supporting greater 
openness to international trade, as traders will not need to account for exchange-rate 
risk. In turn, openness may ease technology transfer, thus aiding the productivity 
growth, and supporting the overall economic growth (Moreno, 2001). Second, 
according to De Grauwe and Schnabl (2005), a credible fix promotes certainty, thus 
lowering the country-risk premium embedded in the interest rate. Lower interest rates 
in turn stimulate consumption, investment and growth. Macroeconomic certainty 
imposed by pegging promotes foreign trade, thus ―stimulating economic efficiency and 
growth over the long haul and restraining inflation, which is also good for growth‖ 
(Gylfason, 2000, p.176). 
Nilsson and Nilsson (2000) particularly explore the effect of the exchange-rate 
regime on exports for developing countries. They argue that for these countries, export-
led growth is the spiritus movens for overall development, on the one hand, while on the 
other, developing-countriy exporters are severely affected by the more frequent 
exchange-rate misalignments and volatility under flexible rates, which, in turn might 
harmfully impinge on their market power and thus motivate them to reduce export 
quality. Brada and Mendez (1988) further deepen this hypothesis. They argue that 
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flexible rates depress the volume of international trade in two ways: either through the 
exchange-rate uncertainty for conducting foreign trade, or throughout the erection of 
trade barriers as countries react to the increased exchange-rate volatility. Likewise, 
Domac et al. (2004b) point out that, because of the uncertainty imposed, a floating 
regime may hamper international trade. Moreover, advocates of pegs blame floats for 
throwing bewilderment at the international market as to the exporters‘ competitiveness 
(Grubel, 2000), consequently promoting resource misallocation (Gylfason, 2000) and in 
that manner harming growth. However, the same papers emphasize the efficiency of 
floats in correcting balance of payments disequilibria as their advantage, which in turn 
will enable internal macro-stability to be achieved quicker. 
The preceding notions are related to the exchange-rate risk which stems from 
allowing the rate to float. This risk is restrained with an exchange-rate target, completely 
with a currency board or irrevocable peg or considerably with an exchange-rate band or 
crawling peg/band. Then the relation between an exchange-rate target and trade could 
be straightforward: a stable macroeconomic environment promotes bilateral trade. 
Contrary to this, however, Viaene and de Vries (1992) argue that such a straightforward 
assumption of a negative link between uncertainty and trade may not be appropriate, 
because agents might amplify their incentives to trade more under intensified exchange-
rate fluctuations, depending on their risk aversion. Dellas and Zilberfarb (1995) found a 
significant positive link between exchange-rate variability and trade growth; they also 
emphasised that (exporters‘) risk-aversion matters. Namely, a low level of risk aversion 
could imply a positive effect; yet, a developed forward market could be helpful and 
serve as shock absorber by supplying a variety of hedging instruments. If, when risk 
aversion is not low, exporters are provided with an efficient vehicle for hedging 
exchange-rate risk such as forward markets, increased exchange-rate volatility could 
ultimately have no effect (Bailliu et al. 2003). However, such instruments are unavailable 
in developing markets. Hence, the relationahip between the exchange-rate volatility and 
trade is highly conditional, including on the hedging opportunities, as the meta-
regression analysis of Ćorić and Pugh (2010) suggests. 
In line with what has been said for the relationship between exchange-rate 
regime and trade, Bohm and Funke (2001) suggest that the channel through which the 
exchange-rate regime influences investment is the level of uncertainty. When 
uncertainty is reduced, investment is increased and, therefore, new-jobs creation and 
output (Bohm and Funke, 2001). The effect of uncertainty connected to the exchange-
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rate regime is the concern of the study of Dixit (1989), which states that instability leads 
to disinvestment or puts off already planned investment. Krugman (1991) affirms the 
belief that exchange-rate volatility will ―warm up‖ reasons for taking on ―a ‗wait and see‘ 
attitude towards both investment and trading decisions‖ (p.3). However, although the 
literature relates the exchange-rate regime to investment via uncertainty, it offers 
negligible evidence of this relationship, which could be ascribed to the decision to invest 
internationally, or to engage in the international capital flows, is dependent not only on 
the exchange-rate system and the perception of uncertainty, but on other, probably 
more real factors as well (Crowley and Lee, 2003). 
Although the preceding arguments are plausible, Bailliu et al. (2003) argue that, 
despite the regime‘s indirect effect on growth through trade and investment, growth 
could also be achieved directly - through the regime‘s effect on shock adjustment. The 
exchange rate has the power of ―dampening or amplifying the impact and adjustment to 
economic shocks‖ (p.385), suggesting that a flexible rate will enable fast and easy 
accommodation and absorption of aggregate economic shocks. Consequently, ―when 
the adjustment to shocks is smoother, one would expect the growth to be higher, given 
that the economy is, on average, operating closer to capacity‖ (p.385). Given this role of 
the flexible rate, Friedman (1953) further explains that adjustment under a peg must be 
channelled through change of relative prices. But, in a world of Keynesian prices, 
adjustment is slow, thus creating an excessive burden in the economy and ultimately 
harming growth. Moreover, Section 1.3.1 suggest that under perfect (or at least high) 
capital mobility, interest-rate changes produce high costs for the economy, in attempts 
to defend a peg when the currency is under attack. Given this, the strengthened capital 
mobility in modern times will make pegs unsustainable, leading to severe recessions in 
times of negative external shocks, which pegs will immediately transmit onto the real 
economy (Fisher, 2001). McKinnon and Schnabl (2004) illustrate that before the Asian 
crisis of 1997/98 exchange-rate stability against the US dollar contributed to low 
inflation and a sound fiscal position. The resulting stable expectations then promoted 
investment and boosted long-term growth, which became known as the East Asian 
miracle. But the miracle came to an end because it was inefficient in absorbing shocks!  
The general conclusion to the above is that the lower the uncertainty gained by 
pegging the currency, the higher are trade and investment. However, there is a 
theoretical possibility (but limited amount of empirical evidence; see Ćorić and Pugh, 
2010) that extremely risk averse traders will trade more when the exchange rate varies. 
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Moreover, the peg does not provide a buffer mechanism when external shock hits the 
economy. Still, there can be a second-line buffer - the level of development of the 
financial system. This is closely related to the peg‘s effect on productivity growth. 
Ghosh et al. (1997); Garofalo (2005); and Collins (1996) all deal with the relationship 
between the peg and (productivity) growth. The first paper argues that a peg enhances 
investment, but a float might produce faster productivity growth. Reverting to the 
production function and specifically to the Solow growth model, output growth could 
be promoted if one or both of the production factors (labour and capital) or the total 
factor productivity, or all three, increase. Therefore, if there is considerable evidence 
that an exchange-rate peg promotes investment, then the lower growth under a peg that 
some studies establish has to be associated with slower productivity growth. We 
consider this channel next. 
A peg‘s impact on productivity growth is especially emphasised in emerging 
markets, where credit markets appear to be thin. The ultimate effect of the peg on 
economic growth, channelled through productivity growth, nevertheless remains 
unclear. For instance, Aghion et al. (2009) argue that an aggregate negative external 
shock under a peg transmits into real activity and causes a higher share of firms in the 
economy to experience credit constraints, given the under-developed financial market. 
Suppose that producers can decide whether to invest in short-run capital or in a long-
term productivity-enhancing venture. Typically, the long-term productivity-enhancing 
investment creates a higher need for liquidity in order to face medium-term 
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, the latter mainly stemming from an aggregate shock that 
hits the economy. With perfect credit markets, the necessary liquidity is always supplied, 
but this is no longer the case when credit markets are imperfect. The liquidity shock is 
only financed when the firm has enough profits, because only profitable firms can 
borrow enough to cover their liquidity costs. A negative aggregate shock, by making all 
firms less profitable, makes it less likely that the liquidity needs of any of them will be 
met. As a result, a fraction of the potentially productivity-enhancing long-term 
investments will go to waste, with apparent consequences for growth. A main 
implication is that firms in countries with better financial markets will deal better with 
an aggregate shock and therefore will tend to go more for long-term investments, which 
in turn should generate higher aggregate growth; while the shock in developing markets 
will result in the distorting of real activity and lower productivity growth. Given this 
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exposition, although the literature seems consensual on this channel, still it remained 
little explored both theoretically and empirically. 
In conclusion: there are some theoretical channels through which the exchange-
rate regime might affect growth: i) uncertainty imposed on the economy and its effect 
on investment and trade; ii) the shock-adjustment mechanism and the level of financial 
development; and iii) the interaction of credit-market development with productivity 
growth. However, the directions in which the regime may impinge on productivity, 
investment, trade and thus, on output growth are still ambiguous. Hence, the 
relationship between the exchange-rate regime and growth becomes an empirical issue 
and is further debated in the next section, while empirically investigated in Chapter 3. 
 
1.3.4. A review of the empirical evidence on exchange-rate-regime effects 
on growth 
Since economic theory does not reveal clear foundations for the relationship 
between the exchange-rate regime and economic growth, the issue becomes empirical. 
However, the few published empirical studies give differing results. These are 
summarized in Table 1.2 at the end of this section and are reviewed as this section 
proceeds. The methodological approach of the studies is the criterion according to 
which these are examined in this section. 
Two classic papers, Baxter and Stockman (1989) and Mundell (1995) compare 
growth between two periods: the period of the fixed exchange-rate system and the one 
under the generalized floating in the US and four other regions. The first study 
concluded that exchange-rate arrangements have little effect on key macroeconomic 
variables. The second found that the period of fixed rates achieved better performance 
in all respects, including real growth. However, these simple comparisons do not 
proceed with an econometric analysis to consider the independent effect of the factors 
of concern. Ghosh et al. (1997) provide descriptive analysis (means and standard-
deviation comparisons across regimes) of growth performance under alternative 
regimes in 145 countries for 30 years after 1960 and found slightly higher GDP growth 
under a float (1.7% under a float compared to 1.4% under a peg). The study concludes 
that as investment rates contributed two percentage points (p.p.) of GDP growth, then 
the lower growth under a peg must be a result of a negative productivity growth. Higher 
productivity growth under a float also supported trade growth. However, the evidence 
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is not overwhelming. Surprisingly, growth appeared to be the highest (2%) under an 
intermediate regime (soft pegs or managed float). Switching to a floating regime resulted 
to improved growth by 1 p.p. in three years. However, the study does not provide 
evidence on whether these results are statistically different from each other. Contrary to 
these findings, Moreno (2000; 2001) also using descriptive statistics, measured how 
regime (actual behaviour) affected GDP growth and volatility in two samples: 98 
developing countries and East-Asian countries, respectively, over the period 1974-1999. 
His work supports the view that real growth was higher under a peg by 1.1 p.p. and 3 
p.p., respectively. The difference is robust to excluding the periods of currency crises 
preceded by a peg and excluding the top 1% high-inflation episodes. However, Moreno 
accounts for the so-called survivor bias (he excludes sharp devaluation episodes which 
could be attributed to policies adopted while pegging) and finds that the growth 
difference between regimes significantly narrows. Both studies do not provide sufficient 
evidence that growth is an independent effect of the exchange-rate regime; in addition, 
as the growth of investment and output are opposite under certain regimes, the studies 
prescribe the result to productivity, which is the residual. However, there are no figures 
to confirm this. 
In the article mentioned in Section 1.3.3, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) 
examined the issue with a sample of 183 countries in the post-Breton-Woods era (1974-
2000), using a pooled regression. The study presents a minimal growth framework 
necessary to examine the exchange-rate-regime effect on growth, and consistent with 
both the neoclassical and endogenous growth models; state variables included account 
for initial conditions and belong to the neoclassical framework; control variables capture 
differences in steady-state levels across countries and belong to the endogenous-growth 
model. The specification can be used to explain either what determines differences in 
transitional growth rates across countries as they converge to their respective steady 
states (consistent with a neoclassical framework), or what determines differences in 
steady-state growth rates across countries (consistent with an endogenous-growth 
framework). We will return to the growth framework in Chapter 3. Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2002) used the variables listed in Table 1.2; population variable controls 
for the size of the economy, as the choice of exchange-rate regime is expected to be 
related to size. Specifically, the study tests the effect of hard pegs, explaining that 
conventional pegs (which might exhibit flexibility to a limited extent) may fall short of 
credibility and thus making the strong commitment under hard pegs necessary. Findings 
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for developing countries are that a peg is likely to be associated with slower growth; 
however, the conclusion does not hold for industrial countries. Edwards and Levy-
Yeyati (2005); Husain et al. (2005) and Garofalo (2005) use the same growth 
specification as in Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) to investigate the same issue. 
The first study investigated the period 1973-2000 over a 183-country sample and using 
de-facto classification. It found that countries with fixed exchange-rate regimes have 
had a lower growth rate, ranging between 0.66 and 0.85 p.p. per year, than compared 
with a flexible regime. The second study investigated the period 1970-1999 over a 158-
country sample using de-jure exchange-rate regimes and, differently, found that pegs do 
not harm growth nor flexible rates support growth. The hypothesis that exchange-rate 
regime affects growth is investigated by Garofalo (2005) for the case of Italy, over the 
period 1861-1998. The study used OLS and the results indicate, differently from the 
preceding two studies discussed, that Italy experienced the highest growth rates under 
some form of intermediate regime.  
Because of possible simultaneity between growth performance and the 
exchange-rate regime, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) and Garofalo (2005) use an 
IV estimator. As an instrument, they use the predicted value of the exchange-rate 
dummy from a logit model, whereby a country‘s economic size, land area, island 
dummy, level of reserves and a regional exchange-rate dummy are used as regressors. 
However, no discussion about instruments‘ strength is offered. Yet, the authors point 
out that endogeneity, if present, might be weaker for growth than for inflation 
(discussed in Section 1.3.2) with respect to exchange-rate regime, due to the general 
inconclusiveness of the channels through which exchange-rate regime might influence 
growth. The findings support the initial findings in both studies, suggesting that the 
relationship is robust to estimation allowing for potential endogeneity. The other two 
studies, although aware of the issue, do not allow for endogeneity in their empirical 
work. 
Dubas et al. (2005) regress per capita growth on a set of control variables (listed 
in Table 1.2) and a set of exchange-rate dummies for 180 countries in the period 1960-
2002. The study utilizes random-effects panel estimation. Contrary to the studies 
previously discussed, this study finds that the highest growth rates are associated with 
de-facto fixers, which experience, on average, 1% faster growth than de-facto floaters. 
However, the conclusion is statistically significant for the non-industrial countries only. 
The conclusion is robust to when exchange-rate dummies are replaced with an indicator 
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for exchange-rate stability. However, the study does not report the coefficients on the 
control variables, which is important for considering if the growth model specified is 
suitable for such analysis. Still, the study makes a pioneering approach to the issue if the 
distinction between de-jure and de-facto exchange-rate regime matters for growth. The 
evidence that such a distinction matters for industrialized countries is scarce, but, 
expectedly, some important insights for non-industrial economies are found: countries 
that de-jure float, but de-facto peg are estimated to grow at 1.12% above countries that 
de-facto and de-jure float; countries that de-jure and de-facto peg are estimated to grow 
at 0.64% above countries that de-facto and de-jure float. Hence, countries displaying 
―fear of floating‖ (as introduced in Section 2.2), experience significantly higher growth. 
However, the study does not analyse the possibility that these results can be assigned to 
factors other than the exchange-rate regime. Namely, the sample might be biased 
towards countries that have experienced currency crises, which would have led to severe 
economic outcomes. The latter in turn, blurs the relationship between the regime and 
growth. Apparently, the study does not treat the potential endogeneity bias (not only of 
the exchange-rate dummy, but of the other regressors as well). 
Huang and Malhotra (2005) examine the relationship between the exchange-rate 
regime and growth by paying attention to two aspects: exchange-rate-regime 
classification and differentiation between developing and developed economies. They 
augment the earlier approaches by considering the classification issue and achieve a firm 
de-facto classification of exchange-rate regimes. In addition, the differentiation of the 
level of development should help in considering if financially underdeveloped 
economies need a credible anchor, compared to developed economies. The study uses 
12 developing Asian countries and 18 advanced European economies over the period 
1976-2001. No special cautions are considered when constructing the sample. It utilizes 
descriptive statistics and regression variables as presented in Table 1.2; however, some 
of the arguably minimally-needed variables for a credible model are missing, which 
might lead to omitted-variables bias and, hence, giving endogeneity bias, because these 
variables could also be associated with the exchange-rate dummy (like inflation, 
population and the political indicator). Findings suggest that the exchange-rate regime 
matters for developing economies: fixed and managed floating regimes outperform the 
others in terms of growth. However, for advanced economies, no significant regularity 
is discovered. Similarly, Bleaney and Francisco (2007) pay attention to the regime 
classification. They utilize a de-facto classification, including 91 developing countries 
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over the period 1984-2001. They regress the growth rate on its lagged value, exchange-
rate dummies and time dummies and exclude high inflation periods. However, they do 
not estimate with a dynamic estimator, but with a standard OLS, although estimation in 
the presence of a lagged dependent variable using standard panel estimators yields 
biased estimates. Contrary to Huang and Malhotra (2005), their findings suggest that 
pegs are associated with significantly slower growth than soft pegs or floats. However, 
no theory-consistent growth framework is applied; endogeneity is not considered; 
robustness checks are not offered. It could be argued that this study cannot ―see the 
forest for the trees‖: it pays to much attention on the classification schemes and too 
little to other important issues. 
A different approach that opts to address the problems that undermine the 
robustness of the previous findings is carried out by Domac et al. (2004b). At the outset, 
they emphasise that the regime‘s effect on growth can not be independently revealed if 
macroeconomic fundamentals and institutional arrangements are not considered (the 
standard regressors in a growth model). Also, the study criticises the previously 
mentioned studies (and essentially all studies published on the topic) for their failure to 
capture the change in regression parameters when exchange-rate regime switches and 
hence to address the Lucas critique. In addition, as the sample-selection problem is not 
addressed in these earlier studies (since the choice of the exchange-rate regime depends 
on macro-fundamentals and is not random), Domac et al. (2004b) argue that the error 
term in a standard equation would be correlated with the regime choice and thus 
parameters would be biased. However, their findings are inconclusive. The study 
analyses the relationship between exchange-rate regime and growth with a switching 
regression. Based on the empirical results, it concludes that there is no particular 
exchange-rate regime that is superior to another in terms of growth performance. 
Although the technique seems superior over other techniques, some caution in 
interpreting the results is needed: the study uses a de-jure classification, a short time 
period (less than 10 years for the majority of countries in the 1990s) and 22 transition 
countries.  
De Grauwe and Schnabl (2005) carried out a growth-model investigation of 10 
CEE countries for the period 1994-2002. To the standard set of variables explaining 
growth (which, however, lack the initial condition; see Table 1.2), they added a measure 
of exchange-rate stability. The study takes account of the endogeneity issue by utilizing 
the GMM technique; GMM uses a full set of valid lags of all endogenous and 
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exogenous variables as instruments. This technique is superior to that used in Domac et 
al.'s (2004b) as it may create more effective instruments. Without attempting an 
exhaustive explanation of the results, this study suggests that exchange-rate pegging 
promotes growth in the CEE countries, the results being more significant than from 
studies that use all-country samples. A similar approach using a dynamic model is 
applied by Eichengreen and Leblang (2003), who investigated the issue on a sample of 
21 countries over the period 1880-1997. The dynamic panel estimator contains internal 
instruments to eliminate bias arising from possible endogeneity of the independent 
variables. The independent variables used are given in Table 1.2; averages over 5-year 
period are used; however, some of the standard-growth-regression variables are still 
missing. The study advances the issue of the inclusion of the economy in the global 
capital markets, approximating it by a dummy variable for capital controls. However, 
the study is problematic in another way: it uses a long period within which the 
international monetary environment has been subject to considerable change: the effect 
of the generalized pegging under Bretton Woods and that of pegging today on growth 
might be different (due to capital restrictions, say). Also, the sample could be biased 
towards countries that use a flexible or floating rate but are developed because of other 
reasons. The overall finding is that pegged economies perform worse than compared to 
flexible-rate ones by 5.2 to 8.6 p.p. per annum in terms of growth. These findings, 
though, seem implausibly high. 
Distinct from previous studies, Bailliu et al.‘s (2003) research turns the focus 
from the exchange-rate regime to another important aspect of the story, that is, the 
monetary-policy framework applied along with the exchange-rate regime. They 
accentuate their belief that the exchange-rate anchor is a monetary anchor 
simultaneously, thus providing firm grounds for appropriate assessment of the link 
regime-growth. On the other hand, intermediate and floating regimes might be 
associated with weak monetary regimes, which will reflect upon the mentioned 
relationship. Explicitly, Bailliu et al. (2003) assessed the impact of regime on growth on a 
panel data set of 60 countries over period 1973-1998 using dynamic GMM and taking 
account of endogeneity, and the correlation between the unobserved country-specific 
effects and the explanatory variables. Variables included are those identified in the other 
studies; these are averaged over 5-year periods. The exchange-rate regime is averaged as 
well, and grouped into pegged, intermediate and floating regime, but then augmented 
with the monetary regime: pegged; intermediate without anchor; intermediate with 
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anchor; floating without anchor; and floating with anchor. However, averaging the 
exchange-rate regime might hide valuable information about regime switches, hence 
blurring the ultimate objective and findings of the study. The study finds that if a regime 
is accompanied by a monetary policy anchor, it ―exert[s] a positive influence on 
economic growth‖, regardless of its type (p.398). On the contrary, when there is no 
monetary anchor, a regime other than a peg reduces growth. At this point, though, the 
study is ambiguous since it does not explain how a non-pegging country can have a no-
anchor policy. Even some of the implicit targeters (defined in this study as no-anchors) 
use several indicators for controlling inflation and thus might be more efficient in their 
endeavour.  
The following table summarizes the studies above. 
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Table 1.2. Summary of the empirical research of the exchange-rate regime effect on growth 
Study Data and 
sample 
ER 
classificatio
n 
Model Technique Endogeneity Result 
(Peg and Growth) 
Other 
problems 
Baxter and 
Stockman 
(1989) 
1946-1984; 
49 countries 
Only sub-
periods of 
general fixing 
and general 
floating 
considered 
Descriptive analysis Averages and 
standard 
deviations 
- NO EFFECT 
No systematic relationship 
between real aggregates 
and exchange rate system 
Unconditional 
analysis 
Mundell 
(1995) 
1947-1993; 
US, Japan, 
Canada, EC, 
other 
Europe 
Only sub-
periods of 
general fixing 
and general 
floating 
considered 
Descriptive analysis Average 
growth rates 
between two 
sub-periods 
- POSITIVE 
Considerable higher 
growth under generalized 
pegging 
Unconditional 
analysis 
Ghosh et al. 
(1997) 
1960-1990; 
145 
countries 
De-jure 
supplemented 
by 
categorizing 
non-floating 
regimes by 
the frequency 
of the parity 
changes 
Descriptive analysis Means and 
standard 
deviations 
comparison 
across ERRs 
- INCONCLUSIVE 
Slightly higher growth 
under a exchange-rate 
floating regime; 
Growth the highest under 
soft peg or managed float 
Unconditional 
analysis; no 
evidence of 
whether ERR 
affects 
productivity; 
causal 
relationships 
and the effect 
on productivity 
only assumed 
Moreno 
(2000 and 
2001) 
1974-1999; 
98 
developing 
countries 
East-Asia 
De-facto 
classification 
Descriptive analysis Means and 
standard 
deviations 
comparison 
across ERRs 
- POSITIVE 
Higher growth under a peg 
by 1,1 p.p. and 3 p.p. 
respectively in both 
studies. The difference 
Unconditional 
analysis 
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countries 
 
narrows when survivor 
bias considered 
Levy-Yeyati 
and 
Sturzenegger 
(2002) 
1974-2000;  
183 
countries 
De-facto Pooled regression; Real growth = f 
(inv/GDP; ToT; GC; political 
instability; initial per capita GDP; 
population; openness; secondary 
enrolment; regional dummies and 
exchange-rate dummies) 
OLS 2SLS to correct for 
endogeneity; Logit 
model estimated 
and predicted values 
used as instruments 
NEGATIVE 
NO RELATION 
Slower growth under a peg 
for developing countries; 
No association for 
developed countries 
 
Edwards and 
Levy-Yeyati 
(2005) 
1974-2000; 
183 
countries 
De-facto Pooled regression; Real growth = f 
(inv/GDP; GC; political instability; 
initial per capita GDP; population; 
openness; secondary enrolment; 
regional dummies and exchange-rate 
dummies) 
FGLS Not treated NEGATIVE 
Lower growth under fixed 
regime then compared to 
flexible 
 
Husain et al. 
(2005) 
1970-1999; 
158 
countries 
De-jure Pooled regression; Real growth = 
f(investment ratio; trade openness; 
terms of trade growth; average years 
of schooling; tax ratio; government 
balance; initial income/US income; 
population growth; population size; 
exchange rate dummies) 
Fixed effects 
panel 
Lagged values of 
the exchange-rate 
dummy used as an 
instrument 
INCONCLUSIVE 
Pegs do not harm growth, 
but flexible rates do not 
deliver growth rates 
Weak 
robustness 
checks; 
Classification 
issues 
Garofalo 
(2005) 
1861-1998; 
Italy 
De-facto Simple regression; Real growth = f 
(inv/GDP; ToT; GC; political 
instability; initial per capita GDP; 
population; openness; secondary 
enrolment; regional dummies and 
exchange-rate dummies) 
OLS 2SLS to correct for 
endogeneity; Logit 
model estimated 
and predicted values 
used as instruments 
INCONCLUSIVE 
Highest growth under soft 
peg or managed float 
Weak 
robustness 
checks 
Dubas et al. 
(2005) 
1960-2002; 
180 
countries 
De-facto 
versus de-jure 
especially 
Random-effects panel regression;  
Real per capita growth = f(initial year 
GDP; initial year population; 
Random-
effects 
estimation 
Not treated POSITIVE 
De-facto fixers, on 
average, have 1 p.p. higher 
No robustness 
or diagnostics 
checking. Other 
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considered population growth; investment to 
GDP; secondary education 
attainment; a political indicator of 
civil liberties; trade openness; terms 
of trade; dummies for transitional 
economies; regional dummies for 
Latin America and Africa; time-
specific dummies; exchange-rate 
dummies) 
growth than de-facto 
floaters; de-jure floaters - 
de-facto fixers grow at 
1,12% above de-facto and 
de-jure floaters. 
Conclusions significant for 
non-industrialized 
economies only. 
variables not 
reported if in 
line with theory.  
Huang and 
Malhotra 
(2005) 
1976-2001; 
12 
developing 
and 18 
developed 
countries 
De-facto Panel regression; 
Per capita growth = f(Financial crisis; 
Openness; Government 
consumption; Initial GDP; Fertility 
rate; Secondary school enrolment 
ratio; exchange-rate dummies) 
OLS Not treated INCONCLUSIVE 
NO RELATION 
For developing economies, 
fixed and managed float 
outperform the others in 
terms of growth; for 
developed economies, no 
relationship revealed 
Weak growth-
framework; no 
robustness 
checks 
Bleaney and 
Francisco 
(2007) 
1984-2001; 
91 
developing 
countries 
De-facto Growth = f(growth[-1]; exchange-rate 
dummies; time dummies) 
OLS Not treated NEGATIVE 
Growth is slower under 
more rigid exchange-rate 
regime 
Very weak 
growth 
specification; no 
robustness 
checks 
Domac et al. 
(2004b) 
10 years 
(1990s, 
different 
period for 
each 
country); 22 
transition 
countries 
De-jure Growth = f (budget balance, lagged 
liberalization index, inflation, years 
under communism, share of industry, 
urbanization, share of CMEA trade) 
Switching 
regression 
technique 
Address 
endogeneity 
―through the 
assumption of 
constant covariance 
between the error 
term in the 
structural equation 
and the normally 
distributed random 
variable whose 
INCONCLUSIVE 
There is an association 
ERR-growth, but the 
strength is different for 
different ERRs 
Weak growth 
specification. 
Small period and 
small sample; 
does not 
account for de-
facto exchange-
rate behaviour. 
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realization 
determines the 
exchange rate 
regime‖. 
De Grauwe 
and Schnabl 
(2005) 
1994-2002; 
10 CEE 
countries 
De-facto Real growth = f(inv/GDP, export, 
fiscal balance/GDP, short-term 
capital flows/GDP, real growth of 
EU-15, ER dummy) 
GLS Not treated POSITIVE 
ER peg does not reduce 
economic growth 
Weak growth 
specification. 
Short time 
period and small 
sample 
Eichengreen 
and Leblang 
(2003) 
1880-1997; 
21 countries 
De-jure Real per capita growth = f(Per capita 
income as a share of US income; 
primary and secondary enrolment 
rates; capital controls and exchange-
rate dummy) 
Dynamic 
GMM and 
IV 
estimators 
The technique 
generates internal 
instruments, but 
they also run probit 
model of the 
exchange-rate 
dummy to obtain 
fitted values, which 
are then used as 
instruments. 
NEGATIVE 
More flexible exchange 
rates associated with faster 
growth 
Weak growth 
specification. 
De-jure 
classification 
and sample 
selection; weak 
robustness 
Bailliu et al. 
(2003) 
1973-1998; 
60  
countries 
De-jure and 
de-facto, but 
the latter 
more 
important in 
terms of 
findings 
Real per capita growth = f(initial 
growth; investment-to-GDP; 
secondary schooling; real government 
share of GDP; trade-to-GDP; M2-to-
GDP; private sector credit-to-GDP; 
domestic credit-to-GDP; gross 
private capital flows-to-GDP; 
exchange-rate dummies) 
Dynamic 
GMM  
Internal lags 
generated by the 
technique itself. 
POSITIVE 
ERR exercised by any 
monetary anchor positively 
affects growth; otherwise, 
ERR other then peg 
destructs growth 
Weak on 
robustness 
check 
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This review of the studies suggests that whereas one group of studies found that 
a pegged exchange rate stimulates growth, while a flexible one does not, another group 
concluded the opposite holds. Moreover, a third group of studies came up with no 
effect or inconclusive results. This could be due to a measurement error in the 
exchange-rate regimes‘ classifications (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2002), divergences 
in measuring exchange-rate uncertainty (Du and Zhu, 2001) or sampling bias (Huang 
and Malhotra, 2005). A great part of the studies focuses on the parameter of the 
exchange-rate dummy, but do not appropriately control for other country characteristics 
nor fully apply an appropriate growth framework (Bleaney and Francisco, 2007). Also, 
the issue of endogeneity is not treated at all or inappropriate instruments are repeatedly 
used (Huang and Malhotra, 2005; Bleaney and Francisco, 2007) in many of the studies. 
Moreover, all the published studies on the topic, except one, do not address the Lucas 
critique at all. Very few studies pay attention to capital controls, an issue closely related 
to the exchange-rate regime and only one study puts the issue in the context of nominal 
anchors, but its approach remains unjustified. Du and Zhu (2001) add that results from 
many empirical studies differ among counties when the same method of examination is 
applied and even for the same country at different points of time.  
 
1.4. Conclusion 
This chapter considered the variety of monetary-policy regimes and their 
differentiation from exchange-rate regimes. It focused on ERT, whereby the exchange 
rate serves as a nominal anchor of monetary policy. Then, the literature on the 
macroeconomic effects of a fixed exchange rate was reviewed and assessed. In 
summary, there is strong empirical support that the exchange-rate regime matters for 
inflation but the empirical support is ambiguous as to whether it affects the growth 
performance of a country. At the theoretical level, there are at least three channels 
through which the exchange-rate regime might affect growth: i) uncertainty imposed in 
the economy and its potentially positive effect on investment and trade; ii) shock 
adjustment under flexible rates and its potentially positive effect on growth; and iii) the 
level of credit-market development and its potentially positive influence on productivity 
growth under fixed exchange rate. However, the overall effect of these three channels 
remain unresolved in the literature and require empirical investigation. The relatively 
few empirical studies on the issue diverge in terms of the period covered, exchange-rate 
PhD Thesis 
Chapter 1 – Macroeconomic effects of fixed exchange rate 
 
 
58 
regime classification, growth-regression used and the technique applied. Some studies 
use models and techniques which are highly questionable and it is perhaps not 
surprising that there are conflicting results (positive, negative or no evidence). Hence, 
the chapter concludes that the issue is not resolved in the empirical literature.  
However, the evidence from the chapter, gives two lines of inquiry to take 
forward. First, the inconclusiveness as to how the exchange-rate regime might affect 
growth in theory and practice gives rise to the belief that the exchange rate, similarly to 
inflation, may not be important in affecting long-term output, but rather its short-run 
departure from the long-run trend. These issues are further analysed in Chapter 2. 
Second, the chapter sketched the background necessary to develop a new empirical 
investigation of whether and how the exchange-rate regime might affect growth. This is 
developed in Chapter 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PhD Thesis 
Chapter 2 – To fix or to float: Output volatility, vulnerability to shocks and peg-exit 
 
 
59 
 
CHAPTER 2 
To fix or to float: Output volatility, 
vulnerability to shocks and peg-exit 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed how exchange-rate pegging introduces the 
inflation of the anchor country into the domestic economy. This effect has been 
supported in the theoretical and empirical literature. However, the peg‘s effect on 
growth remains inconclusive even at an empirical level. In addition, ―[t]he linkages 
among the international financial system, a country‘s exchange-rate regime and its 
domestic real and financial sectors are quite complex and dynamic, challenging our 
simple models and conventional understanding.‖ (Piragic and Jameson, 2005, p.1465). 
The assertion stems from the fact that global capital mobility increased in the last 
decade, the conclusion being particularly relevant for developing economies. This 
revives the older debate of fixed versus flexible exchange rates and, in particular, the 
unsustainability of an exchange-rate peg under increased inclusion of the economy in 
the international capital markets. This chapter looks at a second stage of the review of 
the theoretical and empirical literature, focusing on the relationship between a peg and 
output volatility and the exit from a peg. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 revisits the older debate of fixed 
versus flexible exchange rates; Section 2.3 puts particular emphasis on output variability 
and vulnerability to crises under alternative exchange-rate regimes; and Section 2.4 
further debates peg exits. The last section concludes the chapter. 
 
 
2.2. Fixed versus flexible exchange rates – revisiting an older debate 
 An issue that has long triggered heated debates in academia not least in 
empirical research from the post-WWII period is how a country chooses its exchange-
rate regime. Even today, ―debates on the appropriate exchange-rate regime for a 
country are perennially lively‖ (Rogoff et al. 2004, p.2). Two prominent studies 
considerably added towards the latter conclusion: ―The Mirage of Fixed Exchange 
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Rates‖ (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995) and ―The Fear of Floating‖ (Calvo and Reinhart, 
2002). The former highlights that fixed rates are not so fixed given ―literally only a 
handful of countries in the world today have continuously maintained tightly fixed 
exchange rates against any currency for five years or more.‖ (p.87). The latter argues 
that floaters do not really float, because they fear of the large exchange-rate fluctuations 
that might harm the economy. This section revisits the major ambiguities in light of the 
question ―to fix or to float?‖. 
Although far from consensus, a general assertion widely present in the 
exchange-rate-regime economics is that there is no regime uniformly superior over 
another; different countries have different exchange-rate regimes; even a single country 
may adopt different regimes with changes in macroeconomic fundamentals and the 
macroeconomic objectives to be attained. IMF discussions7 in late 1999 on exchange-
rate regimes came to the view that there is no simple prescription for the choice of a 
country‘s exchange-rate regime. Instead, macroeconomic fundamentals should be first 
considered along with the consistency of the exchange-rate regime with the underlying 
macroeconomic policies. Several studies (Section 1.3.2) noted and offered evidence for 
the early gains of a peg for inflation; other studies (Sections 1.3.3 and 1.3.4) opted to 
explain the exchange-rate-regime role for growth. Nevertheless, the two influential 
articles referred in the previous paragraph suggest that a de-jure exchange-rate regime is 
not necessarily long lasting and not necessarilty the same as a de-facto one and are 
further supported by empirical research that finds no role for the declared exchange-
rate regime on macroeconomic outcomes (see Chapter 1; Mussa, 1986; Flood and Rose, 
1995). In consequence, the science of international finance faces an issue which is 
complex at both the theoretical and empirical level. 
 A country that opts to peg its currency in order to impose credibility and to 
reduce inflation gives up its monetary policy. The policy ―trilemma‖ suggests that after 
capital markets became increasingly integrated and obstacles to the free movement of 
capital dwindled, a country could peg its currency but then ties its monetary policy 
decisions to those of the anchoring country; or it lets the currency float to pursue a 
monetary policy directed towards domestic considerations. However, the latter may be a 
privilege of the large and stable economies, which usually serve as anchor countries. 
Cooper (1999) suggests that with a floating exchange rate, a complete freedom in capital 
                                                 
7 Summarized by Mussa et al. (2000) 
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movements for a small, open economy which lacks a developed financial market, might 
be unsustainable. A large disturbance might hit the economy; for instance, capital flight 
because of changed investors‘ incentives or political instability. Without capital 
restrictions, this will cause exchange-rate volatility, which is immediately transmitted 
onto the domestic economy, causing nominal and real distortions. Therefore, the choice 
is narrowed down to a floating rate with some restrictions on capital movements and 
considerable monetary autonomy vis-à-vis a hard pegged rate without any restrictions 
but with subordinated monetary policy. Fisher (2001) articulates this as the ―hollowing 
out‖ hypothesis: the strengthened financial integration, while being beneficial for 
international trade, portfolio diversification and risk sharing (Tavlas, 2003), leads to 
corner exchange-rate regimes and makes any intermediate regime weak. (We will return 
to the ―hollowing out‖ hypothesis in Section 2.4). However, many economists would 
not agree. Eichengreen (1994) explains that within a financially integrated world, even 
contingent monetary-policy rules (like exchange-rate pegs) will be no longer viable, as 
they do not shield the economy from external disturbances. This returns intermediate 
regimes to fashion; the issue is returned to in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.  
The preceding discussion implicitly suggests that shocks play an important role 
in deciding which regime to establish. Namely, apart from macroeconomic effects 
which an exchange-rate regime might entail, policymakers are also concerned with the 
ability of the country to respond to different disturbances. Cavalho (2005) and Chang 
and Velasco (2000) state that a country should opt to peg its currency if it is exposed to 
nominal shocks, i.e. disturbances affecting the LM curve in a standard ISLM model 
(changes in money supply, autonomous changes in money demand). For instance, 
assume that bondholders' preferences change because interest rate on bonds becomes 
increasingly volatile and thus the demand for money increases. A peg ties monetary 
policy decisions to those of the anchoring country and subordinates interest rates to the 
world rates. In other words, a peg will decrease the volatility of interest rates. On the 
other hand, if shocks hitting the economy are predominantly originating from the real 
economy (IS curve: changes in autonomous consumer expenditure, changes in 
investment spending, changes in terms-of-trade, and so on), then a floating rate is 
preferable in order to serve the function of disturbances absorber. For example, assume 
that the terms of trade deteriorate so that exports become more expensive on the 
foreign market. If the exchange rate is held fixed, such a shock will reduce exports and 
ultimately output if not compensated by increasing productivity or government subsidy 
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measures. However, these steps could be undertaken once the effect of the shock is 
realized. If the rate is flexible, then the terms-of-trade change will result in a 
depreciation of the currency and output will not diminish. Thus, the exchange rate acts 
as a smoother of external disturbances. We will return to this point in Section 2.3. 
 Earlier approaches to the exchange-rate regime choice were related to the size 
of the economy: small economies are usually open and the fixed rate will serve them 
better, and vice versa. But, recent literature (see Poirson, 2001 as a good representative) 
goes further by grouping factors determining the choice into two broad categories: 
political factors; and ―fear of floating‖. Advocating the former approach, Collins (1996) 
explains that political instability might influence the choice of an exchange-rate regime 
by suggesting a floating rate, because the choice to peg the currency imposes a greater 
political commitment to defend the peg with unpopular measures, like higher interest 
rates, which may depress economic activity. Also, under a floating regime, exchange-rate 
adjustments are less visible to economic agents, compared to official devaluations under 
a peg. Edwards (1996) agrees that politically unstable countries are not willing to tie 
their hands by pegging the exchange rate, and by that forgo the opportunity to inflate, 
in order to create an illusion of augmented economic activity (in the short-run, at least). 
On the other hand, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) introduced the ―fear of floating‖ 
approach, according to which authorities fear that the float might hinder the economy, 
in the worst case leading to default on foreign debt and a crash of the exchange-rate 
system; and usually choose to peg their currency in the face of unhedged foreign-
currency debt, which creates large exchange-rate exposure. Moreover, small, open 
economies may also have a particular ―fear of floating‖ because of relatively high 
exchange-rate pass through into the domestic price level, as suggested by Velickovski 
and Pugh (forthcoming). Fixing the rate in such a case (implicitly or explicitly) will 
protect the economy from a massive switch from the domestic currency to the foreign 
one, thus impeding excessive exchange-rate volatility (Berg and Borezensztein, 2000). 
The latter occurs because a larger interest elasticity of domestic money demand in a 
euroized economy makes the exchange rate more sensitive to expected changes in 
money supply.  
Returning to the discussion of capital integration and aggregate shocks, it is 
probable that international capital flows make external real shocks more likely (Obstfeld 
and Rogoff, 1995), suggesting that the flexible option of the exchange rate is a more 
desired alternative today. It is argued that, by hitting the pegged rate, in turn, foreign 
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shocks augment the variance of output. These aspects are analyzed in Section 2.3; we 
will get back to the ―fear of floating‖ and the implication it might have for our empirical 
work in Chapter 3. 
 
2.3. Output volatility and vulnerability to shocks under different exchange-rate  
2.3.1. Theory and survey of evidence on exchange-rate regimes and 
output volatility 
The discussion in Chapter 1 highlighted that the core assertion of the Natural 
Rate Theory is that inflation cannot affect output in the long run. Once nominal wages 
are set, based on the anticipated inflation rate, the labour supply meets labour demand 
and the market is cleared. If the central bank eases monetary policy and inflation 
increases, the real wage decreases because the nominal one is fixed. Firms have 
incentives to increase labour demand, hence increasing employment and output. In 
other words, overly expansionary monetary policy which aims at higher employment 
might shift output from its potential level and create a short-run effect of a booming 
economy (see, for instance, Mankiw, 2006). At this point, incentives of policymakers 
and consumers differ: the former try to surprise the latter after they have announced 
zero inflation. However, this behaviour of the central bank undermines its credibility: 
workers become rational instead of adaptive in their expectations, as Kydland and 
Prescott (1977) explained, and anticipate this ―inflation bias‖. The game of the central 
bank is quickly understood by economic agents; they do not believe the central bank 
when it announces zero-inflation targets and increase their nominal-wage demands. On 
balance, in the long run, output gets back to its trend level but prices have increased. 
Hence, monetary policy cannot steer long-run output. Likewise, Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2001) state that the longer-term real performance of the economy is 
believed to be unaffected by the nominal exchange rate, similar to inflation. However, 
the theoretical survey of the literature in Section 1.3.3 and empirical studies of the 
exchange-rate regime effects on growth in Section 1.3.4 have demonstrated that the 
relationship between them, even if it exists, remains unclear. These views implicitly 
might suggest that the nominal exchange rate is not crucial for affecting output growth, 
but rather for responding to departures of output from its long-term level, i.e. for 
output volatility. However, the literature is not in agreement on this issue. Writers have 
been unclear; for instance, Moreno (2001), in the theoretical section of his study 
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explains how the peg, which imposes monetary and fiscal restraint, causes increased 
output volatility under a shock, but later in the study, he says that pegging helps 
policymakers' ability to respond to shocks and reduce output volatility, without 
explaining how and why. What is the true relationship hence remains unclear and again 
is an empirical question. 
 As we have seen in the previous section, a general observation in the literature is 
that the origin of the shock matters. Following our exposition in the previous section 
on these matters, now let us expand this argument further. If a monetary shock hits the 
economy (shifts the LM curve), then the volatile interest rates which increase money 
demand will spill over to other interest rates in the financial system. Consumers and 
firms will be deterred from borrowing/investing (binding credit constraints) when the 
rate is unfavourable and vice versa. But, as interest rates are volatile, the behaviour of 
economic agents (households and firms) will result in volatile output as well (Chang and 
Velasco, 2000). Given this, as the peg provides macroeconomic stability, it stabilizes 
output volatility caused by domestic nominal disturbances. However, the peg will not 
insulate the economy from a shock hitting money demand in the anchoring economy. 
In this case, quite the contrary, the volatility of the foreign interest rates will be directly 
transmitted to the domestic economy. 
Contrary to this, if the shock is rooted in the real economy (affects the IS curve) 
and if, in particular, the shock is coming from abroad, a floating rate will be desirable to 
smooth output fluctuations, as explained earlier. In the case of a negative real shock, 
depreciation will counteract the rise of the export prices and will increase import prices. 
If this was not the case, then output would have fallen further below its potential. 
Given frequent real disturbances, output volatility will be intensified under a peg. It is 
argued that increased capital mobility augments the exposure of economies to external 
shocks which are usually related to capital flight, conditional on changes in investors‘ 
incentives, domestic political factors or global considerations like oil shocks or even 
terrorism. Therefore, the view that a peg might be beneficial for trade and investment 
by imposing certainty in the economic environment, underscores the view that it might 
increase output volatility under aggregate shocks. In addition, Calvo (2001) warns that 
an exchange-rate peg attacked by capital flight or decline in exports must be defended 
by an increase of interest rates, which is further harmful for short-run output. 
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Another group of studies (McKenzie, 1999; Pugh et al. 1999), however, argues 
that floating rates, because of the exchange-rate volatility implied, spillover shocks onto 
output. Creedy et al. (1994), Pentecost (1993), and De Grauwe (1996) support the view 
that exchange rates are unpredictable by demonstrating that nominal exchange-rate 
movements under a floating regime may be represented as lacking in any periodicity, 
and hence as chaotic. Therefore, exchange-rate movements cannot be anticipated and, 
hence, create uncertainty in the economic environment. Moreover, exchange-rate 
movements over a longer period are argued to be no less unpredictable and to persist 
for several years (Pugh and Tyrrall, 2001). Rogoff (1999) argues that such variability 
could be transmitted into real output and consumption volatility, but in developing 
countries only. If the financial market is sufficiently developed, hedging instruments 
could serve the function of absorbers of exogenous shock, an assumption which is, as 
yet, unrealistic for developing economies. However, since long-run exchange-rate 
variability is less subject to hedging (Cooper, 2000), the absorber function of hedging 
instruments is unlikely to be that powerful for developed economies too. 
From this discussion, it follows that the way in which an exchange-rate regime 
affects output volatility is not as unclear as the effect on growth, but is likely to be 
dependent on the nature of the shocks. In general, there is a tendency to conclude that a 
peg transmits real external shocks into output volatility, although there are studies that 
argue that floating rates, since volatile, make output vary as well, particularly when the 
financial system is underdeveloped. Moreover, Moreno (2001) argues that in a world of 
sticky wages, a peg will limit the transmission of a real shock (say, a shock to 
productivity) onto output: the adjustment of the real wages and labour supply is 
delayed. Hence, again, this issue has to be observed at an empirical level; yet, the 
literature published on this is very limited; studies are summarized in Table 2.1 and 
reviewed next. 
To begin with, two studies pursue a descriptive approach. Basu and Taylor 
(1989) compared the volatility of output, consumption, investment and the current 
account under four different exchange-rate-regime periods: the gold standard (1870-
1914); the inter-war period (1919-1939); the Bretton-Woods period (1946-1971); and 
the period of generalized floating (1972-1998). They found that the volatility of these 
real-economy measures was the highest during the inter-war period: 50% higher 
compared to the gold standard. The Bretton-Woods era experienced similar volatility to 
that of the gold standard, but the lowest volatility has been found under generalized 
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floating. These results are indicative, but they are unconditional on other measures of 
economic activity or economic shocks. 
Moreno (2001) focuses on a sample of 98 developing countries over the period 
1974-1998 and calculates the average percentage changes of inflation, output growth 
and volatility under a peg vis-à-vis floating regime. However, contrary to the initial 
expectations, output volatility was not found to be higher under a peg; rather, it did not 
differ between the pegging and floating countries in the sample. Although results are 
indicative and point to the belief that the exchange-rate regime might not be related to 
output in general, there are some drawbacks to the study. It does not distinquish 
whether the category of a peg encompasses only hard pegs or both hard and soft pegs; 
yet the latter distinction may make a difference in terms of output volatility. Moreover, 
the study does not encompass other factors that might have influenced output volatility 
and thus may create a spurious impression that the exchange-rate regime is powerful: 
among others, the possibility of capital controls being imposed and their strength. The 
study excludes developed countries because ―their institutional characteristics may 
influence the interpretation of results‖ (Moreno, 2001, p.26). However, this sampling 
strategy creates two types of biasness: the first originating from the fact that developing 
countries are more prone to adopt a rigid form of the exchange rate (because are they 
usually small and open and without a developed financial market); the second that the 
sample might be biased towards countries that did not commonly experience exchange-
rate crisis. The former might blur the difference between the effect of the peg and that 
of the float on output volatility, given the dominance of peggers in the sample; whereas 
the latter would militate against the clear analysis of regime effects on output volatility 
after currency crisis.  
A few other studies have taken a deeper empirical approach. Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2001) empirically tested the relationship between the exchange-rate 
regime and output volatility on a 183-country sample over the period 1974-2000. The 
volatility of real growth is regressed on the volatility of investment to GDP, terms of 
trade and government consumption, and on measures of political instability, initial per 
capita GDP, population, openness, secondary enrolment, regional dummies and 
exchange-rate dummies, the last distinguishing among hard pegs, intermediate regimes 
and freely floating rates. Volatility is approximated by the rolling standard deviation. 
The study found that pegs are associated with greater output volatility in developing 
countries. The study refers to previous studies which might have confirmed the 
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relationship, but these are not cited, while the available literature on the topic is very 
scarce (see: Moreno, 2001; Bleaney and Fielding, 2002). For advanced economies, 
however, the relationship was found to be the reverse. The authors themselves 
ultimately conclude that the evidence of how exchange-rate regime [might] influence 
output volatility is mixed and depends on the level of development of the economy. 
Coupled with the effects of financial integration, the conclusion might highlight the fact 
that developing economies are usually small and open markets and hence more 
vulnerable to external shocks.  
Some criticisms of the approach of this study can be made. The study 
constructs the regression by reference to the literature, but does not state which 
literature. However, if the reference to the literature is the growth literature, then the 
question of whether determinants of long-run growth and output volatility are the same 
remains open. For instance, the Natural-Rate theory mentioned earlier suggests that 
monetary policy could affect the output gap, but not long-run growth. This study does 
not make this distinction. Moreover, the assumption that volatility in some of the 
production factors will be contemporaneously transmitted onto output appears too 
strong, which raises the question as to why authors do not explore the potential 
dynamics of the relationship. 
The possible problems with this study are investigated in Edwards and Levy-
Yeyati (2005), using the same sample and period, but through partial-equilibrium model 
Firstly, the study constructs a long-run growth equation, according to the growth 
literature (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995) (refer to Table 1.2). to obtain the fitted growth 
values, *jg . These are then used in the following model, outlining output volatility, tjg : 
tjtjtjjtjtj uvggg    )( ,1
*
     (2.1) 
Whereby: 
*
jg  are the fitted growth values from the growth regression (as explained in 
Table 1.2); jtg ,1 are the lagged actual growth values;  refers to the speed of adjustment 
of the growth to its long-run level; tjv  represents a terms-of-trade shock as measured by 
the change in the terms of trade defined as the relative price of exports to imports; 
tju refers to other shocks, including political ones (civil unrest used as a proxy).   is the 
parameter of interest which is assumed to be positive, since a positive terms-of-trade 
shock should amplify the economic activity and vice versa;   is also assumed to be 
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positive, since a political shouck would amplify output volatility; tj  is i.i.d. random 
shock. More importantly, the study tests how the coefficient   changes under 
alternative exchange-rate regimes, by interacting tjv  with different exchange-rate-regime 
dummies. It also specifies separate regressions for groups of countries according to 
their regime. De-facto classification is used. Feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) is 
used to estimate the partial adjustment model and indicative results are obtained.  
The main finding is that under a peg, a 10% deterioration of terms of trade is 
associated, on average, with a contemporaneous decline in growth of 0.8 p.p. Under 
flexible rates, this figure is 0.43 p.p. When separate regressions are used, the same 
finding is obtained: the more rigid the exchange-rate system, the more amplified the 
effect of the shock on growth is. Finally, no crucial differences between shock 
implications are determined if countries are observed as developing versus advanced. 
The study of Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2005) is among the very few studies in the 
exchange-rate literature that in a comprehensive and theory-consistent manner captures 
the effect of exchange-rate regime on output. Not only are the determinants of growth 
are considered, but mostly importantly, shocks are considered in an appropriate 
manner. However, the model might be augmented by other variables as a proxy for 
certain shocks and certainly include variables representing buffers. A possible critique of 
the study is the way in which output volatility is measured – double differencing of 
output – which has neither theoretical rationale, nor econometric support. This is 
returned to in Chapter 3. 
Following the widely presented argument that a peg produces output variance, 
Bleaney and Fielding (2002) are also confident that a flexible exchange rate safeguards 
output stability and test the hypothesis on a sample of 80 developing countries. The 
standard deviation of the real growth in the period 1980-1989 is regressed on a measure 
of the volatility of the terms of trade, the agricultural share, country size and dummies 
for pegged or floating rate, single-currency or basket-currency peg and regional 
dummies. This study makes crucial advancements in comparison to the above-discussed 
ones: by including the standard deviation of the annual change of the terms of trade, the 
model approximates the variation in the size of the output shocks among countries. 
Moreover, proxies for the country size and its economic structure are included to 
account for the possibility of easier absorption of an external shock. They find that a 
peg is associated with greater output volatility, a conclusion which is particularly strong 
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for CFA-franc-zone countries, but "the difference in output variance … relative to 
countries with floating exchange rates was less marked" (p.14). However, the study only 
makes a differentiation between pegs and pure floats and uses de-jure classification.  
A similar model, but using a different estimation technique and sample is used 
by Bastourre and Carrera (2004) who regress the measure of output volatility on per 
capita GDP, the same variable squared, GDP growth, trade openness, inflation 
volatility, terms-of-trade volatility, investment volatility and an institutional index. The 
regression includes exchange-rate dummies which represent de-facto and de-jure 
regimes separately. The study concentrates on the importance of the measure of output 
volatility and it uses two measures: inter-annual output volatility (proxied by the 
volatility of the industrial production which is published monthly) and three-year rolling 
output volatility, both measured through the standard deviation of the output measure. 
The study incorporates a terms-of-trade measure with the similar purpose to the other 
mentioned studies: to capture the effect of real external shocks on output volatility. 
Similarly, inflation volatility should capture the effect of domestic nominal shocks on 
real volatility. Another interesting advance made by study is the inclusion of the 
institutional setting as its level of development is argued to be a stabilizer of the real 
volatility. 
The study utilizes four estimation approaches: fixed-effects panel; random-
effects panel; random-effects panel with institutions included; and dynamic GMM 
(though, no arguments are given in support of the dynamic specification). The study 
concludes that pegs give higher output volatility than intermediate regimes or floats, 
irrespective of the way in which the volatility is measured, exchange-rate regime 
classification used or the estimation technique. In all econometric specifications it is 
found that inflation and investment volatility are positively associated to output 
volatility; in addition, in the case of three-year rolling volatility, the terms-of-trade is also 
found to be positively associated with output volatility. The inclusion of an institution 
index led to the expected conclusion: better institutions reduce real volatility. In such a 
manner, the study presents a theory-consistent and comprehensive way of treating the 
relationship between the exchange-rate regime and output volatility. Results are robust 
across the four econometric specifications and the study appropriately includes the 
sources of possible shocks and treats their effect on output volatility. A possible 
criticism to the study is the usage of dynamic-GMM versus static estimators, because: i) 
these are two distinct models, and there needs to be a discussion of the economic 
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grounds for a dynamic or non-dynamic specification; and ii) which variables are 
instrumented is an important issue, but the choice is not explained. 
A general criticism to a part of the limited number of published studies on the 
topic is that they use the rolling-standard deviation as a measure of output volatility. 
However, as it will be argued in Chapter 3, constructed in this manner, the measure 
adds persistence to the series which, if not accounted for in the estimation process, 
might lead to spurious results. This is especially the case for studies where the time 
dimension of the data is considerable, which is the case for nearly all the reviewed 
studies. This concern, at this point, could be supported by comparing the estimates in 
Bastourre and Carrera (2004) based on intra-annual industrial volatility vis-à-vis those 
based on rolling standard deviation (reviewed on p.29) – those are completely different. 
Moreover, measuring volatility as a difference is arguably problematic, since: i) it will 
not distinguish it from growth rate; and ii) double differencing (as in Edwards and 
Levy-Yeyati, 2005) has neither theoretical rationale (as giving a growth of growth) nor 
econometric support (further differencing of already stationary variable).  
The next table gives a summary of the above-presented studies: 
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Table 2.1. Summary of the empirical research of the exchange-rate regime effect on output volatility 
Study Data and sample ER 
classification 
Model Technique Result 
(Peg and Output volatility) 
Problems 
Basu and Taylor 
(1989) 
Four sub-samples 
during 1870-1998 
Only general 
exchange-rate 
regimes 
considered 
Descriptive analysis Standard deviation 
of the included 
variables 
POSITIVE 
Volatility has been the lowest under the 
generalized floating (1972-1998) 
Unconditional 
analysis 
Moreno (2001) 98 developing 
economies; 1974-1998 
De jure Descriptive analysis Average changes 
in output volatility 
under alternative 
regimes 
INCONCLUSIVE 
Output volatility does not differ between 
pegging and floating economies 
Unconditional 
analysis 
Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger 
(2001) 
183 countries; 1974-
2000 
De facto Volatility of real per capita GDP = f(volatility of inv-
to-GDP; volatility of ToT; volatility of gov‘t 
consumption; political instability; initial per capita 
GDP; population; openness; secondary enrolment; 
regional dummies; exchange-rate dummies) 
OLS POSITIVE 
Pegs associated with greater output 
volatility for developing economies. The 
opposite for advance economies 
Estimation 
technique? 
Edwards and 
Levy-Yeyati 
(2005) 
183 countries; 1974-
2000 
De facto Change of real per capita GDP = f(level of 
adjustment of the growth rate towards its long-run 
equilibrium [difference between the term stemming 
from the growth equation presented in Table 1.2. 
and the lagged actual growth]; terms of trade; civil 
unrest) 
FGLS POSITIVE 
10% deterioration of terms of trade lead to 
decline in per-capita growth of 0.8 p.p. 
 
Bleaney and 
Fielding (2002) 
80 developing 
countries; 1980-1989 
De jure Standard deviation of real output growth = f(terms-
of-trade volatility; agriculture share; country size; 
regional dummies; exchange-rate dummies) 
OLS POSITIVE 
Peg associated with greater output 
volatility 
Estimation 
technique? 
ERR 
classification 
Bastourre and 
Carrera (2004) 
45 countries for the 
regression including the 
industrial production; 
153 countries for the 
regression including the 
output as dependent 
variables; 1974-2000 
De facto and 
de jure 
Standard deviation of real output growth = f(per 
capita GDP, the same variables squared, GDP 
growth, trade openness, inflation volatility, terms-of-
trade volatility, investment volatility, an institutional 
index, exchange-rate dummies) 
Fixed and random 
effects; dynamic 
GMM 
POSITIVE 
The more rigid the exchange-rate regime, 
the higher the output volatility 
- de-facto peg increases output volatility by 
about 0.005 p.p. (intra-annual volatility) 
- de-facto peg increases output volatility by 
about 0.9 p.p. (rolling-standard deviation 
volatility) 
- similar results for the de-jure 
classification 
Not giving 
preference 
among the 
three 
estimators 
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 In summary, the review of the empirical studies often reveals a positive 
relationship between the rigidity of the exchange-rate regime and output volatility. 
Nevertheless, these results are not overwhelming, because of the very small number of 
studies and their diversity, mostly in terms of the empirical strategy applied. They 
estimate models with different definitions of the dependent variable and also important 
differences in the control variables used. Moreover, the technique of examination 
differs and checks for robustness are usually lacking. A very important aspect in all 
those studies is that they all consider a moderately-large time dimension in their studies, 
which gives rise to stationarity issues. In particular, it is known in econometrics that a 
rolling-standard deviation over an x-year span makes the series persistent (Maddala, 
2005), i.e. makes them non-stationary. Moreover, over-differencing of time series can 
lead to moving average dynamics that are not taken account of by the estimators used. 
So as well as lacking economic rationale, this practice is also statistically dubious. Hence, 
further research is needed to address the drawbacks of the reviewed studies and, in 
particular, i) to capture the sources of shocks onto the exchange rate; and ii) to consider 
the problem of the persistent series. 
 
2.3.2. Are pegs crises-prone? 
Contrary to the studies surveyed in the previous section, Klein and Marion 
(1997) put their emphasis on the effect of a long-lasting peg on output volatility through 
the possibility that a currency crisis will occur. They argue that the duration of the peg 
determines the probability that a currency crisis will happen, which then could transmit 
into output volatility and a severe recession. A peg‘s sustainability is heavily dependent 
on the current-account balance, the stock of international reserves and on the rate of 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. The probability of devaluation or exit increases 
when the level of official reserves falls, the current-account deficit widens; the inflow of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) is relatively small compared to the inflow of hot money; 
the debt burden is high and rising; and when the real exchange rate appreciates to a 
level that threatens international competitiveness (i.e. the currency is over-valued; see: 
Frankel and Rose, 1996). Aizenman and Glick (2008) argue that a severe enough shock 
will ultimately lead to costly pressure on the foreign-exchange market and a speculative 
attack on the chosen parity, causing a run on the official reserves. Defending the chosen 
parity will require spending reserves or raising the domestic interest-rate, or both. 
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Subsequently, resisting a large shock, or small, but frequent shocks over a lengthy 
period of time, will make the cost of sustaining the peg rise above the cost of regime 
change, hence leading to a collapse of the regime: either devaluation is needed, which is 
only a temporary solution if shocks persist; or a switch to a more flexible regime, which 
is a longer-term option, given the possibility that flexible rates will act as an absorber. 
But, at the moment of pressure, in both cases, soaring interest rates will depress real 
activity, while the over-valued currency will depress net-exports, hence adversely 
affecting the output. Devaluation might partially compensate these unfavourable 
developments; however, the effect depends on the timeliness of the action. Moreover, 
delayed action might even produce bank run and a sizeable disruption of the overall 
economic activity. 
Many papers opt to measure currency pressures/crises and these are 
summarized in Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2003)8. Nevertheless, two prominent papers 
particularly assess the proneness towards currency collapses under different exchange-
rate regimes. IMF (1997) utilizes the period 1975-1996 and groups currency crises 
according to the prevailing exchange-rate regime in the period before the crisis and 
defines it as a sharp change in the exchange rate. Using de-jure classification, the study 
found that half of currency crashes occurred under a floating regime. Two criticisms on 
the study are: the first, recognized by the study itself, is the ―fear of floating‖, which is 
not considered in the grouping, reflecting that the crisis could have happened because 
of using the exchange rate as a policy instrument while officially reporting a floating 
rate; the second, stemming from sample-selection bias, is that the study uses only 
episodes of sharp exchange-rate changes. The study of Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2003) 
tests whether currency crises have been more associated with pegged regimes and which 
types of pegs were more prone to crisis; an IMF-member sample is used during the 
period 1990-2001. Contrary to IMF (1997), Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2003) use the 
actual behaviour of the exchange rate and measure the crisis as sharp movements in 
both exchange rates and interest rates, so that, as we argued before, to also capture 
those attacks which were successfully resisted by authorities. Crisis is identified when 
the exchange-rate pressure index (as measured by the volume of official reserves spent 
                                                 
8 The tabulation in the mentioned study is useful as guidelines for the variations for constructing the 
exchange rate pressure index. However, at this place, no critical assessment of those measurements will 
be offered, since the issues of measuring exchange rate pressures are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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to defend the peg per month) exceeds its mean by three standard deviations. Simple 
statistical tests have been employed to test various hypotheses and these provided 
support for the bipolar view: crises proneness is lower under hard pegs and floating 
rates compared to intermediate regimes. The paper finds no difference in proneness to 
crisis across intermediate regimes, with the firm exception of conventional pegs, which 
appeared significantly more crisis-prone. Hence, what is of importance for this thesis is 
that pegged regimes as a whole have been more prone to crises compared to floating 
rates. This is particularly applicable to developing markets that are more integrated in 
the international financial market. Albeit these findings are expected, the simplicity of 
the statistical approach in the study could be contested along with the claim that other 
factors might lead to currency crises in addition to the exchange-rate regime itself, like 
the durability of the peg and its consistency with the other macroeconomic policies, 
contagion. At present, these are not included in the analysis. 
 Consequently, given our earlier discussion on the way in which different shocks 
might affect output volatility given the exchange-rate regime, it is likely that large attack 
on the peg leads to a sizable disruption of the economy, first and foremost reflected in 
output volatility and a considerable output loss (Aizenman and Glick, 2008; Frankel and 
Rose, 1996). Whereas there is evidence that ―normal‖ aggregate shocks are transmitted 
onto real volatility both under fixed and flexible rates, severe shocks are a threat to the 
peg, as they inflict reserve losses, large interest-rate increases and ultimately a currency 
collapse. At that point, the effects on the real economy becomes increasingly distorting, 
leading to severe output decline. This suggests that more conservative pegs and pegs 
exposed to shocks over a longer period are likely to end with severe output losses 
(Aizenman and Glick, 2008). Still, although the evidence seems to suggest that 
exchange-rate pegs are more prone to crises, this issue has not reached consensus. 
 
2.4. Peg exit towards greater exchange-rate flexibility – further discussion  
2.4.1. Can pegs plant the seed of their own demise? 
Given the arguments in Section 2.3, a natural question arises if pegs can ―plant 
the seed of their own demise‖ (Aizenman and Glick, 2008, p.819). Under increased 
capital mobility, the answer to this question tends to be positive, but still far from being 
overwhelming. Aizenman and Glick (2008) further argue that pegs lead to the usual trap 
whereby they deliver early gains in anti-inflationary credibility, but ultimately result in an 
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exit followed by large adverse real consequences, i.e. welfare losses to the economy. 
Nevertheless, the peg‘s macroeconomic impact in the period between the ―early gains‖ 
and the ―crisis times‖ remains theoretically and empirically weakly supported (see 
Section 2.2). However, we cannot deny that the effect on real activity might be highly 
correlated to peg‘s duration. 
For instance, Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2003) argue that majority of pegs have 
lasted less than five years, but Schuler (1999) emphasizes that some rigid rates existed 
for decades or even centuries. Klein and Marion (1997) estimated the median duration 
of a dollar peg to be 10 months in a sample of 16 Latin American economies (1957-
1990), whereas Duttagupta and Ötker-Robe (2003) estimate four quarters for 32 
economies with pegged regimes ranging from currency boards to crawling pegs (1985-
2002). But, these studies do not account for the exposure of these economies to 
international capital flows. Hence, the notion that a long-lasting peg establishes grounds 
for its own downfall could be supported by a look through the history: ERM-EMS 
currencies crisis (1992); Mexican peso crisis (1994); East-Asian currencies crisis (1997); 
Russian rouble crisis (1998); Brazilian real crisis (1999); Turkish lira crisis (2001); 
Argentinean peso crisis (2001); and so on. The cause of all these crises was a pegged or 
tightly managed exchange rate at a level which, at certain point, became incompatible 
with the macroeconomic fundamentals and increased international capital mobility 
manifested through volatile capital flow reversals (i.e. external shocks). In addition, such 
regimes have been seen as ―too costly for a government to maintain when its promises 
not to devalue lack credibility and when developing and maintaining credibility has 
become increasingly difficult‖ (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). In may cases, the 
consequence was exchange-rate devaluation or, more probably, peg exit and the 
establishment of a flexible exchange-rate system, followed by wider financial ―twin-
crises‖, i.e. crisis in both the foreign-exchange and banking system, and an adverse 
effect on output. Only as an illustration, output declined by 6% in Mexico in 1995, 7% 
in Thailand and Korea in 1998, and by more than 11% in Argentina in 2002. 
 In general, peg-exits are classified as: i) exits with adjustments within the same 
regime (for example, devaluation); ii) exits to more flexible regimes (from conventional 
peg to exchange-rate band); iii) exits to less flexible regimes (from conventional peg to a 
currency board); iv) exits to other type of regimes not comparable with the current 
regime in terms of flexibility (from peg to managed or free float, probably) (Duttagupta 
and Ötker-Robe, 2003). Although this study makes a pioneering step to grouping peg-
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exits, still their classification can be questioned as to whether it is the best for purpose. 
For instance, the first three groups are not, in essence, peg-exits (a target is still 
announced, there is a change in flexibility, but not a peg-exit per se), while the last, which 
could be treated as a peg-exit, is not thoroughly explained. From the explanations by 
Duttagupta and Ötker-Robe (2003) and Tavlas (2003), we above listed the ―famous‖ 
crises resulting in the so-called disorderly peg-exits preceded by an exchange-rate attack 
or pressure. However, the propensity towards greater exchange-rate flexibility has not 
always been preceded by severe exchange-rate attacks, resulting in financial crises. 
Although Duttagupta and Ötker-Robe (2003) talk about orderly peg exits as well, these 
still refer to those where authorities envisaged that the pressure on the forex market 
would expand into financial crises and prempt it by flexibilizing the rate before reserves 
collapsed or interest rates soared. Table A1.1 in Appendix 1 lists the exchange-rate 
crises that resulted in abandonment of the peg towards greater exchange-rate flexibility 
and the new monetary regime if the ERT was completely abandoned9. The table does 
not attempt exhaustiveness. 
 
2.4.2. Toward greater exchange-rate flexibility 
Taking on a historical perspective, countries recognized that a peg made their 
economy vulnerable to foreign disturbances and this led to the era of flexible exchange 
rates in the aftermath of the Bretton-Woods period. Specifically, during the Bretton 
Woods system, shocks hitting one economy were easily transmitted to the other 
economies that maintained fixed rates. However, since Breton Woods broke down, the 
propensity towards flexible exchange rates has been increasing. In 1972, 91% of 
countries had a hard pegged exchange rate; by 2007, this percent had fallen to 49% 
(IMF web site, 2010). A similar, but less pronounced, conclusion is derived when de-
facto arrangements are observed for all IMF-member states: between 1972 and 2007, 
the percentage of hard fixers fell from 68% to 46%, while that of intermediate regimes 
(soft pegs and managed floats) doubled from 23% to 50% (Reinhart web site, 2010). 
Figure 2.1 gives a further detail over the period on this point. Caramazza and Aziz 
(1998) argue that the shift from fixed to more flexible exchange rates has been gradual, 
leading to complete abandoning of fixed rates in the developed world and an increasing 
                                                 
9 Refer to Table 1.1. for clarification. 
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number of developing countries that embark on more flexible exchange rates, which is 
confirmed by the preceding data. An exception from this assertion is the process of 
monetary integration in Europe, but that is a rather different topic and beyond the 
scope of this study.  
 Figure 2.1. Evolution of de-facto exchange-rate regimes (1970-2007) 
 
Nevertheless, these studies pass over the fact that, excepting the EMU, there is 
no increased propensity to establish hard pegs (Figure 2.1). Hard pegs belong to the 
group of irrevocable commitment (euroization, currency board) to support the peg with 
necessary policies and institutions. Among others, Fisher (2001) argues that the peg 
might become unsustainable under increased capital mobility, unless it is in the form of 
a hard peg. Otherwise, it must freely float. ―There is little, if any, comfortable middle 
ground between floating rates and the adoption by countries of a common currency‖ 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995, p.2). Fisher‘s idea became known as the ―bipolar view‖ or 
the ―hollowing out‖ hypothesis (Eichengreen, 1994). Intermediate regimes are 
unsustainable under high capital mobility, especially for countries that commit to defend 
the peg but do not establish the firm institutional background that would require 
implementing policies devoted solely to the exchange-rate objective. Yet, evidence that 
intermediate regimes (like soft pegs and managed floats) will disappear is scarce (for 
instance, Masson, 2001), while there is some evidence that corner solutions also might 
end up with exchange-rate crises; for example, the speculative attacks on Hong Kong's 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Reinhart’s web update (2010) 
Note: The total number of countries included grows from 123 in 1970 to 157 in 2007. All countries with 
less than 7 annual observations excluded. 
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and Argentina's currency board in 1997 and 1994, respectively, and the collapse of 
Argentina‘s board in 2001 (Bubula and Ötker-Robe, 2003). Moreover, the current 
economic crisis has shown some reversion to intermediate regimes (Frankel, 2009). 
Some arguments follow the line that the corner solutions are more adequate for 
countries that are fully or relatively open to international capital markets, whereas those 
with capital restrictions find intermediate regimes more feasible. Although this assertion 
might be logical and some attempts to test it have been made (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 
1995; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2005), it is still not empirically verified.  
Partially opposed to the ―bipolar view‖, however, economies recognized the 
importance of macroeconomic policies directed towards domestic considerations, an 
assertion which is not compatible with fixed rates and capital mobility simultaneously. 
Unreservedly increased capital mobility has been the biggest factor behind the 
propensity towards flexible (but not floating) exchange rates in the last four decades 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995; Frankel, 2009). The trend towards greater exchange-rate 
flexibility has been associated with more open, outward-looking policies in trade and 
investment generally, and an increased emphasis on market-determined exchange and 
interest rates. Duttagupta and Ötker-Robe (2003) support the argument that shifts to 
more flexible regimes are associated with an increase in trade openness. Moreover, by 
their attitude towards more flexible rates, authorities directly affect the real economy: 
flexible rates are argued, but not proved to be, absorbers of real exogenous shocks and 
to steadily smooth output volatility (see Section 2.3.1). However, the literature and this 
particular study again overlook the evidence from the practice that floating rates are 
prone to overshooting and to unprecedented short- and long-run variations (Pugh et al. 
1999; Pugh and Tyrrall, 2001), which might spill over into domestic output.  
Not only does the greater openness lead to greater exposure to capital flows, but 
it might be also be a result of the economic development of the country. As the 
economy grows, it becomes export-oriented and thus more open. But, an aspect related 
to this is the idea that growing economies might not sustain their peg for some other 
reasons. Caramazza and Aziz (1998) explain that the real effective exchange rate of the 
domestic currency tends to appreciate when the economy is booming. Namely, as the 
economy gets involved in the foreign markets, the tradables sector experiences 
enhanced productivity growth, which outpaces the productivity growth of the non-
tradable sector. The process is accompanied by increasing inflation, due to the higher 
wages requested by workers in the non-tradables sector and this particularly happens as 
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a country converges to the level of development of other countries. If the exchange rate 
is pegged, then the real rate will be appreciating; and the faster the economy grows, the 
larger the pressure on the peg. Besides, inflation will be higher. This process, which 
became known as the Balassa-Samuelson (B-S) effect (due to Balassa, 1964; and 
Samuelson, 1964), has been largely confirmed in the literature. A review of 58 studies 
which were published on this topic in the period 1964-2004 can be found in Tica and 
Druzic (2006) and among these only six did not find support for the B-S effect. 
Exchange-rate flexibility would enable the exchange rate-inflation effects to be offset: 
exchange-rate appreciation will cancel out the effect of the increased inflation on 
competitiveness. For instance, between 1980 and 1996 Hong Kong, which had a type of 
a currency-board arrangement since 1983, experienced relatively higher inflation than 
Singapore which had a managed floating regime. But, the real exchange rates of both 
countries appreciated at roughly the same rates (Caramazza and Aziz, 1998). 
Following the preceding lines of argument and those in Section 2.2, the 
propensity towards greater exchange-rate flexibility does not mean that the choice is to 
tightly fix or to freely float. The propensity towards floating rates from the beginning of 
the 1970s in the developed world and the limited evidence of propensity to establish 
hard pegs (Hong Kong, Argentina, Bulgaria, Estonia and so on) or to form currency 
unions later (for example, EMS/Euro zone in 1979/1999) support Fisher‘s (2001) 
bipolar view or ―hollowing out‖ hypothesis. However, along the partial, but increasing 
inclusion in the world capital market, developing countries still have relatively small and 
thin financial markets, where a few transactions could lead to considerable exchange-
rate volatility, which could not be easily hedged from being transmitted onto the real 
activity. Therefore, managing the exchange rate is still needed (Caramazza and Aziz, 
1998). For these countries, the question is not to fix or to float, but rather a choice 
among a greater palette of flexible or intermediate regimes, all listed in Table 1.1. 
Intermediate regimes differ among each other according to the level of flexibility and 
part of those could appear under an ER target, whereas a managed float is freed of any 
target, but the central bank prevents excessive exchange-rate fluctuations. The choice of 
the level of flexibility is related to the concept of ―fear of floating‖. However, while the 
―fear of floating‖ emerges when the central bank announces a de-jure float, but opts to 
maintain a de-facto fixed parity, which is believed to be consistent with macroeconomic 
fundamentals (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002), intermediate regimes are those within which 
the currency is neither narrowly fixed nor freely floats. In the latter case, the de-jure and 
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de-facto regime coincides: flexibility is provided and the fear of floating is made explicit. 
The level of flexibility depends on the relative weight given to sustaining activity or 
limiting inflation and on the shocks hitting the economy or, implicitly, on real-sector 
effects (Masson, 2001). Along the same lines, Williamson (1999) agrees that 
intermediate regimes could help prevent misalignments and provide greater flexibility to 
cope with shocks. 
 Rogoff et al. (2004) advances the discussion by considering the greater 
exchange-rate flexibility due to increased credibility and maturity of the financial 
institutions. Albeit that financial integration affects all countries, developing countries 
still face institutional weaknesses (for example, instrument independence of the central 
bank is often contested in these economies). These in turn are an obstacle for 
establishing an exchange rate regime with considerable flexibility (like the managed 
float), except in the case when the currency is attacked and the target must be 
abandoned because reserves are already depleted. Consequently, institutional 
weaknesses could manifest themselves in higher inflation, debt sustainability problems, 
fragile and highly concentrated banking systems, all of which could undermine the 
credibility of the monetary policy. As noted earlier, credibility is accumulated by 
pegging; it decreases inflation and enables authorities to pursue credible macroeconomic 
policies. At the same time, this is a period of self-reflection, whereby pegging countries 
could learn to float (Rogoff et al. 2004). The same study introduces the concept of 
financial maturity, explaining that a shift to a more flexible regime must be founded on 
a sound financial system, which includes well-developed financial markets, institutions 
and instruments, including the foreign-exchange market, as well as access to 
international capital markets and greater trade openness. The latter in turn assumes 
boosted competitiveness on the global market and greater labour productivity (Salman 
and Shukur, 2004).  
*** 
In summary, the debate whether to fix or to float is not ended. It is theoretically 
and empirically verified that a peg helps reduce inflation quickly by imposing credible 
macroeconomic policies on the economy. However, the history of currency crises 
across the world and the limited evidence have suggested that de-facto pegs are prone 
to exhibit crises and real-economy distortions when exogenous disturbances occur, 
although the latter remains without theoretical consensus or convincing empirical 
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verification. However, the practical evidence is more in favour of the inference that 
long pegs are prone to failure when the economy is subject to large shocks. On the 
other hand, flexible rates are argued to be firm shock absorbers; they provide an 
adequate buffer against external shocks (Ghosh et al. 1997). Still, this does not reach 
immediate consensus in the literature. Flexible rates, although not prone to crises, are 
prone to overshooting and unpredictable volatility (Pugh et al. 1999), which could be 
easily transmitted to real activity. Taking into account the level of institutional and 
financial development of a country, this reasoning might give a priority of flexible over 
fixed exchange rates or vice versa. But, all these considerations require empirical 
verification, depend on the current macroeconomic state of the country and will 
probably remain a debated issue in international finance.  
*** 
The following table (Table 2.2) is presented to summarise all the views related to 
exchange-rate regimes‘ macroeconomic performance and propensity for crises 
(provided in Chapters 1 and 2): 
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 Table 2.2. Macroeconomic performance across exchange-rate regimes 
 Inflation Growth Volatility Collapse/Crisis 
F
ix
e
d
 
Enhances domestic monetary policy 
credibility and lowers domestic 
inflation by tying monetary policy to 
that of the anchor country. 
Developing economies less likely to 
be able to import credibility without 
pegging. Moreover, inflation may be 
suppressed under weak 
macroeconomic management (fiscal 
policy) and weak institutions. 
May raise trade, investment and, 
thus, growth by imposing certainty in 
the economic environment. But may 
also cause price misalignments and 
harm competitiveness by artificially 
appreciated the currency, thus 
harming growth. May also cause 
lower productivity growth, given the 
lacking liquidity when financial 
markets are underdeveloped. 
May decrease output volatility under 
domestic nominal shocks, but may 
increase output volatility in the 
presence of real (and particularly 
exogenous) shocks and nominal 
rigidities. 
High risk of speculative attacks 
against the currency, especially 
when exposed to volatile capital 
flows (which is highly realistic 
assumption in times of a financially 
integrated world). Large shocks 
might lead to the exchange-rate 
system demise. Vulnerability to 
financial-sector distress. 
F
le
x
ib
le
 
The importance of ―imported‖ 
credibility declines with stronger 
institutions (central-bank 
independence, disciplined fiscal 
policy) and financial sector maturity 
(diversified hedging instruments). In 
the majority of cases, price stability 
achieved by other monetary-policy 
anchor (like inflation targeting or 
implicit targeting). 
May aid growth due to shock 
absorbers and fewer distortions 
following real shocks, but may be an 
obstacle to growth by imposing 
economic uncertainty. 
Reduced output volatility due to the 
―shock absorber‖ function; but the 
nominal and real exchange-rate 
volatility may spill over into real 
activity, if not insulated by a 
developed financial sector. 
Low risk of currency and banking 
crises, but the exchange-rate 
volatility might cause uncertainty in 
the financial system and large 
shocks may cause exchange-rate 
and output volatility. 
 Source: Adopted and modified by the author from Rogoff et al. (2004), p.30, according to the discussion in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. 
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2.5. Conclusion 
The debate on whether to fix or float the exchange rate is still lively. The choice 
of the exchange-rate regime depends on the size of the economy, macro-fundamentals, 
but especially on the type of shocks hitting the economy. If nominal shocks 
predominantly hit the economy, a peg serves better; if real external shocks predominate, 
a flexible rate is needed to act as a buffer. In the case of real shocks, pegs are too rigid 
to absorb them and hence transmit a negative disturbance onto the real economy – 
output must fall. As an economy becomes increasingly involved in the world financial 
market, real exogenous shocks become increasingly apparent, hence supporting the 
adoption of a flexible rate to fulfill the function of absorber of such disturbances. 
Moreover, the evidence favours the inference that long pegs are exposed to large shocks 
and are prone to failure. However, although theoretical arguments tend to support the 
buffer role of the flexible exchange rate, still there is argument that exchange-rate 
volatility under flexible rate might be also transmitted to real activity, due to flexible-
rates‘ propensity toward overshooting and erratic volatility. Empirical evidence is 
unreliable though, largely owing to the limited number of studies, the measure of output 
volatility used and the econometric procedures applied. Still, at the empirical level, there 
is tendency to conclude that a peg increases output volatility, the conclusion being 
strong for crisis-periods, i.e. periods when the peg is under a severe attack. Given these 
conclusions, the issue remains an empirical problem and, along with the open issues 
from Chapter 1, will be further empirically investigated in Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Empirical analysis of  an exchange-rate 
regime effect on output growth and volatility 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 established that there is no conclusion as to whether 
and, if so, how the exchange-rate regime affects economic growth. Some channels were 
identified; however, the relationship remains unclear even at the empirical level. Albeit 
that some academics have worked to unveil this relationship, others have argued that 
the exchange-rate regime does not impinge on long-run growth at all, but might be 
important for short-run variations of output from its long-run level. The latter is usually 
put in the context of external shocks hitting the economy, whereby the exchange rate 
plays an important role of conveying these onto real (output) activity. Although, 
theoretically, more arguments support the view that a peg does not buffer against 
external shocks and, hence, that these are easily transmitted into real activity, this has 
been little researched. A few papers have tried to establish the relationship between 
exchange-rate regime and output variability, but the findings are not consistent across 
studies. 
This chapter conveys the debate from Chapters 1 and 2 to the empirical level. 
More specifically, the chapter aims to estimate the relationship between exchange-rate 
regime and output (growth and volatility) by investigating data for 169 countries over 
the period 1976-2006. This will help in establishing whether the exchange-rate regime 
matters for growth at all and whether pegs more frequently cause output variations. 
These conclusions will be the basis for further analysis of the switch towards another 
monetary-policy regime and for inflation targeting itself. 
For those purposes, the chapter is organized as follows. The next section 
reviews the major problems with the exchange-rate regime literature, on issues related 
to the empirical work. This section is the basis for the further empirical analysis. Section 
3.3 considers the data and gives a descriptive analysis; Section 3.4 discusses the applied 
methodology. Section 3.5 reports the findings and offers some discussion. The last 
section concludes the chapter. 
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3.2. Background of the empirical analysis 
3.2.1. Empirical issues for modelling 
Chapters one and two portrayed the theoretical background of the issue to be 
examined in this chapter – the relationship between the exchange-rate regime and 
output. Although the possible channels through which the relationship may work were 
established, still there is no agreement on whether and, if so, how the exchange-rate 
regime affects output growth and volatility. Empirical research has also come to no 
conclusion. This section briefly reviews problems with previous research, with the 
objective being to resolve/account for these issues in the empirical analysis that follows 
in this chapter.  
Firstly, the investigation of the relationship between exchange-rate regime and 
output depends on the growth-modelling framework employed. The growth equation 
needs to reflect recent advances in the literature, considering new insights from the 
neoclassical and endogenous-growth theories. More importantly, the growth equation 
should encompass macroeconomic fundamentals and institutional arrangements. Also, 
important concepts related to exchange-rate regime, like capital controls, need to be 
considered. A country with the same exchange-rate rigidity, but differences in capital 
controls might have different results in terms of growth. Once the theoretical 
background of the growth equation is justified, it can be augmented by measures of the 
exchange-rate regime. Robustness checks need to confirm the soundness of the growth 
framework. 
Secondly and equally importantly, the specified modelling framework should 
address the Lucas critique. Specifically, it has been argued in Chapter 1 and by Domac et 
al. (2004b) that when the exchange-rate regime changes, the coefficients in the growth 
regression are not invariant to this switch. Addressing the Lucas critique requires 
capturing this change. A brief discussion of the Lucas critique is offered in Section 
3.2.3. 
Thirdly, control variables in the output-volatility regression need to be carefully 
chosen. Several studies (reviewed in Table 2.1) consider different control variables 
capturing conditional economic convergence, nonlinearities, trade openness, size of the 
economy or the share of agriculture in the economy. However, the crucial point is to 
capture the shocks hitting the economy and their impact upon the real activity under 
alternative regimes. Therefore, estimating output-volatility models with variables that 
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represent shocks (like terms of trade, monetary/interest-rate and fiscal shocks or civil 
unrest) emerges as a necessity. 
Fourth, two measurement issues emerge in such an analysis. The classification 
of exchange-rate regimes matters. Also, how output volatility is to be measured remains 
a debated issue. A broader discussion is offered in Section 3.2.4, but this thesis does not 
opt for developing its own classification of exchange-rate regimes. 
Potential endogeneity is an important concern. Discussing inflation, Levy-Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger (2001) argued that countries with a peg constrain inflation (Section 
1.3.2), but also countries with low inflation might decide to peg the exchange rate in 
order to maintain the macroeconomic stability achieved. Thus, the estimated coefficient 
in front of the exchange-rate dummy in a standard money-demand equation might 
suffer endogeneity bias. The same applies to the relationship between exchange-rate 
regime and growth, although the argument is possibly weaker. The modelling 
framework needs also to address this issue. Endogeneity will be treated within the 
methodological section below. 
Some studies also report other problems when modelling this relationship. For 
instance, Moreno (2000) accounts for the so-called survivor bias; the term referring to a 
situation whereby, for instance, high-inflation episodes appear under a floating regime. 
For example, assume that high inflation caused the peg, which preceded the floating 
regime, to fail. However, it is inappropriate to attribute (inflation) performance during 
such episodes to the floating regime itself. This, though, might be corrected by 
excluding sharp-devaluation episodes which could have been attributed to policies 
pursued under the peg. Bleaney and Francisco (2007) exclude high-inflation episodes 
which might be also a result of incorrect policies while pegging. The latter has been 
more generally described as the peso problem, related to the episodes of severe economic 
stress that can lead to peg exit. Finally, sample-selection bias needs to be addressed. 
Previous studies usually fail to construct an unbiased sample given the question of 
interest. Some studies (Table 1.2) consider only developing countries, which more often 
have rigid exchange rates or face problems not related to exchange-rate policy. The 
hypothesised negative impact of the peg on growth in such instances is likely to be 
biased and the real picture obscured. Some other samples do not differentiate between 
countries that experienced severe exchange-rate crises and those with long-lasting stable 
regimes. These issues could be resolved by considering a large sample, but the 
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distinction between developing and advanced economies must be made (Chapters 1 and 
2); structural stability should not simply be assumed. 
No study on the relationship between exchange-rate regime and output (growth 
and volatility) (reviewed in Table 1.2 and Table 2.1) treats all of the issues mentioned 
above. This chapter will address, or try to address, these issues in its empirical 
framework, which is considered to be its contribution to the existing literature. 
 
3.2.2. Growth theory and output-volatility frameworks 
Understanding what determines growth has been long disputed among 
academicians and policymakers. Higher growth is beneficial for the overall economic 
welfare of the country, so that knowing the factors that determine it becomes an 
imperative in order to know how to boost or contain it. The root of this concern goes 
back to the classical period (Hume, 1742; Tucker, 1776; Smith, 1776), which provided 
many of the basic ingredients that appear in modern theories of economic growth, such 
as competitive behaviour, equilibrium dynamics, diminishing returns and its relation to 
capital accumulation, the importance of population growth rate, ―the effects of 
technological progress in the forms of increased specialization of labour and discoveries 
of new goods and methods of production, and the role of monopoly power as an 
incentive for technological advance‖ (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, p.9). However, 
there is at present no straightforward and simple answer to the specification of growth 
determinants, with growth theory constantly evolving. This section presents, in a 
condensed manner, the stream of thought about economic growth in order to build the 
context in which the effect of the exchange-rate regime on growth will be analysed. The 
objective is not an in-depth analysis of growth theory; a comprehensive and advanced 
reading on economic growth is Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). 
 
 Neo-classical economic growth 
To begin with, classical economists mainly focused on capital accumulation, but 
disregarded the role of technology, until the revolutionary work of Solow (1956, 1957) 
and Swan (1956) was published. A significant development in growth theory was made 
by Solow who developed a formal model, in the neoclassical tradition, that describes the 
path of important economic variables over time, such as per capita output and capital. 
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Two key features of the conceptual structure of neoclassical growth theory are 
important. First, it is based on ―the production function approach to the analysis of 
economic growth‖ (Thirlwall, 2005, p.140). That is to say, it is based on an aggregate 
production function, which expresses the relationship between aggregate output on the 
one hand and stocks of inputs and their productivity on the other. Second, the 
neoclassical model is designed to show the long-run equilibrium growth rate with all 
resource inputs fully employed and returns to capital and labour equal to their marginal 
productivity. The main outcome of this model is that the growth rate declines as the 
economy evolves toward its steady state, where income, capital and consumption per 
capita grow at a constant rate. This implies that countries with low levels of capital grow 
faster than rich countries, and so their per capita income level will converge towards the 
level of rich countries. Indeed, following the influential work of Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1991, 1992, 2004) and Mankiw et al. (1992), the conditional convergence properties of 
neoclassical growth models are well-known. The main assumptions behind the Solow 
growth model are perfect competition, homogeneous product, homogeneous capital, 
constant returns to scale, perfect substitutability between capital and labour, and 
diminishing marginal productivity of labour and capital (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). 
As a result of the last assumption, economies starting with lower levels of initial capital 
stock are expected to experience higher returns to capital and are therefore expected to 
grow faster than rich countries and to converge towards the leader country‘s level of 
income.  
In the Solow model, the driving force of output growth in the short and 
medium run is physical capital accumulation determined by the saving rate. In the long 
run, per capita output growth is entirely determined by technological progress, which is 
assumed to be exogenous in the model. In this theory, technology is treated as a public 
good, i.e. it is available to everyone free of charge. The neoclassical growth model 
predicts that, in the long run, countries reach their steady states. Countries that own the 
same technology and population growth rate are expected eventually to converge to the 
same steady-state growth rate (as determined by a bulk of control variables, as discussed 
in the ‗Growth theories and empirical analysis‘ section below), although their steady-
state levels of income do not necessarily have to be same. Thus, if technology is 
assumed to be a public good, all countries are expected to attain the same steady-state 
growth rate in the long run. 
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Models based on Solow‘s ideas have been the point of departure for most 
empirical analysis of economic growth. Some decades later, empirical research (Mankiw 
et al. 1992) acknowledged the role of human capital (educational attainment and the 
health of workers) to be equally important as the role of the physical capital. This 
research established the so-called augmented Solow model. However, since the Solow 
model by construction does not explain the engine of economic growth (technological 
progress), it assumes away what it actually tries to explain: ―we end up with a model of 
growth that explains everything but long-run growth, an obviously unsatisfactory 
situation‖ (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, p.11). Thus, an alternative to the neoclassical 
model was developed – the endogenous-growth theory, which is next discussed. 
 
Endogenous growth 
The difficulty in including endogenous technological progress in neoclassical 
growth theory, while at the same time preserving the perfect competition assumption, 
led to the modification of neoclassical growth theory by Romer (1986; 1990; 1994), 
Lucas (1988), Rebelo (1991) and others, who developed the ‗new‘ endogenous growth 
theory by making technological progress endogenous to the model. In practice, the shift 
towards endogenous growth has been accomplished through retaining the production 
function approach and the general equilibrium framework, but modifying the 
assumptions about the nature of the production function and relaxing assumptions of 
perfect competition which underpin the old neoclassical model. Most critically, in 
endogenous-growth theory, the assumption of perfect competition was replaced by 
imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale, which allow for the generation of 
new ideas. One can view endogenous growth theory as an extension to the Solow 
model, combining elements of the earlier growth theory with the assumptions of 
increasing returns; elements of imperfect competition; and some of the microeconomic 
research on science, R&D, and technological change (Hands, 2001). 
There are now a variety of sophisticated endogenous-growth theories in which 
innovation increases product variety or product quality and also considers the effects of 
general purpose technologies which constitute radical technological breakthroughs (see 
Aghion and Howitt, 1998; and Verspagen, 2004, for reviews). But these models 
generally make the above-mentioned assumptions to ensure a steady-state growth rate 
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(as determined by the control variables) and although they may have a separate sector 
for education or R&D, they continue to work with an aggregate production function. 
Although the new growth theories which seek to endogenize technological 
change are sometimes seen as the major alternative to the old neoclassical growth 
theories, there are a number of other alternatives (reviewed in Gore, 2007), which go 
further by rejecting the production function approach and general-equilibrium 
framework. These are briefly reviewed in turn. 
 
Alternative growth approaches 
These theories reject the aggregate production function approach in three 
different ways – focusing on, respectively, institutions, structure and demand. The first 
alternative theory (Nelson and Winter, 1974; 1982) relates economic growth to the 
institutions within which their actions are embedded and the economic capabilities of 
agents (firms). This approach has been developed as a critique of the micro-foundations 
of the neoclassical growth framework. 
The second major alternative growth theory (Ocampo, 2005) rejects the 
production function approach through interrelating economic growth and the sectoral 
structure of production. Instead of ―viewing the growing economy as an inflating 
balloon, in which added factors of production and steady flows of technological change 
smoothly increase aggregate GDP‖, growth is seen as a dynamic process in which some 
sectors surge ahead and others fall behind ―as part of a continuous transformation of 
production structures‖ (p.8). 
The third alternative growth theory (Setterfield, 2002; Blecker, 2002) rejects the 
production-function approach, because it explains growth solely in terms of supply 
factors of production and their productivity and ignores the role of demand in this 
process. Theories of demand-led growth recognize that, at any point in time, the level 
of utilization of productive resources may vary according to demand conditions. 
Moreover, they are founded on the view that both factor accumulation and 
technological progress are ultimately demand-determined. 
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Growth theories and empirical analysis 
Relating the characteristics of the mainstream growth theories, in what follows 
an empirical growth model will be designed. The following generic form of a growth 
model is used in the literature: 
titititi ZXg ,,,,          (3.1) 
where tig ,  is real per capita growth in economy i over period t. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(2004) suggest that real per capita GDP growth should be related to two groups of 
variables: initial levels of some variables, denoted tiX ,  (like the GDP itself or variables 
for schooling and health) and the population level or growth rate; and control variables, 
denoted tiZ , , which will reflect policy actions, institutional setting or other country 
characteristics. The inclusion of initial values of some variables date back to the Solow-
Swan models (p.88) which predict that, for a given value of these variables, an increase 
of initial per capita GDP or initial human capital per person, would reduce growth. That 
is, a richer economy tends to grow slower and vice versa. However, each economy has 
its own steady state, as determined by the control variables (rooted both in the neo-
classical and endogenous growth theory; further refer to Table 3.2); the so-called steady-
state level of output per ―effective‖ worker (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, p.517). For 
given values of the state (initial) variables, a change in control variables (say, a change in 
government consumption) might hence impinge on growth. 
A fundamental problem in growth empirics is which variables to include in the 
model. This is a result of what Brock and Durlauf (2001) call ―the open-ended theory‖; 
namely, a causal relationship between one variable and growth, suggested by one theory, 
does not exclude the relationship between another variable and growth, suggested by 
another theory. The literature (Durlauf and Quah, 1999) suggested over 90 variables as 
potential determinants of growth. However, the primary purpose of the empirical 
investigation in this chapter is not to make a contribution to growth theory or empirics, 
but rather to investigate whether and, if so, how the exchange-rate regime affects 
output. For that purpose, a minimally-specified growth model will be a tool for tackling 
this linkage, which will be sufficient to explore one-variable effects on output growth 
and volatility. However, the growth framework is not chosen randomly and it dovetails 
within the considerations specified in this section and as the text proceeds. 
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At an outset, the growth function is specified with the expected sign of each 
relationship noted in parentheses: 
Per capita GDP growth = f(initial GDP(-); average years of schooling(+); 1/(life 
expectancy at age 1)(-); government consumption/GDP(-); trade openness(+); 
inflation rate(-); investment/GDP(+); fertility rate(-); democracy index(+); 
population growth(?); rule of law index(+); exchange-rate regime(?); 
regional/country specific/time dummies)   (3.2) 
As mentioned above and as suggested by the classical growth theory (reviewed 
in Barro and Sala-i-Martin; 2004), the initial level of per capita GDP should enter the 
regression in a log-form, so that the coefficient will represent the rate of convergence of 
the economy. In addition, the other initial variables are here measured as commonly in 
the literature as the average years of school attainment (as a proxy for the human capital 
– education) and the life expectancy (as a proxy for the human capital – health). 
The list of control variables that ensure the achievement of the steady-state 
growth rate in both neoclassical and endogenous growth theory includes: trade 
openness; the ratio of the government consumption to GDP; the log of the total 
fertility rate; the ratio of real gross domestic investment to real GDP; the inflation rate; 
an indicator of the maintenance of the rule of law and an indicator of the democracy 
(the latter two as explained by the theory that relates growth to institutional factors). 
One sub-group of these variables is policy variables. For instance, government 
consumption is assumed not to contribute to productivity directly, but as entailing 
distortion to private decisions. Moreover, such distortions can reflect the governmental 
activities themselves. Hence, a higher value of the government consumption leads to a 
lower steady-state level of output and to lower growth, ceteris paribus. Explanatory 
variables also include a measure of the international openness (exports plus imports to 
GDP) which reflects the size of the economy, but might also reflect the influence of 
some government policies, like tariff and trade restrictions, on international trade. The 
inflation rate is included as a measure of macroeconomic stability. Fiscal variables could 
also be included as a proxy for macro-stability. In the same line of thinking, the 
exchange-rate regime can be considered as a policy variable. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(2004) do not directly account for the exchange-rate regime (that is not their primary 
interest), but nevertheless this could be included in the list of policy variables, since 
altering the exchange-rate regime, or passing from ERT to IT, would be considered as a 
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policy action aimed at certain macroeconomic goals (like preserving price stability 
and/or supporting the real economy and/or isolating the economy from shocks from 
abroad). Hence, in our model, policy variables will include the exchange-rate regime, 
since this is our primary concern. 
In the neoclassical growth model, the fertility rate exhibits a negative effect on 
growth, since higher fertility entails more resources devoted to the raising of children 
and, hence, lowers growth. The effect of the saving rate in the neoclassical model is 
accounted for through the investment-GDP ratio. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) 
attempt to isolate the effect of the saving rate on growth, rather than the reverse, by 
using lagged values (lagged investment ratio) as instruments in order to account for the 
endogeneity problem (this is further discussed in Section 3.4). 
Another sub-group of variables reflects the institutional setup. As a measure for 
the institutional setting two indicators are used. One measures the rule of law, which 
reflects the argument that by enhanced property rights investment and growth 
incentives are supported. The second indicator is the democracy index in the sense of 
electoral rights and it is usually included along with a squared term, which suggests that 
democratization is expected to enhance growth for countries that are not very 
democratic, but to retard growth for countries that have already achieved a substantial 
amount of democracy. Nevertheless, the effect of democracy on growth might be 
ambiguous, because some models that stress the incentive of electoral majorities to use 
their political power to transfer resources from rich minority groups found a negative 
effect. Democracy, on the other hand, could be productive as a mechanism for 
government to commit itself not to confiscate the capital accumulated by the private 
sector (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). 
The final variable reflects shocks hitting the economy. The terms-of-trade 
variable (ToT) is included through its interaction with trade openness. Changes in the 
ToT measure the effect of changes in international policies (including financial crises) 
on the income position of the domestic residents. Higher export prices will induce an 
increased inflow from abroad and will improve the income position at home, and vice 
versa. Hence, the ToT exogenously affects the position of each individual country. A 
positive movement of the ToT variable (higher export prices, lower import prices) 
would increase domestic purchasing power, consumption and hence, growth. However, 
following the discussion in Chapter 2, the ToT are not related to the steady-state 
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position, and these are usually argued in relation to output volatility, as argued in the 
following subsection. 
In conclusion, as basic ingredients of the growth function should be considered: 
initial level of GDP; human capital (average years of schooling and life expectancy); 
government consumption/GDP; domestic investment/GDP; fertility rate; population 
growth; inflation rate; rule of law and democracy index; trade openness; and changes in 
the ToT. Finally, what is of particular interest of this thesis, the growth equation would 
include a measure of the exchange-rate regimes, as a policy variable, in a manner that is 
described further in Sections 3.2.4 and 3.3.1. 
 
Output volatility and empirical analysis 
When academics examine the effect of the exchange-rate regime on growth, 
they apply a growth framework which dovetails the theoretical aspects considered above 
and empirical findings present in the literature (refer to Table 1.2). However, when the 
output-volatility framework is observed, then many differences appear (refer to Table 
2.1). Moreover, the empirical research on the linkage between output volatility and the 
exchange-rate regime is very limited. This could be due to there being no consensual 
theory of output volatility per se; academics usually view this issue as merely practical. 
However, what is consensual in this very limited literature is that output volatility has to 
do with shocks. Changes in money demand, fiscal stance or changes in the terms of trade 
as a result of external factors or even civil unrest in the country would impinge on the 
real economy in the way elaborated in Chapter 2. ―Employment and output fluctuations 
inevitably relate to shocks and to the manner in which the economy copes with those 
shocks‖ (Easterly et al. 2001, p.8). However, what is of particular importance to this 
thesis is how these shocks affect the real economy under alternative exchange rate 
regimes; namely, different regimes are argued to channel differently the various shocks 
to the real economy. 
Following the works of Mundell (1968) and Poole (1970), many economists still 
believe that the relative merits of exchange-rate regimes depend on the nature of shocks 
that hit the economy. When shocks come from the domestic money market, fixed 
regimes automatically prevent them from affecting the real economy. In the event of a 
positive demand shock (i.e. an increased demand for money that, ceteris paribus, raises the 
interest rate), the money supply will increase as the monetary authority buys foreign 
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reserves to prevent the appreciation of the local currency and real output is left 
unchanged. On the other hand, flexible regimes require income to fall (via currency 
appreciation effect on net export) so that real money demand is reduced back to the 
unchanged level of real money supply. Therefore, if nominal shocks predominate in the 
economy, this is an argument in favour of fixed regimes. 
However, when shocks are mostly real, floats are, theoretically, the more 
effective choice. Indeed, one of the most important benefits commonly attributed to 
free-floating exchange-rate regimes is that they allow smooth adjustment to real 
aggregate shocks. When domestic prices are sticky and thus change at best slowly in 
response to shocks, a negative real shock (say, a fall in export demand or in the terms of 
trade) leads to a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. This depreciation in the 
exchange rate, in turn, reduces the relative price of tradable goods at precisely the 
moment when demand for them has fallen and therefore partially offsets the effect of 
the negative shock. Furthermore, the nominal depreciation increases the domestic price 
of the export good exactly when its foreign price has fallen, also helping the economy to 
have a smoother adjustment. That is, the exchange rate acts as an automatic stabilizer in 
(managed) floating regimes. These issues were broadly discussed in Chapter 2. A second 
channel through which floats are able to smooth shocks is the freedom they give to 
pursue an independent monetary policy (refer to Chapter 1). In the presence of real 
negative shocks, governments would like to be able to respond to alleviate the 
recession. Under flexible rates, the country can respond by means of a monetary 
expansion. Under fixed rates, any injection of money would imply an outflow of 
reserves and no effect on output. 
However, while almost all studies reviewed in Table 2.1 include shock variables, 
the differentiation between real and nominal shocks is neglected. Hence, a well-
specified output-volatility regression should make this differentiation. Next, studies 
suggest incorporating variables representing buffers against the shocks. Easterly et al. 
(2001), for instance, suggest including trade openness, an indicator of financial 
deepness, price volatility and an indicator of political instability in the output-volatility 
regression. Mobarack (2001) suggests taking an even broader list of variables, among 
which are those present in the growth regression, plus, for example, the Gini 
coefficient, tax revenues, real-exchange-rate volatility, credit to the private sector and 
war participation. However, his suggestion is not backed by solid explanations of why 
these variables could potentially affect output volatility. Nevertheless, in general, those 
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suggested variables could be thought of as representing certain shocks or reflecting the 
responsiveness of different economies to shocks, which is again in line with the 
preceding discussion. Focusing on the exchange-rate regimes literature, one group of 
academics (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2001; Bastourre and Carrera, 2004) uses the 
volatilities of the same explanatory variables as in the growth regression, though again 
these are not backed by rationales for their inclusion; Bleaney and Fielding (2002) use 
some variables to capture the country size and agriculture share, since these are 
important buffers when a shock hits the economy; Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2005) 
estimate the growth vector and use its residual in the output-volatility regression to 
measure the speed of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium, along with some 
variables representing shocks. However, they measure the output volatility through 
differencing the growth series, as in a standard autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) 
model, which might be contested. They find a positive sign in front of the lagged 
adjustment mechanism, ranging between 0.75 and 0.80 and suggesting a relatively fast 
restoration of the equilibrium once a shock hits. Thus, in summary, although different 
studies consider different regressors in the output-volatility regression, it is generally 
accepted that the model must contain variables representing shocks and variables 
representing buffers, but there is little agreement on what else should be included. 
Hence, following these contemplations we include money-growth and government-
consumption volatility as nominal policy shocks; TOT changes as a real shock; and civil 
unrest as a political shock. We also follow the suggestion of Kose et al. (2005) and 
Easterly et al. (2001) and we add per capita GDP growth and a measure of financial 
development, as these may act as buffers when a shock hits the economy.  
We further include a variable for trade and financial openness, to reflect the 
extent of integration of the economy into global trade and capital markets. Easterly and 
Kraay (2000) argue that the level of financial development may matter little if firms in 
the country have easy access to credit abroad. Hence, a high degree of international 
trade and financial integration could also play a buffer role and smooth the output 
fluctuations. However, while high degrees of openness of the capital account could 
serve to smooth the adjustment of a country to a shock, it may also expose it to another 
adverse source of dynamic reaction and, in essence, may measure the economy‘s 
vulnerability to an external shock. Investors, observing the weakening condition of 
firms and financial institutions within the country in response to a shock, may decide to 
pull their (short-term) money out of the country and put it elsewhere, thus further 
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weakening both firms and financial institutions (e.g. by further weakening the currency) 
and possibly inducing a crisis. A negative shock to the capital account will have adverse 
effects on the terms at which firms can get access to funds and may be exacerbated by 
the presence of credit rationing. The increased uncertainty about different firms‘ 
balance sheets, caused by the economic disturbance, may lead to a greater prevalence of 
credit rationing and to further contractions in demand, as firms attempt to increase their 
liquidity. 
Inflation and wage growth need to be included in the regression to account for 
the traditional explanation of output fluctuations by downward nominal rigidities 
(Newbery and Stiglitz, 1982). Namely, rigid real wages provided an easy explanation of 
unemployment — a decrease in the demand for labour immediately turns into 
unemployment (lower output), because real wages are rigid and fail to equilibrate the 
market. The reduction in the demand for labour could be explained by the falling 
demand for goods, in itself explained by rigidities in intertemporal prices. 
Consequently, in the regression we include: policy, external and political shock 
variables, variables representing buffers, openness, price rigidities and the exchange-rate 
regime, given the literature and the concerns of this thesis; interaction terms are also 
included, in order to measure whether, under real and nominal shocks respectively, 
output reacts differently depending on the exchange-rate regime. On that basis we 
proceed with the empirical investigation in this chapter. Differently from Edwards and 
Levy-Yeyati (2005), we carefully discuss the basis of and investigate different definitions 
of the output-volatility measure, include actual growth instead of a growth-residual and 
add more shock variables that theoretically can be considered to have a role. 
The empirical model with the expected signs of the regressors is: 
Output volatility = f(terms-of-trade volatility(+); money-supply volatility (+); 
gov’t consumption volatility(+); civil unrest(+); GDP per capita growth(-); 
financial development(-); trade and financial openness(+); inflation(+); wage 
growth(+); exchange-rate regime(?); exchange-rate regime*TOT volatility; 
exchange-rate regime*money volatility; exchange-rate regime*government-
consumption volatility; regional/country specific/time dummies)  (3.3) 
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3.2.3. The Lucas critique – A revisit 
The Lucas (1976) critique of econometric policy evaluation argues that it is 
inappropriate to estimate econometric models of the economy in which endogenous 
variables appear as unrestricted functions of exogenous or predetermined variables. In 
Lucas own words, ―[E]ven to obtain the decision rules … we have to attribute to 
individuals some view of the behaviour of the future values of variables of concern to 
them. … To assume stability of [the exogenous or predetermined variables] under 
alternative policy rules is thus to assume that agents‘ views about the behaviour of 
shocks to the system are invariant under changes in the true behaviour of these shocks‖ 
(p.111). Instead, expectations about future policy actions should be considered and 
affect current decision-making; this view revived and brought into prominence the 
theory of rational expectations. He argues that expectations about the future are highly 
important to economic decisions made by households and firms today. But, contrary to 
adaptive expectations, rational expectations are genuinely forward-looking (Li, 2008). 
The rational expectations hypothesis means that agents exploit available information 
without making the systematic mistakes implied by earlier theories. Expectations are 
formed by constantly updating and reinterpreting this information. 
The objective of this thesis is not to explore the Lucas critique per se, but instead 
to take it into consideration. As argued in the preceding chapters, changing the 
exchange-rate or monetary regime (rule), implies that model‘s parameters might change 
as a result of the arguments of Lucas. The econometric work pursued (Section 3.5.1) 
thus needs to incorporate the Lucas critique. In order to account for the Lucas critique, 
we use interaction terms of all independent variables with the dummies representing the 
exchange-rate regimes. In such a specification, the significance of the estimated 
coefficients in front of the interaction terms will indicate if and how parameters change 
when the exchange-rate regime switches. 
 
3.2.4. Exchange-rate regimes classification and output-volatility measures 
Two influential articles in the literature (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; Levy-Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger, 2005) consider an issue that has been ever since treated as trivial: the 
classification of exchange-rate regimes. Namely, the majority of studies employ the 
classification schemes by the IMF, which are based on what countries report and not on 
the actual behaviour of the exchange rate. In practice, by law, a country could pursue a 
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pegged regime, but in practice could allow certain flexibility, in order to, say, support 
the real economy. This is only one example; other combinations are also possible. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) (hereafter RR) made a pioneering inroad into this issue by 
measuring the actual behaviour of the nominal exchange rate. Moreover, in their study 
they account for the existence of dual foreign-exchange markets and for related factors, 
like exchange controls and currency reforms. By applying the classifying algorithm (p.14 
in their study), they identify 14 options for exchange-rate regime, applied to 227 
countries 10 for the period 1940-2007. This fine-tune classification is then generalized 
into 5 groups (fixed, limited-flexible, flexible, free-floating and free-falling). The 
following fine groups were identified: 
Table 3.1. Classification categories of the exchange-rate regimes, 
according to Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
Classification category Number 
assigned to the 
category (fine) 
Number 
assigned to the 
category (coarse) 
   
No separate legal tender 1 1 
Pre-announced peg or currency board arrangement 2 1 
Pre-announced horizontal band that is narrower than or 
equal to ±2% 
3 1 
De facto peg 4 1 
Pre-announced crawling peg 5 2 
Pre-announced crawling band that is narrower than or 
equal to ±2% 
6 2 
De facto crawling peg 7 2 
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to 
±2% 
8 2 
Pre-announced crawling band that is wider than ±2% 9 3 
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to 
±5% 
10 3 
Moving band that is narrower than or equal to ±2% (i.e., 
allows for both appreciation and depreciation over time) 
11 3 
Managed floating 12 3 
Freely floating 13 4 
Freely falling (includes hyper-float) OTHER OTHER 
Dual market in which parallel market data is missing OTHER OTHER 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
Note: By contrast to the common crawling bands, a non-crawling band refers to the relatively few 
cases that allow for both a sustained appreciation and depreciation of the exchange rate over time. 
While the degree of exchange-rate variability in these cases is modest at higher frequencies (i.e., 
monthly), lower frequency symmetric adjustment is allowed for. 
                                                 
10 However, some of those no longer exist. 
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Although very influential and prominent, this procedure does not account for 
the behaviour of foreign-exchange reserves, which could be considered as its main 
drawback. This is due to the notion that under a peg, reserves exhibit increased 
volatility; the lower the exchange-rate rigidity, the lower the need for foreign-exchange 
intervention. As such, foreign-exchange reserves interventions would signal government 
commitment to maintain the peg. However, the authors dispute this drawback by 
emphasizing the widespread switch from intervention based on reserves to intervention 
based on interest-rate changes; though, data on the latter are also difficult to obtain. On 
the other hand, although measures of capital controls have not been directly accounted 
for, the authors argue that the data show that the black market premium becomes 
insignificant with capital market integration and hence could be considered as a measure 
for the ―size‖ of the capital controls imposed. Hence, the latter are implicitly taken into 
account when de-facto classifying the exchange-rate regimes. This also accounts for the 
possibility that a country with the same exchange-rate rigidity, but differences in capital 
controls, might have different results in terms of growth. 
The other important paper, by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) (hereafter 
LYS), utilizes cluster analysis (p.4) in order to de-facto classify regimes for 119 countries 
over the period 1974-200411. Before forming clusters of similar regimes, the authors use 
three measures to define the regime: nominal exchange-rate changes; volatility of 
nominal exchange-rate changes; and the volatility of international reserves. The idea 
behind this is that countries with a volatile nominal rate and stable reserves are classified 
as floaters, while those with stable nominal rates and volatile reserves are fixers. 
Although the approach considers foreign-exchange reserves behaviour into the 
classification of exchange-rate regimes, it does not account for the existence of capital 
controls or currency reforms. The approach of LYS identifies four regimes (flexible, 
dirty float, crawling peg and fixed) and one ―inconclusive‖ group, which, compared to 
the RR approach, is a small number of identified groups. A drawback of this method is 
that countries which do not exhibit considerable volatility in either variable are classified 
as inconclusive. While the authors present a solid theoretical argument for the 
inconclusive group, it decreases the sample size and the variance of the data, which 
might reduce its usefulness in regression. Moreover, classification is to an extent vague, 
                                                 
11 However, data are missing for a lot of years. On the other hand, in the RR classification, the missing 
fields are related to the non-existence of the state in that period or similar reasons. 
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since it does not distinguish well between a dirty float and crawling peg. On the other 
hand, having in mind that RR account for capital controls (which might be of crucial 
interest when measuring the macroeconomic effect of a particular exchange-rate regime 
– see Chapters 1 and 2); use 14 and 5 categories of de-facto regimes; come up with an 
exhaustive set of data, in terms of time-span and country-coverage; and the idea that the 
purpose of this thesis is not to classify the exchange rate regimes; the empirical work 
will continue by using the RR de-facto classification, as specified in Table 3.1.  
For the sake of comparison with the previous literature, the empirical part will 
also present the results from de-jure classification, as specified by the IMF, which 
classifies the exchange-rate regime on the following scale: fixed; limited flexibility; 
managed float; and free float.  
Another, at first sight a trivial issue, is the measure of output volatility. Various 
measures have been proposed in the literature. Some authors (Ramey and Ramey, 1995) 
use the standard deviation in the annual GDP growth rate. However, Gavin and 
Hausman (1996) define real volatility as the standard deviation of GDP level. Some 
other authors (such as Pritchett, 2000) suggest taking higher order measures, like the 
standard deviation of the first difference in the annual GDP growth rates. Bastourre 
and Carrera (2004) use the rolling standard deviation of per capita GDP (level and 
growth) over 5-year periods as a proxy to output volatility. However, if this 
methodology is applied to annual-level data, then two general problems are apparent 
with using a rolling standard deviation: i) it will add persistence to the series, i.e. will 
make it an autoregressive process (Maddala, 2005); and ii) it tends to generate 
oscillations – the so-called Yule-Slutsky effect (Bartholomew and Bassett, 1971). More 
importantly for this thesis, iii) significant information regarding the switching from one 
exchange-rate regime to another could be lost. In consequence, the rolling standard 
deviation has significant drawbacks and in this thesis will be used only for the purpose 
of comparison. Regrettably, most of the published literature on the relationship 
between exchange-rate regime and output volatility (Table 2.1) uses this measure. An 
exception is the study of Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2005) who define output volatility 
as the growth of the GDP per capita growth, which is likely to be without theoretical 
and econometric support. 
In Chapter 2, we argued that if the exchange-rate regime is not relevant for 
long-run growth, then it might be relevant for its short-run departure from the potential 
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long-run growth assumed to be determined by fundamentals, which implicitly suggests 
defining output volatility as the output gap. In this thesis, besides defining (for purposes 
of comparison) output volatility as the rolling standard deviation of the annual GDP 
growth over 5-year periods, we advance the issue by considering two other measures: i) 
output volatility defined as the difference between the actual per capita GDP growth 
and the long-run trend (average growth rate over the period); and ii) output volatility 
defined as a difference between the actual per capita GDP growth and the potential per 
capita GDP growth derived by Hodrick-Prescott filtering. Both measures should 
approximate how far the economy is pushed (heated or depressed, usually by external 
or policy shocks) away from its long-run level assumed to be defined by the 
fundamentals. However, since the first measure assumes that the long-run equilibrium 
growth rate is constant, we focus on the HP-based measure. The purpose of using both 
definitions is to investigate whether a different measure of output volatility changes the 
results significantly. 
 
3.3. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.3.1. Data issues 
We matched the countries of the RR classification (227) with the IMF member 
states (185) and obtained data for 169 countries. Given that the total GDP of these 
countries in 2006 accounts for 95.1% of the world‘s GDP12, they represent a sufficient 
country-set in order to offset concerns about sample-selection bias. The empirical 
investigation will deal with the post-Bretton-Woods monetary/exchange-rate era, hence 
covering the period 1976-2006. The variables used and their sources are fully described 
in Table 3.2 on p.120. The provider for most of the data is the IMF; educational-
attainment and life-expectancy variables are obtained from the World Bank; the fertility 
rate is obtained from the United Nations; the democracy index and the index of civil 
liberties are provided by Freedom House, which, as a source, might be contested, but 
no comparable alternative is presently available. 
For the definitions of the growth-regression variables, we follow Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (2004) and Section 3.2.2. An exception is the variable measuring the rule of 
law; this variable could be obtained only with considerably high monetary cost and, 
                                                 
12 According to IMF‘s World Economic Outlook. 
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since it is not of our primary interest, we do not include it. For the definitions of the 
output-volatility variables, we follow the notions in Section 3.2.2. The series on the 
standard deviation of the annual GDP (level and growth rate) are estimated from the 
GDP series as a rolling standard deviation over 5-year periods, while the series on the 
output gap is approximated by the absolute values of: i) the deviation of each 
observation from the average growth rate and ii) the deviation of each observation from 
the filtered growth rate obtained by the Hodrick-Prescott method. 
In order to account for the Lucas critique as described in Section 3.2.3, we use 
interaction terms of all independent variables with the dummies representing the 
exchange-rate regimes. In such a specification, the significance of the estimated 
coefficients in front of the interaction terms will indicate if and how parameters change 
when the exchange-rate regime switches. 
In order to account for potential survivor bias (the peso problem), as defined in 
Section 3.2.1, we will exclude the high-inflationary episodes. Some studies and 
textbooks (Fuhrer et al. 2009; Baumol and Blinder, 2006; Poulson, 1994) define high 
inflation as within the range of 30-50% per year. Hence, we will exclude all years where 
the inflation rate exceeds 30%. In order to account for the monetary integration in 
Europe (the common currency and the ERM-2 as its predecessor), we use a dummy for 
all 12 countries in the period 1991-2006 13; this is done because the common currency in 
Europe might follow a different pattern in terms of growth and output volatility as 
compared to a country that unilaterally adopted another-country‘s currency (such as 
Montenegro or Ecuador). We define regional dummies, which along with all remaining 
dummies are described in Table A2.1 in Appendix 2 and follow from the discussion in 
the preceding sections. 
 
3.3.2. Descriptive analysis 
This section portrays a simple descriptive analysis of output-growth and 
volatility performance under alternative exchange-rate regimes and classifications. We 
present the outcomes for the two regime classifications: de-facto (RR) and de-jure 
(IMF). This analysis does not discover causal relationships and its aim is not to do so, 
but rather to inform expectations about the issues treated herein. 
                                                 
13 However, with minor adjustments in terms of when these countries joined or left ERM-2. 
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The growth rates by the RR classification (Table A1.2 in Appendix 1) span from 
2.1% in the flexible-regime category to 2.7% in the limited-flexibility category (free-
falling category excluded). While the growth rate in the IMF classification spans from 
1.8% for fixers to 2.6% for flexible regimes. Table A1.2 in Appendix 1 and Figure 3.1 
below suggest that, nevertheless, it could not be inferred that a certain exchange-rate 
regime is superior over another in terms of output growth, particularly within the de-
facto classification.  
Figure 3.1. Growth performance under different exchange-rate regimes 
and under two classification schemes (averages 1976-2006) 
 
A different picture emerges when the exchange-rate regimes are put in the 
context of the level of development of the countries in the sample. The latter are 
observed on advanced and developing economies, according to the specification in 
Appendix 2. Table A1.3 and Figure 3.2 (left panel) suggest that within the de-facto (RR) 
classification, there are apparent differences: the growth rates of advanced economies 
do not much vary across exchange-rate regimes, although it is the highest under the 
fixed regime; for the developing economies, the variance gets larger: lower growth is 
experienced by flexible-rate countries, followed by fixers. The highest growth is 
observed with limited-flexible-regime countries. The de-jure (IMF) classification in 
Figure 3.2 (right panel) portrays a different picture. Growth-differences among 
exchange-rate regimes are again not considerable for advanced economies, as in the RR 
classification. However, for developing economies, fixers exhibit a considerably lower 
Source: Calculations based on figures from International financial statistics and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
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average growth, the flexible-rate countries being the best in terms of growth, but still 
similar to limited-flexible-rate ones. This conclusion of the comparative analysis is 
expected, bearing in mind that larger differences are apparent between the exchange-
rate policy pursued and the one reported to the IMF within the developing-economies 
group. This observation strengthens the need to rely on the de-facto classification, as 
argued in Section 3.2.4. 
Figure 3.2. Growth performance under different exchange-rate regimes, 
depending on countries’ level of development (averages 1976-2006) 
 
Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 convey the descriptive analysis on the output volatility 
under different exchange-rate regimes. We observe three volatility measures, according 
to the discussion in Section 3.2.4. However, although preference was given among these 
three measures, they all suggest that, within the de-facto classification, output volatility 
appeared the lowest under limited-flexible exchange-rate regime and the highest under 
the free-floating regime. Fixers are ranked second and flexible regimes third, but the 
discrepancy almost disappears when the output volatility is measured as the difference 
of the actual growth from the HP-filtered growth. The HP-output volatility is generally 
lower than the other two measures, and the linear-trend one is generally lower than the 
rolling-SD output volatility (see Table A1.4 in Appendix 1). The de-jure classification 
(Figure 3.3, right panel) reveals a different picture. Output volatility is negligibly 
different among the four categories. These discrepancies between the de-jure and the 
de-facto classification point to an important source of divergent results among previous 
studies (see Table 2.1). 
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Figure 3.3. Output-volatility performance (three measures) under 
different exchange-rate regimes, (averages 1976-2006) 
 
Figure 3.4 below and Table A1.5 in Appendix 1 advance the analysis by 
differentiating countries between developing and advanced. In advanced economies, 
under the de-facto classification (upper panel) all three measures point to no-differences 
in output volatility as the regime becomes more flexible. Within the same classification, 
however, developing economies reveal a different picture. Firstly, the general level of 
output volatility is higher in developing economies, but declines going from the SD-
based measure to the linear-trend-based measure to the HP-based measure. In all three 
measures, output volatility is the lowest under the limited-flexible regime and the 
highest under the floating regime. Fixers are second-ranked, but output volatility under 
a peg does not considerably differ from the one under a flexible regime. Observing the 
de-jure classification (lower panel), output volatility is generally lower and nearly the 
same under different exchange-rate regimes, but still lower under limited-flexible and 
floating regimes for the advanced economies. However, for the developing economies, 
contrary to the de-facto observations, the highest output volatility is noted under 
limited-flexible regime, and the lowest under fixed and flexible exchange-rate regime. 
Almost no difference is noted under fixed vis-à-vis flexible regime within the de-jure 
classification. 
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Figure 3.4. Output-volatility performance (three measures) under 
different exchange-rate regimes, (averages 1976-2006) 
In conclusion, the descriptive analysis of growth and volatility performance 
under alternative exchange-rate regimes points to no straightforward expectation for 
links between the exchange-rate regime and either output growth or output volatility. 
Nevertheless, the level of development of the economy and the exchange-rare-regime 
classification appear to make considerable differences, especially for the output-volatility 
considerations, and this should be investigated further in the empirical investigation. 
Source: Calculations based on figures from International financial statistics and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
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3.4. Methodology 
3.4.1. Addressing endogeneity 
The preceding sections discussed how the outlined issues will be addressed 
within the empirical investigation in this chapter. What remains to be addressed is the 
endogeneity problem. An explanatory variable is said to be endogenous if it is correlated 
with the error term. Endogeneity bias might arise because of omitted variables, 
measurement error, simultaneity or the presence of a lagged dependent variable 
(Wooldridge, 2002). The first three of these are discussed in the current sub-section and 
the latter in the following sub-section. 
Endogeneity because of omitted variables appears when there is a need to 
control for variables, but these are not included in the empirical model, either because 
they are unavailable or because they are unintentionally left out of the analysis. The 
estimates will be biased if the excluded variable is correlated with included variables. In 
the estimations in this chapter the variable of most concern is the exchange-rate regime. 
Chapter 1 suggested that the number of variables which are assumed to be highly 
correlated to the exchange-rate regime are very few: inflation, trade volume, investment 
and population. These variables are included in the growth regression and consequently, 
there are no theoretical grounds to expect that endogeneity bias could arise because of 
omitting a variable that might be correlated to the exchange-rate-regime dummies. 
Endogeneity because of measurement error arises when we want to measure the 
effect of the exchange-rate regime over growth, but we have an imperfect measure of 
the exchange-rate regime. The error term would suffer endogeneity bias because it will 
contain the measurement error as well. Section 3.2.4 discussed the issue of the 
measurement of the exchange-rate regime and argued for a preferred measure, but the 
results using both measures are given here for comparison. 
Endogeneity because of simultaneity arises when at least one of the explanatory 
variables is determined simultaneously along with the dependent variable. Part of the 
literature suggests that the relationship between exchange-rate regime and growth might 
be simultaneous. Thus, this type of endogeneity might be present in the overall growth 
regression and, hence, needs to be taken account of in estimation. 
However, the exchange-rate literature is not agreed over the exchange-rate 
regime effect on growth nor does the growth literature associate its choice with growth 
PhD Thesis 
Chapter 3 – Empirical analysis of an excnahge-rate regime effect on output growth and volatility 
 
 110 
performance. Hence, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) believe that this problem 
should be relatively minor. Eichengreen and Leblang (2003), however, run a probit 
regression whereby they regress the choice to peg on a set of explanatory variables: 
trade openness; country size; inflation; GDP per capita; and some political indicators. 
They find that the majority of these variables are significant in terms of affecting the 
probability to choose a fixed exchange-rate regime. In consequence, the study suggests 
that the exchange-rate regime should be treated as endogenous and the failure to do 
that ―is likely to confound efforts to identify the impact of the exchange-rate regime on 
growth‖ (p.810). Regarding the output-volatility regression, endogeneity of the 
exchange-rate regime might be less of an issue, albeit that deciding the exchange-rate 
policy based on the output fluctuations is theoretically plausible. However, other 
relationships would appear to dominate the policy agenda and so this issue is not 
pursued. 
Because endogeneity, arising mainly because of simultaneity, is/might be of 
concern within the growth-, output-volatility and exchange-rate literature, it will be 
extensively treated in this thesis. The next section discusses both the final possible 
source of endogeneity and the estimation technique which will be used to address the 
problem. 
 
3.4.2. Instrumental-variables and dynamic panel techniques 
Endogeneity, as defined in Section 3.4.1, causes inconsistency of the usual OLS 
estimates and requires the use of instrumental variables to correct it. An instrumental 
variable (IV) is highly correlated with the regressor (which is assumed to be 
endogenous), but is not correlated with the error term (Wooldridge, 2007). Two 
general14 IV estimation techniques were developed to correct the endogeneity bias: two-
stage least squares (2SLS) and the generalized method of moments (GMM) techniques. 
In the 2SLS technique, at the first stage new variables (so-called, instruments) are 
created to substitute for the original endogenous ones and then, in the second stage, the 
regression is computed using the newly created variables, which are not correlated with 
the error term (i.e. are exogenous). In GMM estimation, the information contained in 
                                                 
14 By ―general‖, we mean techniques applicable in all fields of econometrics where endogeneity might be a 
problem, including panel econometrics. 
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the population moment restrictions is used to define instruments (Hall, 2005). In 
addition to the two general IV methods, Hausman and Taylor (1981) developed, and 
Amemiya and MaCurdy (1986) advanced, an IV estimator, applicable to panel data only, 
based on the random-effects model. Namely, in RE model, regressors are assumed to 
be uncorrelated with the individual-specific error; the Hausman-Taylor estimator allows 
some of the regressors to be correlated with the individual-country effect, but not with 
the idiosyncratic error. However, the former is still a source of endogeneity bias and 
requires an IV correction. Still, 2SLS and GMM estimates, on the one hand, and 
Hausman-Taylor, on the other, are not directly comparable, because they correct 
endogeneity arising from correlation with iu  and not it  (Greene, 2003, p.303). The 
three IV estimators (2SLS, GMM and Hausman-Taylor) are important in a panel 
context.  
A large strand of the panel literature focuses on endogeneity bias stemming 
from the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable as a regressor. The revitalization of 
the interest in long-run growth, its treatment as being a dynamic process (Islam, 1995) 
and the availability of macroeconomic data for large panels of countries and time spans, 
has raised the interest in estimating dynamic panel models (See: Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
2004; Mankiw et al. 1992; Fisher, 1993; Levine and Renelt, 1992; and others). Judson 
and Owen (1996) argue that the utilization of panel data is appropriate because it allows 
the identification of country-specific effects that control for missing or unobserved 
variables. The term ―dynamic‖, in econometrics, refers to adding the lagged dependent 
variable as a regressor in the regression equation (Baltagi, 2008). Furthermore, Bond et 
al. (2001) argue that the right-hand-side variables in a standard growth regression are 
―typically endogenous‖ (p.1) and hence suggest GMM estimation of growth models 
within a dynamic context. A dynamic model could be specified as follows (Lokshin, 
2008): 
tiitititi xyy ,,1,,               (3.4) 
whereby, the dependent variable, tiy , , is determined by its one-period lag, 1, tiy , an 
exogenous regressor, tix , , which is assumed not to be correlated with the error term 
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ti , , an unobserved individual effect (the so-called, unobserved heterogeneity), i  
15, 
and a random error, 0),N(0,~ 22,   ti . Judson and Owen argue that the fixed-
effects model is preferred in macroeconomics because of two reasons: the unobserved 
individual effect, representing country characteristics, is highly likely to be correlated 
with the other regressors; and it is fairly likely that a macro-panel will not represent a 
random sample from a large number of countries, but rather the majority of countries of 
interest. 
Since the model contains the lagged dependent variable, the least squares 
dummy variable (LSDV) estimator produces biased coefficients (Behr, 2003). Namely, 
since the dependent variable is included as a regressor with one lag, the latter will be 
correlated with the error term, rendering estimated coefficients biased (Sevestre and 
Trognon, 1985). Nickel (1981) shows, however, that when there are no exogenous 
regressors, the LSDV estimator‘s bias approaches zero as the time dimension 
approaches infinity. However, Judson and Owen (1996) found that even when T is as 
large as 30, the bias could span up to 20% of the coefficient‘s true value. The effort to 
account for this bias resulted in two classes of estimators: bias-corrected (BC) and 
instrumental-variables (IV) estimators (Behr, 2003).  
Two practical questions arise in applied econometrics: i) which 
estimator/technique to proceed with; ii) how large should T be for the bias to vanish? 
From the viewpoint of this thesis, since we have only 31 years of data use LSDV does 
not seem appropriate, given the findings reported above. However, the first question 
asks for more attention. Before we have a look at the results of several Monte Carlo 
analyses, we briefly review the different estimators within the BC and IV groups, which 
is simultaneously the chronology of the dynamic-panel developments. 
                                                 
15 It is worthwhile to make a note, at this point, on the confusion that persists in the literature of whether 
the unobserved individual effect is an FE or RE within a dynamic context. Pugh (2009) elaborates on 
this. As we will see later in this section, the confusion applies to both the difference and the system 
estimator. Arellano and Bond (1991), themselves, although not explicitly, defined their model with FE, 
but some software (e.g. Stata) implement the difference-GMM estimator as RE model. However, as the 
individual effect is removed by differencing, its nature is not of any useful importance within the 
difference-GMM estimator. However, when it comes to the system-GMM estimator, which estimates the 
specified equation both in levels and in first-differenced form, this issue is clearly important. Both, 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Roodman (2009) clearly set out the system-GMM within an RE 
specification. 
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Following the investigation of the bias by Nickel (1981), Kiviet (1995) suggested 
a direct BC method, whereby a formula for the LSDV bias is subtracted from the 
estimated LSDV coefficients. Based on this, Hansen (2001) suggested an alternative BC 
method, with a two-step procedure where residuals from the first-step consistent 
estimator are used in the second-step calculation of the bias. Everaert and Pozzi (2007) 
further developed the BC approach, with an iterative bootstrap procedure. The general 
idea behind the correction procedures is to take advantage of the variance, which is 
much smaller under LSDV than with IV estimators (Behr, 2003). Because of this, it is 
found that BC methods perform well, i.e. produce more efficient estimates than IV 
estimators (Judson and Owen, 1996; Lokshin, 2008). However, they rely on the 
assumption of the other regressors being exogenous (Behr, 2003) and cannot be applied 
to unbalanced panels (Judson and Owen, 1996; Roodman, 2009). These drawbacks are 
directly applicable to the case of this thesis (with an unbalanced panel data set and a 
model with possibly endogenous regressors).  
The use of instrumentation methods, mentioned at the beginning of the section, 
removes the endogeneity bias resulting from the correlation between the regressor and 
the error term (Wooldridge, 2007). Anderson and Hsiao (1981) and (1982) were the 
pioneers in proposing use of the GMM procedure within a dynamic context; they 
differenced equation 3.2 in order to remove the individual effects in the error term 
which, otherwise, are correlated with the lagged dependent variable; however, the 
difference of the lagged dependent variable will still be correlated with the error term 
and, hence, should be instrumented. These researchers proposed using the second lag 
of the dependent variable ( 2, tiy ) or the lagged difference ( 3,2,   titi yy ) as instruments 
of 1,  tiy , because those are expected to be uncorrelated to the error term. Arellano 
(1989); Arellano and Bond (1991); and Kiviet (1995) analysed the properties of the two 
instruments suggested by Anderson and Hsiao and found that the ―level‖ instrument 
has smaller variance and is, hence, superior to the ―differenced‖ one. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggested exploiting an enlarged set of instruments; 
namely, all available lagged values of the dependent variable and the lagged values of the 
exogenous regressors. A possible drawback of this, so called, difference-GMM 
estimator, is that by enlarging the number of periods, the number of instruments gets 
considerably larger. Moreover, instruments could be weak, because they use information 
contained in differences only (Ahn and Schmidt, 1995) and because they do not account 
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for the differenced structure of the residual disturbances (Baltagi, 2008). Ahn and 
Schmidt (1995), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998) consequently 
suggested using additional information contained in levels, which should result in a 
more efficient estimator, known as the system-GMM estimator. This augments the 
difference-GMM by simultaneously estimating in differences and levels, the two 
equations being distinctly instrumented (Roodman, 2009). In the system-GMM 
estimator, both predetermined and endogenous variables in first differences are 
instrumented with suitable lags of their own levels (used by Arellano-Bond); and 
predetermined and endogenous variables in levels are instrumented with suitable lags of 
their own first differences. As a consequence, the system-GMM estimator should 
produce more efficient estimates and, hence, outperform the difference-GMM 
estimator. All Arellano-Bond, Arellano-Bover and Blundell-Bond estimators can be 
estimated as one- or two-step procedures; the one-step estimator makes use of a 
covariance matrix that accounts for autocorrelation, while the two-step estimator uses 
the residuals from the first step to estimate the covariance matrix.  
Nevertheless, when either difference- and system-GMM are applied, a problem 
arises: increasing the number of instruments can mean increasingly weak instruments 
which, in turn, reduces the power of the Sargan/Hansen test to reject the null of 
instrument validity. The problem has been acknowledged in the literature (Roodman, 
2009; Tauchen, 1986; Altonji and Segal, 1996; Andersen and Sørensen, 1996; Ziliak, 
1997; Bowsher, 2002; and others). However, as Roodman (2009) argues, the literature - 
albeit making some inroads - has not yet provided a general direction on how much bias 
an instrument collection of a given size generates. For instance, Windmeijer (2005) 
found that when the number of instruments is reduced from 28 to 13, the average bias 
reduces by 40%. Similar results were obtained by Ziliak (1997) and Tauchen (1986). It is 
inherent that the number of instruments gets larger as the number of endogenous and 
predetermined variables increases and as T grows. Moreover, the researcher can add 
external instruments. However, ―the overall count [of instruments] is typically quadratic 
in T‖ and this makes asymptotic inference of the estimators and the specification tests 
misleading (Roodman, 2009, p.141). Moreover, the bias rises as both T and N grow 
(Arellano, 2003b). 
The development of the dynamic-GMM panel techniques in recent years 
established that both difference- and system-GMM panels can generate moment 
conditions prolifically (Roodman, 2009). A crucial assumption for the validity of GMM 
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is that the generated instruments are exogenous, i.e. do not correlate with the error 
term. Sargan and Hansen-J tests have been designed to detect violation of this 
assumption, but there is no formal test to check how many instruments should be cut 
(Ruud, 2000). Sargan and Hansen-J tests set the null as ―instruments are valid‖, which is 
the assumption that we want to test. However, the Hansen-J test grows weaker with 
more moment conditions and a p-value of 1 is a classic sign of instrument proliferation, 
because it points out that the test is unable to detect the problem. Sargan/Hansen tests 
can be also used to test the validity of subsets of instrument, through the difference-in-
Sargan specification. Roodman (2009) suggests combining two ways to cut instruments: 
collapsing them and/or limiting lag length. Using simulation, he found that the problem 
of too many instruments becomes apparent when T>15; also, the bias slightly increased 
when both collapsing and lag-limiting commands were used (from 0.03 to 0.05), but 
strangely lessened as T went from 5 to 20. 
There are two great additional advantages of the GMM estimator in addition to 
those already discussed (Verbeek, 2000): i) it does not require distributional 
assumptions, like normality; and ii) it can allow for heteroskedasticity of unknown form. 
The first feature means that normality is not an assumption that should be a subject of 
diagnostic testing; while the potential heteroskedasticity can be allowed for by 
estimating ―robust‖ parameters. However, if the errors are serially correlated, than these 
will not be independent of the instruments; the GMM estimator, hence, requires no 
(second-order) serial correlation in the error term of the differenced equation (Arellano 
and Bover, 1995). Moreover, the above-mentioned Sargan and Hansen-J tests 
(Roodman, 2009; Baltagi, 2008) test whether instruments are uncorrelated with the error 
term, i.e. it checks the validity of over-identifying restrictions in the model. 
An early trial to evaluate the different dynamic-panel estimators was made by 
Judson and Owen (1996). However, the study was done when the system-GMM 
estimator was in its launch-phase and it is thus not included in the analysis. This Monte 
Carlo study shows that OLS generates significant bias, even when T gets large. The bias 
is lessened, but still spans up to 20% under the LSDV estimator even when T=30, but 
the estimator does not become more efficient. In any case, LSDV was acknowledged to 
be inappropriate in many cases, among which is this thesis. To account for the 
computation difficulty of including too many instruments in the difference-GMM 
estimator, Judson and Owen (1996) restrict the number of instruments to a maximum 
of eight; vary T from 10 to 30 and N from 20 to 100. The one-step difference-GMM 
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estimator is found to outperform the two-step in terms of producing a smaller bias and 
a lower standard deviation of the estimates. When compared to all dynamic-panel 
estimators, difference-GMM again shows superiority when N is large. ―[F]or a 
sufficiently large N and T, the differences in efficiency and bias of the different 
techniques become quite small‖ (p.12), suggesting that the estimators improve as T gets 
larger (up to 100 periods). Albeit, results suggest that the Anderson-Hsiao estimator 
produces the lowest average bias and lower bias as T gets larger. Therefore, ―a 
reasonable strategy … for panels with larger time dimension [would be to] use the 
Anderson-Hsiao estimator‖ (p.12). On the other hand, the Monte Carlo study by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) (N=100, T=7) showed that the difference-GMM estimator 
has negligible finite sample bias and substantially smaller variance than the Anderson-
Hsiao estimator. However, the estimated standard error of the two-step estimator was 
found to suffer downward bias, which is attributed to the estimation of the weight 
matrix (Windmeijer, 2005). Hence a correction has been proposed, based on a Taylor-
series expansion that accounts for the estimation of the weighted matrix16. 
Behr (2003) conducted Monte Carlo analysis which includes the system-GMM 
Blundell-Bond estimator. When N=100, T=10, the Anderson-Hsiao estimator is found 
to be unbiased but rather inefficient because of the large standard deviation. The 
system-GMM estimator is found to be unbiased and the most efficient. The same 
conclusion holds, although both estimators improve, when N=1000, T=10. If 
predetermined endogenous variables are used, then the system-GMM is again found to 
be superior. A drawback of the simulation is that it does not enlarge the number of 
periods in order to observe how these estimators perform, but rather focuses on the 
cross-section dimension. Changes in the number of periods are examined in Harris and 
Matyas (2004) who found that both difference- and system-GMM estimator suffer bias 
when the sample is small and the number of instruments very large. They found that the 
bias is reduced as T gets larger, but they do not relate the bias to the consequent 
proliferation of instruments.  
In summary, the evidence of the Monte Carlo studies is not overwhelming, but 
tends to suggest that the least biased and the most efficient estimator is system-GMM. 
The biasness is further lowered by increasing T, which is of particular importance in this 
study. The number of instruments, however, matters in terms of the trade-off between 
                                                 
16 Roodman‘s (2008) xtabond2 command implements this correction. 
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biasness and efficiency: (1) limiting instruments might slightly increase bias, but 
negligibly as T grows; (2) efficiency increases as poor instruments are removed; and (3) 
computation becomes less cumbersome. Consequently, we estimate the growth and 
volatility regressions within the system-GMM framework. 
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3.5. Results and discussion 
3.5.1. Exchange-rate regime and output growth 
Taking into account what was proposed in Section 3.2, the growth regression is: 
)( ,1,,,,1,0, tiittijtijtijtijijtiti uLAGINTNZXGROWTHGROWTH   
          (3.5) 
The coefficients are specified according to the groups of variables, as follows: 
- 
0   is the intercept; 
-   is for the lagged dependent variable; 
-  s for predetermined variables )1 ;75( LIFELGDPX i  ; 
-  s for endogenous variables 
)/ ; ; ;; ;( IMFxRRxEM;LFERTIL; DINVGDPINFTOGCGDPEDUCZi  ;  
-  s for exogenous variables 
) ; ; ; ;( SAHARLATCARSURVIVOREURERLPOPULNi  . Dummies for 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean enter as routinely 
suggested in the growth literature; 
-  s for interaction terms of exchange-rate regime dummies with all policy 
variables ); ; ;;(, DEMINVGDPINFTOGCGDPINT ti  , including variables 
which are objects of policy actions );( FERTILEDUC . Interaction terms are 
added in order to address the Lucas critique (see Section 3.2.3). Following 
Lucas (1976), we believe that interacting policy variables may be sufficient to 
capture the possible parameters-change; 
-  s for one-lag regressors ( 1, tiLAG ) from the policy variables 
) ; ;;( INVGDPINFTOGCGDP  and from the two object-policy variables 
);( FERTILEDUC . This is because of Bond et al.‘s (2001) and Roodman‘s 
(2008) argument that the right-hand-side variables in a standard growth 
regression are lagged as well, which means the process of adjustment to 
changes in these factors may depend on the passage of time; 
- t  is a time-specific fixed effect (if applicable and reported in the print-outs 
in Appendix 4 only), which, according to Sarafidis et al. (2009) and 
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Roodman (2008) is always suggested as a wise strategy to remove any global 
time-related shocks from the errors, hence eliminating – or, at least, 
reducing – cross group residual correlation; 
- )( ,tiiu   is the composite error term, where: 
o iu  is a country-specific error term (not reported); 
o and it  is the usual i.i.d. error term. 
 Variables are as defined in Table 3.2. We estimate this regression for 169 
countries and 31 periods. One of the exchange-rate dummies is dropped to represent 
the base and is indicated as the ―omitted category‖ in Table 3.5, Table 3.6 and Table 3.8. 
The log of the average GDP per capita (1970-74) enters as an external instrument to 
correct potential measurement error in GDP per capita in 1975. 
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Table 3.2. Growth variables: definitions, sources and expected signs  
Variable Theory and expected sign Source Notes 
Dependent variable 
Real Per Capita 
GDP growth 
GROWTH IMF, World Economic 
Outlook 
This variable is expressed in percentages (i.e. value 
of 3 refers to 3% and is not settled as 0.03). 
Independent variables 
Initial values 
Log(Initial Per 
Capita GDP) 
LGDP75 
LGDP90 (for 
regressions 
1991-2006) 
Neo-classical theory - Solow model (-) IMF, World Economic 
Outlook 
Observation for 1975 (1990) – a predetermined 
variable. Earlier values (average over 1970-1974; 
and value in 1989) are used in the list of 
instruments in order to lessen the tendency to 
overestimate the convergence rate because of 
temporary measurement error in GDP 
Life expectancy at 
birth (reciprocal 
value) 
LIFE1 
LIFE2 (for 
reg. 1991-2006) 
Neo-classical theory - Augmented 
Solow model (-) 
World Bank Database 
 
An observation in 1975 (1990)– a predetermined 
variable. The reciprocal value is multiplied by 100 
to avoid parameter with many decimals. 
Log of Population LPOPUL Neo-classical theory - Solow model (-) 
Endogenous theories (+) 
IMF, WEO 
UNDP, Demographic 
statistics 
Exogenous 
Policy and object-to-policy variables 
Educational 
attainment 
EDUC Neo-classical theory - Augmented 
Solow model (+) 
World Bank Database 
 
Average years of secondary and higher schooling, 
observed as average values over 5-year periods for 
1985-2006. Previous values are unavailable.  
Log of Fertility rate LFERTIL Neo-classical theory - Solow model (-) UNDP World Population 
Prospects, 2006 
 
Total lifetime live births for the typical woman 
over her expected lifetime. It enters as a log of the 
averages 1985-1990; 1990-1995; 1995-2000 and 
2000-2005. Previous and annual values are 
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unavailable. 
Government 
consumption ratio 
GCGDP Neo-classical theory - Solow model (-) 
Endogenous theories (-) 
IMF, WEO 
World Bank estimated 
Ratio of nominal government consumption to 
nominal GDP.  
Trade openness TO Neo-classical theory - Solow model (+) 
Endogenous theories (+) 
IMF, Trade Statistics Ratio of export plus import over two over GDP. 
 
Investment ratio INVGDP Neo-classical theory - Solow model (+) IMF, World Economic 
Outlook 
Ratio of gross capital formation to GDP. 
 
Inflation rate INF Neo-classical theory - Solow model (-) 
Endogenous theories (-) 
IMF, World Economic 
Outlook 
Consumer price inflation 
Exchange rate 
regimes 
RRx 
IMFx 
Exchange-rate regime theories 
(insignificant or sign mixed) 
Official IMF classification 
De-facto classification by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
x represents the type of ERR: 1 – fix; 2 – limited 
flexibility; 3 – flexible; 4 – free float; 5 – free falling 
(RR only); OT –other (like dual markets; IMF only) 
Institutional variables 
Democracy index DEM Theory of institutional factors of 
growth (-); squared term (+) 
Freedom House The index of political rights  
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We utilize system-GMM dynamic panel estimation, according to the discussion 
in Section 3.4.2. Bond et al. (2001) argue that utilizing system-GMM approach in a 
growth framework has at least four advantages: i) it produces estimates not biased by 
omitted variables (like the initial efficiency); ii) produces estimates which are consistent 
even in the presence of measurement error; iii) accounts for the endogenous right-hand-
side variables (like investment in a growth-context); and iv) exploits an assumption 
about the initial conditions to obtain moment conditions that remain informative even 
for persistent series (i.e. series that contain a unit root, like output). In their empirical 
work, Bond et al. (2001) found that the difference-GMM in growth models is seriously 
biased, due to the high degree of persistence of output and the resulting weak 
instruments. On the other hand, they found the system-GMM to be unbiased and 
consistent even when some of the series contains a unit root. Hence, this study discards 
the earlier recommendation by Caselli et al. (1996) to use differenced-GMM estimator 
for empirical growth models. 
Nevertheless, although system-GMM is found to be unbiased and consistent 
when some of the series are persistent, no solution has been offered when variables 
cointegrate, i.e. when they are all I(1), but a linear combination of those is I(0). We add 
this caution following the recent work of Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Pesaran et al. 
(1997, 1999) who consider the implications of the non-stationarity and cointegration 
properties of the underlying data-generating process. Nevertheless, the system might 
cointegrate only if all variables contain a unit root. Table 3.3 presents the results from 
two panel unit-root tests proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999) and Pesaran (2003), 
respectively. The first, the so-called Fisher‘s test, combines the p-values from N 
independent unit-root tests and assumes that all series are non-stationary under the null 
hypothesis. Pesaran‘s test applies to heterogeneous panels with cross-section 
dependence and it is based on the mean of the individual Dickey-Fuller (or Augmented 
DF) t-statistics of each unit in the panel. The null hypothesis also assumes that all series 
are non-stationary. To eliminate the cross-group dependence, the standard DF (or 
ADF) regressions are augmented with the cross-section averages of lagged levels and 
first-differences of the individual series. 
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Table 3.3. Panel unit-root tests (growth regression) 
 Maddala and Wu (1999) Pesaran (2003) 
 Constant Constant and trend Constant Constant and trend 
Real per capita GDP 
growth 
1540.38*** 1370.20 *** -15.53*** -10.90*** 
Inflation 1410.18*** 1265.26*** -13.05*** -13.14*** 
Trade openness  499.14*** 459.84*** -0.77 -2.85*** 
Government 
consumption to GDP 
617.53*** 559.70*** -0.99 0.38 
Investment to GDP 702.35*** 742.97*** -3.84*** -4.52*** 
Democracy index 565.71*** 527.91*** No obs No obs 
Log of population 140.79 754.03*** 9.44 6.74 
 Log of population 1156.57*** 968.74*** -11.96*** -4.96*** 
Note: Numbers represent Chi2 statistics or t-statistics. *, ** and *** indicate that the null of a unit root is 
rejected at 10, 5 and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
Regressions for testing for unit roots include one lag to eliminate possible autocorrelation. 
The results suggest that there is little empirical basis for concern that the variables are 
non-stationary. As expected, the only non-stationary variable is population, where both 
tests indicate the presence of a unit root; hence, we use the first difference, reflecting 
population growth. Pesaran‘s test indicates a unit root in the government-consumption 
variable, but this is not the case with Fisher‘s test. Another possibility to take account of 
in considering the statistical generating mechanism of each variable is that there may be 
structural breaks in a stationary process, i.e. mean-breaks, trends and/or broken trends. 
For example, although in the case of the dependent variable, real per capita GDP, the 
unit-root tests reject its non-stationarity, what is left is likely to be stationarity with 
shifting means (reflecting the business cycle). A mean-shift that applies to all countries 
in a similar fashion is captured by the set of period dummies that is included in our 
model. However, structural breaks that differ in timing and magnitude between 
countries will not be picked up, unless these are allied with the regime shifts. Only in 
the latter case will an effect of the regime change be detected. Conversely, the possibly 
of several mean shifts in each series, and that they are idiosyncratic (i.e., different for 
each country) might lead to identifying a zero effect of exchange-rate regimes on 
growth. In this particular case, this line of argument actually supports our conclusion. 
Namely, if GDP growth in each country has a shifting mean then non-significance of 
the regime shift dummy suggests that the mean shifts do not "line up" with the shift 
modeled by this dummy variable. Should they exist, there will be some cause of the 
mean shifts; but this cause is not modeled by the regime shift dummy. More generally, 
however, not having modelled structural breaks distinct from exchange-rate regime 
dummies might complicate the estimation and, in turn, the interpretation of the results. 
However, there are problems in identifying the timing and type of such breaks as well as 
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difficulties in statistically testing for them (Perron, 1989). Given this, while 
acknowledging that if such breaks exist then they may bias our estimation, this type of 
investigation is beyond the scope of this thesis and we leave it for further work (see 
Section C.5). 
Thus, given the findings on unit roots discussed above, we proceed with the 
system-GMM estimation, as explained above. We use both the lag-limiting and collapse 
commands available under Roodman‘s (2008) xtabond2 command to reduce the 
number of instruments. These methods are important in reducing the number of 
instruments, whose number otherwise will be enormous because of the number of 
regressors and the large T. Lag-limits are set so that the number of instruments does not 
exceed the number of cross sections and/or to get useful Hansen‘s statistics. Current 
thinking suggests that the null of instrument validity is not rejected if the relevant p-
value is above 0.25 but below values near unity17 (Roodman, 2009). 
 Section A4.1 in Appendix 4 presents estimations from our specification search. 
We start with equation 3.5; Hansen‘s test for over-identification and the Arellano-Bond 
test for serial correlation both suggest an appropriate specification18. We conduct F-
tests, to check if interaction terms, group-by-group, are jointly significant; these suggest 
that the null that the effect of the policy variables do not change when regime switches 
could not be rejected for all exchange-rate regimes and, in consequence, there is no 
evidence for the Lucas critique. Moreover, there is no particular variable among those 
which was individually significant, which excludes any oversight of a specific-variable 
effect. We remove those interactions and reestimate. The Hansen test (p=0.739) 
suggests the over-identifying instruments are valid, while the Arellano-Bond-AR(2) test 
statistic (p=0.396) suggests no evidence of serial correlation in the errors. However, 
observing the coefficients, the majority of these are insignificant at conventional levels. 
A possible explanation is that including the current and lagged value of each variable 
                                                 
17 Our general principle in all specifications was to expand the number of instruments until Hansen‘s p-
value deteriorates, i.e. approaches 0.25 or unity. 
18 The AR(2) test suggests that there is no obvious problem with heterogenous error cross-section 
dependence. However, to further investigate this, the procedure proposed by Sarafidis et al. (2006) is 
followed. The Difference-in-Hansen test for the excluded group of instruments on the lagged dependent 
variable (not shown, but available on request) suggests that at the 10% level of significance, there is no 
undue problem with cross-section dependence in our data. 
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might give rise to multicollinearity. The F-test for the joint significance of the lagged 
independent variables does not reject the null of joint insignificance (p=0.3352). The 
next estimation in Section A4.1 is without lagged values. The regression is well specified 
(p(AR2)=0.860; p(Hansen)=0.646) and this is our final specification, which is central in 
Table 3.5. All results in the tables do not report the time dummies, but these are 
reported in Section A4.1. In general, some of the dummies across the specifications 
appear (highly) significant, hence picking up some global developments and supporting 
our strategy of their inclusion. 
 The Wald tests (p=0.000) suggests that all the right-hand-side regressors are 
jointly highly significant in explaining growth. Observed individually, some of the 
regressors are statistically significant, some are not, but all of them have the expected 
sign and magnitude. The lagged dependent variable has the expected positive coefficient 
(0.157), which is below one and is in line with the literature (Roodman, 2008), pointing 
to a stable dynamic process. Before we proceed with the explanation on the other 
variables, a note on the issue of long-run versus short-run coefficient. Given that we 
have the dependent variable as lagged regressor, the coefficients reported are short-run 
or impact effects. We need a guidance on the magnitude and significance of the long-
run effects. These are calculated as:  
regressor’s coefficient / (1 – coefficient of the lagged dependent variable). 
Given that the coefficient in front of the lagged dependent variable in all estimations 
ranges between 0.12 and 0.30, obtained long-run coefficients will not be much larger 
than the short-run. However, their significance is more important. Though, across all 
specifications the exchange-rate dummies were insignificant even at the 10%, similarly 
as the short-run coefficients. Hence, we decided to proceed with building the argument 
based on the short-run effects only. 
All other regressors have the expected sign and magnitude, although only 
inflation, fertility rate, trade openness and, in some specifications, government 
consumption and investment, are significant at conventional levels. Table 3.4 compares 
the system-GMM estimate of the lagged dependent variable with the FE one (which is, 
on average, downward biased) and with the OLS one (which is, on average, upward 
biased). Our finding is within the range given by FE and OLS estimators (Bond et al. 
2001; Roodman, 2008) which supports its validity. 
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Table 3.4. Comparison statistics of System-GMM with OLS and FE in 
terms of the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (RR 
classification) 
 FE OLS System-GMM 
Growth(-1) 0.118 0.232 0.158 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.607 0.000 
AR(2) (p-value) - - 0.860 
Hansen (p-value) - - 0.646 
 The variable of main interest – the de-facto exchange-rate regime, is statistically 
insignificant at conventional levels, although the signs suggest that de-facto fixers 
deliver the best growth performance. The insignificance of the de-facto exchange-rate 
regime in explaining growth is confirmed by the F-test of the joint effect of the regimes 
(p=0.172). Hence, the main conclusion is that the de-facto exchange-rate regime is not 
significant in explaining growth. The results are confirmed if the specification is applied 
to developing countries only, reducing the sample to 139 countries19. In these 
specifications also the de-facto exchange-rate regime did not come close to 
conventional significance levels. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3.5 present the estimates 
for two distinct sub-periods: 1976-1990 and 1991-2006. The intuition behind this 
division is to capture the early post-socialism period (after 1991), when transition 
countries experienced accelerating inflation and nearly all of them subsequently 
established a form of fixed exchange rate. The de-facto regime again is insignificant at 
conventional levels in both periods, although coefficients in the overall regression 
slightly differ between the two periods. Finally, column (7) distinguishes de-facto 
regimes between advanced, developing and transition economies for the period 1991-
2006, but finds no different results.  
  Table 3.6 advances the issue by considering peg duration. Some studies and 
findings mentioned in Chapter 1, argued that a peg delivers early benefits by curbing 
inflation, but long pegs strangle growth. To check for this, we make an arbitrary cut-off 
of peg duration at: pegs up to 5 years; pegs longer than 5 but shorter than 10 years; and 
pegs longer than 10 years. All specifications are diagnostically valid. However, signs, 
magnitudes and significance, and hence, conclusions are similar to those in Table 3.5. 
                                                 
19 We do not run a regression for advanced-countries group because they comprise a sample of 30 
countries, so that N=T. In this case, it could be argued that dynamic system-GMM is not the best 
estimator. Refer to Section 3.4.2. 
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The de-facto exchange-rate regime and its duration are not significant in explaining 
growth, irrespective of the level of development of countries or of the observed sub-
periods. 
It is worthwhile, though, to note that fixed exchange rate regimes and, in 
particular, short-to-medium-lived pegs appear to favour growth under the FE estimator. 
Yet, these results cannot be taken as compelling evidence, because of: (1) in a large 
sample, the 10% significance is indeed marginal; (2) the FE estimator is biased even 
with T=30 (Judson and Owen, 1996); (3) the potential endogeneity of some of the 
independent variables. 
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Table 3.5. Growth regression under RR (de-facto) classification of exchange-rate regimes 
Dependent variable: 
Real per capita GDP growth 
FE OLS System-GMM Developing 
countries 
Sub-periods 1991-2006 – 
Lev. of devel. 1976-1990 1991-2006 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Real per capita GDP growth(-1) 0.118*** 0.232*** 0.157*** 0.163** 0.167 0.295*** 0.298*** 
Initial GDP in 1975 - -0.192 -2.469 -0.455 3.875 -1.945 -1.551 
Life expectancy at birth (inverse) - -0.422 33.276 14.424 10.707 -6.976 -11.084 
Inflation -0.383 0.158 -2.649 -3.367** 4.820 3.107 2.673 
Average years of schooling - -0.062 2.254 1.925** -2.650 0.037 -1.047 
Log of fertility rate 0.119 0.00078 -11.978** 4.153 -6.831 -0.394 -0.544 
Trade openness  4.771*** 1.961*** 8.272** 12.880*** 7.384 0.210 1.327 
Government consumption to GDP -23.068*** -7.453*** 13.436 18.389 13.807 0.561 8.085 
Investment to GDP -0.032 0.014 0.775* 0.870 -0.446 0.196 -0.122 
Democracy index -0.091 -0.058 -0.786 -1.162 -3.666 -0.229 -0.537 
Democracy index squared 0.005 -0.015 0.073 0.155 0.492 0.028 0.023 
Fixed ERR 1.206* 0.106 2.317 -1.564 0.415 1.160 3.382 
Limited flexible ERR 0.446 0.312 -0.183 -3.004 2.572 -0.355 -0.918 
Flexible ERR 0.022 0.149 1.134 -0.110 -1.090 0.025 0.303 
Free floating ERR Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat 
Other cat. (dual market / free fal.) -2.073*** -1.766*** 0.124 -1.543 -3.670 -2.672 -2.804 
Δ Log of population -87.489*** -65.394*** -0.075 -117.391 -99.67 -80.729 -89.059** 
Dummy for the Euro zone -0.716 -0.782** -1.788 - -2.081 -1.865 -5.153 
Dummy for survivor bias 0.580 0.931 1.641 1.504 - -0.438 0.0067 
Dummy for Latin A. and Caribbean - -0.765** 3.698* -0.147 -0.102 -0.414 -0.059 
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa - -0.240 -2.704 -5.159 -0.757 1.288 2.794 
Fixed ERR in Transition countries       -0.480 
Lim-flex ERR in Transition countries       3.786 
Flexible ERR in Transition countries       4.079 
Fixed ERR in Developing countries       -3.852 
Lim-flex ERR in Developing countries       1.307 
Flexible ERR in Developing countries       0.478 
Constant 5.413*** 6.891*** -35.440 -30.203 -22.530 30.027 36.717 
Wald test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) (p-value) - - 0.860 0.539 0.565 0.901 0.838 
No instruments - - 54 52 36 48 56 
Hansen (p-value) - - 0.646 0.662 0.617 0.308 0.505 
Notes: *, ** and *** refer to a significance level of 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. All regressions (except the regressions of the first two columns) are two-step system GMM. The Windmeijer (2005) 
corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. ● The specification for the period 1991-2006 uses the initial level of real per capita GDP in 1990. The level in 1989 is used as instrument to 
correct for possible measurement error. Life expectancy at birth refers to 1990. 
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Table 3.6. Growth regression under RR (de-facto) classification of exchange-rate regimes – by peg duration 
Dependent variable: 
Real per capita GDP growth 
FE OLS System-GMM Developing 
countries 
Sub-periods 1991-2006 – 
Lev. of devel. 1976-1990 1991-2006 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Real per capita GDP growth(-1) 0.118*** 0.224*** 0.159** 0.136** 0.119* 0.287*** 0.276*** 
Initial GDP in 1975 - -0.317* -2.033 -4.603 8.889 -2.350 -1.280 
Life expectancy at birth (inverse) - -0.537 21.952 14.598 41.597 -9.795 -11.856 
Inflation -0.373 -0.012 -1.877 -4.138* 7.036 3.219 3.302 
Average years of schooling - -0.048 1.562* 2.491* 2.889 0.124 -0.316 
Log of fertility rate 0.101 0.068 -8.247* 1.691 16.845 2.389 3.621 
Trade openness  4.816*** 2.049*** 8.771*** 13.059*** 23.764 -0.644 -0.198 
Government consumption to GDP -23.198*** -7.113*** 3.538 24.247 84.155 8.310 9.374 
Investment to GDP -0.03 0.016 0.601* 0.784 2.817 0.149 -0.069 
Democracy index -0.088 -0.092 -0.180 -0.2 5.125 -0.722 -0.363 
Democracy index squared 0.0049 -0.01 0.017 0.023 0.604 0.073 0.001 
Fixed ERR under 5 years 1.154* 0.975** 1.506 -3.937 10.984 0.102 -1.878 
Fixed ERR 5 to 10 years 1.405* 0.557 1.458 -7.544 9.135 -1.848 -5.512 
Fixed ERR over 10 years 1.312 -0.449 0.251 -16.384 9.978 -2.137 -5.956 
Limited flexible ERR 0.461 0.304 -0.801 -3.410 9.488 -1.071 -4.856 
Flexible ERR 0.040 0.131 0.332 -0.068 9.472 -0.433 -2.172 
Free floating ERR Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat 
Other cat. (dual market / free fal.) -2.068*** -1.724*** -0.934 -1.074 10.613 -2.996 -3.995 
Δ Log of population -87.631*** -66.026*** -31.845 -70.086 218.957 -93.556** -92.09** 
Dummy for the Euro zone -0.768 -0.836** -1.423 - 4.284 -0.037 1.35 
Dummy for survivor bias 0.598 0.848 0.939 1.504 - -0.714 -0.796 
Dummy for Latin A. and Caribbean - -0.681** 2.652 3.018 6.681 -1.149 -1.427 
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa - -0.128 -1.651 -1.380 5.112 1.004 1.921 
Fixed ERR 5 in Transition countries       3.044 
Fixed ERR (5-10) in Transition countries       7.698 
Fixed ERR 10 in Transition countries       7.325 
Fixed ERR 5 in Developing countries       5.338 
Fixed ERR (5-10) in Developing countries       4.238 
Fixed ERR 10 in Developing countries       1.621 
Constant 5.427*** 7.707*** -19.530 -3.427 -43.065 36.341 36.717 
Wald test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) (p-value) - - 0.939 0.536 0.519 0.802 0.921 
No instruments - - 58 50 40 52 60 
Hansen (p-value) - - 0.693 0.740 0.439 0.440 0.637 
Notes: *, ** and *** refer to a significance level of 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. Notes of Table 3.5 apply. 
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The above testing-down procedure is repeated with the de-jure (IMF) 
classification and the final specification20 is reported in Section A4.1. The regression is 
well specified, according to the diagnostic statistics (p(AR2)=0.724; p(Hansen)=0.191). 
The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is within the range established by FE 
and OLS and hence, this supports its validity. 
Table 3.7. Comparison statistics of System-GMM with OLS and FE in 
terms of the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (IMF 
classification) 
 FE OLS System-GMM 
Growth(-1) 0.124 0.248 0.219 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.0000 0.3984 0.000 
AR(2) (p-value) - - 0.724 
Hansen (p-value) - - 0.191 
Table 3.8 takes the issue further. Contrary to the de-facto classification, in the 
overall specification, the IMF‘s de-jure classification of the exchange-rate regime reveals 
some significant effects on growth. Namely, the system-GMM estimates suggest that a 
de-jure peg performs better than de-jure float with a magnitude of almost 4 percentage 
points (hereafter p.p.), while de-jure flexible rate delivers better growth performance 
with a magnitude of about 2 p.p. The associated long-run coefficients are 5 p.p. and 2.8 
p.p., respectively, but the former is insignificant and the latter at the 10% only. 
Nonetheless, studies that use de-jure classification and terminate their investigation at 
this point might end up with invalid conclusions. Namely, this discrepancy compared to 
the de-facto classification disappears when specifications for developing countries and 
two sub-periods are observed; in those specifications de-jure exchange-rate regimes are 
insignificant in explaining growth. For the same reasons specified above, column (7) in 
Table 3.8 differentiates transition, developing and developed economies, but finds no 
different results in terms of regimes‘ significance. All the other coefficients in the 
regressions are of similar magnitude and sign as when de-facto classification is used and 
this is a kind of robustness check of the obtained results. Considering the duration of 
the peg yields similar conclusions – insignificance of peg (duration) in explaining 
growth; hence these estimates are not reported. 
 
                                                 
20 All the other intermediate steps towards the final specification supported the same conclusions. Hence, 
these are not reported, but are available upon request. 
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Table 3.8. Growth regression under IMF (de-jure) classification of exchange-rate regimes 
Dependent variable: 
Real per capita GDP growth 
FE OLS System-GMM Developing 
countries 
Sub-periods 1991-2006 – 
Lev. of devel. 1976-1990 1991-2006 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Real per capita GDP growth(-1) 0.124*** 0.248*** 0.219** 0.146* 0.091 0.336*** 0.360*** 
Initial GDP in 1975 - -0.15 0.827 -0.039 -3.031 -3.631 -0.069 
Life expectancy at birth (inverse) - -0.279 15.067 11.321 6.532 -18.507 -5.643 
Inflation -1.277*** -0.831 0.674 -2.999* -1.688 4.624 3.421 
Average years of schooling - -0.074 0.926 2.328* 3.096 -0.173 -0.958 
Log of fertility rate 0.428 0.077 -3.878 7.0 -0.165 2.426 -0.283 
Trade openness  4.007*** 2.468*** 5.541 14.07*** 31.196 -0.614 -5.060 
Government consumption to GDP -23.16*** -6.82*** -34.085 4.024 -3.680 -3.770 -26.776 
Investment to GDP -0.007 0.003 0.054 0.727 -0.371 -0.126 -0.013 
Democracy index -0.362 -0.229 -0.307 -1.873 -2.05 -0.248 -1.817 
Democracy index squared 0.034 0.003 -0.016 0.221 0.407 -0.112 0.143 
Fixed ERR 0.435 0.012 3.884** 3.138 1.412 2.853 3.381 
Limited flexible ERR 0.329 0.202** 1.128 -2.875 3.718 1.570 0.620 
Flexible ERR 0.348 0.495 2.166* 1.344 4.881 2.076 12.962 
Free floating ERR Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat 
Other cat. (dual market / free fal.) -0.666 -1.776 -8.252 -3.61 1.079 - - 
Δ Log of population -94.227*** -64.77*** -49.797 -113.017 4.560 -99.55* -57.152** 
Dummy for the Euro zone -0.393 -0.91*** -1.266  -7.513 -2.459 -4.061 
Dummy for survivor bias 0.923 0.656 0.127 2.444  -1.301 -0.617 
Dummy for Latin A. and Caribbean - -0.834*** -0.693 -1.177 -0.388 -2.505 -2.143 
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa - -0.287 -1.367 -5.904 -4.138 2.709 0.646 
Fixed ERR in Transition countries       -0.924 
Lim-flex ERR in Transition countries       2.892 
Flexible ERR in Transition countries       -10.599 
Fixed ERR in Developing countries       -3.348 
Lim-flex ERR in Developing countries       -0.790 
Flexible ERR in Developing countries       -13.309 
Constant 4.978*** 8.839*** -25.064 -15.433 -16.718 28.777 13.308 
Wald test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) (p-value) - - 0.724 0.460 0.612 0.415 0.461 
No instruments - - 54 52 36 44 52 
Hansen (p-value) - - 0.191 0.345 0.756 0.197 0.557 
Notes: *, ** and *** refer to a significance level of 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. Notes of Table 3.5 apply. 
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In general, encompassing all theoretical and modelling aspects discussed in 
Chapters one and two, and from the beginning of this chapter, the conclusion is that 
the empirical evidence suggests that exchange-rate regime does not affect growth, as a general 
rule. No empirical grounds were established that coefficients in the regression suffer the 
Lucas critique. Observing two sub-periods or developing countries led to the same 
conclusion – insignificance of the exchange-rate regime. Observation of the de-facto 
versus de-jure regime does not matter in that respect. Specifically, although de-facto 
classification accounts for the actual behaviour of the exchange rate, any capital controls 
and any devaluation or crisis episodes which were all apparent in the developing, 
including transition, economies during the 1990s and early 2000s, the conclusion is the 
same; namely, the exchange-rate regime does not affect economic growth, irrespective 
of the regimes‘ classification, the observed time period or the level of development of 
countries. The duration of the peg is not important either. The duration and 
developing-countries group was especially considered for the period 1991-2006, a 
period in which episodes of devaluation and currency crises were observed, which 
might have played a role in affecting growth. However, this was not the case. The 
empirical findings suggest, however, that there is a significant positive effect of an 
exchange-rate peg on growth according to the de-jure classification for the entire 
sample, but that this is insignificant in all other de-jure specifications. Reverting to the 
general findings, though, if the exchange-rate regime, as a nominal variable, is found not 
to affect growth, then it might be important in affecting its departure from the long-run 
level, i.e. the output volatility. The next sub-section proceeds to examine whether the 
exchange-rate regime is significant in explaining output volatility. 
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3.5.2. Exchange-rate regime and output volatility 
 Output volatility will be modelled according to the following regression: 
)( ,,,4,3,2,10, tiittijtijtijtijtijti uINTZZZZVOLAT        (3.6) 
The coefficients are specified according to the groups of variables, as follows: 
- 0  is the intercept; 
-  s for the variables representing shocks originating from policy measures 
(monetary and fiscal); real (aggregate supply) shocks, or from political 
sources, ),,,(1 CIVILvolGCvolMSvolTOTZ  . The three measures defined 
for the output volatility (Section 3.2.4) are applied to the terms-of-trade, 
money-supply and government-consumption growth; 
-  s for the variables representing shock buffers or measuring the economy‘s 
vulnerability to real (external) shocks, ),,,(2 FOTOFINGDPGROWTHZ  , 
as follows: 
o Growth - due to the empirically observed regularity between 
countries‘ economic growth and output volatility (see, for instance, 
Kose et al. 2005); 
o Financial-development variable – due to the empirically observed 
regularity between the level of financial development and output 
volatility (see, for instance, Easterly et al. 2001); 
o Trade- and financial-openness variables – due to Easterly and 
Kraay‘s (2000) arguments offered in Section 3.2.2. – to measure the 
economy‘s vulnerability to external shocks. We use Chinn and Ito‘s 
(2008) measure of financial openness, because besides using capital 
inflows and outflows, it also aims at measuring the extensity of 
capital controls imposed; 
-  s for inflation )(3 INFZ   – to account for the traditional explanation of 
output fluctuations by downward nominal rigidity (Newbery and Stiglitz, 
1982). Note that we could not obtain credible series for wage growth and 
hence, this variable is left out of the regression; 
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-  s for the exchange-rate regimes 
),4,3,2,1/5,4,3,2,1(4 IMFOTIMFIMFIMFIMFDUALRRRRRRRRRRZ 
, according to the discussion in Chapter 2; 
-  s for interaction terms of exchange-rate-regime dummies with the terms-
of-trade, money-supply and government-consumption volatility 
)*/;*/;*/( volGCIMFxRRxvolMSIMFxRRxvolTOTIMFxRRxINT  .  
Interaction terms are included in order to measure whether, under real and 
nominal shocks respectively, output reacts differently depending on the 
exchange-rate regime. Namely, in the case of supply-side shock, a peg is 
argued to transmit the shock directly onto real activity (output volatility), 
while a flexible rate is a shock absorber. On the other hand, there is at least 
theoretical consensus that the role of exchange-rate regimes is reversed 
when shocks originate from the monetary economy. These issues were 
broadly debated in Chapter 2 and remain to be empirically tested. This 
distinction is, in essence, one of the objectives of this section and its 
contribution to knowledge; 
- t  is a time-specific fixed effect (if applicable and reported in the print-outs 
in Appendix 4 only); 
- )( ,tiiu   is the composite error term, where: 
o iu  is a country-specific error term (not reported); 
o and it  is the usual i.i.d. error term. 
Variables are defined in Table 3.9. We estimate this regression for 169 countries 
and 31 periods. One of the exchange-rate dummies (floating) is the base and is indicated 
as the ―omitted category‖ in Tables 3.11 - 3.12. Note that the coefficient on the TOT-
volatility variable itself represents the effect of a float under a real shock. 
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Table 3.9. Output volatility variables  
Variable Expected sign Source Notes 
Dependent variable 
Output volatility VOLATSD 
VOLATDEV  
VOLATHP 
Author‘s 
estimates 
Defined through 3 measures: 
1. Rolling central standard 
deviation of the annual GDP 
growth rate over 5-year 
period;  
2. Absolute value of the 
deviation of actual output 
from the linear trend; 
3. Absolute value of the 
deviation of actual output 
from the Hodrick-Prescott 
trend (approx. of potential 
output). 
Independent variables 
Buffer variables 
Real Per Capita 
GDP growth 
GROWTH (-) IMF, World 
Economic 
Outlook 
 
Financial 
development 
FINGDP (-) IMF, 
International 
Financial 
Statistics 
Total bank assets as a 
proportion of GDP 
Financial openness FO (+) Chinn and Ito 
(2007) 
Index which includes capital 
flows and capital restrictions 
Shocks’ variables 
Volatility of Terms 
of trade changes 
volTOT (+) IMF, 
International 
Financial 
Statistics 
Defined through 3 measures 
as per the output volatility. 
Terms of trade variable is a 
ratio of the exports unit value 
index to imports unit value 
index 
Volatility of Money 
supply changes 
volMS (+) IMF, 
International 
Financial 
Statistics 
Defined through 3 measures 
as per the output volatility. 
M2 monetary aggregate  
Volatility of 
Government 
consumption 
changes 
volGC (+) IMF, 
International 
Financial 
Statistics 
 Defined through 3 measures 
as per the output volatility. 
 
Civil unrest CIVIL (+) Freedom 
House 
The index of civil liberties 
Exchange rate 
regimes 
RRx 
IMFx 
(unknown sign, 
but more likely 
the more rigid 
regime, the 
higher the OV) 
 
 
Official IMF 
classification 
De-facto 
classification 
by Reinhart 
and Rogoff 
(2004) 
X represents the type of ERR: 
1 – fix; 2 – limited flexibility; 3 
– flexible; 4 – free float; 5 – 
free falling (RR only); OT –
other (like dual markets; IMF 
only) 
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We start by checking for unit roots in the series, because of the moderately-large 
T dimension. The presence of unit roots might result in spurious regression. Table 3.10 
presents the results from two panel unit-root tests proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999) 
and Pesaran (2003), respectively, as explained in the preceding section.  
Table 3.10. Panel unit-root tests (output volatility regression) 
 Maddala and Wu (1999) Pesaran (2003) 
 Constant Constant and trend Constant Constant and trend 
Output volatility     
Standard deviation 530.0166*** 510.6916*** -0.446 1.307 
Deviation from trend 1613.5884*** 1376.8509*** -14.785*** -11.171*** 
Hodrick-Prescott 1533.0448*** 1336.9578*** -16.737*** -12.171*** 
Real per capita GDP growth 1281.7970*** 1068.7094*** -12.773*** -9.115*** 
Bank assets to GDP 335.9691 368.7419* 3.985 5.817 
 Bank assets to GDP 2082.5972*** 1751.9981*** -18.755*** -13.439*** 
Trade openness 499.1490*** 459.8479*** -0.776 -2.856*** 
Financial openness  446.6506*** 445.4119*** -1.645 -8.162*** 
Inflation 1410.1860*** 1265.2675*** -13.056*** -13.145*** 
Volatility of TOT     
Standard deviation 361.5842*** 312.1579* -0.480 4.699 
Deviation from trend 1038.7767*** 312.1579*** -12.995*** -8.897*** 
Hodrick-Prescott 1484.1000*** 1107.3476*** -15.938*** -10.633*** 
Volatility of money supply     
Standard deviation 504.5929*** 349.6309 no obs no obs 
Deviation from trend 1824.1591*** 1696.0216*** -12.817*** -7.734*** 
Hodrick-Prescott 1554.6121*** 1696.0216*** -12.027*** -7.517*** 
Volatility of gov’t 
consumption 
    
Standard deviation 421.5621** 282.0083 no obs no obs 
Deviation from trend 1205.8077*** 1009.8103*** no obs no obs 
Hodrick-Prescott 1324.5336*** 1095.3444*** no obs no obs 
Civil unrest 431.2248*** 432.0027*** no obs no obs 
Note: Numbers represent Chi2 statistics or t-statistics. *, ** and *** indicate that the unit root null is 
rejected at the 10, 5 and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
Regressions for testing for unit roots include one lag to eliminate possible autocorrelation. 
Both tests suggest that the financial-development variable contains a unit root at 
conventional levels; however, the unit root is removed by differencing. In principle, as a 
bounded variable, the bank assets-to-GDP is unlikely to contain a unit root (although, it 
appears to have a unit root here given the relative short time series). Yet, as we decide 
to difference this variable, the presence of the unit root is implicitly accepted. The 
alternative is that the variable is a trend stationary process with structural breaks that 
can be difficult to distinguish from a difference stationary process (i.e., a unit-root 
process), as Perron (1989) highlighted. In the case that the alternative is the true 
statistical generating mechanism, then differencing would not be a valid approach. 
However, the dataset we use here is too short to pursue Perron's (1989) modified ADF 
to test for a unit root in the (possible) presence of a deterministic trend or a broken 
deterministic trend. Hence, the dataset available to the present work might be too 
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limited to address this issue in a fuller manner and we leave this issue for the further 
work (see Section C.5). 
The results suggest that there are some empirical grounds for concern that the 
variables are non-stationary when volatility is measured through a rolling-standard 
deviation. Our concern over these measures was raised in Chapter 2 and Section 3.2.4 is 
here confirmed by problems in practice. The evidence supports the view that using a 
rolling-standard deviation gives a variable persistence and that this could make the 
regression spurious and the estimates biased. All reviewed studies in Table 2.1 deal with 
moderately-large T, as in this thesis, but do not consider the non-stationarity of series. 
Non-stationarity, however, should not be a concern when volatilities are estimated 
based on deviations from trend (linear and HP). This is supported by the panel unit-
root tests, which reject unit roots at conventional levels. Considering the issue of 
stationarity of panel data when T is moderately large, and considering that this may 
affect the significance, sign and magnitude of the estimated relationship between 
exchange-rate regime and output volatility, is one of the contributions to knowledge of 
this chapter. Hence, we proceed with estimation, as explained above. 
Before specifying the estimation technique, the issue of endogeneity deserves 
some attention. Unlike the case for the growth regression (Section 3.5.1), the literature 
is not in agreement over the endogeneity issue within the output-volatility framework. 
Long-run growth is expected to act as a buffer and prevent the output 
falling/expanding too much when a shock hits the economy, but no theoretical 
arguments are on hand for the reverse relationship, nor do empirical growth-models 
include output volatility as a standard regressor. A strong argument cannot be 
constructed for the endogeneity of the financial-development variable either - the more 
a country is financially developed, the better the buffer for output volatility when a 
shock hits the economy; however, increased/lowered output volatility does not directly 
imply lower/higher financial development, albeit that it could force traders/investors to 
seek more hedging instruments to prevent risks or credit lines to meet their liquidity 
needs. Inflation, measuring nominal rigidities, could be endogenous, since rational 
agents could form their expectations based on developments in the real economy. The 
more the economy is economically open, the more exposed to external shocks and, 
hence, to increased output volatility. However, since trade openness is generally 
dependent on foreign demand and supply and trade barriers, and financial openness on 
foreign-investors decisions and capital-account restrictions, all of which depend on 
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global/regional decision-makers, we treat those two variables as being exogenous. It can 
be argued that the exchange-rate regimes could be treated endogenous, i.e. not only is a 
peg expected to increase output volatility, but also countries with increased output 
volatility tend to choose not to peg. However, the assumption is very weak, because, as 
argued, the regimes effect is different depending on the shock‘s source. Theoretically, 
models do not treat the relationship between the exchange-rate regime and output 
volatility as potentially endogenous, nor practically has a country decided its exchange-
rate policy following output-volatility developments, nor do empirical models for 
regime choice include output volatility as a regressor. In mainstream economics, shocks 
tend to be exogenous by definition (see, for instance Broda, 2002, for terms-of-trade 
shocks), albeit, when they come from government-policy measures they could be 
treated as potentially endogenous (see, for instance, Easterly et al. 2001), especially if 
these policy measures come as a response to output fluctuations and are expected by 
the economic agents. 
Considering the difficulty in classifying financial development, exchange-rate 
regimes and policy shocks as being endogenous or exogenous, we start with a different 
modelling strategy. At the outset, assuming that all right-hand side variables are 
exogenous, a logical strategy would be to utilize a fixed effects model which assumes 
that all variables are exogenous and assumes that these are correlated with the 
unobserved country-specific effects. Using a fixed effects estimator is still reasonable 
because of the argument of Judson and Owen (1996) that a macro-panel will not 
represent a random sample from a large number of countries, but rather the majority of 
countries of interest. However, referring to the output-volatility regression, if right-hand 
side regressors are assumed exogenous, it cannot be justified that these are correlated 
with the unobserved-country effect. Namely, some of the variables remain correlated 
with the individual effect 
)/,,,,,,( IMFxRRxINFCIVILvolGCvolMSFINGDPGROWTH  , but some are not 
dependent on country characteristics, but rather on global or regional events 
),,*/,( FOTOvolTOTIMFxRRxvolTOT . Hence, although not correlated with the 
idiosyncratic error, the former are correlated with the unobserved country effect and 
this could be a source of endogeneity bias. Thus, some correction for endogeneity is still 
needed. The Hausman-Taylor estimator explained in Section 3.4.2 best fits this 
situation. 
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The estimation strategy was to start with a wide specification that included all 
the interaction effects of the shocks with the exchange-rate dummies. We ran a variable 
deletion test for the interaction terms, group-by-group, and in all specifications we 
found that the interactions of the nominal shocks and the regimes were jointly 
insignificant. Moreover, there is no particular variable among those which was 
individually significant, which excludes any oversight of a specific-variable effect. This 
implies that, as opposed to the real shocks, the nominal shocks do not have differential 
effects with different exchange-rate regimes. The presented estimates here are without 
these insignificant interactions, because of space. 
Table 3.11 and Table 3.12 below and Table A1.6; Table A1.7; Table A1.8 and 
Table A1.9 in Appendix 1 present the estimates. All results in the tables do not report 
the time dummies, but these are reported in Section A4.2. In general, some of the 
dummies across the specifications appear (highly) significant, hence picking up some 
global developments and supporting our strategy of their inclusion. Table 3.11 presents 
the estimates for the entire sample for the three measures of output volatility. The 
rolling-SD-based estimates suggest that a de-facto peg in general delivers lower output 
volatility compared to all other de-facto regimes, but the coefficient is significant only at 
10%. However, when a TOT shock hits the economy, this has double the effect on 
output volatility under a de-facto peg compared to a de-facto float. In this specification, 
the effects of the regimes under a real shock are individually insignificant, but they are 
jointly highly significant. The coefficients‘ signs and magnitudes portray an interesting 
story which is consistent in all the studies published on the topic and reviewed in Table 
2.1. However, as Table 3.10 reveals, when volatility is measured as a rolling-standard 
deviation, the series are persistent, i.e. contain a unit root. Working with variables which 
are I(1) can produce spurious regression in which the estimated coefficients are invalid. 
All published studies on the relationship between exchange-rate regime and output 
volatility do not treat the issue of stationarity and almost all of them use a rolling-
standard deviation measure. Given the theoretical problem that argues strongly against 
using this definition of volatility, in practice it can give rise to very different results and 
this needs to be borne in mind when assessing estimates by past researchers (studies 
presented in Table 2.1). The results presented in the other sections of Table 3.11 using 
alternative (stationary) measures of volatility offer different, arguably better, estimates 
and are a contribution to knowledge from our investigation.  
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Comparison between column (1) against (2) and (3) of Table 3.11 suggests that 
our concerns about the effects of the non-stationarity of volatility-variables may be 
important and lead to incorrect conclusions if ignored. Once we measure volatilities as 
deviations from (linear and HP) trend, we obtain stationary variables, which when used 
in the output-volatility regression give different results. Although the linear-trend-based 
and HP-based estimates look similar in other ways, they differ considerably when we 
observe the coefficient on real per capita GDP growth. This may be because linear-
trend-based volatility assumes constant growth. However, this assumption is practically 
weak. Hence, as suggested earlier in the chapter, our preferred measure of volatility is 
the one based on the HP filter; hence, the emphasis is on interpreting the HP-based 
estimates.  
In what follows, we first interpret the exchange-rate effects when there is no 
change in the TOT (the exchange-rate dummies); second we interpret the additional 
exchange-rate effects when a real shock hits (the interaction terms); lastly, we derive the 
overall effect. In column (3), the estimated effects of a change in the exchange-rate regime 
from floating are that: a peg decreases output volatility compared to de-facto float by 
about 0.46 p.p., but without individual significance. Limited-flexible and flexible 
regimes, however, are estimated to reduce output volatility by more, 0.62 p.p. compared 
to de-facto float, but are only significant at the 10% level. Also, the two effects are not 
statistically different (p=0.9819). It is estimated that compared to a de-facto float an 
increase in TOT volatility by 1 p.p. will give an increase of output volatility of 0.05 p.p. 
more under a de-facto peg; however, the coefficient is not statistically significant. Under 
de-facto limited-flexible and flexible regimes, a 1 p.p. change in TOT volatility also 
gives greater output volatility than under a de-facto float by 0.07 and 0.08 p.p., 
respectively (but again not significant). The theoretical argument that a float buffers the 
real shock lacks support with a significant insignificance in this estimation, although the 
sign is as expected.  
To investigate our concerns about peg duration raised in Chapter 2 and Section 
3.5.1, we split the de-facto pegs into those that lasted up to 5 years, between 5 and 10 
years and over 10 years (column 4). The basic intuition is that a peg is introduced to 
calm down the economy, usually when monetary policy lacks credibility and inflation 
soars. However, some argue (see Chapter 2), that the initial gains that a peg provides in 
terms of stabilization become exhausted as time passes and it could become a 
problematic strategy as the economy becomes more developed and rapidly integrated 
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into the international financial market. Not surprisingly, there is support for this view 
from the estimations. The exchange-rate dummies, indicating the effect on output 
volatility if there is no TOT change, are significant and negative for fixed exchange rates 
of over 5 years. The estimates suggest a reduction in output volatility of around 0.9 to 1 
p.p. Considering the interaction effects, we observe that short pegs have an insignificant 
additional effect on output volatility, while longer pegs (from 5 to 10 years) are 
significant at the 1% level, with the magnitude suggesting that if TOT changes by 1 p.p., 
this longer peg will, compared to a float, have an additional effect on output volatility of 
about 0.12 p.p. This finding might further suggest that observing all pegs (from the 
viewpoint of their length) in one basket might be misleading.  
Lastly, the overall effect is estimated. The overall effect of going from floating 
to another exchange-rate regime (RRx) is estimated as follows: 
Estimated coefficient * (Volatility of TOT*RRx) + estimated coefficient * RRx 
In order to find out the value of TOT volatility above which the output volatility is 
boosted under the concrete exchange-rate regime, we need to set this to be higher than 
zero: 
Estimated coefficient * (Volatility of TOT*RRx) + estimated coefficient * RRx > 0 
 
E.g. In the case of going from float to peg (longer than 5 years, since this is the significant one), 
we have: 
0.121*Volatility of TOT-0.89 > 0 
0.121*Volatility of TOT > 0.89 
Volatility of TOT > 7.36 
This implies that a TOT shock higher than c.7 p.p. will increase output volatility. 
 
Overall, the effect of changing from a float to a fixed exchange rate is estimated as 
(0.121*Volatility of TOT-0.89). This estimate suggests that a change in TOT lower than 
c. 7 p.p. will decrease output volatility under a long peg, compared to a float, and vice 
versa. Whether this is beneficial from a policy viewpoint depends on the frequency and 
size of TOT shocks (and how then these are translated by a utility function). Similarly, 
the effects of changing from a float to limited-flexible and flexible regimes are estimated 
as (0.069*Volatility of TOT-0.61) and (0.075*Volatility of TOT-0.63), respectively, 
suggesting an approximate threshold of 8-9 p.p. change in TOT. The other coefficients 
are similar to those in column (3). Hence, the policy implication is that a TOT shock 
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larger than 7 p.p. will increase output volatility under fixed exchange-rate regime 
compared to a float, while when larger than 8-9 p.p. will increase output volatility under 
limited-flexible and flexible regime compared to a floating regime. This is in line with 
the expectation that a peg increases output volatility under real shock faster than a more 
flexible option of the regime. 
As well as the a priori preference for the volatility measures estimated with the 
HP filter, columns (3) and (4) in Table 3.11 largely present results that seem 
economically sensible. Economic growth is significant and is negatively related to 
output volatility, estimating that countries with a higher economic growth by 1 p.p. 
would have, on average, lower output volatility by 0.4 p.p. The coefficients on both 
trade and financial openness are positive and significant, suggesting that the more open 
the economy, the more it is exposed to external shocks and hence to increased output 
volatility. Monetary shock is insignificant, and fiscal shock is significant only at the 10% 
level, which suggests a ‗buffer‘ role for government action; civil unrest positively affects 
output volatility as expected but is only significant at the 10% level. Financial 
development has the expected negative sign, but is insignificant. Also, nominal rigidities, 
at the centre of traditional Keynesian analysis, seem on average, to play little role in 
explaining output variability. 
For the purpose of comparison, Columns (5)-(7) of Table 3.11 re-estimate the 
same regressions with the de-jure exchange-rate regime classification. At the outset, it is 
interesting to notice that most of the coefficients on the independent variables are 
similar, with the same magnitude and signs as the de-facto estimates. The exceptions are 
the coefficients of the exchange-rate dummies and their interactions with TOT 
volatility; which change their magnitude, sign and significance from specification to 
specification, which is as expected and supports the concern that de-jure regimes might 
lead to invalid conclusions (Section 3.2.4). Consequently, working with the de-jure 
regimes might be misleading. Accordingly, in considering the developing-countries 
sample, when splitting the sample into two sub-periods and when using other 
techniques, we do not pursue the de-jure classification. 
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Table 3.11. Hausman-Taylor estimates for three definitions of volatility (1976-2006) – de-facto and de-jure classifications 
Dependent variable: 
Output volatility 
De-facto (RR classification) De-jure (IMF classification) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
Standard 
deviation 
Dev. from 
linear tr. 
Deviation from HP trend Standard 
deviation 
Dev. from 
linear tr. 
Deviation 
from HP  
Real per capita GDP growth 0.016 0.013 -0.400*** -0.402*** 0.017 0.02 -0.417*** 
 Financial development -0.854* -2.326*** -0.201 -0.261 -0.852* -2.392*** -0.312 
Trade openness 0.025*** 0.008 0.012** 0.010** 3.142*** 1.028 0.603 
Financial openness 0.281*** 0.099 0.140*** 0.151*** 0.237*** 0.09 0.091* 
Volatility of money supply 0.003 0.006* -0.001 -0.001 0.004* 0.006* 0.000 
Volatility of gov’t consumption 0.110*** 0.061*** -0.014* -0.013* 0.125*** 0.066*** -0.016* 
Civil unrest 0.074 0.229*** 0.103* 0.090 0.111* 0.282*** 0.105* 
Volatility of TOT 0.035 -0.011 -0.063 -0.063 -0.005 0.016 0.0097 
Volatility of TOT * Fixed 0.036 0.050 0.050  0.042 0.016 -0.018 
Volatility of TOT * Fixed up to 5 years    0.045    
Volatility of TOT *Fixed - 5-10 years    0.121***    
Volatility of TOT * Fixed over 10 years    0.042    
Volatility of TOT * Lim-Flex -0.043 -0.001 0.070* 0.069* 0.053 0.001 -0.078* 
Volatility of TOT * Flexible -0.007 0.032 0.075* 0.075* 0.019 -0.036 -0.001 
Volatility of TOT * Float Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted 
Volatility of TOT * Other  -0.077** 0.044 0.034 0.036 0.1 0.102  
F-test (p-value) 
H0: ERRs under TOT shocks are jointly insignificant 
0.000 0.286 0.180 0.220 0.003 0.029 0.102 
Fixed ERR -0.774* -0.812* -0.457  -0.999*** -0.291 -0.329* 
Fixed ERR under 5 years    -0.131    
Fixed ERR 5 to 10 years    -0.891**    
Fixed ERR over 10 years    -0.971**    
Limited flexible ERR 0.000 -0.514 -0.621* -0.614* -0.632 0.249 0.141 
Flexible ERR 0.197 -0.767* -0.617* -0.628* -0.605** -0.101 -0.239 
Floating ERR Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted 
Other category (dual market and/or free falling) 1.531*** -0.139 
 
-0.047 -0.002 -1.08 -1.043 - 
F-test (p-value) 
H0: ERRs are jointly insignificant 
0.000 0.348 0.170 0.003 0.005 0.766 0.347 
Inflation 0.336 0.986* 0.279 0.190 0.275 1.454*** 0.430* 
Dummy for Latin A. and Caribbean -0.070 -0.129 -1.167** -1.085* 0.012 -0.132 -1.461** 
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa -0.529 -0.467 -1.322*** -1.236** -0.535 -0.362 -1.430*** 
Constant 2.405*** 2.665*** 3.894*** 3.910*** 2.872*** 1.827*** 3.881*** 
Notes: *, ** and *** refer to a significance level of 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3.12 continues the analysis by: i) narrowing the sample to developing 
countries only21; and ii) differentiating two sub-periods, using the HP-based estimates 
only; similarly to the analysis in Section 3.5.1. Considering the estimates for the 
developing group, it is noticeable that they do not have dissimilar magnitudes and/or 
signs compared to the specifications for the entire sample, except that the significance 
and size of the exchange-rate variables increases (both the dummy variables and the 
cross-products with the terms of trade). This is as expected, because the regimes have a 
bigger role to play in developing countries (see Sections 1.3.2; 1.3.3; 2.2 and 2.3). 
Considering the estimated effect of the exchange-rate regimes, which assumes no 
change in TOT volatility, in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.12, they give similar results 
as for the whole sample, but of greater size and individual and joint significance. A de-
facto peg is estimated to give lower output volatility than a float by a magnitude of 1.2 
p.p.; differentiating this effect by duration suggests that a peg over 5 years has a greater 
role in stabilizing output volatility. De-facto limited-flexible and flexible regimes are 
estimated to steady output by a little less than long pegs; in practice there seems little 
difference between these two and the appropriate test suggest that the effects are not 
statistically different (p=0.5697). The additional effects of the exchange-rate regimes 
under a TOT shock are individually significant. They suggest that a peg, compared to a 
float, amplifies a real shock, with a TOT change by 1 p.p. giving an additional increase 
in the volatility of about 0.12 p.p. (but only significant at 10%). Once pegs are divided 
by their duration, we conclude that there is no differential effect of TOT volatility on 
output volatility under a short peg (the variable is insignificant); however, it is estimated 
that longer pegs do give an increased transmission of external shocks to output 
volatility, with an additional increase of about 0.23 p.p., compared to a float, when the 
TOT change by 1 p.p. Overall, the effect of changing from a float to a longer-term peg is 
estimated as (0.23*Volatility of TOT-1.61). This estimate suggests that a change in TOT 
of less than cca. 7 p.p. will decrease output volatility under fixed as compared to a 
floating regime, and vice versa. Similarly, the effects of changing from a float to limited-
flexible and flexible are estimated as (0.13*Volatility of TOT-1.21) and (0.14*Volatility of 
TOT-1.35), respectively, suggesting an approximate threshold of 10 p.p. change in TOT. 
Hence, for the policy implications, under fixed compared to a floating regime, output 
volatility will be increased with a TOT shock larger than 7 p.p.; and larger than 10 p.p. 
                                                 
21 We do not estimate regression for the advanced economies, because in that case T=N, which might 
cast doubt on the estimation techniques, which are generally justified when N>T. 
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under limited-flexible and flexible regimes. Hence, the same was concluded as for the 
entire sample and this can be interpreted as a robustness check of the results. Observing 
the estimates for two sub-periods (columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.12), the individual 
significance of the results vanishes, but estimates are of similar magnitude as for the 
entire period. 
Table 3.12. Hausman-Taylor estimates for developing countries and two 
sub-periods (HP-based estimates) 
Dependent variable: 
Output volatility (HP-based 
measure) 
Developing countries 1976-1990 1991-2006 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
   
Real per capita GDP growth -0.420*** -0.421*** -0.319*** -0.288*** 
Financial development -0.203 -0.263 -0.466 -0.345 
Trade openness 0.011** 0.011* 0.030*** 0.048 
Financial openness 0.209*** 0.210*** 0.183* 0.0117 
Volatility of money supply 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.010** 
Volatility of gov’t consumption -0.014 -0.014 -0.053*** 0.039*** 
Civil unrest 0.052 0.044 0.197** 0.081 
Volatility of TOT  -0.129** -0.129** -0.019 0.042 
Volatility of TOT under Fixed 0.117*  0.026 -0.008 
Volatility of TOT * Fixed up to 5 years  0.114   
Volatility of TOT * Fixed - 5-10 years  0.226***   
Volatility of TOT * Fixed over 10 years  0.107*   
Volatility of TOT * Lim-Flex 0.136** 0.135** 0.023 -0.078 
Volatility of TOT * Flexible 0.142** 0.141** 0.021 -0.041 
Volatility of TOT * Float Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat 
Volatility of TOT * Other  0.100 0.102 0.057 -0.005 
F-test (p-value) 
H0: ERRs under TOT shocks are jointly 
insignificant 
0.214 0.256 0.904 0.037 
Fixed ERR -1.217**  -0.144 -0.295 
Fixed ERR under 5 years  -0.945   
Fixed ERR 5 to 10 years  -1.608***   
Fixed ERR over 10 years  -1.631***   
Limited flexible ERR -1.217** -1.210** -0.434 -0.011 
Flexible ERR -1.345** -1.350** -0.302 -0.440 
Floating ERR Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat 
Other category (dual market / free 
falling) 
-0.685 -0.661 -0.356 -0.082 
F-test (p-value) 
H0: ERRs shocks are jointly significant 
0.092 0.046 0.810 0.329 
Inflation 0.312 0.237 0.353 -0.098 
Dummy for Latin A. and Caribbean -1.277** -1.195* -0.893* -0.871* 
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa -0.957* -0.832 -0.684* -1.095*** 
Constant 4.810*** 4.873*** 1.470* 3.392*** 
Notes: *, ** and *** refer to a significance level of 10, 5 and 1%, respectively.  
 
As argued earlier in this section, however, variables in the output-volatility 
regression could be treated as exogenous, but still there are some arguments for treating 
some of them as potentially endogenous. In the following investigation and according 
to our discussion in Section 3.4.2, we analyse the estimates of three IV-estimation 
techniques which allow for potential endogeneity of the correlation between a regressor 
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and the idiosyncratic error. These are: the two-stage least-squares (2SLS) within 
estimator; the generalized method of moments (GMM) within estimator; and the 
dynamic system-GMM estimator. All three estimators allow correction for endogeneity; 
and system-GMM adds dynamics in the model by including the lagged dependent 
variable as a regressor and also is appropriate given the persistence of the series (see 
Section 3.4.2).  
According to the earlier discussion in this section, financial development, policy 
shocks (fiscal and monetary) and inflation could be treated as potentially endogenous. 
On the other hand, exchange-rate dummies; TOT volatility and its interaction with 
exchange-rate regimes, trade and financial openness will be treated as exogenous. 
Growth will be also treated as exogenous, for the reasons identified earlier. Finally, the 
civil-unrest variable will be treated as exogenous, considering that political shocks for 
small economies are usually related to global and regional political developments, albeit 
that there are some arguments that political instability could be also internally generated.  
Table A1.6 and Table A1.7 in Appendix 1 present the estimates for the IV-
based regressions for the HP-based volatility measures for the whole sample and for 
developing countries, respectively. In addition to the two IV-estimators explained in 
Section 3.4.2 (2SLS and GMM), we estimate here the results of continuously updated 
GMM estimations (CUE) proposed by Hansen et al. (1996) and of limited-information 
maximum-likelihood (LIML), since the recent research (Hahn et al. 2004) suggests that 
those might perform better than GMM and 2SLS when instruments are weak, that is if 
the appropriate test fails to reject the null (weak instruments), which might be the case 
in the estimations here22. Moreover, these estimators, although not more efficient than 
2SLS and GMM asymptotically, might have better small sample properties (Baum et al. 
2007). We return to the issue of ‗weak identification‘ in Chapter 6, whereby IV 
estimators are our main estimation techniques and hence more attention is paid there. 
Observing the diagnostics, there is insufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are valid, according to the Hansen and under-
identification test. The weak identification test suggests that there is a possible problem 
of weak identification. There is no critical values devised for more than three 
                                                 
22 Critical values are not available for a number of endogenous variables exceeding three, but one can 
argue that the obtained values are apparently small. Hence, we perform CUE and LIML as a 
precautionary step. 
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endogenous variables (Stock and Yogo, 2005), but the obtained values are far away 
from the conventional ‗rule of thumb‘ of 10 (Staiger and Stock, 1997). Columns (4) and 
(5) report CUE and LIML, which as explained, are argued to be robust to weak 
identification. Nevertheless, results‘ interpretation needs to be increasingly cautious. 
The endogeneity test, in all cases, fails to reject the null, which suggests that the 
specified variables cannot be treated as endogenous, given the caution about the weak 
identification. This is an important finding which might suggest it is unnecessary to use 
IV estimation. Indeed, in this situation IV estimators are less efficient (again, given the 
caution regarding the potential problem of weak identification). Though, we do not 
observe large differences compared to the Hausman-Taylor estimates. The still-
exogenously treated variables preserve their coefficient signs and magnitudes, for which 
these estimates may be regarded as a robustness check.  
In the final estimation, we conduct dynamic system-GMM estimation, since the 
literature is not consensual on using a non-dynamic or a dynamic model, but there are 
some economic arguments that may suggest treating output volatility as being a dynamic 
process. Table A1.8 in Appendix 1 presents the estimates when the only treated variable 
for potential endogeneity is the lagged dependent one, while Table A1.9 when financial 
development, money and government-consumption shocks and inflation are treated for 
potential endogeneity. The diagnostics are acceptable: the null hypotheses of no second 
order serial correlation and of instrument validity are not rejected. It is evident that, 
since system-GMM possesses the facility to account for persistent series, the rolling-
SD-based estimates are considerably different from those estimated by Hausman-
Taylor. That the series is highly persistent is confirmed by the estimate of the coefficient 
on the lagged dependent variable (0.88). Observing the HP-based estimates, the lagged 
dependent variable is only significant at the 10% level or insignificant and the estimated 
size of the effect is small, with an increase in output volatility during the previous period 
of 1 p.p. giving an estimated increase in output volatility of 0.05 p.p. in the current 
period. This only provides minimal support for a dynamic specification. Moreover, the 
Difference-in-Hansen test does not lend support that financial development, nominal 
shocks and inflation should be treated as endogenous. In other respects, similar 
conclusions to the Hausman-Taylor specifications can be drawn, both in Table A1.8 
and Table A1.9. 
Summarising aspects analyzed in this section, overall a relationship is empirically 
supported between the de-facto exchange-rate regime and output volatility, analyzed 
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using three different estimators. Using rolling-SD as a measure of volatility is 
problematic because of non-stationarity, which then leads to potentially spurious 
regression. In practice estimates using this measure varied considerably from the 
preferred linear-trend-based and HP-based ones. Also, the rolling-SD-based estimates 
from the system-GMM estimator, which accounts for the persistence of the series, 
differed substantially from the estimates based on other measures. Furthermore, 
considering the estimates of linear-trend-based and HP-trend-based regressions, we 
argued for the latter, because the former assumes constant growth, which might be a 
poor assumption. Tests using the IV estimator rejected the suspected endogeneity of 
some regressors, given the caution as to the potentially weakly identified regression, and 
the likely conclusion is that all right-hand-side variables could be treated as exogenous. 
The system-GMM estimator gives the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable as 
significant at the 10% level or insignificant (depending on the model) and, more 
importantly, it is very small, thus giving little support for the utilization of this 
estimator. In the estimates with the Hausman-Taylor regressions, in all specifications, 
there is some evidence for the exchange-rate regime playing a role in explaining output 
volatility, but the magnitude and direction depends on the existence and source of 
shocks hitting the economy. Estimates suggest that, under a fixed exchange-rate regime 
output volatility will be higher, compared to a floating regime, with a TOT shock larger 
than 7 p.p. Whether this is beneficial from a policy view point depends, hence, on the 
frequency and size of TOT shocks. Similarly, the estimates for limited-flexible and 
flexible regimes suggest an approximate threshold of 8-11 p.p. change in the TOT.  
For the policy implication, for the overall sample and for the developing group, 
a TOT shock (defied as the difference between the actual and the HP trend) larger than 
7 p.p. will increase output volatility under a long peg; and larger than 8-11 p.p. under 
limited-flexible and flexible exchange-rate regimes, as compared to a floating regime. To 
give this finding an intuition, Table 3.13 is drafted, where the last column lists the 
severity of the TOT shocks in the pre-exit (from peg) year. Two thirds of the countries 
that exited the peg experienced a TOT shock larger than this magnitude, suggesting that 
it led to a demise of the exchange-rate system (and the consequences upon the real 
economy). Note that this figure does not encompass the TOT shocks larger than 7 p.p 
that were successfully resisted by authorities (i.e. the peg was sustained by interest-rate 
increases). 
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Table 3.13. The severity of a TOT shock before a peg-exit 
Case Date when the peg 
was abandoned 
The severity of the 
TOT shock in the pre-
exit year 
Albania Jul-92 11.6  
Algeria Apr-94 15.3  
Argentina Jul-01 19.7  
Brazil Jan-99 9.5  
Bulgaria Feb-91 6.7  
Chile Feb-99 9.3  
Colombia Sep-98 4.1  
Congo, DR of May-01 7.1  
Egypt Jul-90 15.7  
El Salvador May-90 20.6  
Ethiopia Oct-92 7.2  
Finland Sep-92 2.4  
Guyana Jun-90 9.7  
Hungary Aug-94 7.3  
Iceland Feb-01 2.2  
Indonesia Aug-97 6.2  
Italy Sep-92 3.4  
Kazakhstan Apr-99 20.2  
Kenya Mar-93 17.3  
Korea Nov-97 5.1  
Madagascar May-94 8.0  
Malawi Feb-94 20.0  
Mexico Dec-94 2.6  
Nicaragua Jan-93 38.6  
Nigeria Feb-95 9.4  
Norway Sep-92 0.9  
Peru Aug-90 8.6  
Phillipines Sep-97 8.2  
 Aug-98  
Sweden Sep-92 1.2  
Thailand Jul-97 15.0  
Turkey Feb-01 10.3  
UK Sep-92 2.0  
Uruguay Dec-01 9.8  
Venezuela Dec-95 10.2  
Zimbabwe Dec-97 13.8  
Source: Estimates by the author based on IMF data. 
Note: The table excludes some peg exits (about 15 cases) for which the figure for 
the severity of the TOT shock was not available. 
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3.6. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to investigate whether and, if so, how the exchange-
rate regime affects output growth and volatility, by addressing some of the drawbacks in 
the existing empirical studies. For that purpose, a minimally specified growth model has 
been defined together with a framework for a regime‘s impact on output volatility, 
whereby shocks hitting the economy play a crucial role. The chapter addressed other 
important issues, which are presently - partially or entirely - missing from the exchange-
rate regimes literature. Namely, the investigation contrasts use of the de-jure (IMF) 
versus a de-facto (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) exchange-rate classification; discusses the 
measure of output volatility; draws attention to the Lucas critique, i.e. how parameters 
in the equation may change when the exchange-rate regime changes; and discusses and 
addresses potential endogeneity bias, present in the growth, volatility and exchange-rate-
regimes literature. The empirical investigation covers the post-Bretton-Woods era 
(1976-2006) and includes 169 countries.  
We conclude first on the determinants of growth. A dynamic system-GMM 
panel method has been used. The main finding is that the exchange rate regime is not 
significant in explaining output growth. No empirical grounds were established for the 
coefficients in the regression as suffering from the Lucas critique. Observing two sub-
periods or developing countries only led to the same conclusion – the insignificance of 
the exchange-rate regime. Using the de-facto versus de-jure classification of exchange 
rates did not matter in that respect. The duration of the peg is also not of importance. 
The duration and developing-countries group was especially considered for the period 
1991-2006, with numbers of episodes of devaluation and currency crises, which were 
arguably expected to have played a role in affecting growth. However, these 
expectations proved incorrect.  
Three estimation techniques, Hausman-Taylor, IV and dynamic system-GMM, 
were utilized for the output volatility regression, for two reasons: i) the literature does 
not agree over what technique is most appropriate; and ii) some regressors might be 
suspected of being potentially endogenous, although there are no firm theoretical or 
empirical grounds for the suspicion. We did not find sufficient evidence to reject the 
hypothesis that all right-hand-side variables should be treated as exogenous nor 
sufficient evidence to advocate treating the output volatility as a dynamic process. 
Secondly, we argued that the use of volatilities based on a rolling standard deviation was 
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suspect, since we have shown that with this series there is insufficient evidence to reject 
the hypothesis of a unit root. Moreover, comparing the specifications with linear-trend-
based and HP-trend-based regressions, we preferred the latter, because the former are 
based on the assumption of constant growth, which might be invalid. There is some 
evidence for exchange-rate regimes playing a significant role in explaining output 
volatility; though this is not overwhelming. Results suggest that a TOT shock larger 
than 7 p.p. will increase output volatility under a long peg; and larger than 8-9 p.p. 
under limited-flexible and flexible exchange-rate regime, as compared to a floating 
regime.  
*** 
On the whole, the empirical investigation in this chapter has led to two 
conclusions: 
1. De-facto exchange-rate regimes are not important in explaining output 
growth; 
2. De-facto exchange-rate regimes are important in explaining output volatility 
and: 
i. Long fixed, limited-flexible and flexible regimes, as compared to a float, 
reduce output volatility in general; 
ii. A long fixed rate, compared to a float, is associated with higher output 
volatility under an aggregate-supply shock, but limited-flexible and 
flexible regimes have marginally lower output fluctuations than long 
pegs;  
iii. Overall, a TOT shock larger than 7 p.p. under a fixed, and larger than 8-
9 p.p. under limited-flexible and flexible exchange-rate regimes, will give 
a higher output volatility compared to a float; and 
iv. Exchange-rate regimes are not important for channelling nominal 
shocks to real activity. 
These findings support the initial notion that, although the exchange-rate regime 
as a nominal category might be not important in explaining growth, it could be 
important in explaining output volatility. In particular, this is an important finding in 
times when countries are becoming increasingly financially integrated, hence exposing 
their economies to external aggregate shocks, which if larger than 7 p.p., as estimated, 
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cause output volatility to increase under a fixed exchange-rate regime. From the 
viewpoint of monetary policy, this implies at least two things: i) flexibilization of the 
exchange-rate policy is beneficial for the volatility of output, if real shocks are large 
enough; and ii) a nominal anchor for inflation (expectations) would be still needed. In 
other words, at this point the issue should be moved from exchange-rate-policy to 
monetary-policy. Part two of this thesis pursues this. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The quest for a new monetary strategy. 
Introduction to inflation targeting 
 
4.1. Introduction 
It was argued in Chapter 2 that using exchange-rate targeting (ERT) for keeping 
inflation low may be problematic in the longer run. After shrinking inflation to a low 
level, ERT could eventually become unsustainable as the economy becomes increasingly 
integrated in the international capital market. The latter exposes the economy to 
increased exogenous shocks, which in the case of a peg directly transmits to the real 
economy and might cause distortions in the short run. In addition, Chapter 3 
presentated evidence that although under nominal shock a peg does not affect real 
volatility, a peg does amplify volatility of output when a real external shock hits the 
economy. If the shock is large and persistent, foreign-exchange reserves might become 
insufficient to absorb it and the exchange-rate peg might fail. Increased pressures on the 
foreign-exchange market are alarming and this puts pressure on the authorities to adopt 
a new exchange-rate regime and/or new anchor for inflation.  
This chapter deliberates on the debate on the monetary regime, including the 
real effects of exchange-rate pegging and, therefore, the reason to abandon it, and the 
reasons for adopting a particular new anchor for monetary policy. It argues that since 
the link between money and prices has weakened, hence making monetary targeting 
infeasible, and nominal-income targeting is still only a theoretical option, an alternative 
is to target inflation directly. Thereafter, it introduces and analyses inflation targeting 
(hereafter IT) as a monetary-policy regime from a technical viewpoint. This chapter 
largely considers the theoretical arguments related to IT while the empirical evidence 
and analysis will be developed in the following chapters. As such, this chapter is a point 
of departure for analysis of IT in this part of the thesis.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses monetary policy in the 
aftermath of an exit from a peg. Section 4.3 looks at the preconditions for embarking 
on IT, separating these into institutional and economic grounds. Section 4.4 is 
structured so as to provide a complete introduction into IT; it covers the definition, 
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transmission channels and defines and differentiates between strict and flexible IT. 
Section 4.5 connects back to the chapter‘s beginning and compares IT with ERT. 
Section 4.6 concludes the chapter. 
 
4.2. Monetary policy beyond the exit of an exchange rate peg 
 In a world with increasing global capital movements, a country with a pegged 
exchange rate and a low, sustainable inflation rate, appropriate for conducting economic 
activity, with a sufficient level of reserves and with a prudent fiscal position (without 
debt-sustainability problems) may experience an attack on the exchange rate as a result 
of an exogenous disturbance, which will further transmit to the real exchange rate and 
cause output volatility with consequences for the whole real economy. If the attack is 
strong enough, the exchange-rate might plummet. If the peg is of long standing and 
there is high capital mobility, this makes the foreign-exchange system prone to crises. 
Findings in Chapter 3 suggested a real TOT shock larger than 7 p.p. will increase output 
volatility under fixed exchange rate (of longer than five years) as compared to a floating 
regime. Consequently, if external shocks are more important for small, open economies 
in a world of intensified capital flows, and if pegs produce increased output volatility 
under external disturbances, then there is an argument for relaxation of the exchange-
rate policy.  
Under an exchange-rate peg, the monetary policy regime matches the exchange-
rate regime – exchange-rate targeting. Hence, embarking on the option of a more 
flexible rate results in abandonment of this monetary-policy framework. Consequently, 
from the perspective of monetary policy, the decision to abandon the exchange-rate 
target requires another decision: the one on the monetary regime with a nominal anchor 
different from the exchange rate. In light of the earlier discussion, the monetary regime 
must be designed to attain the ultimate goal of monetary policy – price stability. ERT 
provided that. However, given the discussion in Chapter 2, the new monetary regime 
has to take into account variances in the real economy and, since it will function along 
with a flexible exchange rate, the volatility of the exchange rate as well. ERT (fixed 
exchange rate) theoretically is not expected to be an efficient smoother of foreign 
initiated disturbances and the empirical evidence supports this position. However, at 
this point, the extent of exchange-rate flexibility is a second-order question – the 
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economy needs another anchor for inflation, while the exchange rate will provide the 
smoother when an exogenous shock hits. 
The list of theoretical alternatives for the nominal anchor was introduced in 
Chapter 1: inflation targeting; monetary targeting; nominal-income targeting; and 
implicit nominal targeting. We argued there that nominal-income targeting entails 
central banks targeting real output and inflation at the same time. As this is difficult and 
frequently leads to conflicting policy responses, no country has, so far, adopted this 
approach. Implicit nominal targeting lacks an explicit nominal target of monetary policy, 
but instead it is based on a forward-looking and pre-emptive monetary-policy rule and 
uses a broad information-inclusive approach towards achieving the target. Within this 
strategy, the lack of an explicit nominal anchor is usually compensated by the credibility, 
skills and trustworthiness of the governor, hence making it a viable option for 
economies with longer central-banking traditions. Still, this strategy is a possible option 
for small, open developing economies, but we do not consider it in the analysis of what 
to adopt after peg exit, because of two reasons: i) the already identified disadvantage; 
and ii) its similarity to inflation targeting (see Section 4.4.1). 
Monetary targeting presumes the existence of a stable relationship between one 
or more monetary aggregates and the general price level. When this is the case, 
monetary policy can be directed at a particular growth rate in the monetary aggregate 
compatible with low inflation. Specifically, monetary targeting requires adequate 
knowledge of the parameters characterizing money demand. In an economy undergoing 
rapid financial liberalization, however, these parameters (notably, the interest elasticity 
of money demand) may be highly unstable (Agénor, 2002). In such conditions money 
ceases to be a good predictor of future inflation; that is, the relation between the 
intermediate target and the final objective becomes unstable. Similarly, in a context of 
disinflation, money demand may be subject to large and unpredictable shifts; as a 
consequence, the information content of a money aggregate for future inflation will be 
very low. Finally, Goodhart (1975a, b) developed a thesis according to which once an 
economic indicator is made a target for the purpose of conducting economic policy, 
then it will lose the information content that would qualify it to play such a role. More 
precisely, ―when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure‖ 
(Strathern, 1997). This is because the financial system evolves and financial institutions 
can easily devise new types of financial assets, hence making the controlled aggregate a 
weak predictor of inflation. All these arguments suggest that relying on monetary 
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aggregates can be potentially risky. In addition, suppose that monetary targeting is 
viewed as minimizing money growth volatility around the money-growth target. As 
shown by Svensson (1996), this policy goal may be in conflict with the objective of 
minimizing inflation volatility; that is, often there is a conflict between stabilizing 
inflation around the inflation target and stabilizing money growth around the monetary 
target. Monetary targeting will, in general, imply greater inflation volatility than inflation 
targeting. By inducing higher volatility in nominal and real interest rates, it also leads to 
increased volatility in output (Clarida et al. 1999). Because of the lost link between 
monetary aggregates and prices, several industrial countries have abandoned this 
monetary strategy (Estrella and Mishkin, 1997). Although still limited, the research on 
developing countries (for instance, Mishkin and Savastano (2002) for Latin America) 
suggests that this relationship has weakened there as well and a growing number of 
these countries have discarded money targets. 
While monetary targeting is no longer valid, because of the reasons identified 
above, implicit nominal targeting is risky for a central bank without established 
credibility and nominal-income targeting is still only a theoretical option. The quest for 
a new monetary regime and, hence, a nominal anchor leads to the consideration of an 
inflation-targeting regime. Within this framework, the ultimate goal of monetary policy is 
attained by commitment to a numerical target for the inflation rate and the nominal 
anchor is found in the inflation-rate forecast. Further analysis of IT follows later in the 
chapter. From the perspective of exchange-rate economics, Goldstein (2002) calls for a 
―managed floating plus‖ regime, whereby the exchange rate de-facto floats with the 
necessary interventions (in a form of reserve intervention or interest-rate smoothing), 
but is accompanied by IT which provides a firm nominal anchor for inflation 
expectations. In other words, there is no longer an exchange-rate target; exchange-rate 
flexibility allows some flexibility in domestic interest rates, i.e. these are settled in 
conjunction with domestic objectives (mainly inflation and output). Consequently, a 
managed floating exchange rate, under the umbrella of IT, provides a nominal anchor 
under a de-facto independent monetary policy, where the exchange rate is allowed to 
smooth external disturbances but not allowed to interfere with the price stability 
objective. From Chapter 3 the findings suggest, indirectly, that managed floating 
provides less exposure of the real economy to external shocks, since flexible rates were 
found to transmit external shocks to output less forcibly than do pegs. Finally, as will be 
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argued in Section 4.4.3, inflation targeters have output fluctuations explicitly stated in 
their monetary-policy functions.  
In an IT framework, exchange-rate management aims to reduce excessive 
exchange-rate volatility and to lessen the foreign-exchange exposure of agents‘ balance 
sheets, which may suffer from currency mismatch between foreign assets and foreign 
liabilities. Moreover, by exerting greater control over the currency mismatch or by 
lessening the level of euroization, the fear of floating will be reduced. Furthermore, 
―[theoretically] exchange-rate flexibility instils risk into foreign-currency borrowing, thus 
reducing currency mismatches.‖ (Tavlas, 2003, p.1230). The latter would, to a greater 
extent, support the success of an IT regime. A credible low-inflationary environment 
achieved by the former pegging would increase residents‘ eagerness to hold the 
domestic currency and non-resident lenders‘ will to conclude financial contracts in the 
local currency. The latter would additionally be favourable for the development of the 
domestic bond markets, which, in turn, further reduces the currency mismatch in the 
balance sheets of economic agents. ―With a reduction of mismatches, the authorities 
can lower interest rates to counter a recession without worrying that exchange-rate 
depreciation will set off a free fall in the economy and a wave of bank failures‖ (Tavlas, 
2003, p.1230). Consequently, exit from the exchange-rate peg will result in a managed 
floating regime under the umbrella of IT. 
Conducted in the above manner, the switch from ERT to IT serves three 
simultaneous objectives (Corden, 2002). Monetary policy with a flexible exchange rate: 
i) has still a firm nominal anchor for inflation expectations; ii) can respond to a negative 
external shock which transmits to a real economy distortion; iii) still has the power to 
impede real exchange-rate volatility caused by a negative external shock, as the latter 
could adversely affect international trade. In terms of the latter, both Goldstein (2002) 
and Corden (2002) agree that under a credible monetary policy with a strong 
institutional commitment, prudent fiscal policy, strengthened debt management and 
prudential regulation, the exchange rate under an IT framework will be freed to adjust, 
given macroeconomic fundamentals. 
The above considerations create a firm departure point towards IT. At the same 
time, they directly touch upon the economic environment which will be conducive for 
IT. In turn, the preconditions for adopting this monetary regime are reviewed in the 
next section. 
PhD Thesis 
Chapter 4 – The quest for new monetary strategy. Introduction to inflation targeting 
 
 158 
4.3. Towards inflation targeting – preconditions for adoption 
 Given that IT has not been abandoned by any adopter up to the present time as 
it delivers satisfactory inflation performance and anchors inflation expectations, a 
question arises of why all countries have not adopted IT. The answer is possibly simple: 
not all countries fulfil the necessary conditions for pursuing this strategy. Exceptions to 
this answer are developed economies that pursue another monetary regime, either 
because they participate in a currency union (like the EMU and ERM-2 countries) or 
because they opt for high discretion within an implicit nominal targeting regime (like the 
US). 
 Requirements for successful IT are demanding. This conclusion stems from the 
view that although IT provides ―constrained discretion‖ (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997), 
a weak institutional setting for monetary policy could lead to its abuse and to the 
ultimate demise of the regime. Therefore, establishing an IT regime in such a setting, 
solely because of the authority‘s desire to have a flexible exchange-rate policy (to boost 
competitiveness, for instance) is doomed to fail. In addition, the successful IT regime is 
dependent on the functionality of the entire economic system. Therefore, the 
dichotomy of institutional and economic preconditions for IT adoption, provided in 
Siklos and Abel (2002) is followed in the next sections, but with the intention of making 
the distinction clearer. 
 
4.3.1. Institutional requirements for adopting inflation targeting 
 Institutional requirements for successful IT are first and foremost related to the 
institutional settlement of the central bank (Hennan et al. 2006). First of all, the central 
bank must be given a clear mandate for price stability, which is often clearly stated 
within the central-bank law. Moreover, the credibility of the IT framework is likely to be 
enhanced by a high degree of central-bank independence from the government in its 
policy formulation. In that regard, the central bank has to have at its disposal a variety 
of instruments necessary for achieving the settled inflation target. This is the concept of 
instrument independence. However, the central bank must not be left alone in 
explaining to the public the chosen strategy for monetary policy. In other words, there 
must be a joint responsibility for setting of the inflation target. Almost in all IT 
economies, the ultimate numerical goal is set jointly by the central bank and the 
government (Ministry of Finance). That is, while the central bank must be completely 
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instrument independent, within an IT regime, it is desirable to share the responsibility 
related to setting the goal (Siklos and Abel, 2002). Masson et al. (1997) agree that this 
institutional settlement, where the central bank is instrument but not goal independent, 
is not tailor-made for the IT regime, but it is a general precondition for formulating 
monetary-policy instruments separately of fiscal policy. This aspect is discussed within 
the economic-preconditions section below. 
 It follows from the preceding discussion that a central bank which opts for 
successful IT has to be coupled with strong accountability arrangements for policy 
performance. It must be prepared to answer to the public for successes, failures and 
remedies in case of failure to meet the settled target. Accountability, in turn, will provide 
incentives for the central bank to seek to meet the target. The main mechanisms to hold 
the IT central bank accountable for its actions usually include publishing inflation and 
other special reports, publishing minutes of the committee meetings, clauses for 
dismissal of decision makers in case of unsatisfactory performance, and so on (Hennan 
et al. 2006). It follows that a transparent central bank is simultaneously becoming more 
accountable and, therefore, in such an institutional setting, these two aspects reinforce 
each other. 
 Finally, concluding the central-bank setting required for successful IT, Jonas and 
Mishkin (2003) argue that the central bank has to be equipped with strong forecasting 
capabilities. As will be explained in Section 4.4.1, an IT regime uses the inflation 
forecast as an intermediate target of the monetary policy; hence, the inflation forecast 
de-facto anchors economic agents‘ inflation expectations, in that manner delivering 
optimal inflation performance. In consequence, the forecasting and modelling capacities 
of the central bank gain an importance greater than in any other monetary regime. 
 The second institutional prerequisite for adopting IT is the abandonment of 
other nominal targets, including exchange-rate targets. Putting it differently, the IT 
central bank could not adequately fulfil the accountability and transparency 
requirements if the determination of monetary conditions were not in domestic hands. 
Therefore, in light of the discussion in Chapter 1, an exchange-rate target is completely 
ruled out in the IT framework. However, a clarification here is desirable. While a wider 
exchange-rate band or a crawling peg, by definition, are forms of ERT, they are 
sufficiently relaxed, allowing the authorities to gear monetary policy to some other 
nominal objective (Masson et al. 1997). The same study stresses that although the 
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optimal decision would be to abandon any ERT (including wide exchange-rate 
commitments), consistent with Goldstein (2002) above, still a non-fixed exchange-rate 
target could coexist with an inflation target, ―as long as it is clear that the inflation target 
has priority if a conflict arises‖ (Leiderman and Svensson, 1995). Nevertheless, resolving 
such a conflict could appear costly in terms of losing control over inflation 
expectations, by sending confusing signals to economic agents. 
 Finally, the adoption of an IT regime should be made conditional upon a broad 
political consensus and public support, as these are crucial in guiding the monetary 
policy in the desired direction (Hennan et al. 2006). In summary, institutional 
preconditions are linked to the extent of central-bank independence, its transparency 
and accountability and the non-existence of other nominal targets for monetary policy. 
In this thesis, the second issue is not questioned. Quite the opposite, the issue is to 
design an IT regime given the abandonment of the exchange-rate target. 
  
4.3.2. Economic conditions for successful inflation targeting 
 Whereas the institutional prerequisites are merely on the technical side when 
deciding to embark on an IT regime, the economic preconditions are more substantial, 
as they touch upon the interrelationship between the IT framework, other economic 
policies and the entire financial system. The previous section started to explore the first 
interrelationship. That is to say, in Masson et al.’s (1997) opinion, monetary policy must 
not be subordinated to any other economic policy, primarily fiscal policy. The concept 
of fiscal dominance is crucial in the IT-preconditions literature. Whereas there is no 
qualm that the fiscal stance should be strong (Jonas and Mishkin, 2003), implying fiscal 
deficits and debt levels supportive to the inflation target, the conduct of the monetary 
policy which targets inflation must not be dictated to or severely constrained by 
developments of a fiscal nature. 
 The case against fiscal dominance requires that the government has a 
sufficiently broad tax base and that, therefore, there is no incentive to systematically rely 
on seigniorage. In other words, under an IT regime, public sector borrowing from the 
central bank should be minimized or non-existent (Jonas and Mishkin, 2003). Moreover, 
this implies that a financial market for government securities should be developed in 
order to absorb the issuance of government debt. Similarly, Sargent and Wallace (1981) 
argue that the accumulation of debt should be at a pace that guarantees its sustainability, 
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i.e. that it will not give rise to explosive and unpleasant dynamics. Even if the 
government does not borrow from the central bank, the fiscal theory of the price level 
suggests that such irresponsible behaviour of the government will lead to inflation with 
a fiscal origin. Then, the fiscally-driven inflation process will gradually undermine the 
effectiveness of the monetary policy to attain any nominal target, including the inflation 
target. In such a scenario, fiscal policy dominates, whereas the monetary policy 
accommodates, a situation which is inconsistent with an IT regime. 
 Fiscal dominance can take extreme forms. For instance, shallow capital markets 
are also a common manifestation of fiscal dominance. McKinnon (1991) argues that 
these are usually a by-product of government attempts to increase revenues by forms of 
financial repression, like interest-rate ceilings, high reserve requirements, sectoral credit 
policies and compulsory placements of public debt. If the monetary financing of budget 
deficits under the IT framework is dire and unsustainable, then these forms of fiscal 
dominance are even worse. Moreover, prolonged financial repression would cause the 
banking system to become fragile and would ultimately undermine the entire financial 
system. According to Mishkin (2004), given a weak banking system, the central bank 
would be unable to increase the interest rate in order to sustain the inflation target, as 
this will likely lead to financial-system crisis. This, in turn, will lead to demise of the 
monetary regime and could lead to contagious currency crisis. 
Consequently, in close relation to the fiscal issue in the IT framework is the 
development of the financial system. Not only the government-securities market should 
be developed, but all segments of the financial and banking sector should be developed 
to a level sufficient to provide an efficient transmission mechanism for monetary policy. 
The development of the financial-market infrastructure is crucial for the efficient 
transmission of the interest rate to inflation. This implies that the market is deep 
enough with instruments, including government securities. Moreover, as IT is not 
accompanied by any target for the exchange rate, economic agents will be better off if 
there are hedging instruments against exchange-rate risk. Hedging gains in importance 
when the level of euroization of the economy is considerable. The exchange-rate risk 
arises because of the currency mismatch in economic agents‘ balance sheets in euroized 
economies; it follows that the level of euroization matters. Whereas a low level of 
euroization is not by itself a precondition for IT, it must be considered when embarking 
on such a strategy (Masson et al. 1997); in that line of argument, the flexible exchange 
rate under IT would create greater exchange-rate exposure to economic agents in a 
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euroized economy. A developed foreign exchange market would mitigate this exposure. 
In a world of increased capital mobility, therefore, an optimal combination of the level 
of euroization and the development of the financial market is desirable for successful 
IT. Consequently, the last views involve developed foreign exchange and banking 
markets. The issue of euroization under IT is returned to in Chapter 5. 
Mishkin (2004) argues that financial stability is a wider concept than the stability 
of the foreign-exchange market. Closely linked to the performance of the banking 
sector, the entire financial system should rely on prudential regulations and enforcement 
mechanisms, in order to prevent financial crises on a wider scale. 
In summary, the prerequisites for successful IT range from technical to 
substantive instruments and policies to be in place in order to enable efficient conduct 
of monetary policy under IT. These are: a clear mandate to the central bank for price 
stability; full central-bank instrument independence and shared goal setting with the 
government; increased accountability and transparency of the central bank; a technical 
capability for forecasting inflation; absence of other nominal anchors; a strong fiscal 
position and absence of fiscal dominance in the economy; a well-understood 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy; and a well-developed financial system, 
including the foreign-exchange market and the banking sector. 
 
4.4. Economics of inflation targeting 
4.4.1. Inflation targeting: definition 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, attaining price stability in the medium to long run 
emerged as a primary goal of monetary policy. The reason behind this can be sought in 
two directions. Firstly, a high and variable inflation rate is socially and economically 
costly: price distortions; lower savings and investment (and lower growth); hedging with 
precious metals and real estate; and capital flight. Secondly, the lure of other goals like 
higher output and employment ends with the known inflationary bias and without real 
gains in the long run (Agénor, 2002). The latter issue, known as the time-inconsistency 
problem, has been mentioned in the previous chapters, but remains an important issue 
throughout the entire thesis. 
The monetary policy has long been reliant on intermediate targets, mainly 
monetary and exchange-rate targets. We explained in Section 4.2 that the former are no 
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longer viable as the link between money and inflation has weakened, while the latter 
prevents the pursuit of independent monetary policy and exposes the economy to 
severe exogenous disturbances. The search for a monetary strategy to provide an 
independent monetary policy and greater exchange-rate flexibility, and to mitigate the 
problem of the weak link between money supply and inflation, resulted in the today 
well-known inflation-targeting regime. IT is a relatively new phenomenon dating back 
to the beginning of the 1990s when New Zealand was the first country to adopt it, 
followed by Chile, Canada and the United Kingdom. Up to the present time, 26 
countries have adopted fully-fledged IT, with Serbia being the most recent inflation 
targeter. Inflation targeting encompasses six core elements (Mishkin, 2001; Svensson, 
2007): 
1. public announcement of a medium-term numerical target for inflation, with an 
increasingly explicit concern over inflation and the real economy; 
2. an institutional commitment to price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy, 
to which other goals are subordinated. This implies highly instrument-
independent and a considerably goal-independent central bank; 
3. an information-inclusive strategy in which many variables, and not just the money 
supply or exchange rates, are included when deciding the setting of policy 
instruments; 
4. an internal decision process – inflation-forecast targeting, in which projections of the 
target variable play a prominent role; 
5. increased transparency of the monetary-policy strategy through communication 
with the public and the markets about the plans, objectives and decisions of the 
central bank; and 
6. increased accountability of the central bank for attaining its inflation objectives. 
In the above line of thinking, Batini et al. (2006) defines IT as a monetary 
strategy which commits to a numerical target for achieving medium-term price stability 
and uses an inflation forecast over a horizon as an intermediate target of the monetary 
policy. More precisely, the central bank decides upon a monetary-policy instrument, 
usually an interest rate, which is envisaged to meet the inflation target, through the 
means of intermediate targeting of the inflation forecast. This definition directly adds to 
the notion that price stability has to be the overriding and primary goal of monetary 
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policy, often specified as an inflation rate that makes economic agents not take it into 
account in their decisions. 
Defined in the above manner, the inflation commitment directly mitigates the 
time-inconsistency problem mentioned earlier. With an IT strategy, the central bank is 
freed of inflationary bias in a regime whereby it can exercise full discretion in the setting 
of the policy instruments. IT helps to redress the inflationary bias by making inflation, 
and not the output or the exchange rate, the explicit goal of monetary policy, and by 
providing the central bank with a forward-looking framework to undertake a pre-
emptive tightening of policies before inflationary pressures become visible (Masson et al. 
1997). 
The IT operation procedure as a forward-looking regime could be illustrated by 
the following simple formula (Masson et al. 1997): 
)( *  
e
ittr        (4.1) 
Whereby, tr  is the alteration of the policy instrument (or departure from an 
equilibrium interest rate *tr ) intended to achieve the inflation target 
*  over horizon i 
with information given today (time t), superscript e refers to expected, and γ is the 
adjustment parameter. *  has no time subscript as it is assumed not to change from 
period to period. )( * 
e
it is the difference between the expected rate and the target 
rate - i.e., the forecast deviation from the target rate – which must be reduced by 
interest-rate changes, where the size of the change is dictated by the adjustment 
parameter. 
 Besides expressing the IT-framework, the formula enables an analysis of some 
technical aspects of the regime as well. Within this regime, a clear specification of the 
inflation target 
*  is needed; an ongoing question is whether this should be defined as a 
point or as a range. Inflation expectations are an ingredient of the formula, coinciding 
with the technical capacities of monetary authorities to forecast inflation, that is, e it
 is 
settled upon empirical estimates of inflation dynamics and the effectiveness of the 
monetary policy to anchor these expectations. Consequently, e it
 constitutes the 
intermediate target of the monetary policy within IT. That is, the objective of 
policymakers will be to keep the difference )( * 
e
it  within a prescribed band, so that 
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a value approaching zero will confirm the appropriate choice of tr , as the target 
*  
becomes reachable over the chosen horizon i. On the contrary, tr  will have to change if 
the intermediate target e it  and the ultimate target 
*  diverge. 
The term e it  directly points to the forward-looking character of IT: the policy 
instrument is set based on an assessment of the expected inflation and not the past one. 
Note that within IT, the source of the expected inflation does not matter in the policy 
formulation.23 The target horizon i is important for monetary policy as it corresponds to 
the time lag needed for the monetary decision to affect the goal. Therefore, an 
appropriate choice of i is a precondition for successful IT. Finally, which measure of 
inflation will be considered is an important question as well. For further analysis of the 
technical aspects of IT refer to Hennan et al. (2006). 
A growing body of literature points to the following advantages of IT (see, for 
example Mishkin‘s and Svensson‘s work in this field). For instance, contrary to 
exchange-rate targeting, it enables an independent monetary policy which could be used 
in a direction that focuses on domestic considerations and appropriately responds to 
disturbances hitting the economy. Superior to money targeting, IT is not conditioned 
upon the relationship between broad money and inflation. The comparative analysis is 
further developed in Section 4.5. Finally, IT is easily understood by the public and the 
                                                 
23
 However, given that there are some prices in the economy which are influenced by non-market forces 
(such as tobacco and alcohol, which are influenced by taxes and excise duties); by geopolitical 
developments (the prices of energy-related products); and by the transitory seasonal developments (the 
prices of fresh products); some IT central banks are generally charged with targeting some measure of 
―core‖ inflation, which usually excludes the prices of these types of products, rather than ―headline‖ 
inflation.  
Nevertheless, given that in the major part of the discussion here we talk about small and open economies, 
even if they want to target the core inflation, these relative-prices changes fairly quickly become 
embedded in the prices of a broad-category products in the economy (a type of a second-round effect), 
so that a policy response will be again needed and, hence, the central bank will be concerned with these 
sources of inflation. Refer to Section 4.4.4. 
Mainly because of these lines of thought, the IT literature does not discuss the sources of inflation under 
IT, i.e. whether inflation arises because of a money-goods mismatch (the example on p. 170) or because 
of changes in relative prices (the example on p. 176). 
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regularly published numerical target for inflation increases accountability and 
transparency. 
Although, by providing monetary independence, IT is often blamed for 
providing too much discretion, it does not necessarily do that, since it specifies a range 
or specific target for inflation rate and horizon over which it should be attained. 
Moreover, the governor is often held highly accountable for missing the range, from the 
possibility of being dismissed (New Zealand) to the need to justify why the miss has 
happened (Australia et al.). Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) refer to IT as a ―constrained 
discretion‖ regime, or a state which refers to point F in Figure 1.1 on p.29: discretion 
based on rules and an information-inclusive strategy with structural and judgmental 
models of the economy and appropriate policy-instrument feedback. 
Another possible drawback of the IT regime is that by tight and exclusive focus 
on inflation performance, output variations could be exacerbated should a supply shock 
hit the economy. This expression is related to the often cited qualm in IT literature of 
credibility versus flexibility (Masson et al. 1997). Namely, credibility could be enhanced 
if IT regime tolerates the cost of losing short-run flexibility, especially in times of 
shocks (Svensson, 2000). Yet, this is not the case in the practical application of IT and it 
directly touches upon the distinction between two forms of IT: strict and flexible IT and 
their macroeconomic impact. These practical aspects are analysed separately in Sections 
4.4.2 and 4.4.3. 
 
4.4.2. Transmission mechanism under inflation-targeting regime 
 In an early study, Mishkin and Posen (1998) argue that IT delivers a superior 
inflation performance compared to the other strategies, by anchoring inflation 
expectations in the manner described above. Gosselin (2007), in that regard, found that 
the inflation performance of advanced countries was quite good - more than 60% of 
inflation deviations from targets were smaller than 1 p.p., with the bias 
(under/overshooting of target) almost nonexistent. On the other hand, the late 1990s 
and early 2000s brought new inflation targeters, mainly from emerging economies. 
Inflation performance was found relatively weaker and more heterogeneous in emerging 
market economies with the target missed by more than ±2% in one third of the cases. 
However, no central bank has given up IT, regardless of the magnitude, duration and 
frequency of inflation-target misses. Roger and Stone (2005) point out that this is due to 
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the flexibility of the framework in handling shocks, high standards of transparency and 
accountability, and the lack of a credible alternative monetary regime. What is important 
for this thesis is that the prerequisites for embarking on IT outlined in Section 4.3 
restrain the central bank from using any other anchor for monetary policy. Implicitly, 
this means that targeting inflation goes along with an exchange-rate strategy other than 
exchange-rate pegging. Taking into account that inflation could affect the short-run 
deviations of output from its potential levels (an aspect mentioned in Chapter 2), a clear 
depiction of the transmission channel of monetary policy under IT is considered 
necessary.  
 Economists in recent years have agreed that the control of inflation and the 
output gap should be left to monetary policy, considering that, ―because of the tradeoff, 
unpredictable shocks, uncertainty, and unavoidably imperfect control, there will always 
remain some variability in both inflation and the output gap‖ (Svensson, 2003, p.270). 
Along with this, the assertion that stable prices should be the long-run overriding goal 
of monetary policy (Agénor, 2002) gains substantial support within an IT regime. The 
latter is due to the fact that almost all IT central banks declare a clear low-inflation 
objective and all put some weight on output stabilization besides inflation in their loss 
functions. In the endeavour to match the operating instruments for achieving the goal 
with the goal attainment, central bankers must understand the mechanisms through 
which monetary policy affects the economy. Mishkin (1996) argues that there are three 
asset-price channels (interest-rate, exchange-rate and equity-price channel) and two credit 
channels (bank lending and balance-sheet channel) that link monetary policy actions to 
the real economy and ultimately to prices. Bakradze and Billmeier (2007) add the 
expectations channel. In order to understand the transmission mechanism through 
which IT works, a brief description of the possible channels is provided next. 
 The traditional channel for the transmission of monetary policy is the interest-rate 
channel. Mishkin (1996) considers it as the most important, since the alteration of the 
interest rate directly affects the investment decisions made by firms. This was later 
revised by recognizing that the change in the interest rate also affects consumer 
spending on durable goods and housing. Consequently, change of the interest rate 
affects aggregate demand and, in turn, induces a change in output. Hence, when the 
interest rate is lowered, economic activity is increased and the economy expands, and 
vice versa. Taylor (1995) found strong empirical support for the interest-rate channel, 
i.e. evidence for substantial interest rate effects on consumer and investment spending 
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in a few developed economies (US, Germany, Japan and others) in two distinct sub 
periods from the early 1970s until the mid-1990s. 
With increasing international trade and global capital mobility, the exchange rate 
has again gained in importance in transmitting monetary policy, operating through its 
effects on net exports. It may involve the interest rate, since higher domestic interest rates 
attract more foreign deposits, putting appreciating pressure on the value of the domestic 
currency. The latter in turn reduces international competitiveness, causing net exports 
to decline and, hence, aggregate output. 
The asset-price channel, working through the valuation of equities, comes in two 
forms: Tobin's q; and the wealth-effect channel. Tobin (1969) provided a measure of 
the market value of firms in relation to the replacement cost of capital, called Tobin's q; 
a high value for it suggests a low price for obtaining new capital (since the market value 
of the firm is high relative to the cost of capital). Hence, investment spending will rise 
and vice versa. When the monetary policy is expansionary (interest rates decrease), 
bonds become less attractive and equities more attractive. In turn, the latter causes the 
equity prices to increase giving a high Tobin's q, higher investment spending and thus 
higher output. The second equity channel works similarly: when prices of equities rise 
under expansionary monetary policy: people find themselves wealthier, leading to 
increased consumption and thus increased aggregate demand. Finally, housing prices 
could increase when monetary policy is expanding, which add to wealth and thus 
aggregate demand. 
Distinct from the asset-price channels, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) described 
two credit channels: the bank-lending and the balance-sheet channel. In both channels, the 
effect of monetary policy is magnified due to a change in lending. The theory of the 
bank-lending channel is based on the Bernanke and Blinder (1988) model, where a 
contractionary monetary policy leads to a reduction of bank deposits which, in turn, 
reduces aggregate loan supply. In their model, the financial markets do not clear only 
through price. Loans are provided by intermediary institutions, which are specialised in 
screening and monitoring borrowers in the presence of asymmetric information. Market 
clearance can be achieved not only by changes in the interest rates, but also by the 
quantity of loans supplied, i.e. applying prudential measures to prevent default - credit 
rationing. The decrease in loans then causes investment and consumer spending to 
decline and thus aggregate demand as well. This alternative channel, working through 
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the balance sheets of the firms, is described in Bernanke et al. (1996). There, the agency 
costs of lending endogenously change with monetary policy. Monetary contractions 
reduce the net worth of borrowers, which leads to an increase in agency costs, primarily 
for low-net-worth firms. In the Bernanke and Gertler (1989) model, when these agency 
costs increase, lenders reduce the amount of credit extended to risky firms and invest 
more in a safe alternative (the process of credit rationing). This happens if: i) the bank 
was unable to perfectly distinguish the risky borrowers from the safe ones (problem of 
adverse selection); ii) the loan contracts were subject to limited liability (if projects 
returns were less than the debt obligation, the borrower bears no responsibility to repay 
his part – a problem of moral hazard) (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). In consequence, the 
higher the agency costs, the lower the lending and the lower the investment spending by 
firms. 
Finally, as explained by Bakradze and Billmeier (2007), economic agents‘ 
behaviour depends on what they expect that the central bank will do, or how confident 
they are that the central bank will stick to its long-run goal. Expectations of higher 
inflation than the desired level will result in expectations of higher interest rates in 
future; the latter will put further pressure on the central bank to reconsider its interest-
rate path and thus leads to an actual increase of the nominal interest central-bank policy 
be. 
*** 
 Now that the possible transmission channels are depicted, their application in an 
IT regime will be considered. A more algebraic approach than here is provided in 
Section A3.1 in Appendix 3. To begin with, assume a relatively closed economy, 
whereby only one composite good is being produced. The two equations characterizing 
the economy are the following (lower-case letters refer to logarithms): 
 1 ,)()()( 1112
*
111
*    ttttttt ryyyy   (4.2) 
ttttt yy    )(
*
1111       (4.3) 
Whereby )( *tt yy   refers to the output gap, defined as the difference between the 
actual )( ty  and the potential output )(
*
ty , the latter being time varying, hence subscript 
t; 1 ttt pp is the inflation rate at time t, p denoting the log of the price level; 1tr  is 
the nominal interest rate in time t-1 and t  and t  are i.i.d. random shocks. )( 11   ttr   
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refers to the real interest rate and is important because it is the real rate, not the nominal 
one, that could affect output. Given that *ty  here is time-varying, this is not fully 
consistent with the assumptions in Section 3.5.1, where only limited possibilities for 
mean-shifts were included in the model. However, it is difficult to establish the 
underlying data-generating processes of these variables – as we discuss on pp. 123 and 
136 and in Section C.5 – in particular whether their non-stationarity is rejected against 
the alternative hypotheses of mean-breaks, trends and trend-breaks. 
Monetary policy under IT alters the stance of the (nominal) interest rates, which 
then activates the interest-rate channel, i.e. affects investment. Although not formally in 
the model, the bank-lending channel would be expected to operate as well; i.e. changes 
in interest rate alter the lending rate and hence the availability of credit to consumers 
today. According to equation (4.2), this monetary decision will result in changes in the 
aggregate demand in the next period (period 1). Aggregate demand (represented 
through the cyclical component, i.e. the deviation of the current output from its 
potential level) then affects inflation with another lag (period 2; equation (4.3)) through 
the aggregate-supply function (Phillips curve), whereby inflation is dependent on its past 
value and the output gap. Increased aggregate demand caused by lower interest rates 
gives rise to inflationary tendencies. These issues are revisited in more detail in Section 
4.4.3. As noted before, the stance of the monetary policy facilitates the creation of 
inflation expectations, which in turn affect inflation throughout the process of wage and 
price setting behaviour. 
 How do these transmission channels relate to IT? Opting for a fast return of the 
inflation rate to its target, the central bank would announce an interest rate which is 
consistent with equation (4.1), i.e. a rate that minimizes the difference between the 
inflation forecast and the inflation target over the targeting horizon. Debelle (1999) 
argues that this works via the interest-rate and bank-lending channels (equations (4.2) 
and (4.3)) and expectations channels.  
Pursuing an illustration, a severe widespread drought in the country would 
decrease aggregate supply (assuming that temporary deficiencies emerged in production 
as a result of the drought), thus causing a rise in inflation (assuming that consumption 
does not diminish in step). Although fiscal policy might be more effective by 
subsidizing agriculture and stimulating the production of agricultural products in order 
to equilibrate the aggregate demand and supply, the response of monetary policy will be 
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illustrated for the purposes of understanding IT in a closed economy. In King‘s (1996) 
jargon, in such situation, an ―inflation nutter‖ central bank will immediately 
accommodate (raise) the interest rate so that to bring inflation pressure down and hit 
the target. The increased interest rate to combat inflation will have contractionary 
effects on domestic demand (capital becomes more expensive and reduces investment; 
bank lending diminishes). It can be argued that demand will contract in response to the 
inflationary tendencies, but if the central bank opts to bring inflation close to the target 
as soon as possible, then this attempt could lead to temporary depression of output 
below its trend-line. In the jargon of Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), a great portion of 
output will be forgone in order to tightly and rapidly stick to the inflation target. The 
sacrifice ratio, being the ratio of the cost of output forgone and the rate of inflation, 
hence increases (Ball, 1993); i.e. the higher the actual inflation and the shorter the 
desired time to bring it to target (i.e. the higher the interest rate imposed) the higher the 
output loss. As a consequence, the attempt to bring inflation to the target might 
immediately exacerbate output volatility.  
Figure 4.1 is drawn to picture this monetary-policy response, called strict inflation 
targeting. The horizontal axis represents periods, the left vertical axis represents inflation, 
while the right one represents the output gap. Higher inflation than the target, * t  
(point A) will force the central bank to raise the interest rate – higher inflation deviation 
implies a discrete interest-rate jump. This will cause contraction of output in period 1 
(point B) well below the potential level (negative output gap), but ensures that inflation 
reverts to target in period 2 (point C). The sacrificed output for only one period is the 
vertical distance between B and C. 
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Figure 4.1. Strict inflation targeting 
 
But in this approach IT appears so severe upon the output, so why have none 
of the IT central banks abandoned this strategy? This is now discussed.  
 
4.4.3. Output considerations – flexible inflation targeting  
 While the empirical evidence suggested that there is no long-run trade-off 
between inflation and output, there is ample evidence of a short-run trade-off (Debelle, 
1999). The latter, represented throughout the above-mentioned aggregate-supply 
function, implies a trade-off between inflation and output variability. Assume positive 
output gap, tt yy  . A contractionary monetary policy (increased interest rates) implies 
a declining output gap through the interest-rate and bank-lending channel. In the 
subsequent period this will lower inflation to the desired level. Thus, a policy that 
requires a quick return of inflation to target results in high output variability and an 
increasing sacrifice ratio.  
 Judged according to the preceding notions, even under an IT framework, central 
banks would prefer gradualism in inflation reduction if aggressive policy actions are too 
costly in terms of output instability (Schmidt-Hebbel and Tapia, 2002). Svensson (2000) 
has labelled this behaviour as flexible inflation targeting, compared to the more stringent 
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approach described in Section 4.4.2. This approach includes both inflation deviations 
from target levels and output variations around full-employment levels as arguments in 
central banks‘ objective function. In this way, inflation will be brought on target over a 
longer horizon, while less output is sacrificed and this loss is not felt equally strong as if 
it is sacrificed at once; that is, the sacrifice ratio dwindles. 
 The arguments of Svensson (1996, 1997, 1999a, b, 2001) lead to the conclusion 
that (4.1) is not an appropriate description of the policy rule. Instead, it should include 
output variations as well: 
0 );()( *2
*
1    ttit
e
itt yyr     (4.4) 
Notations are the same as before, and 1  and 2  are the adjustment parameters. 
Note that this is forward-looking interest-rate rule in terms of inflation. The forward-
looking component of the output gap is assumed to be already included via the inflation 
part, as represented by the equations (4.2) and (4.3) above.  2  is a compound 
parameter combining the policy response and the weight the central bank puts on the 
output, and this is the parameter estimated in the empirical specifications (see, for 
instance, Table 6.6, p.262). A strict inflation targeter opts for λ=0, in which case the 
policy rule accommodates only to deviations of the inflation forecast from the target. 
Any figure λ>0 would imply a form of flexible IT. Figure 4.2 is drawn to picture the 
flexible IT. Light lines replicate Figure 4.1 for the purpose of comparison. The starting 
point is again point A where the high inflation is combated with an increasing interest 
rate. However, although * t , the central bank does not want to sacrifice a huge 
portion of the output (distance B-C), thus giving a positive λ in equation (4.4). Now, 
inflation does not immediately revert to the target (A-C), but instead the return is 
gradual (heavy line A-E). More importantly, the initial drop in output is lower than in 
the case of strict IT (B vis-à-vis D) but it also reverts to its potential level gradually 
(dotted line D-E). The figure is drawn so that output gap reaches zero at period 6. On 
the other hand, inflation is brought on target, but not in period 2, due to the desire not 
to severely affect the real economy. Hence, the trade-off is clear: inflation is brought to 
target in seven instead in two periods, but the sacrificed output in the first year is 
considerably less (vertical distance B-C vis-à-vis D-E; discussed below). 
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Figure 4.2. Flexible inflation targeting 
Source: Drafted by the author 
Equations (4.1) and (4.4) represent instrument rules, whereby the instrument is a 
prescribed function of predetermined (backward-looking) and/or expected (forward-
looking) variables. However, Svensson (1996) argues that the central bank does not 
react to the prescribed information set in a mechanical manner, as implied by the 
instrument rules. Instead, the central bank uses all available information (monetary 
aggregates, exchange rate, output volatility and so on) in a given setting which imposes 
the need for re-optimization in each subsequent period.  
 Rather than setting an instrument rule, the IT central bank is systematically and 
rationally committed to following a target rule, with a relatively explicit loss function to 
be minimised (Svensson, 1998). In essence, the equation specifies the target variable(s) 
and targeted level(s). If the instrument (interest rate) affects the output gap with a one-
period lag and inflation with two-period lags via the channels identified above, the 
appropriate loss function would be: 
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Whereby, t  refers to actual inflation, 
*  is the targeted inflation rate, while )( *tt yy   
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output gap. In terms of the loss function, an inflation targeter will attempt to minimize 
deviation of actual inflation from the inflation target contained by the first term of (4.5). 
However the inflation targeter also takes account of the second term, which 
corresponds to the output volatility and it calls for the gradualist policy approach 
towards reducing inflation. This gradualist approach enables the sum of the losses of 
output in the subsequent periods to be smaller than the lump loss under strict IT in one 
period. It is explicit that, since the loss function is quadratic, the bigger deviation in one 
year gives a large loss of utility than several small ones over a number of years. 
Moreover, as shown in Section A3.2 in Appendix 3, the discounting factor makes the 
current value of losses smaller in future years, as well. 
 At last, reverting to the early argument in this study that IT mitigates the time-
inconsistency problem by committing to an explicit numerical target, the loss function 
adds to this conclusion; contrary to what might be the initial impression (Debelle, 
1999). That is, equation (4.5) specifies the implicit output target to be the capacity 
output, which is consistent with the natural-rate hypothesis, according to which, in the 
long-run, an expansionary monetary policy leads to higher prices but not higher 
employment, i.e. no changes in *ty  (Fisher, 1996), but instead changes in the short-run 
deviation of the actual output from its potential level. This theory, hence, constitutes a 
fundamental part of the IT regime.  
  
4.4.4. Open-economy IT: the exchange rate as core transmission channel 
The preceding sections described IT in a closed economy. However, nowadays, 
this assumption is rather unrealistic. Svensson (2000) argues that in the real world, all 
inflation targeters today are small and open economies with free capital mobility. This 
implies at least two things:  
 The exchange rate is an important element of the transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy; and, consequently, 
 Exogenous shocks matter as these are directly transmitted to inflation 
and/or output volatility. 
In other words, the exchange rate should be considered besides the traditional aggregate 
demand and expectations channel in the analysis. Abandoning any exchange-rate target, 
as a precondition for adopting an IT regime, does not seem to have led the central 
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banks to attach a much lower weight to exchange-rate objectives and to stop using the 
exchange rate to guide their monetary policy (Masson et al. 1997).  
How do exchange-rate considerations impact on IT? In an open economy, the 
exchange rate affects the relative price between foreign and domestic goods, thus aiding 
the aggregate-demand channel explained above. Specifically, if the interest parity 
condition holds, then the exchange rate is affected by the interest-rate differential and 
the expected future exchange rate. With sticky prices, the nominal exchange rate then 
affects the real exchange rate which, in turn, affects the relative price between domestic 
and foreign goods (Rudebusch and Svensson, 1998). Specifically, the change in the real 
exchange rate affects aggregate demand, typically with a lag (since consumers need time 
to respond to changed relative prices). Then, this affects the output gap (with a lag, 
equation (4.2)) and then inflation (with another lag, equation (4.3)). The exchange rate 
may also affect the aggregate supply, as the production costs may depend on the cost of 
imported intermediate inputs, while nominal wages may depend on the changes in 
prices generated by the exchange-rate changes (Agénor and Montiel, 1999; cited in 
Agénor, 2002). There is also a direct exchange-rate channel as well, that is the impact on 
the price of imported final and intermediate goods, which affects the inflation rate 
directly (Svensson, 2000). The lag of the direct channel is typically much shorter than 
the indirect one, with a fast inflation response. 
For instance, a foreign exogenous shock will activate the exchange-rate channel, 
directly transmitting to increased inflation. Corsetti and Pesenti (2004) argue that two 
concepts are related to the exchange-rate channel: functionality (degree of pass-through) 
and efficiency (time lag). Namely, this channel is hypothetically assumed to be 
immediate, i.e. without lag, and complete, i.e. the entire shock is effectively brought 
onto domestic prices. As mentioned in the previous sections, the central bank will 
immediately increase the interest rate to bring the inflationary pressure down to hit the 
target. However, besides reducing output, this will lead to increased exchange-rate 
volatility. In order to return inflation to target immediately, a large increase in the 
interest rate will lead to a large movement in the exchange rate via the uncovered 
interest rate parity condition, as the exchange rate possesses the shortest transmission 
path (Svensson, 1997; Lam, 2003). The change in the relative return on assets (because 
of the change in interest-rate differential) will alter expectations of economic agents as 
to the real effective return on foreign assets compared to domestic ones. These, in turn, 
will affect the volatility of the exchange rate. In that way, the exchange rate initially 
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overreacts (over-appreciates) with the increase of the interest rate, i.e. there is short-run 
overshooting. However, it then recovers (depreciates) to a steady level in the long run, 
consistent with the relative return on domestic and foreign assets24. In summary, the 
effort to bring inflation to the target immediately is likely to give exchange-rate 
volatility. The latter is another strong argument in favour of flexible IT. In a small, open 
economy, therefore, IT is described as sufficiently flexible if it brings inflation onto 
target, reducing the sacrifice ratio and curbs excess exchange-rate volatility. In the New 
Classical perspective, the exchange rate is important in determining the appropriate 
weighting when the optimal monetary policy is being created (Flamini, 2007).  
Agénor (2002) also argues that it is not only foreign disturbances that might 
cause excessive exchange-rate volatility under IT. Exchange-rate movements could be 
instigated by domestic factors such as interest-rate differentials, expectations of future 
exchange rates and the risk premium caused by the size of the domestic public debt, the 
degree of credibility of the inflation target and considerations of political stability. 
Consequently, in a small, open economy, the exchange rate is arguably the most 
important price in both transmitting the effects of the alteration of the monetary-policy 
instrument (the interest rate) and in transmitting various exogenous disturbances. 
*** 
In this section we explore the role of the exchange rate in IT, by building on 
equations (4.2) and (4.3). Instead of producing one good, now the assumption is that 
the economy is open and produces two goods: tradables and non-tradables. The price 
of tradables is set on the world market. Conversely, the overall demand and supply 
equations are valid for the non-tradables sector of the open economy whereby the 
exchange rate (direct quote) gains a role, due to substitution between non-traded and 
traded goods (the N superscript refers to the non-tradables sector; all other notations 
are the same as before; Agenor, 2002, is followed): 
 
                                                 
24 An increase in the domestic interest rate causes capital inflow that appreciates the domestic currency. 
This appreciation stops only when the foreign exchange market judges that the appreciation has gone far 
enough to imply a subsequent depreciation of the domestic currency that will offset the higher domestic 
rate of interest, thereby maintaining the interest parity condition (equal returns on similar assets 
denominated in domestic and foreign currency). 
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Equation (4.6) represents the aggregate-demand curve as in (4.2), but differs 
from (4.2) in two respects: i) it assumes that output gap does not have its own lagged 
effect (the parameter on )( * 11   t
N
t yy  is assumed to be zero, for simplification); and ii) it 
adds the role of the exchange rate. In the specification, changes in the real exchange rate 
in this period (represented by the difference between the change of the nominal 
exchange rate and change of prices of non-tradables, Ntte  )
25, affects aggregate 
demand positively in the next period. The aggregate-supply equation for non-tradables 
(4.7) differs from (4.3) in two respects also: i) it includes no lagged effect of the non-
tradable inflation, Nt 1 ; and ii) the rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange rate is 
taken to affect inflation without a lag (the direct channel).  
Now, the aggregate inflation can be written as the weighted average of non-
tradable and tradable inflation: 
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Assuming that tradable prices are determined on the foreign markets and that these are 
constant (hence, 0Tt ), the following is obtained: 
t
N
tt e )1(         (4.9) 
Thus domestic inflation is determined by the movements of prices in non-tradables and 
the movements of the exchange rate.  
 The domestic interest rate tr  is related to the foreign interest rate 
*r  through 
the uncovered interest-rate parity condition; i.e. that the domestic interest rate equals 
                                                 
25
 This follows back from Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) who make a distinction between the 
empirical behaviour of the tradable and non-tradable components of the real exchange rate. Long-run 
movements in real exchange rates are related to movements in the relative price ratio of non-tradable and 
tradable components. The 
te  part is substituting the changes of fundamentals in the tradables sector. 
For instance, an increase in the rate of productivity growth in the tradable sector of an economy will be 
accompanied by an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate 
te . However, this assumes that the 
purchasing power parity condition holds even in the short run, which is only a strong assumption.  
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the foreign interest rate plus the expected rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange 
rate )( 1 ttt eeE  (and a stochastic component, t ): 
 ttttt eeErr   )( 1
*       (4.10) 
whereby expectations of the future nominal exchange rate change as the current 
nominal and real exchange rate change; if non-tradable inflation )( Nt  is rising faster 
than the rate at which the nominal exchange rate is depreciating )( te , the current real 
exchange rate is appreciating. This, in turn, creates expectations of a future nominal 
depreciation (presses 1te  downwards). this is represented by the following equation: 
 0 );(1  
N
ttttt eeeE      (4.11) 
whereby   is determined by the strength of the financial-market expectations and how 
fast those are converted into action. 
The preceding system of equations highlights the relevance of the exchange-rate 
channel in an open economy. Agénor (2002) argues that it is also crucial for output 
stability; the change in the nominal exchange rate causes changes in the interest rates, 
which further causes output to fluctuate in the manner described in the context of the 
transmission channels above. Moreover, this change in the real exchange rate differently 
affects the tradable and the non-tradable sectors (due to the underlying Balassa-
Samuelson effect), which might lead the central bank to attach different weights to the 
output gaps in the two sectors. This issue is further touched upon in Chapter 5. 
As a summary to this section, the monetary-policy loss function given by (4.5) 
could be amended by the exchange-rate term, i.e. by putting an appropriate (positive) 
weighting on the exchange-rate fluctuations,  . More intuitively, by targeting inflation, 
the central bank is interested not only in minimising the sacrifice ratio (stabilising output 
fluctuations), but also in minimising the competitiveness loss (stabilising exchange-rate 
fluctuations). In the loss function, the exchange-rate volatility is defined through the 
movements of the real exchange rate, i.e. through the difference between the nominal-
exchange-rate changes and changes in prices of non-tradables )( Ntte  . Hence, the 
loss function would be: 
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The importance of the exchange rate is reinforced in a small, open economies 
according to Svensson‘s (2000) and Agénor's (2000) arguments. In these countries, 
monitoring exchange-rate developments is important for the conduct of monetary 
policy. The economy might not be able to bear a large depreciation as it could lead to 
financial crises (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001). Thus, an IT central bank would be 
willing to smooth excessive exchange-rate fluctuations, but would not attempt to 
prevent the exchange rate from reaching its market-determined level over longer 
horizons. In other words, foreign-exchange interventions or interest-rate smoothing 
might be preferable when increased exchange-rate volatility is not consistent with 
fundamentals. This implies that under IT, exchange-rate policy should be reframed with 
limited flexibility, as in managed floating. 
The mixture of inflation, output gap and exchange rate gains importance for 
policy decisions within an IT framework. Namely, while the empirical evidence 
suggested that there is no long-run trade-off between inflation and output, there is 
ample evidence of a short-run trade-off (McCaw and Morka; 2005; Arestis and 
Mouratidis, 2004; Arestis et al. 2002; Lee, 1999b; Walsh, 1999; Further, 1997; Taylor, 
1994). The latter, represented throughout the above-mentioned aggregate-supply 
function, implies a trade-off between inflation and output volatility (Debelle, 1999). 
Thus, a policy that requires a quick return of inflation to target results in magnified 
output volatility and an increasing sacrifice ratio. Moreover, while complete flexibility of 
the exchange rate under IT might be intuitively expected, the literature presented in 
Chapter 2 and Table A1.1 support a form of managed-floating exchange rate to enable 
the central bank to account for exchange-rate volatility in its loss function, because of 
the exchange-rate transmission channel to inflation and the likelihood of exchange-rate 
overshooting (both discussed in Section 4.4.2 and Chapter 2, respectively).  
 
4.5. Exchange rate targeting and inflation targeting: a summary comparison 
In Chapter 1 and in this chapter (Sections 4.3 and 4.4), exchange-rate targeting 
and inflation targeting were respectively introduced. Given that the next chapters will 
further deal with IT, this section gives a brief summary comparison between those two 
regimes in order to summarise the debate on the different monetary regimes raised in 
Section 4.2. 
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As outlined in Chapter 1, exchange-rate pegging appeared to be a solid vehicle 
for achieving and maintaining price stability. The economy that targets its exchange rate 
imposes the monetary credibility from the anchor country at home. The curbing effect 
over inflation is brought about through the exchange-rate channel: money supply 
becomes endogenous in this framework and is directly determined by the money supply 
in the anchoring country (Section 1.3.2). On the other hand, IT curbs inflation by 
explicit announcement of a numerical target for inflation to be achieved by the available 
instruments of the central bank. IT highlights the need for the credibility of the central 
bank, which can not be imported, but instead is gained through a record of low inflation 
(Section 4.4.1). However, the desired ultimate outcome of both ERT and IT is low 
inflation, albeit the mechanism through which it is attained differs substantially. 
Bearing in mind that both regimes are capable of delivering desirable inflation 
outcomes and firmly anchoring inflation expectations, Chapter 2, however, offered 
some arguments as to why pegs today are becoming increasingly unsustainable and 
abandoned. In times of increased capital mobility, the exchange rate anchor does not 
serve the function of absorber of external shocks; the latter might cause serious 
disturbances over the real economy as there is no shield against increased output 
fluctuations (Section 2.2). More specifically, the evidence advanced in Chapter 3 
suggests that an external shock directly transmits into output volatility, with greater 
force under pegged than under flexible exchanges rates. Although the exchange rate is 
still an important channel under IT, the central bank considers the loss of output that 
will occur if it opts to quickly get back on target (Section 4.4.3) and instead puts some 
weight on stabilizing output and reducing exchange-rate volatility (Section 4.4.4). 
Consequently, whereas under ERT foreign disturbances could inflict harmful output 
volatility and cause outflows of foreign exchange reserves, under IT output fluctuations 
are a direct ingredient of the central-bank loss function – the intention being that 
neither will inflation tendencies result in harmful inflation nor will a large portion of 
output be immediately sacrificed. Moreover, within an IT regime, particularly in small, 
open economies, the exchange rate plays a crucial role and its volatility is also taken 
account of by the central bank when specifying the loss function (altering the interest 
rate) and when intervening on the foreign-exchange market (changing the foreign-
exchange reserves). These issues are further discussed in Chapter 5. 
From an operational viewpoint, IT adjusts the instrument (interest rate) so as to 
hit the target, and this relies on a systematic (period-by-period) assessment of future 
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inflation. Thus, the quantification of the inflation target must be explicit and credible, 
and be based on a precise mechanism for attainment. Through this mechanism, the 
alteration of the interest rate changes monetary aggregates or the exchange rate (the 
intermediate targets in monetary targeting and ERT, respectively) quicker than inflation 
itself (due to the transmission lags discussed in 4.4.2). Given the latter, what is 
important under IT is the credibility of the regime, or, more intuitively, the promise to 
reach the inflation target in a horizon that takes into account the sacrifice ratio and the 
reduction of exchange-rate volatility. Thus, the reputation of the central bank plays a 
crucial role in curbing inflation expectations, more than in any other monetary regime. 
Also, as pointed out in Chapter 2, IT relies on greater transparency and accountability 
than any other regime. 
In summary, while both ERT and IT deliver desirable inflation outcomes, ERT 
might inflict output volatility under increased international capital mobility. Conversely, 
IT pre-emptively includes output departures from its potential level in the objective 
function and again delivers an optimal inflation outcome, while reducing the sacrifice 
ratio together with exchange-rate volatility.  
 
4.6. Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to discuss the differences between ERT and IT and to give a 
broad, but rather technical, definition of IT. At the outset, this chapter discussed the 
alternative monetary regimes in the aftermath of peg exit and then the preconditions for 
successful IT. It described IT as a pre-emptive monetary strategy that uses an 
information-inclusive framework in order to achieve the pre-announced numerical 
target in a given time horizon. The interest-rate and bank-lending channels are crucial 
for transmitting the monetary policy signals onto aggregate demand and, ultimately, 
onto prices. Moreover, for small, open economies the exchange rate also plays a crucial 
role, as foreign disturbances are transmitted directly onto domestic inflation. An IT 
central bank would be interested in curbing inflation and bringing it immediately on 
target, except that this sacrifices a huge portion of output. Pragmatically, therefore, the 
IT central bank would opt for a not-so-fast inflation decrease, at the same time 
considering the reducing of output fluctuations and exchange-rate volatility. This is the 
concept of flexible IT, which is applied by almost all ITs. 
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Defined in such a way, IT appears to produce the desired inflation outcomes, as 
ERT does, but also takes into account the effects on the real economy in times of 
foreign shocks, contrary to ERT. IT is particularly important for developing economies, 
due to its advantages over ERT, but these countries should first build a solid financial 
system and implement prudent fiscal policy. Caution is needed when applying IT to 
emerging economies also in light of their vulnerability to capital flight and the variable 
degree of euroization. 
This chapter forms a platform for the further analysis of IT. The next chapter 
further elaborates (theoretical observations and empirical evidence) on monetary 
regimes, in particular IT, and their relation to output volatility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PhD Thesis 
Chapter 4 – The quest for new monetary strategy. Introduction to inflation targeting 
 
 184 
 
 
 
PhD Thesis 
Chapter 5 – Output-volatility and exchange-rate considerations under inflation targeting 
 
 185 
 
CHAPTER 5 
Output-volatility and exchange-rate 
considerations under inflation targeting 
 
5.1. Introduction 
We have introduced inflation targeting as a monetary regime in Chapter 4. We 
argued there that, in the real world, inflation targeters are not ―inflation nutters‖ (King, 
1996) but, rather, demonstrate the needed flexibility in order not to sacrifice too large a 
proportion of output in order to quickly return inflation to target when a shock hits the 
economy. Furthermore, monetary authorities observe exchange-rate developments and 
by foreign-exchange interventions prevent large exchange-rate fluctuations, but without 
the aim of preventing the exchange rate reaching its market equilibrium over the longer 
horizon. In essence, by introducing inflation targeting, countries: i) provide an anchor 
for inflation expectations (Svensson, 1996; 1999a); ii) put a positive weight on output 
stabilization (Svensson, 1998; 2000; Debelle, 1999); and iii) introduce a managed-
floating exchange rate in order to prevent large exchange-rate volatility (Goldstein, 
2002; Gersl and Holub, 2006). The aim of this chapter is to evaluate and critique the 
theoretical arguments in Chapter 4, through further analysis and a critical literature 
review on the latter two aspects of the IT regime. The crucial question is if IT, in the 
manner in which it is defined, amends the theoretical consensus and empirical findings 
on the existence of a short-run trade-off between inflation volatility and output 
volatility.26 Since inflation and inflation volatility dwindled after IT was introduced 
(Nadal-de-Simone, 2001b), and since we argued in Chapter 1 that both ERT and IT 
anchor inflation expectations, we aim to highlight the aspects in which these two 
monetary regimes are different – output volatility and exchange-rate issues. However, 
this does not mean that our discussion will not include issues related to inflation. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 focuses on further theoretical 
analysis and a critique of the empirical literature on IT. Specifically, this section further 
investigates output volatility and the role of the exchange rate under IT. Section 5.3 
                                                 
26 For a summary of the discussion on the inflation/output volatility trade-off, see Clarida et al. (1999) and 
the brief discussion in Chapter 4. 
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focuses the discussion on the developing countries and, in particular, on the relevance 
of the exchange rate and related issues in those countries. The last section concludes the 
chapter.  
 
5.2. Theory and empirical literature on inflation targeting 
5.2.1. Further theoretical analysis of output volatility and its trade-off with 
inflation volatility under inflation targeting 
Recall from Chapter 4 that in the real world, IT is designed to bring inflation on 
target while reducing the sacrifice ratio. In mathematical terms, this means that the 
central bank‘s loss function - set in the quadratic form commonly found in the literature 
- explicitly considers the output gap and attaches to it a weight, which reflects the extent 
to which the central bank wants to ―fight‖ for output27: 
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Where the notation follows that of Chapter 4 (p.174). However, while output 
stabilization has a clear role to play within IT, the weight put on it (noted with λ) is an 
empirical question (Debelle, 1999). The general approach in the literature has been to 
stochastically simulate an intertemporal general equilibrium model, the basis of which 
was established in Chapter 4. Namely, it consists of aggregate demand and supply 
relations derived under the intertemporal optimizing behaviour of private agents with 
nominal rigidities in price and wage setting. They give an explicit account of the short-
term interest rate as a core instrument and of the lags in the monetary transmission 
mechanism (presented in equations (4.2) and (4.3), p.169). In such models, the weight 
put on output stabilization (λ) is changed and a variability frontier is then established for 
an optimal policy response. 
Stevens and Debelle (1995) establish a convex relationship (Figure 5.1, solid 
curve) between inflation and output volatility using a model of the form described 
above (with inflation volatility around a given inflation target measured along the 
                                                 
27 We reproduce here (4.5) and not (4.12) since we thoroughly analyze the role of the exchange rate in a 
separate subsection (5.2.2). 
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horizontal axis and output volatility measured along the vertical axis)28. They argue that 
as the weight the central bank puts on output increases, this elevates the variability of 
inflation and reduces the variability of output. When the central bank is an ―inflation 
nutter‖ (λ=0; point N2), the relative disregard of output will lead to a low level of 
inflation volatility but a high level output volatility. For values of λ different from but 
close to zero, a small increase of inflation volatility leads to a very large portion of 
output saved (upper-left part of the curve). Then, a large range of values for λ deliver 
very similar outcomes for inflation and output volatility and are concentrated in the 
middle of the curve (around point N3). As values of λ approach unity, a large increase of 
inflation volatility leads to a very small portion of output saved (lower-right part of the 
curve). The other extreme, let us call it an ―output nutter‖ central bank (λ=1; point M), 
refers to a situation when the central bank targets the output gap exclusively, there is no 
monetary anchor, a situation that is not observed in practice (Svensson, 2003). 
Figure 5.1. Inflation and output volatility trade-off 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Drafted by the author based on the arguments and figures in Stevens and Debelle 
(1995); Debelle (1999); and Svensson (2003). 
                                                 
28 Points above and to the right of the curve correspond to inefficient monetary policy, where either 
inflation variability or output-gap variability, or both, could be reduced by better monetary policy. Points 
below and to the left of the curve correspond to outcomes that are infeasible. See further details in 
Svensson (2003). 
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The curve presented on Figure 5.1 is called the Taylor curve (Taylor, 1979) and 
is a type of volatility trade-off frontier depicting the gains that a central bank could 
achieve and the cost it would pay. Namely, although Chapter 4 argued in favour of both 
lower inflation and output volatility under IT, and some empirical studies (Batini and 
Haldane, 1998; Bean, 1998 and others) found that IT is capable of smoothing both 
volatilities, still central banks must choose a point to position themselves on the trade-
off frontier. A stable trade-off between inflation and output volatility would require that 
inflation volatility increases as output volatility decreases, and vice versa.  
Defined in the manner to optimize the behaviour of inflation vis-à-vis output in 
the short run, IT is, however, criticised in the literature as being associated with 
increased output volatility (Arestis et al. 2002), especially in comparison to non-IT 
countries, which is important for this thesis. For instance, Ceccetti and Ehrmann (1999) 
observe that while inflation volatility fell more in IT countries than in non-ITers, output 
volatility fell by far less in the former than in the latter. The conventional view is that 
when prices are sticky, IT leads to slow adjustment of output to its natural level. Recall 
the example in Section 4.4.2: a supply shock will be combated with increasing interest 
rates, which will reduce inflation but will depress real activity. Such difficulty does not 
arise when a demand shock hits; a monetary policy that tries to offset the effect of those 
shocks on demand helps to stabilize both inflation and output. Policy is capable of 
moving output and inflation in the same direction, as the aggregate demand shock does. 
―It is the aggregate supply movements that create the essential dilemma for policy, 
because they force a choice‖ (Ceccetti and Ehrmann, 1999, p.9). The choice is where to 
position on the trade-off curve, while the extent of the policy response to a supply 
shock will depend on the economic structure as represented by the aggregate demand 
and supply curves29 and the weight put on output stabilization. 
Erceg et al. (1998) demonstrated the existence of an inflation-output volatility 
trade-off under IT, assuming optimizing agents behaviour and staggered nominal wages 
                                                 
29 More specifically, the positioning on the trade-off frontier will depend on the slope of the aggregate 
supply curve )( 2  in equation (4.2) and the slope of the aggregate demand curve )( 1  in equation (4.3) 
(both in Chapter 4). Whereas the shape of the trade-off curve depends on the inverse of the slope of the 
aggregate supply curve )/1( 2 . The flatter the aggregate supply curve and, hence, the higher 2 , the 
more the trade-off curve looks like the solid curve on Figure 5.1. The steeper the aggregate supply curve 
and, hence, the lower 2 , the closer the trade-off curve to the axes. 
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and prices. They argue that only when prices are sticky and wages perfectly flexible does 
the trade-off disappear. However, this combination of assumptions is rather strong, 
making the case unrealistic. They show that when nominal wages are sticky, there exists 
a variance trade-off between price inflation and an output gap, regardless of the degree 
of price stickiness. In this case, the equilibrium real wage moves in response to 
preference and technology shocks, while the nominal wage only moves in response to 
changes in the output gap. Thus, if monetary policy maintains a constant price inflation 
rate, output must temporarily deviate from its potential to induce nominal wage 
adjustment, so that the real wage can move toward its new equilibrium value. Hence, in 
the real world, it is infeasible to simultaneously stabilize price inflation, wage inflation 
and an output gap. A model incorporating reasonable wage inertia produces increased 
output volatility when inflation volatility increases. Blanchard (1997) outlines a simple 
static model with predetermined nominal wages to illustrate the point that IT fails to 
stabilize the output gap. 
Another strand of the literature (see Ceccheti and Ehrman, 1999; Clarida et al. 
1999; and Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997), however, argues that it is possible that a shift 
to an IT regime acts as a commitment device, and through increasing the credibility of 
the central bank, facilitates the achievement of lower inflation volatility and lower 
output volatility.  The central bank improves in anchoring inflation expectations on the 
inflation target by attaining credibility. Svensson (2003) argues that with an explicit 
inflation target, the credibility of an IT regime can be measured as the degree of 
proximity between private-sector inflation expectations and the inflation target. Shocks 
to inflation expectations are historically an important source of volatility in inflation and 
output, since shifts in inflation expectations have independent effects on future inflation 
(the direct expectations channel considered in Chapter 4). Shifts in inflation 
expectations also cause additional indirect disturbances to output and inflation by 
affecting real interest rates and exchange rates. As a result, volatility in inflation 
expectations shifts the curve in Figure 5.1 up and to the right and worsens the 
variability trade-off (dashed curve). Conversely, more stable inflation expectations, 
anchored on the inflation target, improve the trade-off and shift the curve down and to 
the left, allowing inflation volatility, or output volatility, or both to fall. This is also 
because inflation expectations anchored on the inflation target create a strong tendency 
for actual inflation to revert to the inflation target and, everything else equal, mean that 
monetary policy needs to be less active. Interest rates and output need to move less to 
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counter unfavourable movements in inflation expectations. ―The economy is, to some 
extent, put on autopilot. This situation is every IT central banker‘s dream‖ (Svensson, 
2003, p.270).  
Practical experience though shows that credibility cannot be granted by law but 
instead has to be earned over time. In most new IT regimes, especially when the initial 
inflation is high and a period of disinflation is required, inflation expectations are high 
and credibility is low (Mishkin, 2000a). Hence, the central bank should initially put more 
weight on reducing and stabilizing inflation in order to achieve credibility more quickly. 
According to the earlier discussion, the cost would be more output volatility at the 
beginning of the regime, while the benefit - an improved trade-off and, hence, lower 
volatility of both inflation and output – would occur later on, when credibility has 
improved and the central bank can afford to be a more flexible ITer. As an illustration 
using Figure 5.1, suppose, because of low initial credibility, that the economy initially is 
at a point to the upper-right of the efficient frontier (solid curve), i.e. on the dashed 
curve, implying higher volatility of both inflation and output and has some positive λ, 
but not too far from zero (point N0). Suppose the central bank implements strict IT - 
this would correspond to a move up along the dashed trade-off curve (point N1). If 
credibility improves, the trade-off curve would shift to the down-left; the more 
credibility is achieved, the more the curve approximates the efficient frontier (solid 
curve); ultimately, the solid curve is achieved, i.e. the economy will operate at point N2. 
If the central bank then implements flexible IT, the economy could move to point N3. 
Compared to the initial situation (N0 vis-à-vis N3), the economy benefits from lower 
volatility of both inflation and output. Hence, under an IT umbrella it has been doubted 
the existence of a volatility trade-off is so straightforward, suggesting that a shift can 
occur, making IT conducive to output volatility besides inflation volatility. This view, 
which in the jargon of Goodfriend and King (1997) became known as the new 
neoclassical synthesis, however, does not negate the thesis of vital trade-offs among the 
mentioned macroeconomic indicators. The models of King and Wolman (1996, 1998) 
and Goodfriend and King (1997), for instance, consider economies with completely 
flexible wages, while prices are set by monopolistically competitive firms according to a 
staggered price-setting rule à la Taylor (1979), and conclude that IT should be adopted 
because it smoothes inflation and output simultaneously. 
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5.2.2. The role of the exchange rate under inflation targeting 
Several contributions within the so–called New Keynesian synthesis have shown 
that, under quite general conditions, a simple, inward-looking, interest rate rule can be 
regarded as an optimal policy response for a closed economy (Taylor, 1999). Less 
attention has been paid to the choice of monetary policy objectives in an open-economy 
context, given that an open economy is comparable to a closed economy whenever the 
exchange rate pass-through to import prices is complete, which is a strong assumption 
(Galí and Monacelli, 2005). In other words, under complete exchange-rate flexibility, 
policymakers in open economies should also be focused uniquely on domestic targets. 
Unfortunately, there is extensive evidence that, in reality, departures from the law of 
one price for traded-goods are large and pervasive (Rogoff, 1996; Engel, 1993; 1999; 
2002). Under these circumstances, policy choices are not independent of exchange-rate 
dynamics and monetary conduct is liable to focus on more than just domestic 
stabilization. Plainly put, the question in the literature is not whether to account for 
exchange-rate volatility under IT, but whether to explicitly include it in the loss 
function. For instance, Section 4.4.4 and Agénor (2002) argued that exchange-rate-
volatility management (a managed floating regime) under IT should be explicitly 
considered in the policy loss function. Hence, the loss function should be: 
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where notation is the same as in Chapter 4 (p.179), and exchange-rate volatility is 
defined through the movements of the real exchange rate, i.e. through the difference 
between the nominal-exchange-rate changes and non-tradables inflation. However, at 
this point, two questions arise: i) is the exchange rate an instrument towards achieving 
price and output gap objectives or it is an objective of the policy itself?; and ii) why, 
then, is the interest rate, which is the prima-facie instrument under IT, not explicitly 
included in the loss function? Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999) oppose the arguments and 
formulation of Agénor (2002), suggesting that the exchange rate should not be a part of 
the loss function. The rationale for this is the belief that domestic inflation and output 
are the fundamental concerns of policymakers, while the exchange rate is only a vehicle 
to achieve these basic objectives. Namely, as long as there exists a positive pass-through 
from the exchange rate to prices, exchange-rate changes will affect inflation; if real 
exchange-rate changes reflect situations of misalignment, they will also affect the output 
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gap (Edwards, 2006). Hence, an optimal policy would be to consider how exchange-rate 
developments impinge on these two components of the loss function, rather than 
include the exchange rate in it directly. Moreover, the decision to focus on the 
exchange-rate path in the formulation of policy would be a choice of an intermediate 
target, which, in turn, is not a desirable option under IT, according to the discussion in 
Section 4.3.2. Policymakers are not concerned with the behaviour of intermediate 
targets per se, but with the domestic inflation and output outcomes produced by their 
use. Ultimately, intermediate targets under direct IT would lead to conflicting policy 
goals and might throw bewilderment on the financial markets. This argument also gives 
the reason why interest rates should not be included in the loss function. However, this 
reasoning does not say that exchange-rate behaviour should be chaotic or left to chance 
but, rather, that the exchange-rate should be considered as an instrument to achieve the 
goals specified in (5.1). 
Still, although exchange-rate management under IT emerges as possibly 
important, Svensson (2003) argues that it is difficult to find good reasons for stabilizing 
either the exchange rate or the interest rate at the expense of increased inflation and/or 
output-gap variability. In practice, flexible IT, with a longer horizon to meet the 
inflation target and concern for output volatility, will normally mean a more gradual 
approach and a less activist policy and, hence, reduced interest-rate volatility. Because 
interest-rate changes lead to exchange-rate changes, everything else equal, this also 
reduces exchange-rate volatility. Gersl and Holub (2006) argue that, ideally, IT would 
operate with a free-floating exchange-rate regime, so that the only instrument in the 
hands of the central bank would be the short-run interest rate. To the extent that the 
exchange-rate volatility affects the targeted inflation rate and the output gap, interest 
rates are used to respond to an exchange-rate shock. In that respect, credibility is also 
important because increased credibility and increasingly stable inflation expectations will 
reduce a major source of shocks to both interest rates and exchange rates. Thus, 
successful and credible flexible IT is likely to contribute to less volatility of interest rates 
and exchange rates. However, exchange rates are, by nature, volatile asset prices and are 
affected by a number of shocks beyond inflation expectations and interest-rate changes 
and/or a "fear of floating" (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). Such shocks will continue to 
cause unavoidable exchange-rate volatility.  
At that point, the central bank still has the foreign-exchange reserves to prevent 
large exchange-rate fluctuations and to achieve a goal as specified in equation (5.1). 
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Hence, exchange-rate management through foreign-exchange interventions is important 
under IT (Bofinger and Wollmershaeuser, 2003; Goldstain, 2002; Truman, 2003; De 
Mello et al. 2008). Though, the extent to which the central bank would be committed to 
prevent exchange-rate fluctuations would differ from case to case and remains an 
empirical question. In general, for a small, open economy, foreign-exchange 
interventions will reduce the harmful effect of large supply-side shocks coming from 
abroad (empirically supported in Chapter 3) and this will, in turn, improve the overall 
performance of the IT, because it will facilitate a more favourable positioning of the 
trade-off frontier. Some of the IT countries do use foreign-exchange interventions more 
or less frequently in practice (Gersl and Holub, 2006). This group includes Australia, 
Chile, South Korea, Sweden (in 2001), Hungary, and Slovakia, to name just a few. Most 
recently, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, a pioneer of IT, has been given a formal 
mandate to use direct foreign-exchange interventions as a monetary-policy instrument. 
There is thus not a general consensus on the "fall of foreign-exchange market 
intervention as a policy tool" (Schwartz, 2000). 
The use of foreign-exchange interventions under IT faces several challenges, 
though. Among these, the most important is the lack of consensus on the effectiveness 
of such interventions (which is closely related to the effectiveness and completeness of 
exchange-rate pass-through, discussed in Section 5.3). Most of the empirical analyses 
that were carried out during the 1980s did not support the quantitative importance of 
the interventions (Almekinders, 1995; Edison, 1993). On the other hand, there are some 
more recent econometric studies, which benefited from better data availability since the 
1990s and the new methodologies applied, supporting the effectiveness of interventions 
(Disyatat and Galati, 2007; Dominguez and Frankel, 1993; Fatum and Hutchison, 2006; 
Kearns and Rigibon, 2005; Reitz, 2002). New studies focused also on the effect of 
intervention on exchange-rate volatility (Egert and Komarek, 2006; Ito 2003). 
Moreover, some authors have argued that the effectiveness of the interventions may be 
greater in the emerging economies compared with the advanced countries, whose data 
have been typically used in the empirical analyses (Canales-Kriljenko, 2003). The 
evidence in this respect is still rather scarce, but there are papers that do indeed find 
some evidence on the effectiveness of interventions in emerging economies under 
specific conditions (e.g., Guimaraes and Karacadag, 2004). However, the link between 
this policy instrument and its effects is much less clear than for the interest rates, which 
makes its use as a systematic monetary-policy tool challenging. 
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In summary, while there are some arguments that, as an instrument, the 
exchange rate should not be explicitly stated in the loss function, theoretical arguments 
and evidence are still mixed as regards the effectiveness of exchange-rate management 
under IT. As the exchange rate is generally considered to be of greater importance 
under IT in developing economies, we treat it separately in Section 5.3. 
 
 
5.2.3. Empirical evidence: scope and critical analysis 
Since its ―invention‖ in the early 1990s until nowadays, IT has spurred a 
tremendous body of research, part of which evaluates the macroeconomic outcomes of, 
and/or central-bank policy responses under, this monetary regime. Some of this 
literature is primarily based on theoretical arguments, while empirics by and large give 
comparisons of macroeconomic behaviours pre- and post-IT introduction (see, for 
instance, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001; Corbo et al. 2002; Neuman and von 
Hagen, 2002; see also Angeriz and Arestis, 2007, for a summary). In general, this part of 
the literature concludes that after IT was introduced inflation and its volatility fell, but 
that these countries did not reach better performance than non-ITers with a similar 
starting point (mostly taken as an equal initial level of inflation). In other words, the 
environment of the 1990s was, in general terms, a stable economic environment, ―a 
period friendly to price stability‖ (Neumann and von Hagen, 2002, p. 129). The results 
on output volatility remained mixed, thus not giving support for the claim that IT is a 
superior strategy.30 In that respect, the FED and the ECB continue to show scepticism 
                                                 
30 Ćorić (2008) considers the other side of the coin, i.e. tries to establish why output has been more stable 
in the late 1980s and 1990s (the so-called "Great Moderation"). He reviews three strands of the literature 
dedicated to explaining why this happened: good luck, good policy and good practice. The first two 
reasons are important for the present analysis: the "good luck" hypothesis relates the lower output 
volatility to the absence or relative mildness of shocks during this period, while the "good policy" 
hypothesis refers to the economic (mainly monetary) policy pursued. The former establishes milder 
economic shocks, while the latter points to changes in monetary policy as the most likely reason for 
recent changes in the volatility pattern. However, there is no consensus among authors either on what 
kind of monetary policy changes happened or that these changes are related to switches between different 
monetary regimes, and, in particular to IT. As a consequence, this viewpoint of the literature is not 
helpful for our purposes. However, it does direct us towards an important issue: namely, that the analysis 
should control for factors other than monetary policy in order to reveal a clear picture of whether the 
switch to IT has an effect on volatility pattern. 
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towards IT adoption (Gramlich, 2000; Duisenberg, 2003). IT proponents (Bernanke et 
al. 1999; Alesina et al. 2001) have argued in its favour, though without empirical support. 
This (descriptive) part of the literature is not subject to critical analysis in this thesis, 
since it does not establish or reveal causal relationships. There is a need for deeper 
quantitative analysis, which at present still appears scarce. 
Notwithstanding this general impression, a major part of the studies with 
systematic quantitative assessment are based upon structural models of conditional 
volatilities, Friedman‘s (1963, 1993) model of conditional and unconditional volatility, 
unrestricted VAR models allowing for structural breaks and others. A minor, but 
growing part gives sensitivity analyses within dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) models, which is a recent innovation (see Caputo et al. 2007 and de Mello and 
Moccero, 2008). However, the analysis of IT within DSGEs in advanced economies is 
only marginally analysed. This could be due to these economies already possessing 
strengthened monetary credibility and sufficiently developed financial markets and 
institutions, hence, making the analysis of monetary policy more general (in terms of 
transmission channels and their effectiveness), rather than specifically focused on IT 
effects, per se. See, for instance, Liu (2006) for New Zealand; Dib (2003) for Canada; 
Lim et al. (2007) for Australia; Justiniano and Preston (2004) for Australia, New Zealand 
and Canada; DiCecio and Nelson (2007) for the UK; and the references therein. In 
addition to this, the analysis of regime switch has been almost absent. In the words of 
Nadal-de-Simone (2001b), this is ―an issue virtually ignored in the literature‖ (p.4). This 
could be due to the previously observed evidence that developed economies embarked 
on IT from an implicit nominal (inflation) target, hence making the switch smooth. 
Only the study of Curdia and Finocchiaro (2005), for Sweden, evaluates monetary 
regimes within DSGE under the assumption of regime switch and, as such, is reviewed 
separately in Section 5.2.4. Consequently, in this section we will present some empirical 
studies which evaluate IT performance and policy responses. We introduce the models 
used, but the critical evaluation is mainly focused on the assumptions and findings. This 
is because one of the objectives of this thesis is to build a switching model and to 
evaluate monetary regimes through that prism. This will be a contribution to knowledge 
of this thesis and is undertaken in Chapter 6. 
Nadal-de-Simone (2001b) assesses output volatility before and during IT in two 
models. Friedman‘s (1963, 1993) ―plucking model‖ assumes that output cannot exceed 
a ceiling level determined by the resources and the technology available to the economy, 
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but it is occasionally plucked down by a recession. The model assumes asymmetry in 
the shocks hitting the trend or cyclical component of output. Clark‘s (1987) model is a 
restricted version of the former, assuming that there is no asymmetry in output 
behaviour at all. Both models are a type of time-varying-parameter model, which allows 
for the variance of the shock to the cyclical and trend component of output to depend 
on the state of the economy, and are used to estimate output-conditional variance for a 
sample of 12 countries. The study opts to utilize a regime switch between normal and 
recession time by modelling a Markov process, but does not resolve how output reacts 
to a change of the monetary regime, or explicitly consider the role of the exchange rate. 
A sample of six non-ITers and six ITers in the period 1976-2000 is used, in order to 
compare the former with the latter and the latter before and after IT was established. 
However, since the study is conducted in the period when EMEs started to establish IT, 
the sample is restricted to developed economies. As a digression, many studies base 
their assessment on a comparison with non-IT economies, either neighbouring or the 
most successful ones (Growneveld et al. 1998; Almeida and Goodhart, 1998; Siklos, 
1999; Rasche and Williams, 2005; Vega and Winkelried, 2005), but the concern that 
different economies are exposed to different (domestic or regional) shocks suggests that 
these should be treated with caution. In the context of our discussion in Section 5.2.1, 
the study finds that although inflation volatility dwindled after the introduction of IT, it 
was not accompanied by a significant increase in conditional output volatility, with the 
single exception of Canada. The results suggest that by introducing IT, these countries 
succeeded in delivering a combination of both lower inflation volatility and lower, or 
similar, output volatility. However, it is also possible that there were fewer supply 
shocks in the late 1980s and 1990s, so that the general reduction in the variability of 
inflation has not been generally accompanied by an increase in output volatility. 
Contrary to the studies based on DSGE models, which consider the volatility 
trade-off as a long-run issue, but similarly to the previous study, Arestis et al. (2002) use 
a model of stochastic, conditional, time-varying volatilities, with the expectation of 
extracting more information from the short-run dynamics. First, the study compares the 
economic performance of six IT economies in the 1980s and 1990s, focusing on 
inflation and output volatility following a supply shock. However, the switch from the 
previous regime to IT and the IT regime itself, is not considered. The findings suggest 
that in the 1990s, after IT was established, there was markedly lower output volatility 
for an unchanged level of inflation volatility, with the exceptions of Australia and 
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Finland. Again, though, the sample is comprised of developed countries only, and hence 
the results are restrictive. Considering that the 1990s were relatively shock-free, the 
study, in a second stage of analysis, compares the ratio of output to inflation volatility in 
the 1990s, between six ITers and six non-ITers, similar to the study of Nadal-de-Simone 
(2001b). It was found that if IT was not adopted, a worsening of this ratio is observed, 
which suggests that IT regime delivers successful smoothing of inflation and output 
volatility. This conclusion is attributed to the acquired monetary credibility, which is a 
characteristic of developed economies, and to the flexibility of the monetary regime, 
which implicitly refers to the direct accounting for the output stabilization and 
exchange-rate developments within the monetary-policy loss function. 
The relatively shock-free period observed in the 1990s, raised as an issue in 
Ceccheti and Ehrman (1999), is further advanced in Lee (1999a). He observes three IT 
countries: New Zealand, Canada and the UK and analyses an unrestricted VAR system 
of inflation, output, long-term and short-term interest rates over the period 1975-1996. 
Although important, the exchange-rate is omitted from the analysis, hence neglecting 
the discretion that the authorities (especially former exchange-rate targeters) gained with 
the introduction of IT. From today's viewpoint, the study is dated but it still 
encompasses some features in its quantitative approach not present elsewhere in the 
literature. First, the series are examined for containing structural breaks and, in almost 
all cases, particularly for the output series, a break is found to be associated with the 
switch to IT. Hence, in the simulation analysis, the period from 1975 until the 
introduction of IT is taken separately for each country and forecasts are generated. The 
objective of these is to provide a counterfactual for the situation without a regime 
switch in the economy. The comparison with the actual data reveals that, in general, 
inflation and output volatility under IT have been lower than compared to the simulated 
path (non-IT). However, Lee (1999a) argues that these findings, also present in other 
studies, might be deceptive, given the generally observed more stable economic 
environment in the time when IT was established. To check for this, in a second stage, 
he uses the common-trend-and-cycle approach for the three countries with three 
counterparts (their biggest trading non-IT partners: Australia, US and Germany). Under 
his framework, common stochastic trends are characterised by the existence of 
cointegrating vectors among the variables (long-run movements), and common cycles 
by serial correlation of common features among the residual stationary components of 
these variables (short-run movements). The possibility that the cointegration vector 
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could be affected by a structural break (Nadal-De Simone, 2001a) is captured by 
estimating Sup-F and Mean-F statistics (see further in Andrews, 1993). However, no 
such breaks were found to be associated with the introduction of IT. Modelled in such a 
way, the data reveal that the volatility of inflation and output did not decrease; instead, 
the series became slightly more volatile. These differences in the results could be 
ascribed to the process of synchronisation of economic activity rather than to the 
monetary regime itself; and hence, depict IT as instrument ineffective, i.e. a regime 
whose results could have been achieved without embarking on a new regime. In general, 
albeit that the study is, from the econometric approach, alone in the literature, it makes 
a genuine approach towards assessing IT performance. Still, the regime switch is not 
explicitly modelled; also, the results are valid for the developed world only. The absence 
of the exchange rate from the analysis might appear as the main drawback of the study 
if a similar approach was applied to developing IT countries. 
 
5.2.4. The study of Curdia and Finocchiaro (2005) 
This is, to the best of our knowledge, the only study in the monetary-regimes 
literature that evaluates monetary regimes under the assumption of regime switch. It 
investigates the extent to which a fixed exchange rate, compared to IT, limits the central 
bank‘s reactions to inflation and output fluctuations. It builds a DSGE model and 
solves it in a Bayesian framework. What is of most importance from a modelling 
viewpoint is that it explicitly models the switch from a target-zone exchange rate31 to a 
flexible exchange rate under IT. In such a context, the analysis is conducted for Sweden 
and the performance of its economy under the alternative monetary regimes. For the 
period under fixed rates (1980-1992), the model incorporates an interest-rate rule, 
whereby the central bank reacts to exchange-rate deviations from a central parity, while 
for the period under IT (1993-2003), the monetary policy is described by a Taylor rule - 
the policy interest rate reacts to the current and past inflation and output, but not the 
exchange rate. The latter is justified by the arguments of Clarida et al. (2001) who argue 
that the exchange rate does not play a quantitatively relevant role in developed ITers; 
however, recent policy directions (e.g. in New Zealand) and research (Leiderman et al. 
                                                 
31 Target-zone exchange rate is a type of fixed exchange rate, characteristic of the Exchange-rate 
mechanism (ERM, 1970-1992/3). Some argue that it provides more flexibility in exchange-rate 
management than a pure peg. 
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2006) suggest the contrary. The results of the model suggest quite different behaviour 
of monetary policy: under a fixed exchange rate, the interest rate reacts to shocks 
originating from foreign interest rates and from expectations of exchange-rate 
realignment; while in the IT period, the monetary policy did have greater flexibility and 
reacted mainly to domestic shocks and barely to exchange-rate shocks. However, the 
latter conclusion could be because the policy-reaction function did not include 
exchange-rate behaviour, per se. Besides this, the study has significant drawbacks, 
mainly originating from the many simplifications used. For instance, the role of the 
exchange rate in the IT period is definitely neglected, not only in terms of the volatility 
of the exchange rate, but also in terms of its pass-through. Also, parameters are allowed 
to change only in the interest-rate function, which is not in line with the Lucas critique 
which would suggest changing parameters in general when regime switches. No 
acknowledement is made that the 1990s were relatively shock-free and of how this 
might have affected the performance of the model. Ultimately, the study does not 
directly answer the stated objective; instead, it answers which shocks are well responded 
to under different monetary regimes, but still does not consider whether monetary 
policy was closer to the optimal in combating macroeconomic volatility under the one 
regime as compared to the other. 
*** 
Despite the fact that the work on IT in the last two decades has been immense 
in quality and quantity, still there is no quantitatively-credible study for the developing 
world, let alone a study that appropriately measures the regime switch from one 
monetary strategy to another. The studies for emerging markets are primarily based on 
theoretical arguments (Mishkin, 2000a; 2003; 2005; Debelle, 2000), while the empirical 
studies amount to descriptive analysis of the macroeconomic performance and/or 
policy responses since IT introduction, but do not model or reveal causal relationships 
(see Section 5.3.4). Moreover, the majority of developed countries that adopted official 
IT previously relied on an implicit nominal anchor, which is the closest strategy to IT, 
the only difference being that the target is not officially announced (see Section 1.2), 
which is not the case for the developing world. This could be a reason why the switch is 
not explicitly modelled. Hence, a logical doubt arises as to whether the same 
conclusions are valid for those developing countries that adopted IT at the beginning of 
the 2000s, and whether the regime switch matters for inflation and output. We try to 
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address these issues in the next sections and the next chapter, and this is one of the 
contributions to knowledge of this thesis.  
 
5.3. Challenges for developing economies: theory and evidence 
5.3.1. Are emerging markets ready to target inflation? 
The extensive literature on IT and the review of the empirical studies concludes 
that, in the developed world, IT delivers lower inflation and inflation volatility, provides 
favourable output-volatility developments and constrains excessive exchange-rate 
fluctuations, albeit that no systematic differences have been observed in non-IT 
developed countries. On the other hand, the evidence on developing economies is 
scarce; a few exceptions are IMF (2005); Concalves and Salles (2008); Mishkin and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2002; 2006), Corbo et al. (2001); Edwards (2006). Moreover, this 
evidence is based on descriptive analysis, without a credible study that tries to establish 
causal relationships. This could be due to the fact that, contrary to the case of the 
developed ITers, the conduct of monetary policy in developing economies faces several 
challenges. Calvo and Mendoza (2000) highlight the weak institutional environment in 
the emerging economies: they did not have a strong record of low inflation and this 
could have been detrimental for successful inflation targeting. However, a broadened 
list of issues makes the analysis for developing economies more complex. Building on 
Calvo and Mendoza's (2000) precaution and on the preconditions listed in Section 4.3, 
Mishkin (2004); Fraga et al. (2004) and Aizenman et al. (2008) question: i) the capacity of 
fiscal, financial and monetary institutions, including the increased probability that 
authorities will pursue short-run objectives without regard to the long-run damage; ii) 
financial and fiscal dominance; iii) the exposure to shocks and cash-inflows vulnerability 
of those countries as small, open economies; iv) their exchange-rate pass-through to 
prices, as small, open economies; and v) the problem of high euroization. 
Institutions in emerging markets tend to be weaker than those in developed 
economies. Fraga et al. (2004) argue that a central bank that does not enjoy confidence 
with economic agents cannot effectively pursue IT. Private agents have concerns about 
the commitment of the central bank to the target itself and to its reaction to shocks. 
However, the literature does not refer to the case when credibility is acquired through 
another monetary strategy; namely, ERT, which imposes the credibility of the economy-
anchor. From that position, in normal times, the central bank may be encouraged to 
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embark on IT. The central bank would not face the increased volatility of inflation and 
output nor the presence of inflation persistence, due to backward-looking behaviour in 
the process of price setting. In light of this, embarking on IT from ERT, without 
experiencing pressures on the exchange rate would be expected to be manifested 
through lowered inflation and output volatility, i.e. through shifting the curve on Figure 
5.1 to the left. If, however, the credibility has to be earned over some time, inflation and 
output volatility might be increased. But in the medium to long run, it is expected that 
the economy would benefit from an improved trade-off and, hence, from flexible IT. 
The issue of credibility is closely related to the issues of dominance: fiscal, financial and 
external. In the case of fiscal and financial dominance, the problems that arise on the 
monetary policy front are quite similar: the fear that one or both regimes will break 
down increases the probability that the government will inflate in the future, and 
therefore increases expected inflation. This, in turn, increases the challenge of 
establishing a solid monetary anchor. The external dominance, according to Fraga et al. 
(2004), refers to the vulnerability to external shocks as a result of emerging markets' 
increased reliance on external trade and finances, which in turn might exacerbate 
increased exchange-rate volatility and macroeconomic volatility in general. The external 
dominance is closely related to the sudden stops of capital inflows, which is common 
for emerging economies. These sudden stops might reflect weak fundamentals and 
might generate greater instability in the economy and may jeopardize the fulfilment of 
the target (Mishkin, 2004). On the contrary, the objective to manage the exchange rate 
in order to prevent distortion of inflation expectations might signal that the exchange-
rate risk is constrained, hence encourage excessive capital inflows. These in turn, might 
fuel the domestic lending boom and if the risk management is relaxed (either because of 
the cycle or because of the weak supervisory authority), this might result in financial 
fragility which again undermines the attainment of the inflation target. Although capital 
flows are heavily interlinked with the exchange rate we analyse the issues separately, to 
highlight their importance and/or the concern around them. 
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5.3.2. Exchange-rate volatility and pass-through in developing inflation 
targeters 
As mentioned in the preceding sections, the exchange rate gains importance 
within emerging markets that established or opt to establish an IT framework. The 
literature (Amato and Gerlach, 2002; Eichengreen et al. 1999; Chang and Velasco, 2000) 
assigns such an importance to the exchange rate because of the following: i) in emerging 
markets, large shocks or capital flows cause significant volatility in the exchange rate, if 
not responded to by policy actions; ii) in economies with lessened monetary credibility, 
the exchange rate tends to be the core transmission channel to inflation and, hence, the 
focal point of inflation expectations; and iii) exchange-rate volatility affects foreign-
currency borrowing and may affect firms' profitability through its balance-sheet effects. 
We have previously argued that developing countries are more vulnerable to external 
shocks, mainly because of two reasons: i) they are small and open, and hence dependent 
on the regional or world economy; and ii) their policies are usually less credible, which 
might impact on investors‘ incentives and lead to a withdrawal of their investments. 
Consequently, a large external shock or a sudden stop of cash flows would inflict 
increased exchange-rate volatility (Eichengreen et al. 1999) in an IT economy. This 
volatility will throw confusion onto the financial markets, distort inflation expectations, 
change the value of foreign-currency denominated assets and liabilities (and thus 
increase the exchange-rate risk and the induced risk of default) and, in consequence, 
complicate the achievement of the inflation target. Because of this, and as we have 
argued in Chapter 4, countries usually fear to float (Calvo and Reinhart, 2004) and use 
reserve interventions or interest-rate smoothing to prevent such a scenario (Amato and 
Gerlach, 2002), even when the underlying shocks are transitory (Stein et al. 1999). 
However, authorities would not opt to restrain the exchange rate from achieving its 
market value over longer horizons. Instead, in the short run and more frequently in the 
first stages of IT, such smoothing would appear necessary to prevent large fluctuations, 
but should not coincide with exchange-rate anchoring. The latter suggests, inter alia, 
that multiple monetary targets are "leaning against the wind" and could result in 
conflict, although Debelle (2000) and Leiderman et al. (2006) argue that these might 
coexist if hierarchically subordinated and if they do not target the trend of the real 
exchange rate. 
The role of exchange-rate volatility in emerging markets is reinforced given the 
importance of the exchange-rate channel in transmitting monetary-policy actions to real 
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activity. Standard small, open economy IT models, such as Ball (1999) and Svensson 
(2000) embody a central role for the exchange rate in the transmission from monetary 
policy to inflation. For instance, a rise in domestic interest rates to combat inflationary 
pressures typically leads to a short-run appreciation of the nominal and real exchange 
rate, which in turn helps to calm inflationary pressures through both direct and indirect 
channels. Namely, the appreciation will make imported goods cheaper (and, hence, 
prices in the tradable sector lower), hence directly contributing to offsetting inflationary 
pressures. The indirect effect occurs through the effect of the appreciation on aggregate 
demand, output and prices. Svensson (1998; 2000; 2007) argues that the direct 
exchange-rate channel, at the same time, has the shortest transmission path. However, 
the effectiveness of this channel is usually ignored in the context of IT. Edwards (2006) 
is among the few in the field that raises the importance of this issue and argues that, 
historically, the effect of exchange-rate pass-through tended to be large in emerging 
markets. However, Taylor (2000) argued that the 1990s saw a decline of the exchange-
rate pass-through, which is considered to be a result of the decline in inflation and its 
volatility
32
. This might suggest that the effectiveness of the exchange-rate channel might 
be important in the initial IT phase until the regime gains credibility and curbs inflation 
(if it is at a higher level); thereafter, as IT becomes more successful, the pass-through is 
expected to decline due to the combined effect of lower inflation, flexible exchange rate 
and greater central-bank credibility under IT (Nogueira, 2006; Gulsen, 2009). Mishkin 
(2008) explains that in a context of a stable and predictable monetary-policy 
environment, nominal shocks play a vastly reduced role in driving inflation and 
exchange-rate volatility, which "supported by an institutional framework that allows the 
central bank to pursue a policy independent of fiscal considerations and political 
pressures, effectively remove[ing] an important potential source of high pass-through of 
                                                 
32 Several empirical studies tried to measure the effectiveness. For instance, Borensztein and De Gregorio 
(1999; cited in Edwards, 2006) used a sample of 41 countries and estimated that 30% of a nominal 
depreciation has been passed through to inflation after one year; after two years, the pass-through was a 
very high 60% on average. They have also found that the degree of the pass-through has been 
significantly smaller in advanced economies. As for the proposition of Taylor (2000), Gagnon and Ihrig 
(2004) tested it on a sample of advanced countries and found that changes in the pass-through were 
related to the operation of the monetary policy, i.e. to IT. The same conclusion is confirmed by Edwards 
(2006) for an emerging group of countries. 
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exchange-rate changes to consumer prices" (p.4) 33. Moreover, it suggests that the 
opposite also holds: increased exchange-rate volatility under a low pass-through to 
prices cannot threaten inflation volatility, which is in favour of the IT regime.  
Along with the caveats to executing effective IT in developing economies, 
Leiderman et al. (2006) argue that the achievement of an inflation target would seem to 
face a further difficulty in a highly financially euroized economy. We address this issue 
in the following sub-section. 
 
5.3.3. Inflation targeting in euroized/dollarized economies 
The credibility of the fiscal and monetary institutions (i.e. the credibility of the 
central bank to achieve the target and of the fiscal authority to support it) could directly 
reflect on people‘s willingness to hold the domestic currency, thus leading to increased 
currency substitution if the institutions are suspect. The concern of Mishkin (2004) 
related to the need for credibility to target inflation should be taken seriously; however, 
the standing of the central bank attained by pegging the exchange rate is not included in 
his analysis. The majority of developing-economy ITers embarked on this strategy from 
ERT; the latter introduces the credibility of the central bank, as argued in Chapter 1. 
The level of the central-bank's credibility may be shown via the eagerness to hold the 
domestic currency; i.e. is reflected in the level of dollarization/euroization in the 
economy. A loss of confidence will result in a shift between domestic and foreign-
                                                 
33 The channels through which IT is argued to reduce the exchange-rate pass-through are lenghtly 
explained in Gulsen (2009) and Nogueira (2006). Within the first channel, a low inflation environment 
negatively affects the persistence of costs changes, which then positively correlates with the pass-through 
(Taylor, 2000; Fuji and Bailliu, 2004). The second channel works through the flexible exchange rate under 
IT: agents may view the exchange-rate movements as temporary and do not react on them systematically; 
also, foreign-exchange interventions reduce the correlation between inflation and exchange-rate 
depreciation; both effects working to weaken the pass-through (Guinigundo, 2008). The third channel 
works through the acquired credibility under IT: expectations formation changes under IT, since the 
inflation target and not the exchange rate is considered to be the anchor that affects price setting in the 
economy. This is likely to reduce the exchange-rate pass-through (Mishkin and Savastano, 2001; Schmidt-
Hebbel et al. 2002). However, a critique of this strand of the literature is that it ignores the arguments that 
the effectiveness of the first and the third channel might have been already exhausted at the moment of 
establishing IT, if inflation was curbed and credibility acquired during ERT, hence making any post-
switch pass-through decline possibly smaller. Moreover, it is not clear if the first channel can be ascribed 
to IT or to the generally shock-free period. 
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denominated assets, which will further complicate the central bank's task of achieving 
the inflation target. Moreover, in small, open economies, a portion of euroization might 
happen because of the need to carry out international transactions.  
Notwithstanding this, let us assume that a developing country is highly euroized 
- its debts are denominated in euros, while firms depend on local currency receipts. 
Under these conditions, private sector and banks' balance sheets can be vulnerable to 
the type of nominal and real exchange-rate shifts that should occur for IT to work 
effectively. In particular, through balance-sheet effects, large real exchange-rate 
depreciations (for instance, due to a sudden stop), could have a contractionary effect on 
output and be associated with bank failures. That is, instead of real exchange-rate 
depreciation having a positive impact on output, as in a standard model, it would inflict 
a negative effect (Leiderman et al. 2006). However, the level of euroization is not a strict 
precondition for embarking on IT: quite the contrary, since IT is accompanied by a 
flexible exchange rate, the persistent exchange-rate risk will force agents to permanently 
balance their portfolios (the so-called de-euroization in the jargon of Armas and Grippa, 
2006) and will induce fear of floating, forcing the government to prevent large 
exchange-rate fluctuations, as argued earlier (Mishkin, 2000b). The latter also supports 
the view that in small, open economy the exchange-rate channel is of vital importance 
(Section 5.3.2): in euroized economies this is reinforced (Bakradze and Billmeier, 2007). 
Also, IT in partially euroized economies may not be viable unless there are stringent 
prudential regulations on, and strict supervision of, financial institutions that ensure that 
the system is capable of withstanding exchange-rate shocks. 
Given the theoretical observations and the empirical evidence (Leiderman et al. 
2006; Armas and Grippa, 2006) that financial euroization does not preclude an 
independent monetary policy oriented at maintaining low and stable inflation rate, 
euroization is not of interest within the IT literature. For instance, to the best of our 
knowledge, only the two cited studies deal with this concept under IT. Leiderman et al. 
(2006) compare two highly dollarized IT economies, Peru and Bolivia, with two IT 
economies with low levels of dollarization, Chile and Colombia. They conclude that, 
while high dollarization does introduce significant differences in both the transmission 
capacity of monetary policy and its impact on the real and financial sectors, it does not 
seem to preclude the use of IT as an effective policy regime, per se. The same 
conclusion is reached in the separate study for Peru (Armas and Grippa, 2006), 
highlighting the importance of the exchange-rate channel and the choice of operational 
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target and that IT contributed to reducing the level of dollarization (by the process of 
dollarization control, i.e. balancing portfolios because of the constant exchange-rate 
risk). No study currently quantifies the effect more thoroughly, which might suggest 
that indeed the level of euroization is not of much concern.  
 
5.3.4. Review of empirical analyses with emphasis on exchange-rate 
issues 
The very scarce evidence of IT performance in developing countries gives 
support to the relative success of this framework. This strand of the literature is 
generally based on a descriptive analysis of the macroeconomic performance and policy 
responses pre- and post-IT introduction. To begin with, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel 
(2007) find that IT in emerging countries performs less well than in advanced countries, 
although reductions in inflation after IT introduction were found to be substantial. IMF 
(2005) presents results of a study focusing on 13 emerging ITers, compared with 29 
other emerging market economies. They report that IT is associated with a significant 
4.8 p.p. reduction in average inflation and a reduction of its volatility by 3.6 p.p. 
Conçalves and Salles (2008) apply the same methodology to 36 emerging economies. 
Similar to the IMF study, they find that adoption of an IT regime leads to lower average 
inflation rates and reduced output growth volatility compared to a control group of 
non-ITers. A recent edited volume published by the OECD (De Mello, 2008) on IT in 
emerging markets, focusing mainly on individual country case studies, also finds quite 
positive outcomes associated with the adoption of IT regimes. A general drawback of 
these studies, as said previously, is that they do not discover causal relationships as they 
apply neither any modelling framework nor any identification strategy. 
A restricted, but growing number of studies analyse IT in developing economies 
through DSGE models. Caputo and Liendo (2005); Caputo et al. (2007) and Del Negro 
and Schorfheide (2008) develop standard DSGE models for Chile. They all observe the 
IT period only and conclude that inflation volatility mainly originated from domestic 
shocks, but the strong central-bank response to inflation dynamics did not result in 
great changes in inflation volatility. Moreover, the central bank did not respond to 
exchange-rate movements under IT. Strangely, no conclusion is on hand for the output 
volatility, which might result from the relative simplicity of their models. The study of 
McDermott and McMenamin (2008) developed a DSGE model for emerging ITers in 
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Latin America; although it makes a significant contribution to the literature as it 
observes IT in relative terms (pre- vs. post-IT period and ITers vs. non-ITers, which is 
not a case for other studies based on DSGE models), the study has significant 
drawbacks. It finds IT that central banks are more aggressive towards inflation volatility 
under IT than they were prior to IT adoption and compared to non-IT central banks; 
though, IT central banks in the model are treated as being pure ―inflation nutters‖, i.e. 
output volatility is not considered. Also, the model does not incorporate the foreign 
sector and the exchange rate or the level of dollarization, issues which were highlighted 
as important for the developing world. Although no study explicitly explored a 
monetary-regime switch from ERT to IT, the DSGE model for Hungary (Jakab and 
Vilagi, 2008) considers two interest-rate rules given the two monetary regimes in 
Hungary. The finding is that indexation in consumer prices did have a lesser role in the 
IT regime than in the previous crawling peg regime. However, the study does not 
investigate the differences in terms of inflation and output volatility and exchange-rate 
developments. The classically-estimated DSGE-type New Keynesian model developed 
for Israel (Argov et al. 2007) highlights the importance of the exchange rate in 
conducting monetary policy under IT, but no special emphasis is given to volatilities. 
Only one study (Edwards, 2006) has, so far, empirically modelled exchange-rate 
volatility under IT and only a few empirical studies have focused on the central-bank's 
reaction functions in emerging markets. Edwards (2006) explores monthly data for 
seven countries (five of which are developing), in the period 1988-2005. It employs a 
GARCH model of the nominal exchange rate to test if the adoption of IT has affected 
exchange-rate volatility, conditional on the switch to a new exchange-rate regime (given 
that in emerging markets the adoption of IT meant a switch to a flexible option of the 
exchange rate, which could have been the source of volatility). For the purpose of 
accounting for the latter differences, two dummies isolate those effects: one for the 
monetary regime and one for the exchange-rate regime, which is a step usually neglected 
in other studies. They find no evidence that IT increased the nominal effective 
exchange-rate volatility. Quite the contrary, after controlling for the exchange-rate 
regime, IT has tended to reduce the conditional volatility of the exchange rate. A similar 
conclusion is reached when the real exchange rate is considered. Although plausible, 
these results are not supported by other studies at present. Hence, this is a research area 
in a maturing process, both in terms of practical experiences and in terms of empirical 
investigations. 
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The studies that model the interest-rate function in IT economies usually 
employ a form of VAR (individual cases) or standard panel FE and RE models34 (group 
cases) to estimate the elasticities; these estimates are important since they consider the 
role of the exchange rate in those countries, and hence we review some of them. 
Schmidt-Hebbel et al. (2002) apply a VAR model to compare the IT experiences of 
Brazil, Chile and Mexico. They estimate Taylor-rule equations for each country with the 
real interest rate as the dependent variable. Only for Brazil is the expected inflation gap 
(between actual and target inflation) statistically significant, whereas only for Chile is the 
output gap statistically significant. They find no evidence that the central banks have 
consistently reacted to exchange rate movements. One drawback of these time-series 
regressions is the very short sample periods, which might cast doubt on the estimated 
coefficients; also any restrictions derived from the theory of IT are not modelled, but 
variables interact in a general VAR framework. A similar approach is also followed by 
Cordo et al. (2001) for the period 1990-1999 (quarterly data) for IT countries (Chile and 
Israel), the then potential ITers (South Africa, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Korea) and 
one non-IT country (Indonesia). In the first two categories, four central banks appear to 
respond to inflation (output) deviations from target in setting interest rates, but the 
study does not consider the role of the exchange rate, which might be regarded as its 
main drawback. 
Mohanty and Klau (2005) estimate modified Taylor rules for 13 emerging and 
transition economies over the period 1990-2002, including, as well as inflation, the 
output gap and lagged interest rates, current and lagged real exchange-rate changes. 
They find that the coefficients on the real exchange rate are statistically significant in ten 
countries (OLS estimates), with a significant contemporaneous effect ranging from 0.01 
to 0.79 p.p. increase of interest rate when the real exchange rate depreciates by 1 p.p. 
(see Table 5.1 below). The policy response to exchange-rate changes is frequently larger 
than the response to inflation and the output gap, which might confirm our concerns 
that in the developing IT world the exchange rate must not be disregarded at any cost 
(whether for policy analysis or implementation). Mohanty and Klau (2005) do not 
explicitly address the IT issue in this context, but it is apparent that these countries, 
whether or not they profess to follow an IT regime, are attempting to stabilize real 
                                                 
34 Which, in certain cases, could be certainly criticized, but this is not pursued in more detail here because 
of space. 
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exchange rates as well as control inflation and stabilize output. Building on Mohanty 
and Khau's (2005) study, Edwards (2006) investigates the determinants of exchange-rate 
response in Taylor-rule regressions. He runs cross-country regressions of the exchange-
rate coefficient on several explanatory variables (each regression with 13 observations) 
and finds that countries with a history of high inflation, and with historically high real 
exchange-rate volatility, tend to have a higher coefficient on the real exchange rate in 
Taylor-rule equations, which supports the view that exchange-rate volatility does indeed 
play a strong role in the IT framework. 
De Mello and Moccero (2008) estimate interest-rate policy rules within a New 
Keynesian structural model with equations for inflation, output and interest rates, for 
four Latin American emerging markets (Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico), 
characterized by IT and flexible exchange rates in 1999. They find IT, as a post-1999 
regime, is associated with stronger and persistent responses to expected inflation in 
Brazil and Chile. Mexico is the only country where changes in nominal exchange rates 
were found to be statistically significant in the central bank‘s reaction function during 
the IT period (Table 5.1). Aizenman et al. (2008) also use a variant of a Taylor-rule 
specification to test whether the interest rate responds to the developments in the real 
exchange rate. They use panel regression (a FE model) of 16 emerging markets over the 
period 1989-2006, to explore if the external vulnerability (as approximated by the 
exchange-rate volatility and trade openness) has a role to play in the interest-rate setting. 
The general finding is that the exchange rate plays a crucial role in the monetary 
framework of the developing economies, but is less important than in non-ITers, 
probably because the primary concern of ITers is inflation (Table 5.1). Moreover, the 
study finds that the exchange rate gains even more importance in ITers with more 
concentrated exports.  
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Table 5.1. Interest-rate response to changes in the exchange rate 
(elasticities from studies examining group of emerging economies)  
Country Mohanty and Klau 
(2005) 
De Mello and 
Moccero (2008) 
Aizenman et al. 
(2008) 
 Short term Long term Pre-IT Post-IT Non-IT IT 
       
India 0.18*** 0.60***     
Korea 0.29*** 0.67***     
Philippines 0.09** 0.13**     
Taiwan 0.03 0.18**     
Thailand 0.31*** 0.74***     
       
Brazil 0.10** 0.36*** 5.08 0.47***   
Chile 0.01*** 0.03*** -0.40 -0.16   
Mexico 0.79*** 1.58*** 2.85*** 3.75***   
Peru 0.38*** 2.71***     
Colombia   -0.24 -0.13   
       
Czech Republic -0.03 -0.19     
Hungary 0.15** 0.60**     
Poland 0.05 0.20**     
       
South Africa 0.12*** 6.00***     
       
Panel of countries     0.07*** 0.13*** 
Source: Mohanty and Klau (2005); De Mello and Moccero (2008); Aizenman et al. (2008) 
Note: *, ** and *** refer to a significance level of 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. ● The real exchange 
rate is defined so that an increase means a depreciation. 
 
In general, the majority of the studies confirm that the exchange rate has a role 
to play in an IT framework. The empirical studies reviewed report interest-rate increase 
ranging from very low, 0.01, to very high, 3.75, when the exchange rate depreciates by 1 
p.p. However, Taylor (2001) and Edwards (2006) express their scepticism on the merits 
of adding the exchange rate into the policy-rule function, because of the indirect role of 
the exchange rate on inflation and output (discussed in Section 5.2.2) and because its 
addition could add volatility to monetary policy (refer to further discussion in Mishkin 
and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001). 
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5.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has considered further arguments on the merits of inflation 
targeting, with special emphasis on the exchange-rate issues in developing ITers. The 
general conclusion from the chapter is that although the traditionally-supported trade-
off between inflation volatility and output volatility is valid under IT, the credibility that 
the central bank accumulates under this regime, enables the trade-off curve to ―shift to 
the left‖ (in terms of Figure 5.1) and, hence, the achievement of a combination of both 
lower inflation volatility and lower output volatility. Moreover, while the chapter argues 
that a form of flexible IT is needed for viability in practice, the exchange rate is only a 
means to an end and as such is not suggested to be explicitly included in the policy-loss 
function. In empirical terms, studies concluded that IT is beneficial for inflation and its 
volatility; however, there is no consensus concerning the effect of IT on output 
volatility, although the finding is that it is beneficial for short-run output as well. 
Observing the developing countries gives only a slightly different picture. 
However, the chapter concluded that several specifics are important for these countries, 
mainly those connected to the underdevelopment of the financial markets, the issues of 
fiscal dominance and these-countries' vulnerability to external shocks and sudden capital 
stops. The latter, which in such economies are more common, might exacerbate 
exchange-rate volatility which, under the assumption of increased pass-through to 
prices, might threaten the achievement of the inflation target. Thus, proper exchange-
rate management appears crucial in the initial phase of IT, but this managing does not 
coincide with exchange-rate targeting. As monetary policy gains credibility, and as the 
economy institutionally strengthens, the necessity for exchange-rate interventions 
lessens as well as the exchange-rate pass-through. The chapter offered some consensual 
empirical evidence on this point. Moreover, theoretical arguments and empirical 
evidence suggested that financial euroization does not preclude an independent 
monetary policy oriented towards maintaining a low and stable inflation rate, because 
the persistent exchange-rate risk will force agents to permanently balance their 
portfolios while authorities will usually fear to float and will prevent large exchange-rate 
fluctuations.  
The empirical evidence reviewed in the chapter reflects the variety of the ways 
in which IT performance and policy responses are examined in the literature. Yet the 
general conclusion is that the issue of the behaviour of monetary policy under the 
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assumption of a regime switch is virtually ignored in the literature, with no study 
explicitly dealing with it in an appropriate manner. Only one study distinctly models the 
monetary policy under the two monetary regimes, but this study ignores the role of the 
exchange rate, which might be very important for developing economies. The analysis 
in this chapter provides a basis for quantifying IT performance given a regime switch 
and given the role of the exchange rate in developing economies, which is pursued in 
the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PhD Thesis 
Chapter 6 – Empirical analysis and modelling of a monetary-policy regime switch 
 
 213 
 
CHAPTER 6 
Empirical analysis and modelling of  a 
monetary-policy regime switch  
 
6.1. Introduction 
―Throughout the world, monetary-policy regimes have changed dramatically 
over the decade of the 1990s. The biggest transformation has been the move away from 
focusing on intermediate objectives, such as money and exchange rates, toward the 
direct targeting of inflation‖ (Cecchetti and Ehrmann, 1999, p.1). In the first part of this 
thesis (Chapters 1-3) we argued and reported empirical evidence that exchange-rate 
targeting, albeit not important in affecting the long-term growth performance of the 
economy, is important in stabilizing output fluctuations. However, when large real 
shocks hit, it might amplify output volatility. It was argued that as the economy gets 
more involved in the international financial market, real shocks become likely. Further, 
we argued in the second part of the thesis (Chapters 4-5) that the exit from an 
exchange-rate peg will provide the economy with more flexibility in buffering real 
shocks, but the economy will still need a monetary anchor. Inflation targeting along 
with a managed-floating exchange rate was argued to provide a nominal anchor and to 
take into consideration the need to reduce output- and exchange-rate volatility; 
although, opinions in the literature as to the effectiveness with which such a policy 
affects output fluctuations remain divided. The aim of this chapter is to empirically 
examine whether the conduct of monetary policy has significantly changed with the 
switch from exchange-rate to inflation targeting in developing countries. For this 
purpose, a group of developing countries that have historically experienced such a 
switch is analysed. This is done by estimating an augmented interest-rate rule à la Taylor 
(1993; 2001a), through two different regime-switching methods, in order to capture a 
change of monetary-policy regime, along the lines discussed in Chapter 5. This will add 
to the current sparse literature on IT for developing countries and, to the writer‘s 
knowledge, use analysis not applied in this context elsewhere. 
For those purposes, the chapter is organized as follows. The next section 
describes the IT waves and reviews some descriptive statistics, in order to define the 
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sample and build intuition for later modelling. Section 6.3 discusses the data and sets 
out the model to be estimated. Section 6.4 establishes the panel switching-regression 
method as our empirical strategy. Section 6.5 examines the results, while Section 6.6 
gives some discussion, robustness analysis and a critique of the applied methodology. 
Subsequently, Section 6.7 offers the Markov-switching regression as an alternative 
modelling approach. Section 6.8 reports the findings of this approach and presents 
further discussion. The last section concludes the chapter.  
 
6.2. Descriptive analysis 
6.2.1. Waves of IT adoption and some statistics 
IT as a monetary regime is relatively new, dating back to the beginning of the 
1990s when New Zealand was the first to adopt an official inflation target. The first 
several years of the IT era were marked by adoption by advanced countries. However, 
many subsequent ITers either targeted inflation implicitly, i.e. only as a benchmark 
against which outcomes are measured, or followed several explicit targets. A further 
discussion of this issue is given in Sterne (1999) and Morandé and Schmidt-Hebbel 
(2000) and is beyond the scope of this study. The concept of IT, introduced in Chapter 
4, defines this regime as a procedure based on rules and objectives that have to be 
achieved and which is freed of any other monetary policy target. Judging according to 
this specification, there are 26 inflation targeters in the world today (plus three that have 
left IT to join the Euro zone). 
As a monetary regime, IT appeared and grew in the developed world. Figure 6.1 
depicts the time of IT adoption with the income level per capita in the same year. We 
denote the adoption of IT by the advanced economies as the first wave, which 
terminated in the mid 1990s (Figure 6.1; blue points). Most quantitative studies are 
conducted on datasets for those countries. The initial results of the application of the 
new monetary regime were satisfactory: Although inflation reduction started before the 
introduction of IT, ―inflation did not bounce back up afterwards as expected‖ (Mishkin 
and Posen, 1998, p.90). However, there is no overwhelming evidence that the new 
regime in the adopting countries significantly affected inflation expectations nor that it 
significantly reduced output volatility (refer back to Section 5.2). It is perhaps important 
to note that these countries enjoy previously acquired credibility of their central bank, 
which is important for this monetary regime. 
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After the positive experience of the first ITers, in terms of a low inflation level, 
a new wave of ITers commenced at the end of the decade: many developing economies 
started to target inflation, explicitly or implicitly (Figure 6.1; red points). At the same 
time, a growing body of studies emerged around IT in emerging economies, but our 
review in Chapter 5 finds that these studies are merely descriptive. Many of the implicit 
nominal targeters embarked on explicit IT; the majority of developing economies did 
that because of facing pressures on the foreign exchange market, or even a demise of 
the ERT regime. Chapter 2 elaborated on the challenge to sustain the peg against a 
background of foreign disturbances and increased capital mobility. Albeit that this 
section does not intend to do case-by-case analysis, a brief overview of some of the 
cases is used to pursue our argument. 
Figure 6.1. Three waves of inflation targeters 
Source: Table 6.1 on page 217 and World Economic Outlook. 
Note: Countries are grouped according to the three waves outlined in the text: blue points refer to 
advanced countries, majority of which established IT after some years of implicit nominal targeting, but 
also to those which abandoned ERM I; red points refer to developing economies, some of which 
introduced IT after an exchange-rate turbulence; green points refer to developing economies which 
started accepting IT as a strategy oriented at attaining domestic objectives per se. Country names and 
codes are fully available in Table 6.1. 
Among the first cases was Brazil, which after its real exchange-rate crisis in early 
1999, abandoned the peg, embarked on a (managed) floating regime and officially 
adopted IT (Bodganski et al. 2000). Following the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the 
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demise of the Thai baht exchange-rate system, a (managed) floating rate was introduced 
alongside a money-base target in Thailand. The latter suffered from the weak link 
between money and prices and ultimately the Central Bank adopted an IT framework 
(Agénor, 2002). Jonas and Mishkin (2003) report the cases of the Czech Republic and 
Poland, which also introduced IT after exchange-rate regime turbulence, albeit the 
establishment of the new regime in Poland was more gradual (i.e. Poland followed an 
eclectic approach as of 1995, which included a crawling peg of ±2.5% and sometimes 
targeted numerically expressed inflation; Pruski, 2002). After the boom of capital 
inflows in Hungary in the late 1990s, the pressures on the foreign exchange market 
resulted in a widening of the exchange-rate band to ±15% in 2001 which has been 
retained along with the IT until early 2008. As such, Hungary makes an exception 
among ITers, since all the others introduced a form of managed float when introducing 
IT. 
A third wave of IT adoption is underway with developing countries (Figure 6.1; 
green points) which mostly relied on alternative strategies but embark on IT persuaded 
by the case for improved benefits for their economies. A growing number of economies 
are currently examining the introduction of targets and several have already launched 
preparations for formally adopting them. These include the developing and emerging 
economies of Albania, Armenia and Kazakhstan, which already have price stability as a 
stated objective but have yet to adopt a formal IT. The world economic crisis might 
postpone any such plans; they do not dominate the agenda in these countries currently. 
In general, the (quantitative) analysis of IT in developing economies has been 
scarce (Section 5.3.4). Not only are the datasets short and usually of lower reliability 
when compared to the data in advanced economies, but also several other factors make 
the analysis more complex, among which are: i) the institutional capacity; ii) the cash-
inflows vulnerability in those countries; and iii) the problem of high euroization and 
exchange-rate pass-through (Mishkin, 2004). These were discussed in Section 5.3. From 
the viewpoint of the analysis in this thesis (Chapters 3 to 5), an important aspect of the 
story is the monetary regime prior to the adoption of the IT. In particular, this thesis 
opts to model, analyse and understand whether monetary-policy conduct changed under 
a regime switch from exchange-rate targeting to inflation targeting. At the outset, Table 
6.1 summarizes some stylized facts for IT economies, with emphasis on the prior 
monetary regime and prior and posterior exchange-rate regime.  
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Table 6.1. Fully-fledged inflation targeters and switch 
Country name and code IT 
introduced 
Inflation rate 
at the begin-
ning of IT 
Inflation 
target / 
band 
Prior announced monetary 
regime (from which the 
switch has been made) 
DE-FACTO (RR classification) DE-JURE (IMF classification) 
De-facto ERR 
before 
Duration of 
ERR  
De-facto ERR 
after 
De jure ERR 
before 
Duration of 
ERR 
De-jure ERR 
after 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
1. New Zealand  NZ 1989M12 3.3 1–3 Implicit nominal anchor Managed floating 5 yrs Managed floating Free floating 6 years Free floating 
2. Canada  CA 1991M2 6.9 1–3 Implicit nominal anchor Limited flexible 20 yrs Lim-flexible and 
flexible (2002) 
Free floating very long Free floating 
3. UK  UK 1992M10 4.0 2 ERM I Fixed Less than 2 
years (ERM I) 
Managed floating Fixed 7 years Free floating 
4. Sweden  SE 1993M1 1.8 2 (±1) ERM I Limited flexible 15 years Managed floating Fixed 16 years Managed fl. and 
free fl. 
5. Finland1 FI 1993M1 2.6  ERM I Limited flexible 21 years Fixed Fixed 22 years Free floating 
6. Australia  AU 1993M6 2.0 2–3 Implicit nominal anchor Free float 9 years Free float Free floating  9 years Free float 
7. Spain1 ES 1995M1 4.2  ERM I Fixed 2 years Fixed Limited flexible 6 years Limited flexible 
8. Israel  IL 1997M6 8.1 1–3 Exchange-rate targeting Managed floating 6 years Managed floating Managed floating 6 years Managed floating 
9. Czech Rep.  CZ 1997M12 6.8 3 (±1) Exchange-rate targeting Limited flexible 6 years Managed fl. and 
lim-flexible (2002) 
Fixed 6 years Managed floating 
10. Poland  PL 1998M1 10.6 2.5 (±1) Exchange-rate targeting Managed floating 6 years Managed floating Managed floating 8 years Free floating 
11. South Korea KR 1998M4 2.8 3(±1) Monetary targeting Limited flexible 18 years Managed floating Managed floating 17 years Free floating 
12. Brazil  BR 1999M6 3.3 4.5 (±2) Exchange-rate targeting Limited flexible  6 years Managed floating Managed floating 5 years Free floating 
13. Chile  CH 1999M9 3.2 2–4 Exchange-rate targeting Managed floating 7 years Managed floating Managed floating 18 years Free floating 
14. Colombia  CO 1999M10 9.3 2-4 Exchange-rate targeting Managed floating 16 years Managed floating Managed floating 20 years Free floating 
15. South Africa  ZA 2000M2 2.6 3–6 Monetary targeting Free floating 5 years Free floating Free floating 17 years Free floating 
16. Thailand  TH 2000M5 0.8 0–3.5 Exchange-rate targeting Fixed 24 years Managed floating Fixed (1997) Free 
float (2000) 
27 years Managed floating 
17. Mexico  MX 2001M1 9.0 3 (±1) Monetary targeting Managed floating 5 years Managed floating Free floating 6 years Free floating 
18. Norway NO 2001M3 3.6 2.5 Implicit nominal anchor Managed floating 55 years Managed floating Managed floating 6 years Free floating 
19. Iceland  IS 2001M3 4.1 2.5 Implicit nominal anchor Limited flexible 14 years Managed floating Managed floating 4 years Free floating 
20. Hungary HU 2001M6 10.8 3.5 (±1) Exchange-rate targeting Limited flexible 7 years Limited flexible Managed floating 5 years Fixed 
21. Peru  PE 2002M1 -0.1 2.5 (±1) Monetary targeting Limited flexible 8 years Limited flexible Free floating 12 years Limited flexible 
22. Philippines  PH 2002M1 4.5 4-5 Exchange-rate targeting Limited flexible 5 years Limited flexible Free floating 13 years Free floating 
23. Slovak Rep.1 SL 2005M1 5.8 6 (±1) Exchange-rate targeting Limited flexible 6 years Limited flexible Fixed 2 years Managed floating 
24. Guatemala GT 2005M1 9.2 5.5 (±1) Monetary targeting Limited flexible 14 years Limited flexible Free floating 16 years Managed floating 
25. Indonesia  ID 2005M7 7.4 5.5 (±1) Monetary targeting Managed floating 6 years Managed floating Managed floating 4 years Managed floating 
26. Romania  RO 2005M8 9.3 4 (±1) Monetary targeting Managed floating 5 years Managed floating Limited flexible 3 years Managed floating 
27. Turkey TR 2006M1 7.7 4(±2) Monetary targeting Free floating 3 years Free floating Free floating 6 years Free floating 
28. Ghana GH 2007M5 10.5 0-10 Monetary targeting Limited flexible 6 years Limited flexible Managed floating 6 years Managed floating 
29. Serbia SP 2009M1 6.5 8-12 Monetary targeting Managed floating 6 years Managed floating Managed floating 6 years Managed floating 
1/ Finland, Spain and Slovakia abandoned IT upon entry into the Euro zone in 1999, 1999 and 2008, respectively. 
Compiled from: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004); Pétursson (2004); Hammond (2009); Roger (2009); IMF website; Central banks' websites and Carmen Reinhart's web site. 
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6.2.2. Macroeconomic performance of switchers and non-switchers: 
developing countries 
To motivate the discussion about the population used and the modelling 
strategy, in an intuitive way, we will portray some descriptive statistics of economic 
trends before-switch versus after-switch; and of ITers versus ERTers. The objective of 
this descriptive analysis is not to reveal definitive causal relationships. As noted in 
Chapter 5, the assessment of monetary-policy performance under alternative monetary 
regimes, especially given a switch, is a challenging task. Not only is the identification 
strategy important, but also problematic are the merits according to which this 
performance will be judged, including any external factors that might exert influence 
(like, say, the level of euroization and the exchange-rate pass-through).  
We argue that the approach to analysing this issue should be cautious. The 
existing empirical literature (part of which reviewed in Chapter 5) is exposed to the 
identification problem: the comparison group contains a portion of countries that were 
not formal ITers, but did run a policy geared toward IT. In that light, the identification 
strategy might suffer from lack of clear distinction between the two groups and, hence, 
might render conclusions biased. Yet, our objective is not exposed to this problem, as 
we are not interested in analysing all ITers versus a potentially vague group of non-
ITers. Instead, we are interested in only ITers whose former strategy was ERT, versus a 
control group of ERTers which, over the same period continued to target the exchange 
rate and did not move to IT. 
The total number of countries that switched from ERT to IT is small (14 
countries so far) and appropriate for further analysis (blue rows in Table 6.1). However, 
it is reasonable to suspect that the switch from ERT to IT in developed countries (UK, 
Sweden, Finland and Spain) might have been a different process, which might be 
ascribed to the higher credibility of the central bank than in developing countries; or to 
the fact that they were a part of the Exchange Rate Mechanism. Moreover, Finland and 
Spain no longer apply IT, as they joined the common currency in 1999; also, Slovakia 
joined the Euro zone shortly after the adoption of IT.  
The developing-countries switchers or the ―treatment‖ group (henceforth 
referred to as simply ―switchers‖) is: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Israel, Philippines, Poland and Thailand. Our concerns related to the form of 
ERT, raised in Chapter 3, are taken into consideration: albeit that an official target has 
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been announced, the de-facto behaviour of the exchange rate matters. Hence, the de-
facto exchange-rate regime is reported to stand for the strength of the commitment to 
the exchange-rate target (column 6), which might appear crucial for our empirical 
analysis hereafter. We notice that although an official target was announced in Chile, 
Israel, Poland and Colombia, the de-facto behaviour of the exchange rate was 
considerably lax. Hence, we might need to recall this later. The rest of the group is 
relatively homogenous in terms of the de-facto exchange-rate regime prior to the 
adoption of IT - all did have a de-facto tight exchange rate, which gives grounds for 
comparisons of the results. However, some differences within the group would appear 
desirable35, in an era whereby monetary-strategy setup might not be crucial for the 
policy outcomes, but rather external factors, like the Great Moderation.  
The total number of exchange-rate targeters in the world is large compared to 
the number of switchers. We need countries that in the same period continued to target 
the exchange rate and can act as a suitable comparison group (henceforth referred to as 
―non-switchers‖) that do not include implicit ITers. The comparison group for 
developing countries is taken from the neighbouring developing countries to the 
switchers and/or countries with which these have trading and financial relationships, 
and have had the exchange-rate strategy for a prolonged period and did not move to IT. 
These countries are likely to have been subject to the same common regional shocks 
because of the proximity and the economic relations. These are: Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, Uruguay and China. In 
these, the first five serve as counterparts for the European switchers; the next four for 
the South-American switchers; China for the Phillipines and Thailand, while no 
straightforward counterpart could be identified for Israel, but the group of European 
countries might satisfactorily play this role. 
Switchers versus non-switchers are graphically examined next. The numbers 
behind the plots are given in Table A1.10 in Appendix 1. For the switchers group, the 
                                                 
35 Certainly, the most important difference for our research is the flexibility of the de-facto exchange-rate 
regime, which is depicted in Table 6.1. However, other differences must be born on mind when assessing 
the empirical results: the trade arrangements, and hence trade openness (some of the countries are a part 
of larger trade associations or customs unions or a part of the EU single market, but others are not); 
economic structures (in some the agricultural sector is more important, while in others services 
dominate); size and so on. Within the model we are not able to control for all these aspects, but we might 
want to recall them later, when we evaluate the results. 
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date of the switch to IT is given. For the non-switchers group, 2000 is taken as a 
median year when most switchers switched and, hence, the sample is divided into 1991-
1999 and 2000-2008. Taking the median figures, switchers perform better in terms of 
inflation in the second period, but non-switching ERTs perform better in both inflation 
and growth. More importantly, in terms of volatilities, albeit that both groups started at 
high yet different levels, their median volatilities dropped to similar levels in the IT 
period. Hence, although some might argue that IT performs well, it still cannot be 
argued that those which continued to target the exchange rate perform worse. Quite the 
contrary, the reason for the good performance of both groups might be the relatively 
shock-free period (Great Moderation) of the 2000s. 
Figure 6.2. Macroeconomic performance: Switchers versus non-switchers (1)  
In Figure 6.3, the median growth rate and volatilities of the nominal exchange 
rate and official reserves are plotted, similarly to Figure 6.2. On the left panel we 
observe that depreciation of the national currencies considerably slowed in the period 
after ITers switched to IT, but this pattern is observable in both groups. On the other 
hand, the average growth of the reserves declined in the switchers group, but slightly 
increased in the control group. This might suggest that the central bank has been less 
active with the sterilization on the foreign exchange market, which might be expected 
within an IT strategy. In the right panel, volatilities are observed. Our previous assertion 
might be drawn from here as well: reserve volatility fell considerably in the switchers 
group, which might suggest that authorities intervened less frequently under the new 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Economic Outlook data 
1/ Figures based on median country values of median annual values for inflation and growth. 
2/ Figures based on median country values of standard deviation of annual percentage changes. 
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regime; in the control group, the volatility of reserves remained roughly the same. As 
for the exchange-rate volatility, the switchers group experienced a similar pattern after 
the switch, albeit that the volatility started low and that the control group volatility also 
declined considerably in the second period. Hence, the general absence of shocks in the 
second period might have led to this result, making nominal exchange-rate volatility 
non-dependent on the monetary strategy pursued. 
Figure 6.3. Macroeconomic performance: Switchers versus non-switchers (2) 
**** 
Two general conclusions from this graphical analysis can be taken. Firstly, the 
plots suggest that macroeconomic performance under IT improved. However, non-
switchers also exhibit improved macroeconomic performance. Hence, it cannot be said 
that the monetary-strategy switch was the cause of the improved macroeconomic 
outcomes. Rather than that, the favourable economic conditions (i.e. the global 
Moderation, which we referred to in Chapter 5) during the period of IT in switchers 
and non-switchers might explain these trends. Some notable, although not clear-cut, 
differences (switchers versus non-switchers) are observable regarding the exchange rate 
and reserves. Secondly, the statistics on inflation, growth and their volatility (Figure 6.2) 
do not support the view that the switch was endogenous – both switchers and non-
switchers did suffer a greater inflation level and volatility before the switch-year than 
after. However, the evidence from the exchange-rate and reserves statistics (Figure 6.3) 
is not supportive of this view: after the switch the depreciation rate and reserves 
Source: Author’s calculations based on International Financial Statistics data 
Note: Nominal exchange rate is represented by the NEER. Whenever NEER was not available, we used the 
nominal exchange rate of the national currency per SDR. An increase means depreciation. 
1/ Figures based on median country values of median values for growth rates. 
2/ Figures based on median country values of standard deviation of annual percentage changes. 
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volatility declined. Based on the implications of the descriptive analysis, the concern in 
the empirical work needs to take into account the possible endogeneity of the switch. 
We proceed with defining a model (Section 6.3) and designing a switching regression 
(Section 6.4).  
 
6.3. Data and model 
Since we want to investigate how the response of the monetary policy changed 
under alternative regimes, it is convenient to establish a monetary-policy reaction 
function, à la Taylor (1993; 2001a), in which the reactions of the central bank to the 
macro-variables (output gap and inflation) can be estimated. A large strand of the 
monetary-economics literature suggests the interest-rate rule as a neat way to represent 
monetary policy: some review papers include: Boivin and Giannoni (2006); Primiceri 
(2006); Lubik and Schorfheide (2004); Weerapana (2000); Svensson and Woodford 
(2003); King (1999); McCallum (1999a,b); Cristiano and Gust (1999); and Woodford 
(1999a). However, Clarida et al. (2000) remains probably the most cited piece of work 
over the preceding decade; they estimate a Taylor-type policy rule for the US, whereby 
the federal funds rate is a function of inflation and output gap as final targets. Clarida et 
al.‘s (2000) specification is forward-looking in both inflation and the output and relates 
to our discussion of the IT setup in Section 4.4. They argue that the forward-looking 
rule nests the Taylor rule as a special case: if either lagged inflation or a linear 
combination of lagged inflation and the output gap is a sufficient statistic for forecasting 
future inflation, then the forward-looking specification collapses to the original Taylor 
(1993) rule (see the box on the next page for more details). However, the forward-
looking specification of the rule has been emphasized both in the empirical 
specifications and by the central banks around the world, at least in recent years.  
To design an appropriate interest-rate rule, in addition to the suggestion to use 
the forward-looking specification of the Taylor rule, here we recall our discussion in 
Chapter 5. Namely, since we do have developing countries in our sample, it is 
reasonable to consider their multiple-objectives setting (mainly referring to their 
concern over the exchange rate; see Section 5.3). The economic model is therefore as 
follows: 
ttttntttt ueyyErr   3
*
211 )(     (6.1) 
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where tr , nt , )(
*
tt yy  , and te  denote, respectively, the nominal interest rate, 
expected inflation, the output gap and the nominal exchange rate (direct quote) at time 
t  (or plus n periods into the future for expected inflation); tE  is the expectations 
operator conditional on information available at time t ;   is the first difference 
operator;   is the smoothing parameter to be estimated;  s are coefficients to be 
estimated, measuring the central-bank response to the changes in these variables, which 
can partly reflect authorities‘ preferences in designing monetary policy; and tu  is the 
error term. This is a forward-looking interest-rate rule36 explicitly only in terms of 
inflation, but since the output gap is a determinant of inflation (recall equations [4.2] 
and [4.3] on p.169), expectations of the output gap are encompassed in this. Assuming a 
forward-looking specification of the rule in terms of inflation only is reasonable for 
developing economies and especially for the former ERTs, given their only concern 
with inflation during ERT (ERT being introduced to curb inflation) and at least in the 
early phase of IT (when a process of disinflation took place). The rule is augmented 
with the exchange rate; some papers with this inclusion of the exchange rate in include: 
Ball (1999), Mishkin and Savastano (2001), Minella et al. (2003) Mohanty and Klau 
(2005) and De Mello and Moccero (2008). As argued in Section 5.3, there is some 
controversy over the inclusion of the exchange rate in the interest-rate rule, but this is 
done for three reasons, the latter two being largely present in the existing literature (see 
Frankel, 1979): i) our control-group countries target and our ITers formerly targeted the 
exchange rate, hence it is/was the main intermediate objective and might be considered 
as a high-frequency indicator of the external sector that guides monetary policy; ii) there 
may still be more complex interactions between movements in the exchange rate and 
macroeconomic performance in developing ITers (like their ―fear of floating‖, 
discussed in Chapter 2, or the relevance of the exchange-rate pass-through, discussed in 
Chapter 5); and iii) financial imperfections such as a large amount of external debt or 
large foreign currency substitution (Section 5.3.3) might make the case for monetary 
intervention on exchange-rate movements stronger. Overall, the inclusion of the 
exchange-rate is to address our earlier concerns over the role of the exchange-rate pass-
through and the euroization in the economy. 
                                                 
36 Note that the forward-looking specification is used for our SR. However, when we pass onto 
estimating the MS-VAR, we are no longer able to estimate a forward-looking specification. More detail to 
follow in Section 6.8. 
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Forward-looking versus backward-looking interest rate rule: A note 
The baseline policy rule usually considered in the literature takes a simple form. 
If we denote tr to be the target interest rate in period t, then each period it is a function 
of expected inflation and the output and its respective target level. Specifically, we 
postulate the linear equation: 
   tqttkttt yErr   *      (6.1a) 
whereby kt denotes the percent change in the price level between periods t and t+k 
(expressed in annual rates). qty   is a measure of the average output gap between period 
t and t+q, with the output gap being defined as the percent deviation between actual 
GDP and the corresponding target. However, note that in practice, the period t GDP is 
not known as of the time the interest rate is set in that period; i.e. tty 1, , given the 
lag with which GDP is published. tE  is the expectation operator, and t  is the 
information set at the time the interest rate is set. *r  is, by construction, the desired 
nominal rate when both inflation and output are at their target levels – i.e. a kind of 
equilibrium interest rate. 
The policy rule given by (6.1a) has some appeal on both theoretical and 
empirical grounds. At the theoretical level, the forms that (6.1a) can take are optimal for 
a central bank that has a quadratic loss function in deviations of inflation, output  and 
possibly other variables from their respective targets – as are (4.5) and (4.12) on p.169 
and p.179, respectively. At the empirical level, (6.1a) well fits the manner in which many 
central banks reason and act nowadays, especially inflation targeters. 
Nevertheless, the seminal paper of Taylor (1993) opened a strand of the 
literature which relies on an interest-rate rule which is backward-looking, i.e. the interest 
rate responds to lagged inflation and output rather than their expected future values. 
McCallum has, in several papers, like McCallum (1999a), argued that it is more realistic 
from an information point of view ( t  in [6.1a]), to restrict the interest rate in period t 
to depend on the state variables in period t-1. However, some years later, Clarida et al. 
(2000) and the strand of the literature it opened, argued that the central bank has much 
more information about the current state in the economy than captured by the few state 
variables in the backward-looking model. In order words, the lagged inflation and 
output do not reflect the entire information the policymaker has at time t. Hence, 
assuming that the state variables in quarter t+k or t+q in (6.1a), whereby k≠q, are 
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known in quarter t is an implicit way of acknowledging the extra information. In order 
words, the interest-rate rule becomes forward-looking.  
So, how can the reconciliation between the forward-looking and the backward-
looking rule be made? Clarida et al. (2000) offer an intuitive explanation: the forward-
looking rule nests the Taylor rule as a special case: if either lagged inflation or a linear 
combination of lagged inflation and the output gap is a sufficient statistic for forecasting 
future inflation, then equation (6.1a) collapses to the Taylor rule. In other words, if we 
assume that t  contains information only on the previous inflation and business-cycle 
developments, then the rule reduces to backward-looking specification, whereby only 
lagged inflation and lagged output gap are observed in the policy reaction function. On 
the other hand, the forward-looking specification allows the central bank to consider a 
broad array of information (beyond lagged inflation and output) to form beliefs about 
the future condition of the economy. The latter is highly realistic for inflation targeters, 
given that they use the medium-term inflation forecast as an intermediate target toward 
achieving the final goal. 
In addition to this, interest-rate smoothing is allowed by the specification, by 
adding a lagged endogenous variable (see Sack and Wieland, 2000; and Lowe and Ellis, 
1997, for a documentation of this strand of the literature). Mohanty and Klau (2005) 
offer several reasons for smoothing: i) to reduce the risk of policy mistakes, when 
uncertainty about model parameters is high and when policymakers have to act on 
partial information; ii) the authorities‘ concern about the implications of their actions 
for the financial system (if markets have limited capacity to hedge interest-rate risk, a 
sudden and large change in the interest rate could expose market participants to capital 
losses and might raise systemic financial risks); iii) to avoid reputation risks to central 
banks from sudden reversals of interest-rate directions; and so on.  
As a robustness check, later other variables are added that might have an 
importance in our analytical framework:  
i) Lagged inflation, to check if monetary policy was backward- instead of forward-
looking (Taylor, 1993);  
ii) Reserves growth, in order to serve the same purposes as the inclusion of the 
nominal exchange rate, but also to reflect pressures on the foreign-exchange 
market more tightly. It is argued that for the periods under a pegged exchange 
rate, the nominal rate might not fully reflect these pressures;  
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iii) Net-foreign assets (NFA) of the banking system to GDP, to measure the level 
of euroization, hence making a separate case to address the concern of how it 
might have affected the conduct of monetary policy (Section 5.3.3);  
iv) Monetary-aggregate growth, to capture its potential observation as an 
intermediate target of monetary policy (Sims and Zha, 2006). However, many 
studies argue that the inclusion of a monetary aggregate is contestable due to the 
weakened link between money and prices. 
Bernanke and Gertler (2001); Bordo and Jeanne (2002) and Mohanty and Klau (2005) 
argue to include asset prices, in order to capture the potential role of the central bank in 
combating asset bubbles or as a potential source of risk to financial stability. However, 
several arguments lead us not to explore this aspect here: i) the asset-price role in 
monetary policy became of increased interest just after the crisis of 2008 emerged, i.e. 
only at the end of our data period; ii) the effect of asset prices on the economy was not 
as dramatic in the developing economies as in advanced ones; and iii) good data-series 
for the stock market, and particularly for the housing market, are lacking for the 
majority of countries of interest. 
 For estimation, monthly data from 1991:1 to 2009:12 are used. The use of 
monthly data is justified by the fact that almost all central banks decide on the interest 
rate at a fortnightly frequency. The data are from the IFS database; whenever a series 
was missing, the central-bank and statistical-office web sites have been used as the 
source. Data are further described in Table A2.2 in Appendix 2. The policy interest rate 
is represented through the money-market rate, as it best mimics the stance of the 
monetary policy; though where this was not available, the discount rate was used. 
Inflation is taken as the year-on-year monthly percentage change of the consumer price 
index.  Based on similar literature (like Clarida et al. 1998), a forward–looking horizon of 
a year (12 months) is chosen for inflation to reflect the expected component (i.e. the 
12th lead of the inflation is taken). Output volatility is defined through an HP filter, 
following our discussion in Chapter 3, from the industrial production index, since GDP 
is not available on a monthly basis. The difference in the exchange rate is approximated 
through the year-on-year monthly percentage change of the nominal exchange rate of 
the national currency to the special drawing rights, since other series, like the nominal 
effective exchange rate was missing for a major part of our sample. Reserves growth is 
taken to be the year-on-year monthly percentage growth of the official reserves minus 
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gold. Euroization in the economy is measured through the ratio of the absolute value of 
the net foreign assets in the banking system to GDP. Money growth is the year-on-year 
monthly percentage change of the broad money aggregate M2. 
 We conclude this section with a note on expected inflation. We are aware that 
central bankers are not concerned with the month-to-month movements in inflation, 
but rather with its medium-term trend. Hence, the 12-month ahead horizon as expected 
inflation at time t seems a reasonable choice for capturing expected inflation. However, 
this assumes that the central bank has a complete information set in time t and does not 
make forecast mistakes, which is rather strong. Hence, the interpretation here requires 
caution from this viewpoint.  
Although inflation expectations are highly relevant for both theoretical analysis 
and policy making, over the years measurement has remained difficult to accomplish. 
One approach present in the literature relies on distributed lag models of past inflation 
to estimate expected inflation. However, this approach assumes expectations formation 
in an adaptive manner (Mincer, 1969). In terms of the discussion here, such a measure 
would collapse the interest-rate rule into a backward-looking specification, which is 
close to the original Taylor specification, but not in line with the more recent literature 
in this area as discussed above. Alternatively, the ―rational expectations‖ hypothesis 
argues that all currently available information relevant to the actual inflation process is 
considered when forecasts are made (Resler, 1980) – an approach which extends 
beyond lagged inflation. Resler argues that although such an information set would not 
be confined solely to past inflation, it would be likely to be dominated by it, in which 
case expected inflation would be again approximated by some autoregressive process. 
However, this has also been disputed, even in the early literature (for instance, Kane 
and Malkiel, 1976). Moreover, forecasts are revised as new information becomes 
available, which suggests that no central bank is a perfect forecaster. Other measures of 
expected inflation, like the information derived from qualitative data generated by 
surveys in which respondents are asked whether they expect prices to rise, fall or stay 
the same, have also been discussed in the literature (e.g. Carlson and Parkin, 1975), but 
are hard to obtain for developing countries. Given these considerations and cautions, 
here we rely on Clarida et al.‘s (2000) suggestion to use the 12-th lead of inflation as an 
approximation of expected inflation. 
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6.4. Method I 
 6.4.1. Designing a switching regression 
In Section 6.2 we discussed how monetary policy outcomes might have changed 
when the monetary regime changed by observing two time periods: before versus after 
the switch for our switching group and for a non-switching group. It was observed 
there that macroeconomic parameters behaved quite differently between the two 
periods, but that differences between the switchers and the comparison group were not 
readily apparent. This inspection lead us to design a switching regression (hereafter SR), 
whereby a subset of the population is subjected to an exogenous variation in variables, 
which may have been caused by a policy shift (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). A 
traditional way to design a regime-switching regression is to incorporate a dummy 
variable, taking a value of zero for the one regime (pre-switching) and one for the other 
regime (post-switching). In this way, the policy shift will be incorporated into the 
estimation. Further to this, an object of interest is a comparison of the two outcomes 
for the same unit when exposed, and when not exposed, to the regime switch. This 
approach is straightforward and enables an assessment of whether the switch to a new 
monetary regime is significant or not.  
In a SR, we would like to measure the impact of the policy-switch variable on 
the economic outcome of a continuous variable labelled as iy . The policy-switch 
variable is discrete and observable, labelled as D , where D  takes value of 1 if the switch 
is applied and 0 otherwise. A simple SR can be designed by writing the following: 
111 ]|[ uXyEy   - for the switching group   (6.2) 
000 ]|[ uXyEy   - for the non-switching group   (6.3) 
Whereby the policy-outcome variable for each group depends on its mean conditional 
on a set of exogenous regressors, X , and an error term, iu . It is crucial that both 
groups share the same characteristics, captured by the same regressors X . This is a SR, 
because switching and non-switching groups have different conditional mean functions, 
)(Xi , i.e. 
 )(]|[ 11 XXyE         (6.4) 
)(]|[ 00 XXyE         (6.5) 
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The observed outcome is written: 
 01 )1( yDDyyi         (6.6) 
D  being the switching variable and i  indexes countries. Substituting (6.4) and (6.5) into 
(6.2) and (6.3), respectively, and then the latter two in (6.6), yields: 
 
001010
000011
0011
])()([)(
)()()(
))()(1())((
uuuXXDX
DuXDuXDuXD
uXDuXDyi






   (6.7) 
Since D  can take values of 0 or 1, the term ])()([ 0101 uuXXD    switches 
between the switching and the non-switching group. It measures the effect of the new 
monetary regime; the component )()( 01 XX    measures the average change to 
switchers with characteristics X , randomly drawn from the population (often referred 
to as the average treatment effect), while 01 uu   is the random error (often referred to 
as country-specific gain from treatment) (Wooldridge, 2002). 
 If the switching and non-switching group are observed over time, then a panel 
is obtained. In this way, we can make use of the increased variability of the data and 
along with observing switchers versus non-switchers we can exploit the ‗before-switch‘ 
versus ‗after-switch‘ variability (Blundel and MaCurdy, 2000). Now, equations (6.6) and 
(6.7) can be advanced in the following manner: 
 ititititititit uXDDXy       (6.8) 
whereby ity  is the outcome variable for the unit (country) i  in period t; itD  takes the 
value of 1 if country i  switched to the new regime in period t , and 0 otherwise; itX  is a 
vector of explanatory variables; itit XD  captures the switching parameters of the 
explanatory variables ; t  is a time-specific fixed effect; i  is a country-specific fixed 
effect; and itu  is the usual i.i.d. error term. Certainly, all or some of the explanatory 
variables can be allowed to switch, based on economic theory and intuition. Given that 
the itX variables are exogenous, (6.8) can be consistently estimated by the fixed-effects 
estimator, given that some underlying assumptions are satisfied. Namely, as Cameron 
and Trivedi (2005) and Meyer (1995) explain, the extent to which a SR can give credible 
econometric evidence crucially depends on: 
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1. The mean of the non-switching group conditional on itX  does not depend on 
the value of itD  (the so called conditional-mean independence assumption); and 
2. The decision to switch does not depend on the outcomes, after controlling for 
the variation in them induced by the differences in itX variables (the so called 
exogeneity assumption). 
While the decision to establish formal IT aims to be exogenous, as these assumptions 
require, still policymakers might be forced to, i.e. endogenously embark on a new 
regime. Hence, the switch-exogeneity assumption might be violated; this is discussed in 
the next section.  
 
 6.4.2. Endogeneity in a switching regression 
It follows that despite its simplicity, the SR approach has some disadvantages. 
Firstly, as Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) argue, we can at most observe one of the 
outcomes, because the unit (country in this case) can be exposed to only one regime 
switch (hence, two regimes). However, this is addressed by constructing a 
―counterfactual‖ given by the comparison (control)37 group. Secondly, Meyer (1995) 
argues that good natural experiments are those where there is a transparent exogenous 
source of variation in the explanatory variables that determine the treatment 
assignment, like policy changes or financial crises38. This can be achieved by selecting a 
random sample. However: 
Randomization of treatment [switch, n.b] is often infeasible… In most cases, individuals 
[countries, n.b] at least partly determine whether they receive treatment [whether they 
switch, n.b], and their decisions may be related to the benefits of the treatment, 
01 yy  . In other words, there is self-selection into treatment (Wooldridge, 2002, 
p.606). 
As an intuitive explanation, although the switch to IT might be considered as an 
exogenous policy shift, there might be reasons for it not being independent (i.e. 
                                                 
37 Strictly speaking, a control group is the one when the treatment is randomly assigned. That is why a 
suitable terminology would be a ‗comparison group‘.  
38 Although many academics, including Nobel Laureates, regard financial crisis as being fully endogenous. 
This is, though, beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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exogenous) of former high levels of inflation or increased output and exchange-rate 
volatility under shocks. For example, ITers might have been trapped in high inflation or 
devaluation pressures over a prolonged period of time, which forced them to exit a peg 
and switch to IT (see Section 2.4). Hence, ITers might be self-selected. In econometric 
terms, the selection bias arises when itD  (the switch) is correlated with the error in the 
outcome equation (6.8). According to Cameron and Trivedi (2005), this can be induced 
by omitted variables that determine both itD  and ity , or by some unobserved factors. 
To examine the former, (6.8) can be rewritten as follows: 
],|[],,|[ itititititititititititit zXuEXDDXzDXyE    (6.9)  
Whereby itz  denotes a set of observable variables that determine itD  and may also 
determine the outcome ity and 0]|[ itit zuE . Hence, to overcome this potential 
endogenous switching, we need to introduce in the equation all observable variables 
that could be possibly correlated with itu , but also determine ity  i.e.: 
ititititititit uCDDCy       (6.10) 
whereby itC  includes all exogenous ( itX ) and variables related to the switching ( itz ) 
and  at the same time related to ity . By doing so, the observed information contained in 
'
itC  that determines the switch will remove correlation between ity  and itD . This so-
called selection by observables will eliminate any endogeneity of the switch coming 
from observable information (see further in Barnow et al. 1980; Heckman and Hotz, 
1989; and Moffitt, 1996).  
However, 0],|[ ititit DXuE  may still be different from zero if there are 
common unobservable factors that affect both itD  and itu , in which case itD  is still 
endogenous. If there exists a component of the itz  vector that only determines itD , 
then it may be used as an instrumental variable to correct the endogeneity of itD  
(because it is correlated with itD  but not with the outcome ity , except through itD ). 
This means that this component of itz  will not appear in (6.10), because it affects ity  
only indirectly (Wooldridge 2002, pp.621); this is the part of the identification to 
overcome endogeneity stemming from the selection of unobservables and it can be 
tested only indirectly through an over-identification test.  
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 6.4.3. The use of Instrumental Variables techniques 
The literature does not critically address the issue that the interest-rate rule (6.1) 
is part of larger systems of equations (like IS-LM or New Keynesian models wherein the 
interest rate, expected inflation and output gap, at least, are endogenously determined). 
Yet it simply applies IV methods, instrumenting the potentially endogenous variables. 
From an intuitive point of view, since intermediate and final targets of policy enter the 
interest rule, we cannot claim that the right-hand side variables should be treated as 
exogenous. Moreover, we argued above in favour of the endogeneity of the switch to a 
new monetary regime, but the literature on the Taylor rules has not considered a model 
in which a switch has been introduced, let alone the switch being treated as potentially 
endogenous. Hence, our model needs to be estimated using IVs from both viewpoint – 
simultaneity and switch endogeneity. Moreover, since our economic model (6.1) is a 
dynamic model, it might appear that recently popular difference and system GMM 
approaches to dynamic panel analysis might be appropriate. However, this type of 
estimation is appropriate only for panels with a short time and a wide cross-section 
dimension (Baltagi, 2008). Since we have a narrow but long panel of 19 countries 
(N=19) and monthly data over 19 years (T=228), we refer to Nickell (1981) who 
derived an expression for the bias of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable 
(   in [6.1]) when there are no exogenous regressors, showing that the bias approaches 
zero as T approaches infinity. Judson and Owen (1996) document that the bias ranges 
from 3% to 20% of the true value of the coefficient when T=30. Thus, given our large 
time dimension, standard IV estimators should not be invalidated by undue bias of the 
estimator of the lagged dependent variable.  
We draw attention to an issue which is ignored in the empirical literature in this 
area: the difference between the standard IV estimator and the GMM estimator. The 
difference lies in the way of addressing heteroskedasticity, which is often present in 
empirical work. Baum et al. (2003) argue that the presence of heteroskedasticity does not 
affect the consistency of the IV-coefficient estimates, but that the estimates of the 
standard errors will be inconsistent and diagnostic tests invalid. A way to partially 
resolve this issue is to use heteroskedasticity-consistent (―robust‖) standard errors. 
Unfortunately, the Pagan-Hall (1983) test for detecting heteroskedasticity in IV 
estimation has not been developed for panel data. Hence, we rely on the advice of Stock 
and Watson (2006, p.166) that, when using the standard IV estimator: 
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Economic theory rarely gives any reason to believe that the errors are homoskedastic. It 
therefore is prudent to assume that the errors might be heteroskedastic unless you have 
compelling reasons to believe otherwise. [...] If the homoskedasticity-only and 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are the same, nothing is lost by using the 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors; if they differ, however, then you should use 
the more reliable ones that allow for heteroskedasticity. The simplest thing, then, is 
always to use the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
However, it should be noted that this applies as long as the sample is large enough, 
which is arguably the case here. 
A more advanced way of dealing with heteroskedasticity of unknown form is to 
use GMM, introduced by Hansen (1982). ―Efficient GMM brings with it the advantage 
of consistency in the presence of arbitrary heteroskedasticity, but at a cost of possibly 
poor finite sample performance.‖ (Baum et al. 2003, p.2). If heteroskedasticity is not 
present, the GMM estimator is asymptotically no worse than the IV estimator. 
However, the optimal weighting matrix in the GMM estimation is a function of fourth 
moments and obtaining reasonable estimates for these requires very large sample sizes. 
Hence, an efficient GMM estimator can have poor small-sample properties (Hayashi, 
2000).  
However, as we will see in Section 6.5, our estimates might suffer from weak 
identification. The problem of weak identification arises, even when the sample is large, 
when the correlation between the endogenous regressors and the excluded instruments 
is nonzero but small (Baum et al. 2007). Unfortunately, the Stock and Yogo (2005) test 
has critical values devised only up to three endogenous variables, making investigation 
of the problem more problematic in our case. However, not all estimators are equally 
affected by weak instruments. Hansen et al. (1996) proposed the continuous updating 
GMM estimator (CUE), whereby estimation of the covariance matrix of orthogonality 
conditions and of coefficients is done simultaneously, i.e. information is ―continuously 
updated‖. The limited-information likelihood estimator (LIML) dates back to Anderson 
and Rubin (1949), but Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, p.644-649) derived it by 
solving an eigenvalue problem. Both CUE and LIML are argued to perform better in 
the presence of weak instruments (see: Baum et al. 2007). Hahn et al. (2004) offer some 
evidence in favour of this. A possible drawback of CUE could be that it requires 
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numerical optimization39; on the other hand, LIML requires the strong assumption of 
normally distributed disturbances (Baum et al. 2007). Given this, in our estimations, 
CUE is preferred. 
We conclude by addressing the issue of serial correlation. In order to take into 
account any serial correlation in the residual, we take a conservative approach to 
inference by reporting standard errors that are both heteroskedasticity-robust and 
autocorrelation-robust (known as HAC – heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
corrected - standard errors; Newey and West, 1987b). HAC estimates are calculated 
with the kernel function‘s bandwidth, which is set to one40.  
 
6.5. Empirical results I 
Linking our economic model in equation (6.1) and our sample defined in 
Section 6.2.2, with our primary objective to discover if and how the reaction of the 
monetary policy has changed when regime switched (Section 6.4), the following 
estimable form of the model can be written: 
ittiijti
ijtiijtiijti
itit
uswitchafterCOVAR
switchCOVARafterCOVARCOVAR
switchafterswitchafterrr




 




_*
**
_32110
 (6.11) 
Whereby, itr  is the nominal reference interest rate; after  is a dummy variable equal to 
unity for the period after the date of the switch for switchers and after 2000 for the 
non-switchers41, and zero otherwise; switch  is a time-invariant dummy variable equal to 
unity over the whole period for the countries in the sample that switched to IT 
(switchers) and zero otherwise. The period-dummy after  captures unobserved but 
                                                 
39 Even with modern computers the processing time required for CUE estimations is considerable. For 
some of our specifications, Stata needed about four days per regression. 
40 Unfortunately, the optimal choice of the bandwidth by using the automatic bandwidth selection 
criterion of Newey and West (1994) is not provided under xtivreg2. However, setting the bandwidth to 
one has both an economic and a technical rationale: i) the interest rate is often decided at frequent 
intervals of two weeks, lending support to the idea that if autocorrelation exists in the model, it would be 
mostly first-order; ii) estimating the model with larger bandwidth caused computational difficulties. 
41 Recall our discussion in Section 6.2, whereby we take 2000 as the median year in which most switchers 
established IT. 
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systematic influences on the interest rate during the after period in the same way for 
both switchers and non-switchers. The presence of switch  by itself captures possible 
differences between switchers and non-switchers that are independent of the switch. 
after  and switch  control for period- and group-specific level effects on the interest 
rate, respectively. switchafter _  is a dummy variable equal to unity for those 
observations in the switching group after these countries switched to IT, and is the 
variable of primary interest: it identifies the difference to the interest rate associated 
with switching after controlling for both group-specific variations (switch) and period-
specific variations (after). ijtCOVAR  consists of our covariates explained in Section 6.3: 
expected inflation, nit ; output gap, itgap ; and changes of the nominal exchange rate, 
iter . The terms ;*;* switchCOVARafterCOVAR ijtijt  and switchafterCOVARijt _*  
multiply those covariates with ;;switchafter  and switchafter _ , respectively. i s are 
the coefficients of interest which capture differences in monetary-policy reaction in the 
switchers after they switched, which in the presence of controls for both group-specific 
and period-specific variation identifies the effects of switching. i  and i  are used as 
coefficients to control for period- and group-specific responses, respectively. The 
lagged interest rate is not interacted, since there are no intuitive grounds to claim that 
the way in which the authorities smooth the interest-rate path has to do with the regime 
in operation. t s are annual time dummies, which are suggested as a way to remove the 
common influence of any global shocks from the errors (Sarafidis et al. 2009; Roodman 
2008). Annual and not monthly dummies are used because of the large time dimension; 
these are not reported in the main tables, but in Section A4.3 in Appendix 4. i s are 
country-specific dummies, and itu  is the usual disturbance.  
With the selection of observables that might have forced a switch (expected 
inflation, output gap and exchange-rate changes) one part of the endogeneity of the 
switching dummy switchafter _  was addressed. Yet, many authors (the most 
prominent being Clarida et al. 1998) argue that in the interest-rule itself these three 
variables are suspected to be endogenous and need instrumentation. Lagged values of 
the endogenous variables are used as instruments given this potential endogeneity. 
There is no established procedure for choosing the optimal instrument set, so we rely 
on a trial-and-error procedure that produces acceptable diagnostics (see Roodman 2008 
and 2009 for a similar discussion in a dynamic-panel context). We use lags which vary 
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from the third until the 24th lag, at a sequence of three lags. Such a pattern considerably 
improved the instruments tests and has an intuitive explanation that earlier time periods 
become more informative, given the monthly data (i.e information derived from two 
subsequent months is assumed not to be as informative as from two distant months in 
the year). In addition to this consideration, we do not use differenced values of the 
endogenous variables as instruments since, in our case, variables are already in some 
differenced form (inflation is the price difference; the output gap is the difference 
between actual and potential output; and the exchange rate is conventionally 
differenced) and their further differencing might neither produce acceptable diagnostics 
nor have plausible economic meaning. 
Because of potential endogeneity arising from unobservables, switchafter _  
will be instrumented by including variable(s) that do not enter the interest-rate rule per 
se, but might be important for the switch. For finding suitable instruments, we refer 
back to Section 4.3. It was explained there that the necessary preconditions for 
establishing IT are: an independent, transparent, accountable and technically-capable 
central bank; absence of fiscal dominance; and a sufficiently developed financial system. 
We believe these are suitable candidates for instruments for switchafter _ , as nowhere 
in the literature, to the writer‘s knowledge, is it argued that they enter the Taylor-rule 
based model directly, i.e. they affect the interest rate only through switchafter _ . 
However, while a measure of the financial-system development and fiscal dominance 
can be easily obtained (the most frequently used measure for the first being bank assets-
to-GDP and credits-to-GDP; and for the second the amount of monetary financing of 
the public deficit-to-GDP), measures for central-bank independence are usually 
calculated on an annual basis and will thus lack variability. Hence, we proceed by 
addressing the selection of unobservables by adding the ratio of domestic credit-to-
GDP and the central-bank claims on central government-to-GDP as instruments. In 
addition to these, we refer back to Section 5.3.3, where we discussed the role of 
euroization in the IT economies. Although we did not find arguments for euroization 
playing an important role under IT, it may still be the case that highly-euroized ERTers 
might be deterred from switching to IT, because a larger amount of bank assets would 
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become exposed to exchange-rate risk. Hence the ratio of net-foreign assets of the 
banking sector to GDP is used as a third instrument for the switching variable.42 
  Table 6.2. reports the results of the basic switching FE regression. Note that in 
all tables reporting the SR estimates, the time dummies are only reported in the 
Appendix 4 due to space. Also note that because an FE regression is estimated, ‗switch‘, 
as a time-invariant variable is dropped. This does not mean that ‗switch‘ was not 
controlled for in the specifications (it is subsumed within the FE), but we were not able 
to obtain a separate estimate of its value. 
First, both standard IV estimators (homoskedastic-only and HAC) and GMM 
are reported. We firstly compare the standard errors of the homoskedasticity-only 
(column 1) and HAC (column 2) IV estimators and conclude that there are notable 
differences, which leads us to conclude that heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
should be accounted for in making statistical inferences. Then, the GMM estimator is 
utilized whereby estimates and standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation (column 3). In the Stock and Yogo (2005) test the critical values are 
devised only up to three endogenous variables, but we do have more than three 
endogenous variables in all cases, and these cannot be omitted, simply because we work 
with interactions, which are among our variables of interest. However, in all 
specifications we investigated, the weak identification test did not exceed an F-value of 
5. The ―rule of thumb‖ of 10 (Staiger and Stock, 1997) is thus never attained. Yet the 
critical values required to interpret the F-stat depend on the number of endogenous 
variables and instruments and also differ between estimators, and there is a lack of 
studies testing for weak instruments in the presence of non-i.i.d. errors (Stock and 
Yogo, 2005; Baum et al. 2007, p.24). Given the exposition in Section 6.4.3 on how the 
problem of weak instruments can be addressed, CUE is reported in columns (4) and (5) 
and LIML in column (6). Column (4) reports CUE for homoskedasticity only, while (5) 
reports HAC errors. We again observe notable differences and conclude that 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation should be accounted for. LIML estimates are 
efficient for homoskedasticity only, while CUE estimates are efficient for arbitrary 
                                                 
42 There are arguments for including this variable in the main specification to explore the role of 
euroization under the two monetary strategies. We do this in the robustness checking in Table 6.4. 
However, we find there that the NFA-to-GDP is generally insignificant in explaining the interest rate 
(and, hence, has no significant role in monetary policy in the investigated countries), which supports our 
approach in using it as an instrument for correcting ‗after-switch‘ endogeneity due to unobservables. 
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heteroskedasticity. Consequently, our preferred estimator is CUE (HAC errors), and 
henceforth our discussion and further robustness tests are based on it.  
 
 
 
 
 
239 
Table 6.2. Basic switching FE regression 
Dependent variable: 
Interest rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IV 
homoskedas-
ticity-only s.e. 
IV 
HAC s.e. 
GMM 
HAC s.e. 
CUE 
homoskedas-
ticity-only s.e. 
CUE 
HAC s.e. 
LIML 
HAC s.e. 
       
Interest rate (-1) 0.834*** 0.834*** 0.834*** 0.839*** 0.938*** 0.839*** 
       
A 
Expected inflation 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.042 -0.016 0.042 
Output gap 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.081 0.071* 0.081 
Δ Nominal exchange rate 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.051* -0.033 0.051 
       
After -0.570 -0.570 -0.570 -0.644 -0.624* -0.644 
       
B 
Expected inflation_after -0.071** -0.071 -0.071 -0.080* 0.085* -0.080 
Output gap_after -0.063 -0.063 -0.063 0.064 -0.043 0.064 
Δ Nominal exchange rate_after -0.060** -0.060 -0.060* -0.071** 0.060* -0.071 
       
C 
Expected inflation_switch 0.208* 0.208* 0.208*** 0.242*** 0.086 0.242** 
Output gap_switch -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.009 0.041 -0.009 
Δ Nominal exchange rate_switch -0.037 -0.037 -0.037 -0.050 0.018 -0.050 
    -  - 
After-switch 2.442*** 2.442* 2.442*** 2.901*** 1.370*** 2.901** 
    -  - 
D 
Expected inflation_after_switch -0.279 -0.279* -0.279** -0.340*** -0.183*** -0.340** 
Output gap_after_switch -0.002* -0.002 -0.002 -0.011 -0.063 -0.011 
Δ Nominal exchange rate_after_switch 0.074* 0.074 0.074* 0.090** -0.029 0.090 
       
F-statistics 
H0: All regressors are insignificant 
287.39*** 372.38*** 287.39*** 282.59*** 1094.82*** 357.22*** 
Under-identification test (p-value) 
H0: Model is under-identified 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Weak identification test (F-stat) 
H0: Model is weakly identified 
3.764 3.822 3.764 3.764 3.822 3.822 
Hansen test (p-value) 
H0: Instruments are valid 
0.344 0.134 0.344 0.364 0.225 0.170 
Endogeneity test for the switching (p-value) 
H0: After_switch may be treated exogenous 
0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.012 
Note: *,**,*** indicate 10, 5 and 1% of significance, respectively. The potentially endogenous variables are instrumented by their lags, varying from the third until the 24th lag at a sequence of three lags, given the 
monthly data. The potential endogeneity of the switching variable is addressed by using as instruments the domestic credit-to-GDP; central-bank claims on central government-to-GDP and net foreign assets in the 
banking system-to-GDP and their first lags; and is tested through the Wu-Hausman F-test version of the endogeneity test which is robust to various violations of conditional homoskedasticity. Reported over-
identification test is Hansen J statistic. Reported under-identification test is Kleibergen and Paap‘s (2006) test. Reported weak identification test is Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistics.  
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In all regressions the null that the model is under-specified can be rejected and 
the null that the instruments are valid (the over-identification test) cannot be rejected. 
Considering the possibility of weak identification within CUE, it is observed that 
coefficient magnitudes are largely similar to other estimation methods. The endogeneity 
test for the switching variable rejects the null of it being exogenous, which supports our 
approach of using instrumental estimation (Section 6.4.3). Note that given our 
specification, estimated coefficients approximate short-run relationships. However, 
these are the coefficients of interest, given that the monetary-policy reactions are of a 
short-run nature. 
Given the complexity of the estimable model, in what follows we explain each 
panel of Table 6.2. Because of the issues related to weak identification discussed above, 
attention is focused on column (5) – CUE (HAC s.e.). A note on the lagged interest rate 
first: it has a very plausible magnitude, suggesting on a high smoothing, and is highly 
significant. Hence, it is doing a lot of explanation of the significance of the other 
coefficients. Without observing separate groups (panel A), we find that expected 
inflation and the change of the nominal exchange rate are insignificant at conventional 
levels, while the output gap is significant only at 10%. It suggests a very mild reaction of 
the central bank - an increase of output gap by 1 p.p. (economy overheating) leads to an 
increase of the nominal interest rate by 0.07 p.p.  
Panels B and C of Table 6.2 control for the period- and group-specific effects, 
respectively. Recall that the ‗after‘ dummy is equal to one for all countries after their 
official switch (for switchers) and after 2000 (for non-switchers), and zero otherwise. 
The coefficient in front of the ‗after‘ dummy (Table 6.2, Column 5) suggests that in the 
later period interest rates have been, on average and other things equal, lower by 0.6 
p.p. It could be that this is a reflection of the characteristic of this period - an increased 
growth and shock-free macroeconomic environment. The latter is also reflected in the 
time dummies – these are generally insignificant in the period before 2001 and generally 
significant with a negative sign in the period afterward, suggesting that the shock-free 
period added to the ease of monetary-policy conduct (see Section A4.3). However, the 
ceteris paribus effect is very strict here, given that we know that the average 
macroeconomic indicators changed between periods. The results suggest that in the 
―after‖ period, countries toughen monetary policy reaction to expected inflation and 
exchange rate changes, but these are significant only at the 10% level.  
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 What is of importance here is the case when the estimated monetary-policy 
responses in the switchers during the period under IT are considered. Recall that the 
‗after-switch‘ dummy is equal to one for switchers after they switched to IT, and zero 
otherwise. The coefficient on the combined intercept dummy for switchers  in the 
period after the switch (which is the summed coefficient of ‗after‘ and ‗after-switch‘ 
dummies in Table 6.2) suggests that interest rates in switchers have been, on average 
and other things equal, higher by 0.75 p.p. (p=0.0237) (given the caution regarding the 
strictness of the ceteris paribus principle here). The policy-reaction coefficients are with 
negative signs and suggest that switchers, after they switched to IT, were able to 
moderate their reactions to macroeconomic developments. However, only expected 
inflation is statistically significant (at the 1% level) in affecting interest rates: an increase 
of expected inflation by 1 p.p. leads to a lower change in the nominal interest rate - by 
0.18 p.p. - as compared to the period before and to the control group of countries. 
Also, the Wald test (not shown but available on request) suggests that the expected 
inflation coefficient in the switchers is systematically different from the period before 
and from the control group. Consequently, these results suggest that IT represented a 
real switch in the investigated countries. Under IT, the results suggest that these 
countries became more concerned in combating inflation (given its statistical 
significance), but their reaction moderated compared to the period before and to the 
control group (given the change in the interest rate). Still, the price they paid for this is 
the higher level of interest rates, as compared to the period before and to the control 
group (as suggested by the intercept dummy). Although the coefficients on the output 
gap and the change in the exchange rate seem plausible and also suggest moderation in 
the policy reaction, they remain neither significant nor systematically different from the 
period before and from the control group. This suggests that these countries were 
concerned with inflation and the accompanying inflation expectations only and not the 
output gap and exchange rate, i.e. that they ran a monetary policy geared towards strict 
IT. This can be reconciled with reality: many of these countries had suffered periods of 
high inflation in the past (and this is the primary reason why they established ERT in 
the former period), so that even after they switched to IT, inflation remained their 
primary focus. This can be also reconciled with the observation in Section 5.2.1 that 
inflation should remain the main focus of IT policymakers until credibility is acquired, 
which is particularly the case in developing economies. On the other hand, the 
insignificance of the exchange rate might be a result of the relaxation of the exchange 
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rate constraint (the price of which was the higher level of interest rates, picked up by 
‗after-switch‘ dummy), but it runs counter to the discussion of the role of the exchange 
rate in small, open ITers (Sections 5.2 and 5.3).  
Overall, the conclusion runs counter to the idea that monetary policy has not 
undergone any change in the 2000s. Having taken controlled for the relatively shock-
free nature of this period,  the estimates suggest that a switch to inflation targeting had 
an effect. Also, the results run counter to the usual statement in the literature that 
central banks under IT react strongly to inflation deviations from the target - compared 
to the period before and to the control group, these reactions moderate under IT. 
Taken together, a potential reason is that interest rates were maintained at a higher level 
than would otherwise have been the case. On the other hand, no statistical significance 
was established for the output and the exchange rate, suggesting that these countries ran 
policy geared toward strict IT; i.e. policy was not accounting for real-economy 
developments. Also, the significance of the expected inflation effect in the switchers 
after they switched, might suggest that the switch could be more thought of as a switch 
toward more independent monetary policy, which afforded a space to account for 
domestic objectives. However, this is yet very limited evidence, given the insignificance 
of the reaction to the output gap. This modelling approach, unfortunately, does not 
facilitate checking if the overall variability and uncertainty (i.e. the way expectations are 
anchored) in the economy changed with the switch to IT. 
 
6.6. Further discussion on the switching regression 
 6.6.1. Robustness tests 
The general conclusion of the above discussion is that the switch to IT was a 
real switch to a newly-designed monetary policy, focused on inflation. Here, some 
robustness checks are performed, to test the stability of these results; CUE (HAC s.e.) 
only is used. Results are presented in Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 in the same way as in 
Table 6.2. In Table 6.3, three kinds of robustness check are done: i) dropping the ‗after‘ 
and ‗switch‘ intercept and slope dummies; ii) allow for the switching variable to be 
exogenous; and iii) reducing the sample size.  
Using both intercept and slope dummies is often associated with multi-
collinearity and hence, unstable estimates, as the model specification and sample is 
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changed. To investigate this, the ‗after‘ and ‗switch‘ slope dummies are dropped in 
column 1. All diagnostics seem acceptable, including the weak identification test, given 
our earlier discussion. The estimated coefficients in the ‗quadrant‘ of interest again 
suggest moderation of the policy responses under IT, but the output gap, while having 
similar magnitude as in the base regression Table 6.2), now is statistically significant at 
the 1% level. This might lend some support to the notion that the investigated countries 
were not ‗inflation nutters‘, but rather that their policymaking afforded some space for 
pursuing real objectives. 
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 6.3 treat the switching dummy as being 
exogenous, the difference being that the latter column has a gap-period implemented. 
The gap period refers to exclusion of the period around the official switch to IT: this is 
done in order to avoid the potential endogeneity of the switch. We allow a gap period of 
three years, symmetrically shared around the switch. Arguably this gives sufficient time 
to capture any macro-performance that might have forced a switch (pre-switch) and/or 
period when IT was declared but not (fully) adhered to (post-switch). The results 
(column 2) are insignificant for the quadrant of interest and the exogeneity of the 
switching variable is rejected, which renders the specification questionable and supports 
our approach in dealing with the potential endogeneity of the switch followed above. 
When the gap-period is included (column 3), we note that the estimated response 
coefficients of the central bank switch sign, but are insignificant at conventional levels43. 
Also, the appropriate test cannot reject the null of exogeneity, which is expected, given 
that the period around the switch is ruled out of the estimation. A feature of this 
specification is that the ‗after‘ dummy becomes positive, but insignificant, while the 
summed coefficient in front of the after-switch dummy (‗after‘ + ‗after-switch‘) is still 
positive, but its magnitude is lower than in the other specifications (0.35 p.p.) and is 
statistically insignificant (p=0.3253). This might suggest that the period around the 
switch is very important in terms of macroeconomic developments, and although this 
specification (column 3) supports acknowledging switch endogeneity in the other 
specifications, it still excludes this important period. 
In column (4) the sample size is cut to 15 countries: Chile, Israel, Poland and 
Colombia are excluded from the switchers group, given the concern raised in Section 
                                                 
43 As a further check, the gap period was shortened to two years and extended to five years, but the 
conclusions remained largely the same. 
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6.2.2 - although an official exchange-rate target was announced, the de-facto behaviour 
of the exchange rate remained considerably lax. Estimates are robust to reducing the 
sample size (compared to column 5 of Table 6.2); the output-gap effect is of similar 
magnitude, but in this specification is significant only at the 10% level. 
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Table 6.3. Robustness checks of the switching FE regression (CUE [HAC s.e.]) I 
 Dependent variable: 
Interest rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Interactions with 
after-switch only 
After-switch – 
exogenous 
After-switch –
gap-period 
Sample size 
Interest rate (-1) 0.812*** 0.986*** 0.997*** 0.948*** 
     
A 
Expected inflation 0.193*** 0.048 0.072 0.006 
Output gap 0.067*** 0.107*** 0.141*** 0.041 
Δ Nominal exchange rate 0.013 -0.031 0.043 0.006 
     
After -1.404*** -0.349 0.402 -0.262* 
     
B 
Expected inflation_after  -0.011 -0.093 0.028 
Output gap_after  -0.082* -0.139*** -0.017 
Δ Nominal exchange rate_after  0.041* -0.057 0.016 
      
C 
Expected inflation_switch  -0.011 -0.08 0.075** 
Output gap_switch  0.042 -0.048 0.058 
Δ Nominal exchange rate_switch  0.016 -0.023 -0.035 
     
After-switch 2.930*** 0.495 -0.053 0.598** 
     
D 
Expected inflation_after_switch -0.163*** -0.038 0.084 -0.128*** 
Output gap_after_switch -0.060*** -0.058 0.049 -0.077* 
Δ Nominal exchange rate_after_switch 0.013 -0.013 0.050 0.029 
     
F-statistics 949.68*** 259.68*** 956.48*** 1360.73*** 
Under-identification test (p-value) 
H0: Model is under-identified 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Weak identification test (F-stat) 
H0: Model is weakly identified 
3.747 3.623 1.801 3.766 
Hansen test (p-value) 
H0: Instruments are valid 
0.673 0.288 0.151 0.115 
Endogeneity test for the switching (p-value) 
H0: After_switch may be treated exogenous 
0.003   0.109 
C-statistic for the switching (p-value) 
H0: After_switch may be treated exogenous 
 0.001 0.372  
Note: *,**,*** indicate 10, 5 and 1% of significance, respectively. See notes on diagnostic tests in Table 6.2. 
The C statistic (also known as difference-in-Sargan statistic) allows a test of a subset of the orthogonality conditions; i.e. of the exogeneity of one or 
more instruments. It is defined as the difference of the Sargan-Hansen statistic of the equation with the smaller set of instruments and the equation with 
the full set of instruments, i.e. including the instruments whose validity is suspect. Under the null hypothesis, both the smaller set of instruments and the 
additional, suspect instruments are valid. 
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In Table 6.4 robustness testing is further pursued by considering possible 
additional variables. Firstly, we check if the interest rule has a backward-looking 
component; in column (1) the 12th lag of inflation and the interactions are added; since 
these are lagged values, they enter as exogenous in the regression. Lagged inflation is 
insignificant in all groups, suggesting that the forward-looking specification of the 
interest rule might be more appropriate. The remaining coefficients remain stable. 
Column (2) explores the potential role of euroization in the economy. Euroization is 
insignificant in all groups; hence, it is in line with the discussion in Section 5.3.4 and 
lends justification for its usage as an excluded instrument in the previous regressions. 
Other coefficients remain stable.  
Column (3) includes reserves. They are significant throughout the sample, 
suggesting that they play a strong role for these small, open economies. Estimated 
coefficients of other variables are of comparable magnitude as in our basic specification. 
An exception is the expected inflation in the ‗after-switch‘ group, which is insignificant 
and has an unexpected sign, but the output gap is significant at the 10% level. Given an 
exchange rate peg in a major part of the sample, the pressure on the foreign exchange 
market cannot be fully felt on the nominal exchange rate but reserves should capture 
this effect. The positive sign could be unexpected, though, it is expected that growing 
reserves will leave more space for an easier monetary policy. However, it might be that 
the central bank, in such conditions, sterilizes money inflow from abroad (fearing 
inflation) and hence the interest rate increases. In the switchers after they switched, the 
response to reserve changes moderates. 
Money growth is added in column (4) and is significant at 5%, except in the 
base group. An increase of money in the economy increases interest rates in the ‗after‘ 
and switching group, but, in line with the overall conclusion above, the reaction in the 
‗after-switch‘ group moderates. Its inclusion in the regression does not change the 
remaining coefficients and conclusions remain largely the same.  
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Table 6.4. Robustness checks of the switching FE regression (CUE [HAC s.e.]) II 
Dependent variable: 
Interest rate 
Added variables 
Lagged 
inflation 
|NFA| to GDP Reserves growth Money growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Interest rate (-1) 0.964*** 0.912*** 0.970*** 0.962*** 
     
A 
Expected inflation 0.052 -0.014 0.167*** 0.025 
Output gap 0.084** 0.054 0.089*** 0.069 
Δ Nominal exchange rate -0.031 -0.058** -0.001 -0.111** 
Added variable -1.881 -0.006 0.039*** -0.072 
     
After -0.655 -0.622 -1.391 -2.567*** 
     
B 
Expected inflation_after 0.016 0.118** -0.151*** 0.023 
Output gap_after -0.056 -0.029 -0.059** -0.047 
Δ Nominal exchange rate_after 0.049 0.106*** 0.016 0.127** 
Added variable _after 2.894 0.014 0.044*** 0.077** 
      
C 
Expected inflation_switch 0.047 0.094 -0.127* 0.003 
Output gap_switch 0.038 0.045 0.130*** 0.041 
Δ Nominal exchange rate_switch 0.012 0.048* 0.023 0.105** 
Added variable _switch -0.019 0.012 0.040*** 0.082** 
     
After-switch 1.508*** 1.649* 1.992*** 3.242*** 
     
D 
Expected inflation_after_switch -0.176** -0.211*** 0.031 -0.050 
Output gap_after_switch -0.061 -0.062 -0.144*** -0.057 
Δ Nominal exchange rate_after_switch -0.015 -0.082** -0.026 -0.104** 
Added variable _after_switch -0.021 -0.024 -0.047*** -0.072** 
     
F-statistics 932.92*** 752.99*** 1244.07*** 1099.59*** 
Under-identification test (p-value) 
H0: Model is under-identified 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Weak identification test (F-stat) 
H0: Model is weakly identified 
3.504 3.344 3.208 3.599 
Hansen test (p-value) 
H0: After_switch may be treated exogenous 
0.250 0.103 0.290 0.440 
Endogeneity test for the switching (p-value) 
H0: After_switch may be treated exogenous 
0.013 0.006 0.009 0.082 
Note: *,**,*** indicate 10, 5 and 1% of significance, respectively. See notes on diagnostic tests in Table 6.2. 
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Overall, with the basic specification and the robustness checks, the conclusions 
are: i) there is supporting evidence that the switch to IT represented a real switch in the 
investigated countries, i.e. that monetary policy is responsible for the changing results in 
the ‗after‘ period; ii) central bankers in the ‗after-switch‘ react to expected inflation, but 
the reaction moderates in comparison to the control group and the period before; 
however, the latter happens against the background of higher interest rates, which 
might be a reflection of the determination to master inflation, per se; iii) although, in 
general, we concluded that these countries embarked on a policy geared towards strict 
IT (i.e. without considering output fluctuations), still there was limited evidence in some 
of the regressions that real fluctuations were taken into account and suggested that the 
reaction there moderated as well, but this finding is far from being robust; and iv) the 
exchange rate remained largely insignificant in affecting monetary-policy conduct. 
 
 6.6.2. A critique 
Designed in this way, the switching regression suffers some drawbacks; three are 
discussed here; the last two are important for the further investigation. Firstly, some 
shortcomings are associated with the use of the FE estimator. Namely, it precluded the 
‗classic‘ natural experiment identification strategy, i.e. a comparison of ‗before‘ and 
‗after‘ effects in both ‗switch‘ and ‗non-switch‘ groups. This cannot be done in FE 
estimation, because the four dummy variables, each representing one of the four 
‗quadrants‘ sum to an overall constant, as do the country fixed effects. Similar to this 
limitation, in our estimation, the ‗switch‘ dummy, as time-invariant variable, cannot be 
included, given that it is a fixed effect. However, this does not mean that ‗switch‘ was 
not controlled for in the specifications, but we were not able to obtain a separate 
estimate of its value. However, interactions of ‗switch‘ with the covariates were possible.  
Secondly, the technique was originally designed to capture a switch with 
exogenous variation. However, we argued and provided statistical evidence that the 
switch to IT should be treated as endogenous. This was resolved by addressing both 
endogeneity stemming from the selection of observables and of unobservables. The 
overidentifying restrictions on the switching variable were tested and suggested it being 
endogenous. This is not a problematic approach if countries that experienced increased 
inflation volatility and exchange-rate pressures ultimately abandoned the existing regime 
and explicitly embarked on another. However, a potential problem is that some of the 
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countries might have started to target the medium-term inflation well before they 
officially introduced it (like Israel); or, the opposite, they officially introduced it but 
continued to tightly target the exchange rate for some intermediate period (like 
Hungary). The SR approach cannot capture this variety of potential developments. 
Thirdly, this approach enables intercept and slope switches, but not variance 
switches. This cannot facilitate the need to observe if and how the monetary 
environment under IT changed; i.e. if, under IT, the economy achieved both lower 
inflation- and output variance (recall our discussion in Section 5.2.1). To address the 
second and the third drawback, we proceed with an alternative modelling strategy, 
which is described as the chapter proceeds. 
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6.7. Method II 
 6.7.1. Nonlinear switching regression 
Given above drawbacks of the SR approach, other methods are available in the 
literature designed to capture the sources of non-linearities in the data. The last two 
decades marked a substantial increase in the application of non-linear methods to 
macroeconomic and financial data. These are largely classified into two broad areas: 
threshold autoregressive (hereafter TAR) and Markov-switching (hereafter MS) 
methods. The application of the regime-switching methods has been particularly 
common in analysing economic cycles (e.g. Garcia, 1998, Kim et al, 2008); stock markets 
(Ang and Bekaert, 2002b; Dai et al. 2007) and interest rates (Ang and Bekaert, 2002a; 
Garcia and Perron, 1996). However, no study, to our knowledge, uses those methods to 
analyse monetary policy in a context of monetary-regime switch.  
The threshold autoregression models the behaviour of a variable in a relation to 
a threshold value (Tong, 1983; Potter, 2002). Originally, this class of methods was 
proposed by Tong (1978) and further developed by Tong and Lim (1980) and Tong 
(1983). The value that changes (the interest rate, in our case) depending on the values of 
an independent variable (say, inflation) is within the space of the threshold variable 
(which could also be inflation) but not linear in time. When the threshold variable is 
taken as a lagged value of the time-series itself, the method is known as a self-exciting 
threshold autoregressive (SETAR) method (Tong, 1993; Hansen, 1996; 1997; 2000). 
Designed in this way, the TAR method crucially depends on two factors: i) the choice 
of the threshold variable; and ii) the information about the official switch. Although 
some of our right-hand-side variables might be good candidates for a threshold variable, 
and although the official date of the switch to IT is known, our understanding is that 
the approach to the problem is similar to the SR approach (Section 6.4), which is not 
helpful given its potential drawbacks in light of our research question (as discussed in 
section 6.6.2). 
In contrast to the TAR approach (and apparently to the SR approach), the 
structural break in the MS approach is the outcome of an unobserved, discrete, random 
variable, which is assumed to follow a Markov process44 (Goldfeld and Quandt, 1973; 
                                                 
44 A Markov process is a stochastic process in which only the present value of the variable is relevant to 
predict its future behaviour, i.e. its past values and the way in which the present value has emerged from 
the past are irrelevant. Hence, Markov processes are not path-dependent. 
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Cosslett and Lee, 1985; Hamilton, 1989). This strand of the literature was steered by the 
seminal contributions of Hamilton (1989; 1994), although the work was motivated by 
the earlier contribution of Goldfeld and Quandt (1973). Textbook exposition of the MS 
models can be found in Maddala and Kim (1998); Brooks (2002); and Doornik and 
Hendry (2009). Hamilton's (1989) model explores the quarterly percentage change in 
US real GNP from 1953 to 1984 as a function of its own lagged values in the previous 
four quarters and allows the conditional mean to switch between two states: expansion 
and recession. Since this seminal contribution, a growing literature on regime switching 
in applied macroeconomic time-series analysis has emerged (Cecchetti et al. 1990; 
Diebold and Rudebusch, 1996; Garcia and Perron, 1996; Ravn and Sola, 1995; Sola and 
Driffill, 1994; and so on). However, these applications are still largely limited to 
business-cycle analysis. A small part of the literature (Ang and Bekaert, 2002b; Vasquez, 
2004; 2008; Sims and Zha, 2006; Valente, 2003) analyses monetary policy, but 
frequently tries to capture different styles of monetary policy under different central-
bank governors. Also, all these studies are limited to developed countries.  
What advantages would the MS approach have over the SR approach? Although 
we have reviewed in Chapter 5 and obtained in Section 6.6 some evidence in favour of 
IT, still our discussion there and in Ball and Sheridan (2003) poses the contra-argument 
that this evidence is still open to the identification-strategy problem (i.e. how good a 
comparative group is the control group; Sections 5.2.3, 5.3.4 and 6.2.2). Moreover, Creel 
and Hubert (2009) point out that contrary to SR and TAR methods, MS methods will 
circumvent the task of predefining a switch or a threshold and will simply reveal if and 
when different regimes occurred in the switching economies. Moreover, letting data 
speak freely will address our earlier concern (Section 6.6.2) that investigating the 
presence of distinct regimes, rather than assuming a strict break, would enable us to 
check if anti-inflation policies existed in the past (i.e. authorities might have started to 
target medium-term inflation before they officially announced a switch) or if the 
exchange-rate target was not fully abandoned even after the official switch to IT (i.e. 
authorities continued to target the exchange rate for a certain period after they officially 
switched). Finally, by allowing for the variance in the regression to differ in both 
regimes, MS methods allow for investigation of whether the stability of the economic 
environment changed due to monetary policy. Given that this method will potentially 
overcome our concerns within Section 6.6.2, we proceed with an MS framework, which 
is further explained in the next subsection. 
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6.7.2. Designing a Markov-switching regression 
In an MS regression, explanatory power is assigned to the existence of a few 
―states‖ (regimes) among which the economy shifts: 
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where ty  is a univariate time series to be explained; ts  is a latent dummy variable taking 
the value of 0 or 1 and representing two states in which the economy could fit; and t  
is Gaussian white noise ( ))(,0(| ttt SNIDS  ; Hamilton, 1989).   is a mean term 
conditional upon the state in which the economy belongs; the state is assumed to be 
unobservable and has to be inferred from the data. In his work, Hamilton (1989) sets 
the autoregressive order equal to four. In cases where the null of 0  cannot be 
rejected, only one state governs the process and this could be represented by the 
standard AR(4) model. 
To complete the description of the dynamics of (6.12), we need to define a 
probability rule of how ty  changes between regimes. A Markov chain is the simplest 
time-series method for a discrete-valued random variable, such as the regime variable 
ts . ts  is assumed to follow an ergodic
45 first-order Markov process (and is, hence, 
serially correlated) and is characterised by the matrix  , consisting of the transition 
probabilities ijp  from state i to state j:  
 


















N
j
ijij
tttttij
NNNN
N
N
pNip
iSjSpkSiSjSpp
ppp
ppp
ppp
1
121
21
22212
12111
10 ;....3,2,1 ;1
)|(,....) ,|(
... 
.  ...    .     .
... 
... 
  (6.13) 
                                                 
45 Similarly, a stochastic process is said to be ergodic if no sample helps meaningfully to predict values 
that are very far away in time from that sample. Another way to say that is that the time path of the 
stochastic process is not sensitive to initial conditions. 
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For a two-regime state-space, transition probabilities can be expressed as 
follows: 
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whereby the probability that the economy has been in regime 0 and will stay in the same 
regime is p; the probability that it was in regime 0, but it is now in regime 1 is 1-p, and 
so on. With these transition probabilities the regime switch is dependent only on the 
state before the switch, while the expected duration of each regime is constant (Misas 
and Ramirez, 2007; Kim et al. 2008). In other words, Hamilton‘s (1989) approach does 
not require any prior information to characterize the current state of the economic 
series (see also in Medeiros and Sobral, 2008; Moolman, 2004). Hence, the evolution of 
the regime switch occurs exogenously. However, this specification appears very 
restrictive in the description of regime-changes. 
 
6.7.3. Endogeneity in a Markov-switching regression 
As argued above, Hamilton‘s (1989) model is a univariate framework that 
assumes regime shift being exogenous to all realizations of the regression disturbance. 
Since Hamilton (1989), many applications used MS models that included additional 
explanatory variables (see Maddala and Kim, 1998, pp.463-465, for a review). In these, 
though: i) independent variables, as in every other form of regression, might be 
endogenous; and ii) the switch might evolve endogenously. However, neither source of 
endogeneity in the MS regression was resolved until Krolzig (1998) developed the MS 
methods in the area of vector auto-regressions (hereafter MS-VAR; see Krolzig, 1998; 
Krolzig and Toro, 1999). These are standard VAR models, whereby some or all of the 
parameters are allowed to switch when regime changes. In its most general form, the 
MS-VAR process has the following form: 
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where ),.......,( 1 nttt yyy   is an n -dimensional transposed vector of n endogenous 
variables,   is the vector of intercepts, pAA ,....,1 are the matrices with the 
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autoregressive parameters and t  is the white noise vector process 
( ))(,0(| ttt SNIDS  ) and all can be dependant on the switching variable tS . Hence, 
MS-VARs appear in a variety of specifications, whereby different facets are allowed to 
be regime-dependent; Krolzig (1998) gives an overview, which is reproduced here, for 
convenience: 
Table 6.5. Types of Markov-switching models 
Notation       
iA  
 mean Intercept variance AR parameters 
MSM(M)-VAR(p) varying - invariant invariant 
MSMH(M)-VAR(p) varying - varying invariant 
MSI(M)-VAR(p) - Varying invariant invariant 
MSIH(M)-VAR(p) - Varying varying invariant 
MSIAH(M)-VAR(p) - Varying varying varying 
Legend: MS-Markov-switching; M-mean; (M)-number of states/regimes; (p)-order of VAR (number 
of lags); I-intercept; H-heteroskedasticity; A-autoregressive terms. 
Source: Krolzig (1998)  
Since MS-VARs represent a system of equations whereby each potentially endogenous 
variable is regressed on all other potentially endogenous and exogenous variable subject 
to switch, the first source of endogeneity in the MS regression is addressed. In turn, the 
switch, the second aspect of endogeneity in an MS regression, could be endogenous to 
one or more of: 
i) observed variables, like inflation or exchange rate; 
ii) unobserved variables, like macroeconomic shocks to the VAR that correlate 
to the monetary regime in operation (Kim et al. 2008); and 
iii) the duration of the regime in operation (Durland and McCurdy, 1994).  
By allowing the potential determinants of the switch to interact in a dynamic 
framework, the issue discussed in Section 6.4.2, of endogeneity arising from the 
selection of observables is addressed. However, given that transition probabilities are 
constant, one still might be concerned about switch endogeneity stemming from 
unobservables. The literature approaches this issue in a similar fashion as in the SR 
approach: transition probabilities can be allowed to change, depending on the value of a 
variable that does not enter the system, but might be correlated with the latent switch. 
Filardo (1994) and Diebold et al. (1999) argue that an MS model whereby economic 
fundamentals are allowed to affect transition probabilities can recognize systematic 
changes in them before and after switching; capture more complex temporal persistence 
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and allow expected duration to vary across time. Hence, allowing for time-varying 
transition probability (TVTP) will capture some of the remaining endogeneity, if any, 
from the switching variable. Unfortunately, at present: i) the MSVAR package does not 
allow for TVTP and advanced programming knowledge is needed for another program; 
and ii) MS-VARs with TVTP do not allow duration-dependence, which suggests that 
being able to account for all potential source of endogeneity in a single MS model 
awaits further theoretical advance(s). Given this, the possible presence of remaining 
switch endogeneity could be checked only indirectly, by observing whether transition 
probabilities change when the MS-VAR specification changes. Namely, Vázquez (2008) 
argues that there would be a cause for concern if estimated probabilities differ under 
alternative MS-VAR specifications - that is, the switching variable would be exhibiting 
endogeneity stemming from unobservables if the smoothed probabilities depended on 
the MS-VAR specification.  
We need guidance on how large the bias can be if endogeneity remains in the 
switching variable. Kim et al. (2008) performed a Monte Carlo analysis to check for the 
bias. Their results suggest that there is a bias in the estimated coefficients under the first 
regime and in the obtained regimes‘ volatility, but that the bias is lower for larger 
transition probabilities and for lower correlation of the switching variable with the 
economic fundamentals. For illustration, we specifically refer here to Kim et al.‘s (2008) 
results related to the characteristics of our case – T=200 and high persistence, p11=0.9 
and p22=0.9. First, they obtained that allowing for TVTP when the true switching is 
exogenous does not yield any efficiency gain. When the true switching process is 
endogenous, though, the estimated coefficients in the first regime are found to be 
upwardly biased by 6% to 11% for the case when the correlation between the switch 
and the economic fundamentals is moderate, 0.5; and by 10% to 20% for the case when 
the correlation is high, 0.9. Estimated coefficients in the second regime are found to be 
unbiased. Regimes‘ volatilities are found to be downward biased by 3% (for moderate 
correlation, 0.5) and by 6% (for high correlation, 0.9).  
In the empirical comparisons, these findings were roughly confirmed. Some are 
given here for illustration. In Turner et al.‘s (1989) model of equity returns, volatilities‘ 
bias was found between 0% and 1.4%, but the largest bias was documented for the 
coefficient measuring the volatility feedback - one third smaller when endogeneity is 
allowed than when it is ignored. Correlation was estimated to be modest, -0.4 and 
different from zero only at the 10% level. Misas and Ramirez (2007) estimated a MS 
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regression for economic growth in Colombia. Under a very high correlation of 0.98, the 
bias found for volatilities was again very low and ranged from 1.5% to 3.3%, but the 
bias for the means increased from 0.7% up to one fifth of the value when endogeneity 
was accounted for. However, no evidence was provided if these means were statistically 
different from zero or comparatives for the estimated coefficients. Cerra and Saxena 
(2002) evaluated the relative merits of fundamentals versus contagion in determining 
financial crisis in Indonesia in the late 1990s, via MS methods. They obtained a bias of 
15.3% for the mean; 2.4% for the variance; and 24% for the only significant coefficient. 
Chen (2006) used an MS specification of the nominal exchange rate to investigate its 
nexus with the interest rate for six developing countries. The bias ranged from 2.7 to 
8.3% for the means and from 0.5% to 12.6% for variances (although statistically 
insignificant). However, this paper also does not provide evidence on whether TVTP 
models are preferred (i.e. if the correlation mentioned above is different from zero). 
Overall, identified biases in the empirical investigations are in line with Kim et al.‘s 
(2008) Monte Carlo simulation and, although not negligible, they are argued not to be of 
such a magnitude as to affect the qualitative interpretation of results or any 
corresponding policy implications. 
In relation to the possibility that a regime‘s duration can itself inflict a switch 
and hence be a source of endogeneity, it was argued in Chapter 2 that longer pegs could 
be detrimental to output volatility, especially in times of large shocks. In Chapter 3, 
some evidence was provided suggesting that pegs longer than five years transmit real 
shocks larger than 7% onto output volatility and can lead to crisis and, thus, to a peg 
exit. Hence, the exit of a peg might be duration-dependent, i.e. it is reasonable to 
believe that the probability of peg exit is not the same at the very beginning of the phase 
as after several years. However, no such argumentation, practical or quantitative 
evidence exists for IT, at least not yet. Given this, the switch to a new monetary strategy 
might evolve endogenously because of duration. 
Krolzig‘s models cannot possibly capture this source of endogeneity. In order to 
face this limitation, Durland and McCurdy (1994) introduced the duration-dependent 
MS autoregression, designing an alternative filter for the latent switching variable. 
Pelagatti (2003; 2008) generalized the model in a multivariate framework – the duration-
dependent MS-VAR (DD-MS-VAR). He applied his model to the US business cycle 
(Pelagatti, 2002; 2008) and found it being sufficiently capable of discerning recession 
and expansions. Pelagatti‘s (2003) model has the usual MSM-VAR specification (see 
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Table 6.5), whereby in order the switch variable tS  to become duration dependence, a 
Markov chain is built for the pair );( tt DS , tD  being regime duration, defined as 
follows: 

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A maximum value for the duration variable tD  must be fixed so that the Markov chain 
);( tt DS  is defined in a finite state space. Then, a transition matrix of the Markov chain 
tS  is defined; given that it is rather sparse, a more parsimonious probit specification of 
tS  is used. Pelagatti‘s contribution consists in the introduction of the multi-move Gibbs 
sampler to estimate the model. However, given that we use Pelagatti‘s model only at the 
margin in this exposition, for a more technical exposition we refer to Pelagatti (2003; 
2005). Moreover, the DD-MS-VAR has the shortcoming that only the mean can switch 
between two regimes; however, with these attributes, it has been sufficient to analyse 
business cycles (Durland and McCurdy, 1994; Lam, 2004); here, it will be used only as 
an additional indirect vehicle to check for remaining endogeneity in the switching 
variable due to duration. 
Designed in this manner, the MS-VAR approach includes all the ‗time-series‘ 
features of the switching regression (Section 6.4) and is designed to overcome the 
identified drawbacks (Section 6.6.2). Although powerful, Krolzig's MS-VAR suffers 
some potential shortcomings. First, a great disadvantage of it, at present, seems to be 
the apparently non-comprehensive approach to dealing with switch endogeneity. By 
allowing a multivariate framework and, thus, by allowing potential determinants of the 
switch to enter the MS regression, MS-VAR can address one part of switch endogeneity 
– coming from observables. However, the potential endogeneity stemming from 
unobservables or from regime duration is not directly addressed at present. Vázquez 
(2008) and Pelagatti (2003) offered indirect ways to check for these, although Pelagatti‘s 
model has its own shortcomings. Secondly, many variables (and many lags) cannot be 
included in the MS-VAR, because computation becomes cumbersome and frequently 
the system does not converge. A not-so-recent literature (Asea, 1996; Asea and 
Bloomberg, 1998) proposed a Markov-switching panel (MSP) model. Yet, since that 
time, this type of MS model has not evoked much interest nor has it been further 
advanced. Because of this, the current stage of MSP undergoes, at least, two main 
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shortcomings: i) it potentially suffers from not addressing the possible cross-sectional 
dependence among units, which is a considerably debated issue in recent years in a 
panel context; and ii) it does not advance the issue for the switch being endogenous 
more than MS-VAR nor does it allow for endogenous regressors. These considerations 
render estimation of MSP inappropriate for our case. Finally, as compared to the SR 
approach, the MS-VAR has the disadvantage that results have only time comparability 
and not group comparability, which was apparently an advantage of the former. 
 
6.7.4. Solving algorithm 
To solve an MS-VAR model, an algorithm consisting of two steps is used: 
expectation and maximization. The expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm 
(Dempster et al. 1977) is an efficient iterative procedure to compute the Maximum 
Likelihood (ML) estimate of model parameters in the presence of an unobserved latent 
variable. In ML estimation, we wish to estimate the model parameter(s) for which the 
observed data are the most likely. Each iteration of the EM algorithm consists of two 
processes: The E-step, and the M-step. In the E-step, the latent variable is estimated 
given the observed variables and the current estimate of the model parameters. This is 
achieved using the expectation, conditional on the entire sample of observations. In the 
M-step, the likelihood function is maximized under the assumption that the latent 
variable is known. The estimate of the latent variable from the E-step is used in place of 
the actual latent variable. These parameter-estimates are then used to determine the 
distribution of the latent variables in the next E-step. Convergence is assured since the 
algorithm is guaranteed to increase the likelihood at each iteration.46 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 A technical exposition on the EM algorithm is given in Borman (2009). 
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6.8. Empirical results and discussion II 
6.8.1. Basic findings 
In order to proceed with estimating an MS-VAR model, our economic model 
(6.1) needs to be defined in a reduced vector-autoregressive form, as follows: 
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where ty  is our four-dimensional vector comprised of: nominal interest rate, tr ; 
inflation, t ; output gap, tgap ; and changes of the nominal exchange rate, ter ; tx  is a 
vector of exogenous variables which could enter contemporaneously or with a lag, but 
is not mandatory;   is the vector of intercepts, pAA ,....,1  and pBB ,....,0  are the 
matrices containing the autoregressive parameters and t  is the white noise vector 
process ( ))(,0(| ttt SNIDS  ). Note that since we now operate with a vector 
autoregressive model, all endogenous variables enter with a lag(s). Hence, inflation 
cannot be taken as expected, so that we can estimate only a backward-looking 
specification of the interest-rate rule. Some authors (for instance, Rudebusch and 
Svensson 1998; Rudebusch, 2002) suggest and estimate empirical Taylor-rule versions 
which are based on lagged variables only, which is the case with any VAR framework, 
including MS-VAR.  
The same data for switchers as before are used, described in Table A2.2 in 
Appendix 2. Estimations were performed with MS-VAR in OxMetrics, which utilizes 
the EM algorithm, following the guidelines of Krolzig (1998) and others. The model is 
set as MSIAH(2)-VAR(p), allowing the intercept, autoregressive terms and the variance 
to switch between two regimes. Based on the statistical properties of the identified 
regimes, we will argue later about whether these can be reconciled with the switch to IT. 
No exogenous regressors are included in the basic specification. Intercept and 
regressors were allowed to switch within the SR approach but, additionally, by allowing 
the overall variance of the vectors to change here and be part of the regime switching 
identification, we may check whether the monetary environment changed between the 
two regimes (i.e. address what was identified as a drawback in SR). p denotes the 
number of lags, which is chosen by appeal to the Schwarz information criterion (SIC), 
after serial correlation has been eliminated.  
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The results for each country are reported in Table 6.6; only the vector for the 
interest rate is reported, because it is here representing our economic model (6.1). We 
note the linearity test, given in the last row in Table 6.6. This test is based on the 
likelihood-ratio statistic between the estimated model and the derived linear model and 
under the null hypothesis the linear model is preferred (Doornik and Hendry, 2009). 
The first p-value is based on the conventional Chi-squared distribution, while the 
second is derived by Davies (1987). In all cases, the linearity test suggests that the model 
is significantly non-linear and that parameters switch between regimes. The remaining 
diagnostics is available only through visual checks47 which are given in Figure 6.4. The 
same plots are given for each country: the upper panel checks for serial correlation 
(indicated when bars exceed the band); the middle panel checks for normality (the 
‗distance‘ between the red and the blue bell-shaped curves); while the lower panel 
provides evidence on the structural stability of the model (the ‗distance‘ between the red 
line and the blue line). The plots suggest that the errors can be considered normally and 
independently distributed, while the model is stable. All the remaining vectors are 
similarly well specified; they are available in Section A4.4 in Appendix 4, but their 
diagnostics only upon request. 
After checking diagnostics, attention is focussed on four aspects in explicating 
the results in Table 6.6: i) persistence of the system in each regime; ii) volatility of 
innovations in each regime; iii) estimates of the model in each regime; and iv) the date 
of switching inferred from the data. Note that since we have not yet related the 
identified regimes to ERT or IT, the reporting in Table 6.6 and the explication 
henceforth is set so that regime 1 corresponds to the earlier regime in time and regime 2 
to the later one.  
Transition probabilities 11p  and 22p  are given in a lower panel of Table 6.6; 
they refer to the probability that the regime which was prevailing in the previous period 
will continue to operate in the current period and, in that way, are an indication of 
regime persistence. Reported transition probabilities suggest that regimes are highly 
persistent, i.e. there are no ―short‖ and frequent switches between regimes. Brazil and 
Hungary might be considered as slight exceptions, since regime 1 is not as persistent as 
regime 2. This point is returned to. Regime persistence can be also analysed from a 
                                                 
47 Note that MSVAR under OxMetrics does not report any diagnostic test except the linearity test, but 
offers visual diagnostics as shown on Figure 6.4. 
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visual inspection of Figure 6.5, which gives filtered and smoothed probabilities. The 
figure is reproduced for each country – the upper panel is a simple plot of the included 
series; the middle panel gives the filtered probability of the later regime; the lower panel 
gives the filtered probability of the earlier regime48. The occurrence and height of the 
blue bars is a sign of the persistence of the identified regimes and is readily apparent 
from visual inspection as well. Ideally, we look for two blue blocks, inferring hundred-
percent persistence and one switch. 
The standard error of the residuals from the interest-rate equation in each 
regime, approximating the overall volatility of the economic environment in the 
respective regime, is reported within each regime‘s panel in Table 6.6. The volatility of 
innovations is much higher in regime 1 than in regime 2. Therefore, regime 2 can be 
identified as the regime with lower volatility when compared to regime 1.  
                                                 
48 The middle and lower panel are reversed in terms of the timing of regime 1 and regime 2, simply 
because MSVAR in OxMetrics reports these in this way. 
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Table 6.6. Markov-switching regression results 
Dependent variable: 
Interest rate 
Brazil Chile Colombia Czech Hungary Israel Philippines Poland Thailand 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
REGIME 1          
Constant 14.862** 4.078*** -3.372 3.048*** 7.007 0.311 10.565*** 5.160*** 2.580** 
Σ Interest rate lags 0.599*** 0.075 0.532*** 0.695*** 0.797*** 0.947*** 0.352*** 0.672*** 0.762*** 
Σ Inflation AR lags -0.480 1.232* 0.801*** 0.071* -0.192 0.036 -0.186 0.069* -0.111 
Σ Gap AR lags 0.575* 0.791* 0.169* 0.056 0.161* 0.058 -0.089 0.204 0.062* 
Σ Exchange rate AR lags -0.011 0.050 0.148* 0.067** 0.130 0.008*** 0.018 0.021 0.053* 
          
Regime volatility 4.399 3.705 4.805 1.636 0.685 0.556 4.003 1.857 2.356 
          
Rough regime timing 1997:3 -
1998:8*** 
1993:8 - 
2001:8*** 
1995:4 - 
2000:3*** 
1994:4 - 
1999:2*** 
1992:7 -
1996:10*** 
1992:3 - 
1998:4*** 
1992:2 - 
1999:5*** 
1992:5 - 
1998:7*** 
1992:2 - 
1999:1*** 
          
REGIME 2          
Constant 0.033 -0.066** -0.433 0.052*** 0.090 0.012 0.359*** 0.163 0.086* 
Σ Interest rate lags 0.999*** 0.933*** 0.828*** 0.960*** 0.949*** 0.989*** 0.954*** 0.931*** 0.910*** 
Σ Inflation AR lags 0.024*** 0.031*** 0.258*** 0.022*** 0.045*** 0.004*** -0.012 0.041*** 0.048*** 
Σ Gap AR lags 0.026* -0.006 0.009 -0.003* -0.009 0.007* 0.002 0.018** 0.003* 
Σ Exchange rate AR lags 0.000 -0.007*** -0.001 0.000 0.004 0.006 0.006* -0.004 -0.006* 
          
Regime volatility 0.248 0.245 0.374 0.147 0.329 0.159 0.287 0.394 0.221 
          
Rough regime timing 1998:9 -
2009:7*** 
2001:9 - 
2009:9*** 
2000:4 - 
2005:9*** 
1999:3 - 
2009:10*** 
1996:11 – 
2009:10*** 
1998:5 - 
2009:10*** 
1999:6 - 
2008:12*** 
1998:8 - 
2009:11*** 
1999:2 - 
2009:11*** 
          
p11 0.6945 0.9693 0.9640 0.9836 0.6822 0.9711 0.9266 0.9692 0.9882 
p22 0.9280 0.9789 0.9835 1.0000 0.9494 0.9817 0.9594 0.9810 1.0000 
          
Lags (based on SC) 2 4 1 2 3 2 1 4 1 
           
Inferred switch 1998:9 2001:9 2000:4 1999:3 1996:11 1998:5 1999:6 1998:8 1999:2 
Official switch (Table 6.1) 1999:6 1999:9 1999:10 1997:12 2001:6 1997:6 2002:1 1998:1 2000:5 
Linearity test    (chi-stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (Davies) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Ho: The linear model is preferred          
Note: *,**,*** indicate the 10, 5 and 1% levels of significance, respectively. Regime volatility is measured by the standard error of the residuals of the interest-rate vector. By ―rough regime 
timing‖ it is meant that we do not present the identified short periods of a few months, but instead longer periods when the regime prevailed. 
Whenever more than one lag was used, the sum of the lags for each variable is reported, along with the Wald test of their joint significance. 
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Figure 6.4. Diagnostics for serial correlation and normality of the interest-rate vector 
Brazil        Chile       Colombia 
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Figure 6.4. Diagnostics for serial correlation and normality of the interest-rate vector (continued) 
Philippines       Poland       Thailand 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: R refers to the interest rate (the vector we are interested in); ACF – Auto-correlation function; PACF – Partial auto-correlation function; N(s=x) refers to the normal 
distribution function. 
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Figure 6.5. Regime probabilities  
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Figure 6.5. Regime probabilities (continued) 
Philippines       Poland       Thailand 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: On the figure, regimes are in reverse order compared to how they are reported in Table 6.6; hence, what is referred to as regime 1 in Table 6.6 is the lower panel of each 
country on  
Figure 6.5. This is because of the way MSVAR in OxMetrics prints out results. 
The first panel is a simple plot of the series included in the model. On the second and the third panel, the filtered, smoothed and predicted probabilities are plotted. 
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Estimated coefficients are given in the panels headed ‗Regime 1‘ and ‗Regime 2‘ 
in Table 6.6. Whenever more than one lag was used, the cumulative effect (the sum of 
the lags for each variable) is reported, along with the Wald test of their joint 
significance. Results suggest that the coefficient associated with the lagged interest rate 
generally ranges above 0.9 in the regime 2, suggesting a high degree of interest-rate 
smoothing. Contrary to our thought that smoothing might not be regime-dependent, 
here we observe considerably smaller estimated smoothing parameters of about 0.6 to 
0.7 in regime 1.  
The estimated coefficients suggest that central banks responded significantly to 
inflation in regime 2 (asterisks indicating significance are largely present in the regime-2 
panel of Table 6.6 – in eight out of nine countries inflation is significant in regime 2 at 
the 1%), while the response in regime 1 remains insignificant in five out of nine 
countries. In regime 2, the central-bank response to inflation-change of 1 p.p. ranges 
from very mild in Israel (0.004 p.p.) to considerable in Columbia (0.26 p.p.), with the 
median being a 0.03 p.p. increase of the interest rate (in Chile). Still, if significant 
coefficients between the two regimes are compared, we observe that the reaction to 
inflation in regime 2 has moderated.  
The output gap effect in both regimes is significant in half of the countries and 
frequently only at the 10% level. Estimated responses, where significant, suggest that 
the policy reaction to output fluctuations in regime 2 has moderated as well. Moreover, 
when compared to the response to inflation, the response to the output gap in regime 2 
is found to be even milder. The interest-rate increase ranges from 0.003 p.p. in Thailand 
to 0.026 p.p. in Brazil, with the median being 0.007 p.p. in Israel, when the potential 
output is by an additional 1 p.p. higher than the actual. But, can this be interpreted as 
evidence that these central banks were less concerned with the level of economic 
activity than with inflation? The answer is no, because of Svensson‘s (1997) argument 
that the size of the estimated coefficient on the output gap does not necessarily reflect 
the importance of that variable in the central-bank loss function, but that the weight 
and the coefficient are related in a non-linear fashion. The objective here is not to find 
out the weight, because the obtained – qualitative - information that the central bank 
started to take into consideration, albeit partially, the movements in the real economy, 
besides inflation, is sufficient for our purpose. 
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Finally, responses to exchange-rate movements are largely insignificant under 
both regimes. To check for the earlier concern that this might be due to the fact that 
pressures on the foreign-exchange market do not fully reflect onto the nominal rate, 
which, at least in regime 1 was pegged, a robustness analysis with reserves is carried out 
in Section 6.8.2. 
Given the above discussion, it is argued that regime 1 can be reconciled with 
ERT and regime 2 with IT. There are at least six reasons for this conclusion.   
1) The volatility of regime 2 is considerably lower than the volatility of regime 1 
(reported in each regime‘s panel in Table 6.6). It was argued in Chapter 5 that 
the way in which IT is designed allows moving not only along the trade-off 
curve, but also to the left on a new lower-volatility curve (recall Figure 5.1). 
Also, by allowing for a discretion constrained by a pre-set inflation target and a 
horizon to achieve it, the central bank is able to manage a multitude of 
objectives (nominal and real), which potentially gives the lowest possible 
macroeconomic volatility (recall the intuition behind the loss functions [4.5] and 
[4.12]). 
2) The persistence of both regimes is high in almost all cases (reported transition 
probabilities in the lower panel of Table 6.6), which suggests long-lasting and 
continuous regimes, not regimes which appear sporadically and with frequent 
interchanges.  
3) The macroeconomic variables are considerably more often statistically 
significant in regime 2, compared to in regime 1. This is as expected given the 
substance of the two regimes: under ERT, monetary policy is largely dependent 
on the monetary policy in the anchoring economy; i.e. the space for monetary 
policy aimed at domestic goals is restricted (and hence, the estimated effects of 
variables such as inflation and output gap are likely to be statistically 
insignificant). On the other hand, IT is a ―constrained-discretion‖ strategy, 
whereby the policy can be geared toward achieving domestic objectives, per se 
(and hence, variables such as inflation and output gap are likely to be statistically 
significant). 
4) The significance and magnitude of the coefficient on inflation in regime 2 
suggests that these countries embarked on a policy geared toward strict IT, 
whereby large weight is put on inflation. This is expected, given that in the early 
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phases of IT in developing countries credibility needs to be acquired through 
tight observation of inflation.  
5) The sporadically-appearing significance and magnitude of the coefficient on 
economic activity might still suggest that although these economies geared 
policy towards strict IT, still they avoided being complete ‗inflation nutters‘ and 
did to some extent consider short-run output movements, which is an attribute 
of the IT design.  
6) The date of the switch inferred from the data is typically close to the official 
date of the switch. The inferred timing of each regime and, hence, the inferred 
switch date, is given last in each regime‘s panel in Table 6.6. Given the argument 
about the potential endogeneity of the switch, we expected that the real switch, 
if can be inferred from the data, will fall around the official switch (i.e. can be 
just equal to the official switch only by chance). For illustration, Figure 6.6 
charts the comparison between the official- and the inferred-switch date; x and y 
axes measure these respectively. The red line represents the case when the 
official and the inferred switch are just equal. Countries above the red line are 
inferred to have switched later than the official switch date and opposite for the 
countries below. More thorough discussion on the switch date follows. 
Figure 6.6. Official versus inferred switch date 
Source: Table 6.1 on p.217 and Table 6.6 on p.262. 
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In all cases except Hungary, the inferred switch is close to the official switch to 
IT. In Brazil, Philippines and Thailand, it is found to precede the official switch, while 
in all remaining countries it followed the official switch. The distance between the 
official and the inferred switch ranges from as small as in Colombia and Poland (7 
months) to as large as in Philippines (30 months). These findings suggest that Brazil, 
Philippines and Thailand embarked on a regime geared toward IT (i.e. started to target 
inflation forecast) before they officially announced IT, while all the others officially 
embarked on the new regime (as a firm way to anchor inflation expectations), but most 
likely continued to closely target the exchange rate for some time after the official 
switch. In order to pursue these suggestions, in the robustness checks section in 6.8.2.  a 
three-regime specification is estimated, in order to check whether some intermediate 
regime (between ERT and IT) governed monetary policy (which could be either a mix 
of both or an arrangement undertaken to constrain the excessive exchange-rate volatility 
that emerged in some of the countries, like the Czech Republic, Poland or Thailand).  
Hungary is an exception in all considerations of the regime switch, since the 
inferred switch to regime 2 is too early before the official switch to IT, besides the 
rather sporadic appearance of regime 1. This renders the conclusion that interpreting 
regime 2 as IT is invalid. Some intuition behind those results is that Hungary published 
inflation expectations in its monetary-policy guidelines already in 1999. Moreover, the 
crawling peg since March 1995 served for both achieving exchange-rate targets and 
disinflation. The crawling peg continued besides IT until September 2001; until 
February 2008 a ±15% band around the central parity was still in place. This suggests 
that Hungary had a de-facto mixed system at least until 2008, whereby the exchange-
rate targets dominated at the beginning and had only gradually been substituted by IT. 
This might be the reason for not identifying a clear regime switch in Hungary. 
The conclusion from the above investigation is that IT represented a real switch 
in the investigated countries. Results suggest that monetary policy has undergone a 
significant change in the 2000s. The results run contrary to the usual statement in the 
literature that central banks under IT react strongly to inflation deviations from the 
target - compared to the period before, these reactions moderate under IT. On the 
other hand, the statistical significance for the effects of the output gap was found to be 
fragile, while the exchange-rate effects were found to be insignificant. The significance 
of the results in the regime-2 panel in Table 6.6, might suggest that the switch could be 
more thought of as a switch toward a monetary policy that afforded more space to 
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account for domestic objectives. Also, regime volatility was found to be lower under IT 
when compared to ERT, while the inferred regimes‘ timing can be reconciled with the 
switch to IT. 
What could be considered as a possible critique of these conclusions? Certainly, 
the most striking one is that the data might be indicating a switch that is not a result of 
the IT strategy but, rather, of something else. For instance, the Czech Republic and 
Poland exhibited a transition period during regime 1, while the 2000s was a decade 
oriented toward economic growth. But, this is not the case in Hungary which belongs to 
the same group of countries, geographically and in terms of economic developments. 
Secondly, Thailand and Brazil exhibited financial crises during regime 1 and 
subsequently have had a more stable period. Yet, as we argued earlier, a financial crisis 
can force the country to rethink its monetary regime. Thirdly, these nine countries 
originate from distinct geographic regions, so the possibility that common regional 
shocks and potentially strong financial ties drive results is excluded.49 However, for 
strengthening confidence in the results, some robustness checks are performed in 
Section 6.8.2 and some checks for endogeneity in Section 6.8.3. 
 
6.8.2. Robustness checks 
Two types of robustness analysis are performed in this section: i) allowing for 
three regimes, instead of two, to check if an intermediate regime between ERT and IT 
                                                 
49 Since this is a time-series analysis, we are limited in our ability to control for global effects (treatment-
group versus control-group analysis), i.e. for trends affecting all countries at the same time. Although 
uncommon in the MS analysis, we still performed MS-VARs for our non-switchers (refer to Section 
6.2.2): Argentina, China, Lithuania, Latvia and Macedonia. Due to the length of some of the included 
series - for Bulgaria, Estonia, Ecuador, El Salvador and Uruguay - these calculations were not performed 
for these countries. Due to space, the results are available only on request. They suggest that, in general, it 
cannot be established that monetary policy has been governed on a systematic basis by more than one 
regime over the observed period. Namely, the identified second regime, cannot be reconciled with the 
period of after-2000, but to other short-term ‗local‘ events that implied different behaviour of the 
monetary policy; the most likely being: the currency-board crisis of 2001 in Argentina; wider exchange-
rate bands (1994-1996 and possibly the wage reform in this period) in China; the easing of Latvian 
monetary policy in 2000-2001 and the 2008-crisis pressures on the currency board; and the easing of the 
Macedonian monetary policy in 2005 after the long-lasting stabilization, firstly due to the transition, then 
due to the internal conflict, and so on. 
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might have existed; and ii) adding some exogenous variables. Table 6.7 gives the 
transition probabilities and volatilities for the three regimes: the timing in the table is set 
regime 1 to correspond to the potential period of ERT; regime 2 to correspond to the 
potential period of IT; and regime 3 to stand for any other regime. Regime 1 and 2 
persistence and timing can be reconciled with ERT and IT, respectively; also the 
standard errors within those regimes are similar to those in Table 6.6. In Brazil and 
Chile, regime 3 picks up some developments in the early 1990s but these cannot be 
attributed to any intermediate regime. In Hungary and Philippines, regime 3 appears 
only sporadically (has a low probability) and has probably no economic meaning; 
moreover, in Hungary even regime 1 has a relatively low probability, as found before 
(see Table 6.6). In Israel, regime 3 relates to the period of the mortgage crisis.  
However, in Colombia, the Czech Republic, Poland and Thailand, regime 3 
picks up some developments between ERT and IT (bold-typed in Table 6.7). These can 
be reconciled with the evidence: all these countries embarked on IT in the aftermath of 
exchange-rate turbulence, so that some of them observed a money target for a short 
period after peg exit and then started to target inflation, but this was a kind of ―soft 
landing‖. Still, regime 3 is not so different from regime 2 (IT) in Colombia and the 
Czech Republic in terms of variance, and is likely to only reflect the intensive 
disinflation in the early phase of IT (Hrncir and Smidkova, 2004). In Poland and 
Thailand regime 3 undeniably picks up a more turbulent period than the subsequent IT 
period. In Thailand this is the period of the Thai baht crisis (East-Asian crisis), whereby 
a managed floating rate was introduced alongside a money-base target; then, the latter 
suffered from the weak link between money and prices and later the Central Bank 
adopted an IT framework (Agénor, 2002). In the Polish case, indeed the period of the 
eclectic approach mentioned in Section 6.2.1 is identified, when the central bank 
followed multiple objectives. This was a period of structural changes within the financial 
system and a period of constant disinflation (Pruski, 2002). However, Poland 
experienced slower disinflation when compared to other transition countries, which 
might be the cause for the intermediate regime lasting relatively long. Moreover, the 
volatility of the economic environment is found to be about 4 times higher than under 
the subsequent IT. 
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Table 6.7. Regimes persistence and volatility when allowed for three 
regimes 
Country 
Transition probabilities 
[regime volatility] When does regime 3 
(“Other”) appear? p11 
ERT 
p22 
IT 
p33 
Other 
     
Brazil 0.7677 0.9461 0.6104 
1992:7-1993:8 
 [2167.3] [1.328] [84.636] 
     
Chile 0.9083 0.9889 0.8412 
1993:8-1994:12 
 [2.331] [0.151] [6.165] 
     
Colombia 0.9458 0.9420 0.9375 
1999:4-2004:12 
 [2.934] [0.091] [0.700] 
     
Czech 0.9825 0.9455 0.7846 
1998:12-2000:4 
 [1.510] [0.100] [0.161] 
     
Hungary 0.6671 0.5509 0.1056 
Very sporadically 
 [0.553] [0.115] [1.407] 
     
Israel 0.8610 0.9094 0.8593 
2009:1-2009:11 
 [0.892] [0.174] [0.268] 
     
Philippines 0.7776 0.9889 0.6404 
Sporadically 
 [1.070] [0.248] [4.586] 
     
Poland 0.9737 1.000 0.9888 
1995:3-2002:6 
 [3.154] [0.295] [1.175] 
     
Thailand 0.9882 0.9883 0.9458 
1999:2 - 2000:10 
 [0.258] [0.143] [2.357] 
     
Note: Figures in squared brackets are regimes volatilities. Serial correlation accounted for. Bold type 
signifies ‗other‘ regime that is identified between regime 1 and regime 2. 
 
 
The robustness of our results is finally tested by adding some exogenous 
variables. Given our discussion in Section 6.3, reserves growth and NFA-to-GDP50 are 
added as exogenous covariates allowed to switch. The underlying specification is again 
MSIAH(2)-VAR(p), whereby p is chosen according to the Schwarz criterion after any 
serial correlation is eliminated. Results are given in Table 6.8. A similar pattern is 
observed as before: significant variables are largely concentrated in the second panel, i.e. 
inflation and output become more significant under regime 2. The exchange-rate is 
rarely significant. Also, the coefficients largely retain the same magnitudes. Persistence is 
nearly the same as before; implied volatilities under both regimes are similar; and the 
                                                 
50 Money growth is not included in these robustness checks since MS-VAR will become cumbersome for 
estimation (many iteration and possible non-convergence) and because of the support of the literature for 
a marginal money role in affecting monetary-policy conduct (the weakened link between money and 
prices). 
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inferred switching times are similar to those considered in Table 6.651. Overall, the 
estimates are robust to the alternative specifications. 
Surprisingly, reserves are generally insignificant under regime 1 (this regime 
being associated to ERT), albeit their magnitude and sign are as expected. However, the 
size reduces under regime 2, while they remain insignificant. Consequently, although we 
believed that reserves should be more important under regime 1, we do not find strong 
support for this. Moreover, as expected, they are insignificant under regime 2, as is the 
exchange rate, suggesting that in these economies the exchange rate plays a marginal 
role. The level of euroization is found not to be a systematically significant influence: in 
some countries it matters, but in others it does not. Moreover, the sign on this influence 
in Brazil and Chile is not as expected. In general, the limited evidence might give 
support to the idea that higher exposure of bank net-assets to exchange-rate risk 
precludes the central bank lowering the interest rate (i.e. restricts the monetary-policy 
manoeuvre space), but it is very feeble.  
                                                 
51 Hungary behaves slightly differently in this robustness checking, although the conclusion is largely the 
same. Here, the technique infers the existence of two regimes (i.e. the regime that previously appeared 
only sporadically, now gains in persistence) and the timing of the switch comes closer to the official 
switch to IT. However, the two identified regimes are similar in their volatility, while in regime 2, inflation 
is only significant at the 10% level; the output gap is not significant, while the exchange rate is highly 
significant. This might suggest that the distinction in Hungary between the ERT and the consequent IT is 
hard to make, given the preserved exchange-rate target. 
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Table 6.8. Markov-switching regression results exogenous regressors added 
Dependent variable: 
Interest rate 
Brazil Chile Colombia Czech Hungary Israel Philippines Poland Thailand 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
REGIME 1          
Constant 18.746*** -8.504 25.586** 5.425*** 2.136*** 0.226 13.917*** 11.974*** 6.393*** 
Σ Interest rate 0.421*** 0.119 0.420*** 0.433*** 0.897*** 0.937*** 0.28*** 0.688*** 0.564*** 
Σ Inflation AR terms 1.200 1.052*** 0.207 0.131 -0.032 0.043 -0.212 -0.010 -0.190 
Σ Gap AR terms -0.027 0.603*** 0.232** 0.032 0.033 0.051 -0.007 0.236 0.072** 
Σ Exchange rate AR terms -0.192 -0.127 0.261* 0.089** 0.008 0.013 -0.013 -0.013 0.052 
Reserves growth -0.191** -0.051 0.047 -0.015* 0.000 0.003 -0.012 -0.002 -0.085*** 
NFA to GDP -0.950 -0.167 -4.293** 0.064 0.027*** 0.003 -0.399*** -0.382* -0.074 
          
Regime volatility 3.798 4.046 4.591 1.490 0.750 0.551 3.916 1.817 2.200 
          
Rough regime timing 1997:3 -
1999:6*** 
1993:7 - 
2001:8*** 
1995:4 -
2000:3*** 
1994:3 - 
1999:2*** 
1992:2 - 
1998:12*** 
1992:3 -
1999:8*** 
1992:2 -- 
2001:2*** 
1992:5 - 
1998:7*** 
1992:2 - 
1999:1*** 
REGIME 2          
Constant 0.434*** 0.236*** -0.549 0.093 0.690*** -0.265 0.246 -0.849 0.070 
Σ Interest rate 0.962*** 0.967*** 0.825*** 0.960*** 0.911*** 0.994*** 0.978*** 0.930*** 0.916*** 
Σ Inflation AR terms 0.037** 0.024** 0.272*** 0.020** 0.020* 0.009*** -0.020 0.055*** 0.048*** 
Σ Gap AR terms 0.023*** 0.004* 0.009** -0.003* 0.000 0.010** 0.000* 0.020** 0.004*** 
Σ Exchange rate AR terms 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.001 0.004 -0.008** 
Reserves growth -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.011** -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.004 
NFA to GDP -0.025*** -0.013** 0.004*** -0.001 0.010 0.015** 0.001 0.017** 0.002 
          
Regime volatility 0.241 0.149 0.376 0.147 0.308 0.155 0.280 0.430 0.219 
          
Rough regime timing 1999:7 - 
2009:10*** 
2001:9 - 
2009:3*** 
2000:4 - 
2005:9*** 
1999:3 - 
2009:10*** 
1999:1 -
2009:10*** 
1999:9 -
2009:8*** 
2001:3 - 
2008:2*** 
1998:8 – 
2009:11*** 
1999:2 - 
2009:11*** 
          
p11 0.7533 0.9804 0.9652 0.9836 0.9537 0.9706 0.8842 0.9681 0.9882 
p22 0.9371 0.9891 0.9849 1.0000 0.9757 0.9809 0.9275 0.9818 1.0000 
          
Lags (based on BIC) 2 3 1 2 1 2 1 4 1 
Official switch (Table 6.1) 1999:6 1999:9 1999:10 1997:12 2001:6 1997:6 2002:1 1998:1 2000:5 
Linearity test    (chi-stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (Davies) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Ho: The linear model is preferred          
Note: *,**,*** indicate the 10, 5 and 1% levels of significance, respectively. See other notes in Table 6.6. 
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6.8.3. Checks for remaining endogeneity 
Given our discussion on the endogeneity of the regime switch in Section 6.7.3, 
the main shortcoming of the MS analysis seems to be the approach towards addressing 
this issue. Hence, although the MS analysis does address some of the shortcoming of 
the SR analysis pointed out in Section 6.6.2, this is done at the cost of introducing a 
possible problem of not entirely addressing potential switch endogeneity. We argued 
that by introducing into the empirical specification the observable variables that that 
affect switch endogeneity, one part of it is addressed. There are intuitive grounds to 
believe that switch endogeneity is largely governed by the behaviour of the covariates 
that enter the regression: countries might be forced to switch if inflation and its 
volatility are threatening; if output is volatile under a peg when a large shock hits; and if 
the exchange-rate peg is under constant pressure, so that reserves are leaking and 
threaten a peg demise. However, to be on the safe side, we need to be assured that no 
remaining endogeneity is left in the model, stemming from: i) unobservables; and ii) 
regime being duration-dependent. Unfortunately, these checks can be performed only 
indirectly and with considerable limitations, as is considered in what follows. However, 
so far, the literature on MS models has not offered a complete and direct way to address 
entirely the potential endogeneity of the switch. Still, there are approaches that can help 
in building intuition about the problem. 
Firstly, we rely on Vázquez‘s (2008) argument that if any endogeneity is left in 
the latent switching variable (due to unobservables, say), it will be reflected in different 
transition probabilities under different MS-VAR specifications (recall Table 6.5). 
Regime persistence under alternative MS-VAR specifications is checked in Table 6.9. 
The first panel is a reproduction of the persistence of Table 6.6, while the remaining 
three specify the MS-VAR forms MSI, MSIH and MSAH. All probabilities remain 
roughly the same which, given the argument of Vázquez (2008), do not suggest that 
substantial endogeneity remains in the switching variable and that it has, instead, been 
picked up by the covariates. The exception is, as expected, Hungary, whereby we were 
not able to reconcile regime switch with IT introduction and this is further reflected 
here – smoothed probabilities considerably differ between specifications.  
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Table 6.9. Regimes probabilities under different MS-VAR specifications 
MS(2)-VAR(p) 
Brazil Chile Colom-
bia 
Czech Hun-
gary 
Israel Philip-
pines 
Poland Thai-
land 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
MSIAH          
p11 0.6945 0.9693 0.9640 0.9836 0.6822 0.9711 0.9266 0.9692 0.9756 
p22 0.9280 0.9789 0.9835 1.0000 0.9494 0.9817 0.9594 0.9810 0.9921 
          
MSI          
p11 0.9861 0.9889 0.9108 0.9676 0.8473 0.9792 0.9588 0.9616 0.9777 
p22 0.9795 1.0000 0.9411 0.9906 0.9109 0.9890 0.9477 0.9723 0.9685 
          
MSIH          
p11 0.6624 0.9802 0.8901 0.9834 0.2055 0.9703 0.9288 0.9919 0.9906 
p22 0.9146 0.9889 0.9314 1.0000 0.7852 0.9817 0.9660 1.0000 1.0000 
          
MSAH          
p11 0.4883 0.9685 0.9836 0.7288 0.4007 0.8673 0.9323 0.9681 0.9906 
p22 0.9268 0.9756 1.0000 0.9207 0.8044 0.9104 0.9636 0.9638 1.0000 
          
 
Duration-dependent MS-VAR (DD-MS-VAR) is compared to conventional 
MS-VAR in Table 6.10. Pelagatti‘s (2003; 2008) DD-MS-VAR software for OxMetrics 
is used. As mentioned earlier, under DD-MS-VAR, only the mean can switch between 
regimes. From that viewpoint, this application cannot be comparable to our earlier MS-
VAR specifications nor fits our argument, since it assumes that policy responses and 
volatilities are equal under both regimes – the latter differ only with respect to the 
interest-rate mean. Given that this is rather restrictive, the results need to be interpreted 
with caution. However, they are helpful for providing further intuition related to switch 
endogeneity. Given all this, Table 6.10 is drafted differently from the previous tables. In 
the entire tabling, regime 1 is set to associate to ERT and regime 2 to IT. In the upper 
panel, results of the conventional MSM-VAR are presented (only mean switches – this 
is needed for comparability). This panel reports the same statistical properties as before 
(as in Table 6.6). In the lower panel, results of the DD-MS-VAR are reported. Lag 
length is only based on the autocorrelation function (ACF), as other criteria were not 
available. Towards the bottom of the panel, transition probabilities are reported; note 
that these probabilities have a different interpretation from the reported probabilities in 
the upper panel. While in the upper panel (MSM-VAR), probabilities indicate regime 
persistence, in the lower panel (DD-MS-VAR), these represent the probability that a 
switch to the other regime will occur, given its duration. Maximal duration is set at 10 
years (approximating the average duration of the regimes in our sample), but transition 
probabilities are available on request for any duration up to the maximum. 
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Once we pass from MSM-VAR to DD-MS-VAR, the coefficients largely retain 
their magnitudes and levels of statistical significance. Hence, the estimated coefficients 
do not suggest that there is remaining endogeneity in the switching variable, which 
suggests that the covariates that entered the regression accounted for the entire 
endogeneity in the switching variable. Some differences are observed in the means 
between the two specifications; but, in both cases, these suggest that interest rates were 
higher under regime 2 (the one associated to IT). This observation is consistent with the 
findings with the panel estimation (section 6.5). Interesting insights are obtained from 
the transition probabilities (p12 and p21 at the very bottom of the table). The transition 
probability that a switch from ERT to IT will occur (p12) suggests a very high 
probability that, at long durations, ERT will switch to IT. This is in line with our 
findings in Chapter 3 that long pegs are prone to crises and exit under hard attacks. 
Conversely, the transition probability that a switch from IT to ERT will occur (p21) 
ranges from 0% to 15%52 and, as expected, suggests that even after very long duration, 
IT will not switch back to ERT. This is in line with the argument in Chapter 5 and 
could be ascribed to IT flexibility. However, the overall stability of the obtained results 
compared to those when duration dependence is not considered, suggest that duration 
dependence is not an important factor for the switch to evolve endogenously. 
 
                                                 
52 The exception being, again, Hungary, whereby the distinction between the two regimes is negligible, 
which is reflected further in the p12 and p21 probabilities. 
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Table 6.10. Markov-switching VAR (MS-VAR) versus Duration-dependent Markov-switching VAR (DD-MS-VAR) 
Dependent variable: 
Interest rate 
Brazil Chile Colombia Czech Hungary Israel Philippines Poland Thailand 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
MSM-VAR          
Mean in regime 1 (ERT) 18.254** 2.938 -6.620  1.551 5.422 7.477*** 12.657*** 8.492** 2.183 
Mean in regime 2 (IT) 18.618** 9.114**  6.241 -0.849 6.101 9.102*** 8.495*** 14.430*** 5.704** 
          
Σ Interest rate 0.915*** 0.980*** 0.814*** 0.930*** 0.957*** 0.942*** 0.468*** 0.823*** 0.982*** 
Σ Inflation AR terms 0.076 0.920*** 0.309*** 0.072 0.023 0.003*** 0.163** 0.067 -0.002 
Σ Gap AR terms 0.091 0.188 0.038 0.023 0.014** 0.046* 0.006 0.046** 0.007* 
Σ Exchange rate AR terms 0.000 0.006 0.015 0.022 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.017 -0.002 -0.026 
          
Regime volatility 2.444 3.809 2.042 0.834 0.601 0.482 2.658 1.187 0.873 
          
p11 0.909 0.989 0.967 0.969 0.964 0.989 0.979 0.937 0.699 
p22 0.942 1.000 1.000 0.978 0.978 1.000 0.991 0.942 0.925 
          
Lags (based on BIC) 3 1 1 4 1 2 1 2 4 
Linearity test    (chi-stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (Davies) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Ho: The linear model is preferred          
          
DD-MS-VAR          
Mean in regime 1 (ERT) 43.774 -58.712 487.69 90.128 73.69 7.137 -167.31 24.273 -1.538 
Mean in regime 2 (IT) 44.638 -50.143*** 9.673*** 96.495** 74.52*** 7.994*** 8.184*** 28.297*** 1.813*** 
          
Σ Interest rate 0.921*** 0.747*** 0.815*** 0.934*** 0.984*** 0.977*** 0.944*** 0.951*** 1.015*** 
Σ Inflation AR terms 0.072 0.317* 0.296*** 0.068* 0.018 0.018 0.038 0.028** -0.005 
Σ Gap AR terms 0.044 0.216*** 0.086*** 0.012 0.008 0.021 -0.038 0.021 0.009 
Σ Exchange rate AR terms 0.014 0.008 0.025 0.010 0.000 0.010* 0.004 -0.001 -0.015 
          
Lags (based on ACF of sigma) 3 3 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 
          
p12 at max. duration 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
p21 at max. duration 0.150 0.020 0.000 0.040 1.000 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.000 
          
Note: *,**,*** indicate the 10, 5 and 1% levels of significance, respectively. See other notes in Table 6.6. 
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6.9. Conclusion 
The objective of the chapter was to empirically examine and analyse whether the 
conduct of monetary policy has significantly changed with the switch from exchange-
rate to inflation targeting in developing countries. Put differently, we investigated 
whether the switch from ERT to IT represented a real switch. It was argued that the 
literature examining the issue for developing countries is basically descriptive. On the 
other hand, the available literature for the advanced economies usually suffers from the 
identification-strategy problem, the problem of the switch being pre-determined and 
largely ignores the possibility that switchers were self-selected into IT (i.e. that the 
switch emerged endogenously). To begin addressing these questions, a treatment group 
was constructed of all developing-economy switchers from ERT to IT and a 
comparison group of comparable countries that, in the same period, continued to target 
the exchange rate. The economic model used is a fairly classical Taylor rule, augmented 
with the exchange rate, to capture its specific role for developing countries, as small, 
open economies. The sample period is 1991:1-2009:12. 
Firstly, a panel switching regression was designed whereby the switch is 
observable; all covariates in the regression were allowed to switch. By including 
variables in the regression that potentially affected the decision to switch, one source of 
possible endogeneity of the switching variable was addressed. Moreover, to overcome 
the potential endogeneity of the switching variable stemming from unobservables, it 
was instrumented with variables that might have had an influence on the decision to 
switch, but not directly on monetary-policy conduct. The policy-reaction coefficients 
suggest that switchers, after countries in the sample switched to IT, were able to 
moderate their reactions to macroeconomic developments, albeit against the 
background of higher interest rates – ceteris paribus – for the switchers. However, only 
expected inflation was found to be statistically significant in affecting interest rates: an 
increase of expected inflation by 1 p.p. leads to a reduction in the nominal interest-rate 
of 0.18 p.p., as compared to the period before and to the control group of countries. 
Consequently, these results suggest that IT represented a real switch in the conduct of 
monetary policy in the investigated countries. Under IT, these countries became more 
concerned with combating inflation, but their reaction moderated compared to the 
period before and to the control group, perhaps because of a more cautious monetary 
policy. Still, the price they paid for this is a  higher level of interest rates in general. 
Coefficients on the output gap and the change in the exchange rate were found to be 
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neither significant nor systematically different from the period before and the control 
group. This suggests that these countries were concerned with inflation only and not 
with the output gap and exchange rate; i.e. that they ran a monetary policy geared 
towards strict IT. Though, in some specifications, the output gap is marginally 
significant, while the coefficient suggested moderation of central-bank reaction to real 
fluctuations as well. However, this modelling approach could not reveal whether the 
overall variability and uncertainty in the economy changed with the switch to IT. 
Moreover, it was argued that although countries have a date where they officially 
switched to IT, this does not have to be necessarily reconciled with the moment of the 
real switch. Hence, the timing of the real switch might be obscured. 
To overcome these potential drawbacks of the switching regression, another 
modelling approach was employed, whereby regime switching is an outcome of an 
unobservable random variable – the Markov-switching regression. Our economic model 
was utilized in a reduced-form VAR format for each of our nine switcher countries. 
Intercept, autoregressive terms and variance were allowed to switch between regimes. 
By employing a special form of VAR, the potential endogeneity of the switch stemming 
from observables was partly addressed, but we were able to check for any remaining 
endogeneity only indirectly. Hence, although the MS approach addressed some of the 
SR‘s drawbacks, it potentially performed this at the cost of dealing with switch 
endogeneity only partially. However, regime persistence was found to be stable under 
alternative MS specifications, which might lend support to the idea that the only switch 
endogeneity was the one stemming from observables. Moreover, estimated parameters 
were found to be stable when transition probabilities were allowed to depend on regime 
duration, which is an additional, if still indirect, confirmation that switch endogeneity 
might have stemmed only from observables. 
In general, it was found that the inferred regimes are highly persistent; i.e. there 
are no ―short‖ and frequent switches between regimes. Results suggest that regime 1 
can be robustly reconciled with exchange-rate targeting and regime 2 with inflation 
targeting in at least eight out of the nine investigated countries. In general, the volatility 
of the economic environment was found to be lower under IT than under ERT. The 
estimation results suggest that central banks responded significantly to inflation under 
IT, while the response is found to be feeble or insignificant under ERT. The estimated 
effect of the output gap is found to be sporadically significant and only at the 10% level. 
The exchange rate does not have any statistically significant effects in either regime. The 
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estimated coefficients suggest that central-bank responses moderated under IT. Finally, 
it was found that in all cases except Hungary, the inferred switch date is close to the 
official switch date. In Brazil, Philippines and Thailand, it was found to precede the 
official switch, while in all remaining countries it followed the official switch. Only in 
Hungary was monetary policy found to be governed by one regime only, which is likely 
to reflect the combined strategy of ERT and IT that it followed over nearly the entire 
investigated period. 
To what extent are the conclusions from the two techniques reconcilable? The 
two techniques are distinct in their nature: the first is a panel technique (hence results 
have time and cross-section comparability) and observes the official switch; while the 
second is a time-series technique (hence results have time comparability only) and infers 
the switch from the data. Moreover, we estimated a forward-looking interest-rate rule 
with the SR, but we were able to only estimate a backward-looking specification with 
the MS-VAR approach. As such, the obtained estimates are not directly comparable. 
However, they can be compared in a qualitative fashion. Firstly, both methodological 
approaches lead to the conclusion that there has been a statistically significant shift 
towards different design of monetary-policy conduct, which could plausibly be 
attributed to inflation targeting. Overall, this conclusion from both approaches runs 
counter to the idea that monetary policy has not undergone any change in the 2000s. 
Estimates from both methods suggest that monetary policy played a role in the 2000s. 
The SR approach suggested that the switch to a new monetary regime explains these 
results, while the MS-VAR approach that IT may be inferred from the timings. Also, 
the results challenge the usual statement in the literature that central banks under IT 
react strongly to inflation deviations from the target; compared to the period before and 
to the control group, the estimates suggest that these reactions moderate under IT. 
Secondly, both conclude that the period under IT was characterized by a monetary 
policy (more) oriented towards domestic objectives, with a focus on inflation, which 
could be attributed to inflation targeting. Thirdly, the SR approach found that the policy 
response to short-run output movements is significant in some specifications but far 
from being robust, while the MS approach found significance for some of the countries 
– this could be attributed to inflation targeting. Fourthly, both approaches found no 
significant role for the exchange rate in the IT period. In addition to this, the MS 
method concluded that the second regime, which could be reconciled with IT, 
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produced generally lower macroeconomic volatility; and that the probability of a peg 
exit increases with the peg‘s duration, which is not the case with IT. 
Both approaches lead to the conclusion that IT represented a real switch in 
developing countries and that the period of IT was characterized by a more stable 
economic environment, by a monetary policy oriented at domestic objectives, by strict 
focus on inflation and higher interest rates, and, possibly, by consideration of the short-
run real objectives of the economy. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This chapter aims to present the main conclusions from the analysis in this 
thesis and to highlight the contribution to knowledge that it makes as well as the 
corresponding policy recommendations. It discusses some limitations of the research 
and then highlights areas for further research. 
 
C.1 The main line of argument and findings 
The objective of this thesis is to empirically examine and analyse whether the 
conduct of monetary policy has significantly changed with the switch from exchange-
rate targeting (ERT) to inflation targeting (IT) in developing countries. To achieve this 
ultimate objective, the thesis starts by developing the argument that the exchange-rate 
peg, as a nominal variable, might be unimportant for long-run growth performance, but 
detrimental with respect to short-run output fluctuations, particularly in times of real 
shocks. Then, if this is true, the thesis argues that the exchange-rate target may be 
rethought and an inflation target may be established to anchor inflation expectations 
and to serve real objectives as well. Findings are presented as follows. 
 
C.1.1. Is the exchange-rate regime important for growth? 
The argument of the thesis starts around the issue of whether the exchange-rate 
regime is important in affecting the long-run growth performance of the economy. At 
the theoretical level, there are at least three channels through which the exchange-rate 
regime might affect growth: i) certainty imposed in the economy under a peg and its 
potentially positive effect on investment and trade; ii) shock adjustment under a flexible 
rate and its potentially positive effect on growth; and iii) the level of credit-market 
development and its potentially positive influence on productivity growth under a fixed 
exchange rate. However, the effects of these three channels remain largely contested in 
both the theoretical and the relatively scarce empirical literature.  
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The empirical work in this thesis covers the post-Bretton-Woods era (1976-
2006) and includes 169 countries and addresses issues, which are - partially or entirely - 
missing from the literature. The investigation contrasts use of the de-jure versus a de-
facto exchange-rate-regime classification; draws attention to the Lucas critique; and 
addresses potential endogeneity bias. A dynamic system-GMM panel method is used. 
The main finding is that the exchange-rate regime is not significant in explaining 
growth.  
 
C.1.2. Output volatility: A role for the exchange rate? 
Following the argument of Goldstein (2002), the inconclusiveness of the 
evidence as to how the exchange-rate regime might affect growth in theory and practice 
gave rise to the belief that the exchange rate, similarly to inflation, may not be important 
in affecting long-term output, but rather in affecting its short-run departure from a 
long-run trend. Hence, the argument in the thesis continued by addressing the question 
of whether and, if so, how the exchange-rate target affects output volatility and assigned 
a central role to shocks hitting the economy. The view in the economic literature is that 
if nominal shocks predominate then a peg serves better to offset their effects; 
conversely, if real external shocks predominate, a flexible rate is needed to act as a 
buffer. As an economy becomes increasingly involved in the global financial market, 
real exogenous shocks become increasingly apparent, hence supporting the adoption of 
a flexible rate. Moreover, the evidence suggests that long pegs are exposed to large 
shocks and are prone to failure. However, the empirical evidence is found unreliable, 
largely due to the limited number of studies and the measure of output volatility used. 
Still, at the empirical level, there is some support for the conclusion that a peg increases 
output volatility; moreover, this conclusion is stronger for crisis-periods, i.e. periods 
when the peg is under the most severe attack.  
The Hausman-Taylor panel method is used and the same period and countries 
sample as in the growth model. It is argued that the use of volatilities based on a rolling 
standard deviation leads to persistent series and, hence, to potentially spurious 
regression. To overcome this potentially serious drawback of the existing studies, a new 
measure of output volatility is defined in the thesis - the difference between the 
potential and the actual output - given that this difference might arise from either 
economic policies or external disturbances. The empirical evidence suggests that 
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exchange-rate regimes play a significant role in explaining output volatility; though it is 
not overwhelming. The policy implication, both for the overall sample and for the 
developing group, is that a terms-of-trade shock larger than 7 p.p. under a long peg will 
give a higher output volatility compared to a float.  
 
C.1.3. The quest for new nominal anchor – is inflation targeting an 
answer? 
If the exchange-rate peg approach is found to produce output volatility under 
large aggregate shocks, and if these shocks become more common as the economy 
integrates in the international financial system, then, the thesis argues, the exchange rate 
might be flexibilized. However, a more important issue will be to choose a new nominal 
anchor for inflation. The list of theoretical alternatives for the nominal anchor is: 
nominal-income target; implicit nominal target; money target and inflation target. 
Nominal-income targeting entails central banks targeting real output and inflation at the 
same time, which might lead to conflicting policy responses. Implicit nominal targeting 
is short of an explicit target which is usually compensated with the credibility of the 
governor; although the latter is a weak assumption for economies with institutional 
fragility. Monetary targeting presumes the existence of a stable relationship between 
money and the price level and requires adequate knowledge of the parameters 
characterizing money demand. In an economy undergoing rapid financial liberalization, 
however, these parameters may be unstable and, thus, the relation between the 
intermediate target and the final objective becomes unstable, suggesting that relying on 
monetary aggregates can be potentially risky. Consequently, the quest for a new 
monetary regime and a nominal anchor leads to the consideration of inflation targeting.  
Inflation targeting is defined as a pre-emptive monetary strategy that uses an 
information-inclusive framework in order to achieve the pre-announced numerical 
target for inflation in a given time horizon and which uses the medium-term inflation 
forecast as an intermediate target (Mishkin, 2001; Svensson, 2007). An IT central bank 
would be interested in curbing inflation and bringing it immediately on target, except 
that this may sacrifice a huge portion of output. Today‘s ITers are not ―inflation 
nutters‖ (King, 1997). Pragmatically, therefore, the IT central bank would opt for a not-
so-fast inflation decrease, at the same time considering the reducing of output 
fluctuations and exchange-rate volatility. This is the concept of flexible IT, which is 
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applied by almost all ITers. Defined in such a way, IT appears to produce the desired 
inflation outcomes, as ERT does, but also takes into account the effects on the real 
economy in times of foreign shocks, contrary to ERT. Consequently, the switch from 
ERT to IT may serve three simultaneous objectives (Corden, 2002): i) the regime still 
possesses a firm nominal anchor for inflation expectations; ii) it can more smoothly 
respond to negative external shocks and prevent large output volatility; and iii) it still 
has the power to impede real exchange-rate volatility caused by a negative external 
shock.  
 
C.1.4. Has monetary-policy conduct changed under a switch from 
exchange-rate to inflation target in developing economies? 
To investigate whether monetary-policy conduct changed with the switch from 
ERT to IT in developing economies, we use an augmented Taylor rule with the 
exchange rate to capture its specific role for developing countries. The sample period is 
1991:1-2009:12. All nine developing switchers from ERT to IT are included, versus a 
comparison group of countries that in the same period continued to target the exchange 
rate. The latter circumvents the identification-strategy problem present in the respective 
literature. Two modelling approaches are used – a switching regression (SR) and a 
Markov-switching VAR (MS-VAR) – both of which allow for the special case of 
accounting for the potential endogeneity of the regime switch. 
Results from both approaches suggest that IT represented a real switch in the 
developing countries, with a concern for inflation only and not the output gap and 
exchange rate; i.e. they ran a monetary policy geared towards strict IT. Under IT, these 
countries became more concerned with combating inflation, being prepared to pay for 
this by a higher level of interest rates. Yet their reaction to changes in inflation 
moderated compared to the period before and to the comparison group: an increase of 
expected inflation by 1 p.p. leads to a reduction in the nominal interest-rate of 0.18 p.p., 
as compared to the period before and to the control group of countries. In some of the 
specifications (in the SR approach) and for some countries (in the MS-VAR approach), 
the output gap is found to have exerted (marginally) significant influence on the interest 
rate, with the coefficient suggesting a moderation of central-bank reaction to the 
changes in the level of economic activity as well.  
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Within the MS-VAR, we conclude that the inferred regimes are highly persistent 
and that their volatility is found to be much higher under ERT than under IT. The latter 
suggests that the new monetary regime might have been responsible for the more stable 
macro-environment. The MS-VAR approach also finds that, in all cases except 
Hungary, the inferred switch date is close to the official switch date. However, although 
the MS-VAR approach addresses drawbacks of the SR approach it potentially performs 
this at the cost of only partially dealing with the switch endogeneity. 
These findings that a peg inflicts increased output volatility under a real shock 
larger than 7 p.p. change in terms of trade, are consistent with the general argument in 
the thesis that exchange-rate targeting might become inappropriate under large 
exogenous shocks, which are argued to be more present in times of international 
financial integration. In turn, this raises the question of a new nominal anchor for 
inflation expectations and the findings support the notion that targeting inflation 
directly is a neat vehicle for delivering better monetary-policy responses and a more 
stable macroeconomic environment. Findings for developing economies and from the 
approaches pursued constitute contributions to knowledge which are pointed out next. 
 
C.2. Contributions to knowledge 
C.2.1. Contributions to theoretical rigour 
In general, the thesis has been oriented towards empirical findings and how 
these can inform policymaking. However, there are a few theoretical contributions. 
Firstly, debates in the literature relate to either exchange-rate regimes or monetary-
policy regimes. Although the distinction between these might appear trivial, it is usually 
lacking in the literature. Section 1.2 made a pioneering step towards their clear 
distinction and this taxonomy is one contribution. Secondly, the thesis contributes to 
the lively discussion about the trade-off between inflation- and output volatility under 
IT and makes a rigorous critique of the current discussion. Special emphasis is devoted 
to acknowledging the role of the exchange rate and its complex macroeconomic 
relationships (e.g. given euroization and pass-through concerns) for monetary policy 
under IT in developing economies. While this is a second-order issue for advanced 
economies, the literature for developing economies devotes little discussion on this 
issue, which is likely to be more important for them. Only recently have there been 
some studies (e.g. Stone et al. 2009) raising the issue at an appropriate level and such 
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concerns are likely to be a focus for analyses in the years to come. Finally, the thesis 
makes a contribution to the critical analysis of the existing literature on IT. Up until 
recently, researchers typically used undemanding descriptive approaches to analyze the 
effects of IT, which for two reasons may have biased their results: the relatively shock-
free environment that delivered favourable macro-outcomes; and the relative credibility 
of the existing IT central banks and, in turn, the favourable effect of such credibility on 
the monetary policy. In contrast, we offer theoretical discussion and evidence for the 
policy reactions under IT obtained from the more formal procedures of econometric 
modelling.  
 
C.2.2. Contributions to the empirical evidence 
The thesis finds that exchange-rate regime is not significant in explaining 
growth in general and in developing countries in particular. Contrary to the existing 
empirical evidence on the topic, the approach here is in line with the economic theory 
and it addresses neglected issues in the literature: the exchange-rate regime 
classification; the Lucas critique; and the issue of endogeneity. Our comprehensive 
approach to these issues constitutes one contribution to the empirical literature. 
If the relation between the exchange-rate regime and growth has been 
previously analysed using rather imprecise theoretical frameworks and by neglecting 
potential sources of its haziness, then the relationship between regime and output 
volatility suffered from being unattractive for research. More attention has been 
attracted by the large shocks and the associated currency crises. The thesis approaches 
the regime-output volatility relation by designing an appropriate output-volatility 
framework and exploring the associated role of the exchange-rate regime. In particular, 
although the role of shocks in affecting output volatility under alternative regimes has 
been well documented in the theoretical literature, disentangling the source of shocks in 
empirical frameworks has been usually neglected.  
Finally, the thesis makes a contribution to the existing literature in the area of 
monetary-policy responses under switching monetary regimes. Although a growing 
body of papers emerged around monetary policy and macro-performance under IT, no 
paper, to our knowledge, assessed IT as compared to ERT, especially for developing 
economies in which a peg has had a long playing, crucial role in determining inflation. 
Amongst the most important contributions is the finding that monetary policy had a 
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role to play in the Great Moderation era and that these countries, because of the switch, 
became more oriented towards domestic objectives, including short-run output, as well 
as inflation, accompanied by a more stable macro-environment. The contribution is 
important in a time when the literature has not yet reached consensus on the issue of 
whether IT represents a real switch, especially in terms of its role regarding output 
volatility. 
 
C.2.3. Contributions to the methodological design 
On the methodological side, the the thesis makes a contribution at three points. 
Firstly, the discussion of exchange-rate regimes and output volatility contributes to the 
way in which output volatility is measured. For the first time in the literature, we argue 
that if output volatility is measured as a rolling standard deviation, then the series 
becomes persistent. Not accounting for its persistence, in turn, might exacerbate the 
probability of a spurious regression, especially in long panels. The empirical 
investigation lends some evidence in favour of this and contributes to the field by 
supplying a measure which is stationary. 
Secondly, the thesis acknowledges and criticizes the approach to identifying a 
comparison group of countries for ITers. There is a so-called ‗identification problem‘, 
which is discussed but not resolved in the literature: the comparison group of non-ITers 
usually contains countries that have monetary policy geared towards IT (like the FED‘s, 
the ECB‘s and Swiss monetary policy). Hence, this problem might blur and bias the 
clear distinction between IT and non-IT economies. Worse, it can lead to biased 
conclusions for the performances under both. We contribute to this, not by examining 
the problem of grouping in the literature per se, but by careful selection of a comparison 
group of exchange-rate targeters only, hence excluding the possibility that a country is 
in the comparison group, but implicitly belongs to the treatment group. 
Thirdly, to the best of our knowledge, no study has so far analysed the switch 
between ERT and IT with a non-linear estimation method, like the Markov-switching 
method. Although this approach has some limitations (discussed in Section 6.7) and we 
further reveal a technical obstacle in Section C.3, still the pursued non-linear 
methodology (Section 6.7) to the research problem contributes to existing knowledge in 
a novel manner. 
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C.3. Limitations to the research 
This thesis started with a broad consideration of exchange-rate and monetary 
regimes, but was subsequently narrowed down to investigating monetary-policy 
reactions under a regime switch between exchange-rate targeting and inflation targeting 
in developing economies. From that viewpoint, the discussion belongs to the wider 
argument of the pros and cons of the different monetary strategies and contributes to 
the heated debates about different exchange-rate regimes. However, given the limited 
time and space to pursue a PhD, this thesis is limited to the choice between ERT and 
IT in developing economies. Within these boundaries as defined by its objectives, the 
research did not face large obstacles. The literature has been easily accessible; the same 
applies to the data. An exception was the difficulty in measuring expected inflation. The 
usage of the 12-month lead of inflation assumes a perfect foresight model, which is a 
rather strong assumption, but other measures of expected inflation, like those obtained 
from surveys are frequently inaccessible for developing economies. 
Effort has been devoted to expanding quantitative knowledge by application of 
MS-VARs. Still, the limited time for pursuing a PhD prevented expanding the 
programming knowledge on MS-VAR models that may have enabled the measurement 
of time-varying transition probabilities. To a lesser extent, a limitation appeared around 
the application of the Markov-switching panel method, mainly because this 
methodology is still under development: i) it potentially suffers from not addressing the 
possible cross-sectional dependence among units, which is a considerably debated issue 
in recent years in a panel context; and ii) it does not advance the issue of switch 
endogeneity more than MS-VAR does nor does it allow for endogenous regressors. As 
we argued in Section 6.7.3, some of those methods need further theoretical 
advancements in order to address the issue of potential endogeneity in all its aspects, 
rather than piecemeal. This, perforce, represents a limitation on the present work. No 
other major obstacles were encountered during the research. 
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C.4. Policy recommendations 
C.4.1. Can we say “yes” to exchange-rate targeters if they want to target 
inflation? 
Given the primary objective of the thesis, we found support for exiting a peg 
under large real shocks, but also support for establishing IT, suggesting that it is 
associated with lower macroeconomic variability, a more independent monetary policy 
and oriented to other domestic objectives, in particular inflation. Given these findings, 
the most important policy recommendation would be for developing countries that peg 
their exchange rate to start rethinking their monetary strategy toward IT. The thesis 
provides evidence on some important dimensions to support this recommendation. 
However, it is based on several preconditions, among which the most important are: 
clear knowledge of the sources and frequency with which different shocks hit the 
economy; financial-market development; and the role of the central bank in financing 
budget deficits. Moreover, the decision to embark on IT in these countries will 
necessitate the need to allow exchange-rate flexibility. In turn, this depends on the 
effectiveness of the exchange-rate channel, the level of euroization in the economy, the 
effectiveness of foreign-exchange intervention and the readiness to subordinate any 
exchange-rate objective to the inflation objective. 
 
C.4.2. Fears 
At the birth of the newest financial crisis (2008), Joseph Stiglitz stated: “Inflation 
targeting is being put to the test – and it will almost certainly fail”. Is the fear exaggerated and has 
IT failed the test? To our personal judgement, this statement seems far too strong, since 
there is no practical evidence of complete failure so far (i.e. a reversion to another 
monetary strategy; Spring 2011), while a strand of the literature already emerges (see, for 
instance de Carvalho Filho, 2010) providing some support that IT countries performed 
well under high commodity and fuel prices (end of 2007) and under global economic 
crisis (thereafter). Habermeier et al. (2009) finds support for IT playing a positive role in 
minimizing the inflationary impact of the 2007 surge in commodity prices. Also, de 
Carvalho Filho (2010) argues that the IT regime might have played a crucial role in 
fighting deflation during the crisis, by avoiding the liquidity trap and the perils of a zero 
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interest-rate corner. In that light, Ghosh et al. (2009) argue that the credibility of the IT 
regime enables developing economies, which typically face a greater volatility and upside 
risks of inflation than advanced economies, to have a considerably greater scope for 
monetary-policy easing without compromising their inflation outlook. Finally, all this 
and the potential role of the exchange rate in developing economies and the argument 
that flexible rates under IT play a shock-absorbing role, especially in times of crises, 
might lend some support against Stiglitz‘s fear that IT will fail. Overall, the scepticism 
expressed by several major central banks about a recent proposal by IMF Chief 
Economist Olivier Blanchard to raise inflation targets, as a way to give central banks 
more room to lower interest rates in severe downturns, suggest that key features of IT 
will remain intact.  
However, Buiter (2009) is right when saying that IT central banks have 
frequently lost sight of important determinants of financial stability, as they adopted 
intellectual frameworks suited to achieving narrower goals. Similarly, many (e.g. Roger, 
2010) already call for designing a way to reconcile monetary-policy responsibilities and 
objectives with the central-bank responsibility to promote and maintain financial 
stability. In other words, it is certain that what the crisis suggests for monetary policy is 
to reassess its role in responding to potential risks to financial stability – notably, rapid 
increases in credit, house prices and/or stock-market values.  
Ultimately, nevertheless, the global economic crisis is still unfolding, hence any 
premature judgement as to whether IT might not sustain this global pressure, might be 
naïve. We further relate this point to the proposals for future research, as the text 
proceeds.  
 
 
C.5. Proposals for future research 
The process of drafting this thesis coincided with the emergence, progression 
and then moderation of the 2008 Global economic crisis. It would have been 
distraction to try to put the issues we were treating in this thesis into the context of the 
crisis: firstly, because nobody knew the actual severity of the crisis until it happened nor 
knew the timing and durability of the recovery; secondly, because data for robust 
analysis will be available only a certain period after the crisis has ended (and even a 
longer period for developing countries); and, thirdly, this crisis was a sui generis 
phenomenon in many aspects that bars the exploitation of previous crises for extracting 
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conclusions. However, it is certain that the crisis has changed the landscape. At a time 
when it seemed that the world economy has started a slow recovery, Jeffrey Frankel 
(2009) in the September 2009 issue of the IMF magazine F&D, highlighted five things 
that crisis made ‗out‘ and five more that it made ‗in‘. Among them, two attracted our 
attention.  
Firstly, the exit from the corner "hollowing-out" hypothesis (Eichengreen, 1994; 
Fisher, 2001), which we mentioned in Chapter 2; and the entrance of the intermediate 
exchange-rate regimes. However, neither the arguments in this thesis (p.77) nor in the 
theoretical and empirical literature (for instance, Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995) have 
accepted this. In other words, the crisis has confirmed that the "middle ground" - the 
intermediate exchange-rate regimes - has been well populated and "it is uncommon to 
hear that intermediate regimes are a bad choice generically" (Frankel, 2009, p.14). 
Secondly, Frankel (2009), in line of the brief discussion in Section C.4.2, argues 
that IT becomes ‗out‘, while "fighting asset bubbles" becomes ‗in‘. He postulates: "I 
believe that inflation targeting - at least the narrow definition - has already seen its best 
days" (p.15). We are partially agreed with this observation because, a crisis lesson is that 
the strict observation of inflation (narrow IT) and inflation and output (flexible IT) does 
not necessarily deal with asset-price bubbles, as suggested by Greenspan's doctrine that 
it is hopeless to try to identify and prick speculative bubbles in stock markets and real-
estate markets while they are in progress. The crisis challenges this observation, 
however. Our discussion in Chapter 5 showed that economies have progressively 
included the exchange rate into their decisions of the interest-rate setup to design 
monetary policy (p.191, 202). Nevertheless, inclusion of asset prices (like house prices, 
export prices, stock-market prices and so on; and accordingly, accounting for the 
possible asset-price cycle) currently obtrudes only as a necessity; but it is not yet 
pursued either for policy purposes or in the empirical research. 
The objective of this short discussion was twofold: first, to show the awareness 
of the author of the possible questions that the crisis reveals in terms of this thesis, 
although these questions remain unanswered; and, second, to show that, although issues 
treated here have many facets to be explored in future, still the crisis has created some 
additional interesting directions for future research, which might change theoretical and 
policy thoughts on how to conduct monetary policy. A great area, consequently, is the 
orientation towards the inclusion of asset prices into the IT framework. This requires 
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that issues treated in this thesis should be put together with the issues of financial 
(in)stability. This can be a very interesting area for further research. 
An interesting area for further research from an econometric viewpoint would 
be to investigate further the data-generating process of the variables in this thesis 
(growth and the interest rate, in particular) given their potentially shifting means. The 
current work tests for non-stationarity in these series, but there could be possible 
problems if there are structural breaks within a non-stationary process or indeed 
structural breaks in a stationary process. Responding to this problem, the experiment in 
Perron (1989) suggests that if the magnitude of such a break is large, then the null of a 
unit root can be difficult to reject, even if the series is stationary (albeit with one or 
more breaks, which may refer to shifting means, changing growth or both) with i.i.d. 
disturbances.  
However, given that we rejected the non-stationarity for our variables at 
conventional levels, the concern of the further work would be to test for a unit root 
while allowing for the presence of alternative hypotheses, i.e mean-breaks, trends and 
trends with structural breaks. The current research would account for shifting means if 
these occurred at the time of exchange-rate switch or monetary-regime switch, but not 
otherwise. Acknowledging and addressing this wider issue of shifting means and/or 
changing growth would require an investigation of the possible structural breaks in the 
data, which would in turn require both considering the economic intuition behind and 
statistical tests to reveal them. Then, if this testing revealed a problem, it would be 
interesting to observe how results of the empirical investigations (Section 3.5.1 and 
Section 6.5) might change. Namely, as Perron (1989) argues, not accounting for a 
potential structural breaks in the data-generating process of the variables would bias 
regression results. Given current statistical tests, this investigation would require longer 
datasets, since ―when testing for the presence of a unit root ... against the hypothesis of 
stationary fluctuations around a deterministic trend function, the use of a long span of 
data has definite advantages‖ (Perron, 1989, p.1386). For instance, Perron (1989) uses 
annual data spanning over 1900-1970; 1871-1970; and quarterly data spanning over 
1947:1-1986:3. Compared to the time span used in the thesis (31 years annual data, 
Chapter 3; 20 years monthly data, Chapter 6), Perron‘s study (1989) takes a much longer 
time span. 
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Other issues peripherally mentioned throughout the text remain to be explored 
in-depth in future as separate research problems. For instance: the debate of the extent 
of floating under IT (extent of foreign-exchange market interventions); the discussion 
of multiple targets under IT (i.e. predominantly, inflation and exchange-rate targets 
simultaneously); the challenges for the developing countries under IT (in particular 
related to their degree of currency substitution and exchange-rate pass-through); in 
addition to the need to take account of asset prices and financial stability. The latter is 
especially important, because the crisis has also highlighted the importance of financial 
vulnerability and, hence, of the high euroization in a significant number of developing 
ITers. This list is non-exhaustive and only pinpoints some interesting facets of issues 
acknowledged but not treated in this thesis. 
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APPENDIX 1 – Additional tables 
Table A1.1. Peg-exits and new monetary regimes 
Case Date Type of peg/ER target 
before the exit 
New exchange-
rate regime (de 
jure) 
New monetary regime (if 
ERT completely exited) 
Albania Jul-92 Conventional peg Free float Monetary targeting 
Algeria Apr-94 Conventional peg (to 
basket) 
Managed float Implicit nominal targeting 
Angola May-99 Conventional peg Free float Implicit nominal targeting 
Argentina Jul-01 Currency board Managed float Monetary targeting 
Brazil Jan-99 Crawling peg Free float Inflation targeting 
Bulgaria Feb-91 Conventional peg (to 
basket) 
Free float Monetary targeting 
Burundi Aug-99 Conventional peg (to 
basket) 
Managed float Implicit anchor 
Chile Feb-99 Crawling band Managed float Inflation targeting 
Colombia Sep-98 Crawling band Managed float Inflation targeting 
Congo, DR of May-01 Conventional peg Free float Monetary targeting 
Cyprus Sep-92 Conventional peg (to 
basket) 
ER band - 
Czech R. May-97 ER band Managed float Inflation targeting 
Egypt Jul-90 Conventional peg ER band - 
El Salvador May-90 Conventional peg Managed float Managed float 
Ethiopia Oct-92 Conventional peg Managed float Monetary targeting 
Finland Sep-92 ER band Free float Inflation targeting 
Guyana Jun-90 Conventional peg Managed float Monetary targeting 
Hungary Aug-94 Conventional peg (to 
basket) 
Crawling band Inflation targeting53 
Iceland Feb-01 ER band Free float Inflation targeting 
Indonesia Aug-97 Crawling band Free float Implicit nominal targeting 
(1997) and Inflation 
targeting (2005) 
Israel Mar-91 ER band Crawling band Implicit nominal targeting 
(1991) and Inflation 
targeting (1997) 
Italy Sep-92 ER band Free float Implicit nominal targeting 
Kazakhstan Apr-99 Crawling peg Free float Implicit nominal anchor 
Kenya Mar-93 Conventional peg (to 
basket) 
Managed float IMF supported implicit 
nominal targeting 
Korea Nov-97 Crawling band Free float Implicit nominal targeting 
(1997) and Inflation 
targeting (2001) 
Laos Dec-97 Conventional peg Managed float Monetary targeting 
Madagascar May-94 Conventional peg (to 
basket) 
Managed float Monetary targeting 
Malawi Feb-94 Conventional peg (to 
basket) 
Managed float Monetary targeting 
Mexico Dec-94 Crawling band Free float Implicit nominal targeting 
(1994) and Inflation 
targeting (2001) 
Mongolia Jan-93 Conventional peg Free float Monetary targeting 
Myanmar Dec-95 Conventional peg (to Managed float Implicit nominal target 
                                                 
53 Hungary is the exception that runs simultaneously ERT and IT, the ERT being under the most flexible 
option. Hungary is returned to in Chapter 6. 
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basket) 
Nicaragua Jan-93 Conventional peg Crawling peg - 
Nigeria Feb-95 Conventional peg Managed float Monetary targeting 
Norway Sep-92 ER band Free float Inflation targeting 
Peru Aug-90 Crawling peg Managed float Monetary targeting (1990) 
and Inflation targeting 
(2002) 
Phillipines Sep-97 Conventional peg Free float Implicit nominal targeting 
(1997) and Inflation 
targeting (2002) 
Poland Feb-92 Conventional peg (to 
basket) 
Crawling peg - 
Oct-98 Crawling peg Managed float Inflation targeting 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Sep-91 Conventional peg (to 
basket) 
Crawling peg - 
Dec-94 Crawling peg Managed float Implicit nominal targeting 
Sierra Leone May-90 Conventional peg Free float Monetary targeting 
Slovakia Jul-93 Conventional peg ER band Implicit nominal targeting 
Aug-98 ER band Managed float Implicit nominal targeting 
(1998) and Inflation 
targeting (2005) 
Sweden Sep-92 ER band Free float Inflation targeting 
Thailand Jul-97 Conventional peg (to 
basket) 
Managed float Monetary targeting (1997) 
and Inflation targeting 
(2000) 
Tonga Aug-98 Conventional peg (to 
basket) 
ER band - 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Apr-93 Conventional peg Free float Monetary targeting 
Turkey Feb-01 Crawling peg Free float Monetary targeting (2001) 
and Inflation targeting 
(2006) 
Ukraine Oct-94 Conventional peg Managed float  
UK Sep-92 ER band Free float Inflation targeting 
Uruguay Dec-01 Crawling band Free float Monetary targeting 
Venezuela Dec-95 Conventional peg Crawling band - 
Vietnam Jan-96 Conventional peg Free float Monetary targeting 
Zimbabwe Dec-97 Crawling band Managed float Monetary targeting 
 
Source: Babula and Ötker-Robe, 2003; Caruana, 2007 
Note: The table consists of ERT exits only and switches on IT regime. Some of the new regimes are 
today abandoned. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PhD Thesis 
Appendix 1 
 
 329 
Table A1.2. Growth under alternative regimes and classifications (whole sample) 
  Average growth rate 
  RR (2004) de-facto 
classification 
IMF de-jure 
classification 
fixed 2.18 1.81 
limited-flexible 2.69 2.53 
flexible 2.05 2.64 
free-floating  2.39 2.08 
free falling 0.52 n.a. 
Source: Calculated by the author, based on figures by the IMF 
 
 
Table A1.3. Growth under alternative regimes and classifications (countries’ 
development level) 
 Average growth rate 
  Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) de-facto 
classification 
IMF de-jure classification 
  Advanced 
economies 
Developing 
economies 
Advanced 
economies 
Developing 
economies 
fixed 2.21 2.17 1.95 1.79 
limited-flexible 1.64 2.94 2.24 2.62 
flexible 2.04 2.05 2.34 2.68 
free-floating  1.65 2.64 1.94 2.11 
free falling -0.26 0.55 n.a. n.a. 
Source: Calculated by the author, based on figures by the IMF 
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Table A1.4. Average output-volatility under alternative regimes and 
classifications (whole sample; figures in percentage points) 
  RR classification IMF classification 
 Standard 
deviation 
Linear 
trend 
HP trend Standard 
deviation 
Linear 
trend 
HP trend 
fixed 4.75 4.08 2.75 4.75 4.06 2.78 
limited-flexible 4.19 3.64 2.33 5.32 4.37 3.09 
flexible 5.27 4.23 2.83 4.79 4.08 2.81 
free-floating  6.27 5.21 3.34 4.96 4.2 2.83 
free falling 6.33 5.84 4.01 na na na 
Source: Calculated by the author, based on figures by the IMF 
 
 
 
Table A1.5. Average output-volatility under alternative regimes and 
classifications (countries’ development level; figures in percentage points) 
 Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) de-facto classification 
  Advanced economies Developing economies 
  SD DEV HP SD DEV HP 
fixed 2.41 2.4 1.67 5.18 4.45 2.97 
limited-flexible 3.39 2.93 1.79 4.39 3.81 2.46 
flexible 2.92 2.55 1.77 5.69 4.6 3.05 
free-floating  2.9 2.78 1.79 7.09 5.92 3.76 
free falling 7.14 5.24 3.77 6.3 5.8 4.02 
Source: Calculated by the author, based on figures by the IMF 
 
 
 IMF de-jure classification 
  Advanced economies Developing economies 
  SD DEV HP SD DEV HP 
fixed 3.35 2.89 1.87 4.95 4.25 2.9 
limited-flexible 2.41 2.46 1.74 6.26 5.09 3.56 
flexible 3.47 3.12 2.1 4.95 4.22 2.89 
free-floating  2.55 2.42 1.63 5.51 4.69 3.14 
Source: Calculated by the author, based on figures by the IMF 
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Table A1.6. IV estimates of output volatility regression – whole sample 
Dependent variable: 
HP-based output volatility 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
2SLS GMM LIML CUE 
Real per capita GDP growth -0.379*** -0.383*** -0.3734** -0.377*** -0.372*** 
Financial development 0.244 1.236 -0.245 0.451 -0.379 
Trade openness 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.011 1.163 
Financial openness 0.133* 0.156** 0.141* 0.129 0.149* 
Volatility of money supply -0.024 -0.024 -0.019 -0.030 -0.022 
Volatility of gov’t consumption -0.305** -0.263* -0.257* -0.363* -0.332** 
Civil unrest 0.277** 0.248* 0.261* 0.314* 0.297** 
Volatility of TOT  -0.112** -0.108** -0.103* -0.122** -0.115** 
Volatility of TOT under Fixed 0.106*  0.098 0.118* 0.112* 
Volatility of TOT under Fixed up to 5 years  0.063    
Volatility of TOT under Fixed - 5-10 years  0.130**    
Volatility of TOT under Fixed over 10 years  0.099    
Volatility of TOT under Lim-Flex 0.170** 0.158** 0.153** 0.191** 0.176** 
Volatility of TOT under Flexible 0.119** 0.116** 0.110** 0.129** 0.122** 
Volatility of TOT under Float Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat 
Volatility of TOT under Other (dual 
market and/or free falling) 
0.013 0.027 0.025 0.011 0.022 
F-test (p-value) 
H0: ERRs under TOT shocks are jointly 
insignificant 
0.290 0.306 0.399 0.367 0.329 
Fixed ERR -0.620  -0.727 -0.631 -0.773 
Fixed ERR under 5 years  -0.128    
Fixed ERR 5 to 10 years  -1.166**    
Fixed ERR over 10 years  -1.219**    
Limited flexible ERR -0.797 -0.773 -0.843 -0.837 -0.918 
Flexible ERR -0.869 -0.877* -0.898 -0.907 -0.968* 
Floating ERR Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat 
Other category (dual market and/or 
free falling) 
-0.494 -0.423 -0.383 -0.561 -0.464 
F-test (p-value) 
H0: ERRs are jointly insignificant 
0.588 0.086 0.548 0.648 0.595 
Inflation 1.803 1.347 1.207 2.075 1.539 
F-test 
H0: All regressors are insignificant 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Under-identification test (p-value) 
H0: Model is under-identified 
0.040 0.043 0.040 
 
0.040 0.040 
Weak identification test (F-stat) 
H0: Instruments are weak 
1.464 1.419 
 
1.464 1.464 1.464 
Hansen test (p-value) 
H0: Instruments are valid 
0.638 0.647 0.638 0.706 0.626 
Endogeneity test (p-value) 
H0: Regressors are exogenous 
0.347 0.372 0.347 0.347 0.347 
Note: *,**,*** indicate 10, 5 and 1% of significance. Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
The potentially endogenous variables (financial development, monetary and fiscal volatility, and inflation) are instrumented by: their 
first and second lags, terms of trade, inflation and growth and their first lags; and population. For the developing-group and sub-
periods specifications, adjustment in the group of instrument could have been made (changing how many lags to include) in order to 
improve the instrument-identification tests.  
The reported test for endogenous regressors is the Wu-Hausman F-test version of the endogeneity test which is robust to various 
violations of conditional homoskedasticity.  
The reported over-identification test is Hansen J statistic. Reported under-identification test is Kleibergen and Paap‘s (2006) test. 
Reported weak identification test is Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistics.  
Dummies for Latin America and Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa were dropped because of collinearity. Time dummies are not 
reported due to space, but are available on request. 
-xtivreg2- does not report an estimated constant. The reason is that it can cause problems when combining two-step GMM and 
cluster-robust option. 
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Table A1.7. IV estimates of output volatility regression – developing countries 
Dependent variable: 
HP-based output volatility 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
2SLS GMM CUE LIML 
Real per capita GDP growth -0.404*** -0.388*** -0.388*** -0.383*** -0.383*** 
Financial development 0.182 1.025 1.861 0.227 0.227 
Trade openness 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.009 0.009 
Financial openness 0.171** 0.186*** 0.156** 0.175** 0.175** 
Volatility of money supply -0.019 -0.022 -0.021 -0.027 -0.027 
Volatility of gov’t consumption -0.294** -0.271** -0.255** -0.386** -0.386** 
Civil unrest 0.596** 0.247** 0.266** 0.313* 0.313* 
Volatility of TOT  -0.109** -0.107** -0.104** -0.123* -0.123* 
Volatility of TOT under Fixed 0.108*  0.106* 0.127* 0.127* 
Volatility of TOT under Fixed up to 5 years  0.075    
Volatility of TOT under Fixed - 5-10 years  0.136**    
Volatility of TOT under Fixed over 10 years  0.103*    
Volatility of TOT under Lim-Flex 0.167** 0.161** 0.158** 0.198* 0.198* 
Volatility of TOT under Flexible 0.117** 0.116** 0.112** 0.130** 0.130** 
Volatility of TOT under Float Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat 
Volatility of TOT under Other (dual 
market and/or free falling) 
0.012 0.022 0.023 0.009 0.009 
F-test (p-value) 
H0: ERRs under TOT shocks are jointly 
insignif. 
0.082 0.098 0.098 0.100 0.123 
Fixed ERR -0.707  -0.725 -0.736 -0.736 
Fixed ERR under 5 years  -0.266    
Fixed ERR 5 to 10 years  -1.220**    
Fixed ERR over 10 years  -1.193**    
Limited flexible ERR -0.853 -0.834 -0.828 -0.913 -0.913 
Flexible ERR -0.934* -0.946* -0.910* -0.990 -0.995 
Floating ERR Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat Omitted cat 
Other category (dual market and/or 
free falling) 
-0.643 -0.600 -0.547 -0.739 -0.739 
F-test (p-value) 
H0: ERRs are jointly insignificant 
0.086 0.055 0.090 0.098 0.127 
Inflation 1.780 1.528 1.271 2.055 2.191 
F-test 
H0: All regressors are insignificant 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Under-identification test (p-value) 
H0: Model is under-identified 
0.059 0.069 0.059 0.059 0.059 
Weak identification test (F-stat)  
H0: Instruments are weak 
1.350 1.300 1.350 1.350 1.350 
Hansen test (p-value) 
H0: Instruments are valid 
0.695 0.802 0.695 0.695 0.828 
Endogeneity test (p-value) 
H0: Regressors are exogenous 
0.174 0.125 0.174 0.174 0.174 
Note: *,**,*** indicate 10, 5 and 1% of significance. Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
See notes in Table A1.6. 
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Table A1.8. Dynamic system-GMM estimates of output volatility regression 
(only lagged dependent variable is assumed endogenous) 
Dependent variable: 
Output volatility 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Standard 
deviation 
Dev. from 
linear trend 
Deviation from HP 
trend 
Whole sample 
Deviation from HP 
trend 
Developing economies 
Output volatility (-1) 0.812*** 0.093** 0.054* 0.053* 0.050 0.025 
Real per capita GDP growth -0.001 -0.064 -0.377*** -0.377*** -0.393*** -0.375*** 
Financial development 0.566** -1.623* -0.455* -0.476** -0.388 -4.451 
Trade openness -0.001 0.010 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.014** 0.016** 
Financial openness 0.020 -0.003 -0.014 -0.003 0.123* 0.102 
Volatility of money supply 0.001 0.007 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Volatility of gov’t consumption 0.028*** 0.045*** 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.009 
Civil unrest 0.033 0.182*** 0.032 0.037 -0.028 -0.102 
Volatility of TOT  0.010 -0.011 -0.046* -0.047* -0.083 -0.034 
Volatility of TOT * Fixed -0.013 0.037 0.039  0.076  
Volatility of TOT * Fixed up to 5 years    0.063  0.054 
Volatility of TOT *Fixed - 5-10 years    0.026  0.025 
Volatility of TOT * Fixed over 10 years    0.041  0.026 
Volatility of TOT * Lim-Flex -0.022 0.035 0.013* 0.047* 0.084 0.035 
Volatility of TOT * Flexible -0.001 0.021 0.058** 0.058** 0.096* 0.043 
Volatility of TOT * Float Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted 
Volatility of TOT * Other 
category 
-0.005 0.017 
0.017 0.017 0.044 
-0.016 
F-test (p-value) 
H0: ERRs under TOT shocks are 
jointly insignificant 
0.980 0.184 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.410 
Fixed ERR -0.005 -0.365 -0.269  -0.640  
Fixed ERR under 5 years    -0.399  -0.614 
Fixed ERR 5 to 10 years    -0.161  -0.155 
Fixed ERR over 10 years    -0.240  -0.128 
Limited flexible ERR -0.059 -0.464 -0.531* -0.509* -1.168 -0.541 
Flexible ERR -0.021 -0.567 -0.602** -0.582** -1.105 -0.478 
Floating ERR Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted 
Other category (dual market / 
free fal.) 
0.399 0.691 
0.911 0.911 0.247 
1.251 
F-test (p-value) 
H0: ERRs are jointly insignificant 
0.906 0.408 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.075 
Inflation -0.751 -0.837 -0.743 -0.729 -0.329 -0.578 
Dummy for Latin A. and 
Caribbean 
0.144 
0.227 -0.433 -0.440 -0.508 -0.795* 
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa -0.006 -0.336 -0.776*** -0.770** -0.723* -0.673* 
Constant 0.476** 2.037*** 2.505*** 2.467*** 3.576*** 2.968 
Wald test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of instruments 139 71 70 74 73 77 
Hansen test (p-value) 
H0: Instruments are valid – no 
over-identification 
0.434 0.688 0.787 0.779 0.659 0.891 
Difference in Hansen (p-value) 
H0: Instruments are valid – 
regressor (lagged dependent 
variable) is endogenous 
0.739 0.816 0.951 0.956 0.994 1.000 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) (p-value) 
H0: No second-order serial 
correlation 
0.571 0.612 0.434 0.402 0.334 0.475 
Notes: *, ** and *** refer to a significance level of 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. All regressions are two-step system GMM. The 
Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors reported. Time dummies are not reported due to space, but are available on request. 
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Table A1.9. Dynamic system-GMM estimates of output volatility regression 
(lagged dependent and other variables assumed endogenous) 
Dependent variable: 
Output volatility 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Standard 
deviation 
Dev. from 
linear trend 
Deviation from HP  
trend 
Whole sample 
Deviation from HP 
trend 
Developing economies 
Output volatility (-1) 0.805*** 0.129*** 0.062* 0.064* 0.047 0.070** 
Real per capita GDP growth -0.004 0.006 -0.369*** -0.371*** -0.369*** -0.408*** 
Financial development 0.656* -0.025 0.085 -0.063 -3.635 -0.364 
Trade openness -0.004 0.751 0.017** 0.017** 0.015** 0.011 
Financial openness 0.106** 0.030 0.024 -0.030 0.135* 0.097 
Volatility of money supply -0.005 0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.010 -0.001 
Volatility of gov’t consumption 0.091*** 0.071*** -0.003 -0.003 0.006 0.004 
Civil unrest 0.005 0.205*** 0.058 0.059 -0.116 -0.112 
Volatility of TOT  -0.023 -0.108 -0.033 -0.033 -0.068 -0.099 
Volatility of TOT * Fixed 0.013 14.933 2.799  6.334  
Volatility of TOT * Fixed up to 5 years    0.049  0.090 
Volatility of TOT *Fixed - 5-10 years    0.021  0.098 
Volatility of TOT * Fixed over 10 years    0.029  0.086 
Volatility of TOT * Lim-Flex -0.006 0.120 0.031 0.032 0.067 0.098 
Volatility of TOT * Flexible 0.025 0.130 0.046** 0.046 0.080 0.111 
Volatility of TOT * Float Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted 
Volatility of TOT * Other 
category 
-0.014 0.109 
-0.002 -0.000 0.014 
0.073 
F-test (p-value) 
H0: ERRs under TOT shocks are jointly 
insignificant 
0.354 0.540 0.345 0.633 0.268 0.793 
Fixed ERR -0.118 -0.915 -0.074  -0.969  
Fixed ERR under 5 years    -0.115  -0.830 
Fixed ERR 5 to 10 years    -0.018  -0.593 
Fixed ERR over 10 years    -0.087  -0.767 
Limited flexible ERR 0.015 -1.138* -0.364 -0.353 -1.283 -1.178 
Flexible ERR -0.099 -1.190* -0.574** -0.558* -1.270 -1.166 
Floating ERR Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted 
Other category (dual market / 
free fal.) 
0.389 0.212 1.192 1.173 0.696 -0.158 
F-test (p-value) 
H0: ERRs are jointly insignificant 
0.423 0.181 0.020 0.086 0.124 0.549 
Inflation 0.181 1.078 -0.773** -0.766** -0.749** -0.555* 
Dummy for Latin A. and 
Caribbean 
0.038 
0.084 -0.151 -0.135 -0.589 -0.729* 
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa -0.123 -0.315 -0.600* -0.583* -0.544 -0.637 
Constant 0.458* 2.062** 2.336*** 2.282*** 3.876* 4.325*** 
Wald test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of instruments 121 130 75 79 78 59 
Hansen test (p-value) 
H0: Instruments are valid – no over-
identification 
0.204 0.318 0.423 0.408 0.806 0.234 
Difference in Hansen (p-value) 
H0: Instruments are valid (lagged 
dependent variable)  
0.297 0.515 0.573 0.550 0.853 0.295 
Difference in Hansen (p-value) 
H0: Instruments are valid (other 
potentially endogenous variables)  
0.804 0.261 0.166 0.202 0.885 0.234 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) (p-value) 
H0: No second-order serial 
correlation 
0.610 0.800 0.528 0.525 0.558 0.382 
Notes: *, ** and *** refer to a significance level of 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. All regressions are two-step system GMM. The Windmeijer 
(2005) corrected standard errors reported. 
PhD Thesis 
Appendix 1 
 
 335 
Table A1.10. Macroeconomic statistics of switchers and non-switchers 
  Switchers group Control (non-switchers) group 
MEDIANS ERT IT ERT  
(before others 
switch) 
ERT  
(after others 
switch) 
Inflation rate 11.3 3.4 14.4 5.1 
Growth rate 3.9 4.2 2.8 6.7 
Inflation volatility 17.6 2.9 33.9 3.3 
Output volatility 5.9 2.3 4.7 2.7 
Reserves growth 17.4 10.3 18.1 19.7 
Exchange-rate changes -2.6 -0.6 -1.1 0.8 
Reserves volatility 49.9 15.8 24.8 23.2 
Exchange-rate volatility 8.5 6.5 25.2 4.0 
 
Note: Volatility is measured through the standard deviation of the series over the observed period 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from World Economic Outlook 
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APPENDIX 2 – Additional variables 
Table A2.1. Full specification of dummy variables 
Notation Value 1 Value 0 Source 
Exchange-rate regimes  
RR1 If fixed Otherwise De-facto RR 
classification 
RR2 If limited-flexible Otherwise De-facto RR 
classification 
RR3 If flexible Otherwise De-facto RR 
classification 
RR4 If free float Otherwise De-facto RR 
classification 
RR5DUAL If free falling or dual market Otherwise De-facto RR 
classification 
IMF1 If fixed Otherwise IMF web 
IMF2 If limited-flexible Otherwise IMF web 
IMF3 If flexible Otherwise IMF web 
IMF4 If free float Otherwise IMF web 
IMFOT If dual market exists Otherwise IMF web 
Other dummies related to the exchange-rate regime 
EURERM If a country belongs to the Euro zone and the 
ERM II - 12 (mainly the period 1991-2006) + UK 
in 1991 and 1992 
Otherwise Eurostat 
Survivor bias 
SURVIVOR If in the particular year inflation rate exceeds 30% Otherwise Based on CPI 
measure; IMF, 
World 
Economic 
Outlook 
Geographic groupings 
LATCAR If the country belongs to the region Latin 
America and the Caribbean: 
Argentina; Belize; Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; Colombia; 
Costa Rica; Dominica; Dominican Republic; 
Ecuador; El Salvador; Grenada; Guatemala; 
Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Jamaica; Mexico; 
Nicaragua; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; St. Kitts and 
Nevis; St. Lucia; St. Vincent and the Grenadines; 
Suriname; Uruguay; Venezuela. 
Otherwise World Bank 
groupings 
SAHAR If the country belongs to the region Sub-Saharan 
Africa: 
Angola; Benin; Botswana; Burkina Faso; Burundi; 
Cameroon; Cape Verde; Central African Republic; 
Chad; Congo, Rep; Côte d'Ivoire; Ethiopia; Gabon; 
Gambia, The; Ghana; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; 
Kenya; Lesotho; Liberia; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; 
Mauritania; Mauritius; Mozambique; Namibia; 
Niger; Nigeria; Rwanda; São Tomé and Principe; 
Senegal; Seychelles; Sierra Leone; South Africa; 
Sudan; Swaziland; Tanzania; Togo; Uganda; 
Zambia; Zimbabwe. 
Otherwise World Bank 
groupings 
Development groupings 
ADVAN Developed (advanced) market economies 
Australia; Austria; Belgium; Bermuda; Brunei 
Darussalam; Canada; Cyprus; Denmark; Finland; 
France; Germany; Greece; Hong Kong, Iceland; 
Ireland ; Italy; Japan; Rep.; Kuwait; Luxembourg; 
Otherwise World Bank 
groupings, 
Group high-
income 
countries 
PhD Thesis 
Appendix 2 
 
 338 
Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Portugal; 
Qatar; Singapore; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; 
Switzerland; United Arab Emirates; United 
Kingdom; United States. 
TRANS Transition markets 
Albania; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Bosnia-
Herzegovina; Bulgaria; China; Croatia; Czech 
Republic; Estonia; Georgia; Hungary; Kazakhstan; 
Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lithuania; Macedonia; 
Moldova; Mongolia; Poland; Romania; Russian 
Federation; Serbia/Montenegro; Slovakia; Slovenia; 
Tajikistan; Ukraine; Uzbekistan; Vietnam 
Otherwise SSRN 
DEVEL Developing economies (includes transition 
countries) 
Albania; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Bosnia-
Herzegovina; Bulgaria; China; Croatia; Czech 
Republic; Estonia; Georgia; Hungary; Kazakhstan; 
Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lithuania; Macedonia; 
Moldova; Mongolia; Poland; Romania; Russian 
Federation; Serbia/Montenegro; Slovakia; Slovenia; 
Tajikistan; Ukraine; Uzbekistan; Vietnam + All the 
remaining in the sample 
Otherwise Residual 
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Table A2.2. Interest-rule variables: definition and sources 
Label Description Unit Source Notes 
R Money market interest 
rate 
y-o-y % per 
month 
IFS and national 
central banks 
Wherever not available, 
the discount rate used. 
CPI Consumer prices Index number IFS   
INF Inflation y-o-y % per 
month 
Calculated Inflation=  
log(cpi)-log(cpi[-12]) 
IND Industrial production Index number IFS and national 
statistics offices 
  
GAP Output gap Percentage 
points 
Calculated The residual series 
between the actual and 
the potential output 
estimated from the 
industrial production by 
HP filtering. 
ER Exchange rate  Units of national 
currency per 
SDR 
IFS   
DER Change in the exchange 
rate 
y-o-y % per 
month 
Calculated DER=  
log(ER)-log(ER[-12]) 
RES Reserves minus gold Million of USD IFS   
DRES Change in the reserves y-o-y % per 
month 
Calculated DRES=  
log(RES)-log(RES[-12]) 
DC Domestic credit to 
nominal GDP  
% IFS The annual GDP used for 
each month. 
M2 Money aggregate M2 Millions/billions 
of national 
currency 
IFS and national 
central banks 
  
NFA |Net foreign assets| to 
GDP 
Millions/billions 
of national 
currency 
IFS NFA refers to the 
difference between 
foreign assets and foreign 
liabilities of the banking 
system, taken as an 
absolute value. The 
annual GDP used for 
each month. 
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APPENDIX 3 – IT algebra 
Building on the analysis in the main text of Chapter 4 (Section 4.4.2 and 4.4.3), 
the appendix deepens the analysis of IT as a monetary-policy regime, by presenting 
simple algebraic approach. The algebraic approach is taken from the literature, mainly 
from Agénor (2002) and as cited in the text. Derivations are made clearer, to fully 
understand how IT works. Both types of IT regime are represented by a set of 
equations, representing how the alteration of the monetary-policy stance is brought 
onto prices. 
 
A3.1. Strict inflation targeting  
Equations (4.2) and (4.3) in Section 4.4.2 represent a closed economy producing 
one good; the former relates output gap positively to its value in period t-1, and 
negatively with the real interest rate in period t-1; the latter relates inflation positively to 
the output gap in period t-1. The central bank‘s loss function represented by (4.5), for 
the moment, is taken to be a function only of inflation (thus, λ=0). According to the 
previous discussion, the monetary policy objective in period t is to choose a sequence of 
current and future interest rates,  
thh
r , so as to minimize the intertemporal loss 
function at period t )( t , i.e. the expected sum of discounted squared deviations of the 
actual inflation from its targeted level (i.e. the loss function given by (4.5)), subject to 
the length of the transmission channels, represented by (4.2) and (4.3), i.e.: 
 




 





 

th th
hth
th
th
tt ELE 10 ,
2
)(
)( min
2*


   (A3.1) 
Whereby, δ denotes a discount factor and Et the expectations operator of future interest 
rates conditional upon the information disposable at period t. This is the optimisation 
problem to be solved. 
 However, the problem could be given more intuition. Since the nominal interest 
rate affects the output gap with one-period lag (equation 4.2) and inflation with a two-
period lag (equation 4.3), inflation in period t+2 could be expressed in terms of period t 
variables and the shocks occurring at periods t+1 and t+2. Thus, equations (4.2) and 
(4.3) could be rearranged in the following manner. Equation (4.2): 
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 1 ,)()()( 112
*
1
*
11    ttttttt ryyyy    (A3.2) 
Equation (4.3) for period t+1: 
1
*
11 )(   ttttt yy         
1
*
11 )(   ttttt yy        (A3.3) 
And similarly for period t+2: 
2
*
11112 )(   ttttt yy       (A3.4)  
Substituting (A3.2) and (A3.3) into (A3.4), the following is obtained: 
212
*
111
*
12 ))()(())((   ttttttttttt ryyyy   
)())(1()1( 211121
*
1122   tttttttt ryy   
(A3.5) 
Now, we define new notations for the coefficients in front of variables, as follows: 
 ;1 211    
);1( 112    
 ;213    
21112   tttt       (A3.6) 
Substitution of those in (A3.5), we obtain: 
23
*
212 )(   tttttt ryy      (A3.7) 
Now it is clear that the nominal interest rate )( tr  set by the central bank today (period t) 
will affect inflation )( 2t  after two periods (t+2) and afterwards, but not in periods t 
and t+1; the nominal interest rate set by the central bank in the next period t+1 will 
affect inflation in period t+3 and afterwards, but not in periods t+1 and t+2, and so on. 
 Consequently, the solution of the optimisation problem (A3.1) could be 
perceived as setting the interest rate )( tr  today, t, and the periods afterwards (t+1, t+2, 
and so on) so that the expected inflation in period t+2 and afterwards (periods t+3, t+4, 
and so on) will be equal to the target rate. In other words, since today‘s interest rate and 
PhD Thesis 
Appendix 3 
 
 343 
not the future one affects inflation in two periods from now, the minimization of the 
objective function defined by (A3.1) becomes a sequence of one-period problems: 
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Whereby the first part of (A3.8) refers to inflation affected by the alteration of today‘s 
interest rate (see equation A3.7), while the second part is affected by the interest-rate 
alteration afterwards (rt+1, rt+2 and so on; the reconsideration and updated decisions, 
mentioned earlier). Since, the problem in period t is being optimised, it consists of 
minimizing the expected, discounted square value of inflation in period t+2 from the 
target, 2*2
2
)(
2
min 

tt
i
E
h
, by altering today‘s interest rate in accordance to (A3.7). 
Taking from statistical theory that the expected square value of a random 
variable equals the square of the bias plus the conditional variance (Agénor, 2002), the 
following is obtained: 
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Equation (A3.9) indicates that the optimisation problem could be equivalently viewed as 
minimizing the sum of expected future squared deviations of the inflation from the 
target and the variability of future inflation, conditional on the information set 
disposable at time t. As )( 2ttV   is not affected by the policy choice, the optimisation 
problem consists of minimizing the first part of (A3.8). Hence, the first order condition 
of 2*2
2
)(
2
min 

tt
i
E
h
 would be to differentiate it according to inflation in period 
t+2, 2t , but conditional upon today‘s interest rate tr : 
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The last equation in (A3.10) suggests that, given the two-period lag, the optimal 
monetary policy would be to set the nominal interest rate today so that the expected 
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inflation after two periods be equal to the inflation target, *|2   tt , subject to 
information available today. 
We have set the transmission mechanism by (4.2) and (4.3) and further 
explained it by (A3.7). Now, we will derive the interest rate rule. In (A3.7), the expected 
value of the random shock is zero, 02 t . Accounting for this, we rearrange this 
equation and solve for tr : 
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Given the definition of 211 1    in (A3.6), the following is rearranged: 
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ttttt
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



    (A3.12) 
Since we set today‘s interest rate to affect inflation after two periods (A3.7), in the final 
derivation of (A3.12) we observe that the higher the excess of the current inflation rate 
over the forecast for period t+2, the higher the interest rate needed to satisfy the 
condition 
*
|2   tt  derived in (A3.10): 
3
*
221|2 )()(

 ttt
f
ttt
t
yy
r


     (A3.13) 
Since we want 
*
|2   tt  and since tt |2  must be forecasted and we want to minimize 
the difference between the actual and the forecast inflation for t+2, we implicitly need 
to target tt |2 , i.e. to target inflation forecast for period t+2. Hence, now it is clear how 
the inflation forecast serves as an intermediate target within the IT framework 
(Svensson, 1999). If we substitute 
*
|2   tt  in the last row of (A3.11) we obtain: 
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3
**
21 )(

 
 tttt
yy
r       (A3.14) 
And given the definitions of the  ‘s in (A3.6), the rewritten form of (A3.14) is: 
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    (A3.15) 
The last equation in (A3.15) could be rewritten as: 
 )()( *2
*
1 ttttt yyr        (A3.16) 
Where, 
2
1
2
21
1
1
;
1






 . From (A3.16) it follows that it is optimal for the 
central bank to adjust the nominal interest rate upward to reflect current inflation 
(coefficient in front of current inflation is equal to one, thus the reflection will be to a 
full extent), the difference between the current inflation and the target, as well as the 
increase in the output gap. Svensson (1997) argues that the inclusion of the current 
inflation rate and the current output gap in (A3.16) helps in predicting future inflation. 
(A3.16) is also what Agénor (2002) calls certainty-equivalent: the same interest-rate rule 
would be optimal in the absence of shocks. If a shock occurs, (A3.16), however, ensures 
that it will not persist over time. In equilibrium, shocks occur within the specified lag, 
once the interest rate has been set. Thus, the actual deviation in t+2 will deviate from 
the forecast by the scale of the forecasting error, 21112   tttt  : 
 
*
22
2|22






tt
tttt
       (A3.17) 
Precisely because following an optimal interest-rate rule, as defined by (A3.16), the 
central bank cannot prevent deviations of the inflation from the target due to shocks, is 
important in evaluating the performance of IT in practice. 
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A3.2. Flexible inflation targeting  
As mentioned above, central banks are not ―inflation nutters‖ and their loss 
function is not solely dependent on inflation, but also on the output gap as well. Hence, 
the loss function is represented by equation (4.5) while the objective of the central bank 
becomes minimizing the following intertemporal loss function: 
 




 







 

th th
hhhth
th
th
tt
yy
ELE 0 ;10 ,
2
)()(
 min
2*2*


   
(A3.18) 
Where   represents the weight that the central bank puts on stabilizing output 
and the other symbols as in (A3.1). The discount factor   is, for all practical purposes, 
likely to be very close to one, especially when the period is a quarter (Svensson, 2003). 
Interestingly, when the discount factor is close to unity, the intertemporal loss function 
is approximately equal to the weighted sum of the unconditional volatilities of inflation 
and the output gap (when the unconditional means of inflation and the output gap 
equal the inflation target and zero, respectively: *][  tE  and 0][
*  tt yyE ): 
][*][lim *
1
tttt yyVarVar 



      (A3.18a) 
Equation (A3.18a) points to the substance of the flexible inflation targeting which opts 
to stabilize inflation around the inflation target and output around the potential output. 
However, observing (A3.18), the issue is more intricate and this equation could not be 
split into sequential one-period problems, because current inflation depends on lagged 
output and the current output on lagged inflation. Svensson (1997) showed that the first 
order condition for minimizing (A3.18) with respect to the nominal interest rate can be 
written as: 
 0 );( * 1|1
1
*
|2   


 ttttt yy     (A3.19) 
Where,  
2
1
2
1
2 )1( and /4)1(1
2
1




 . Equation (A3.19) proves 
that, given the two-period lag, the optimal monetary policy would be to set the nominal 
interest rate today so that the expected inflation after two periods be equal to the 
inflation target and the weighted output in period t+1, subject to the information 
available today. Implicitly, this means that the central bank would not opt for fast 
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convergence of inflation to the target, because it will have to sacrifice a big portion of 
output. Instead, current inflation will converge to the target in a later period, but less 
output will be forgone (refer to Figure 4.2). Equation (A3.19) shows exactly this: 
convergence will not be achieved in t+2, because the central bank puts some weight on 
output )(
1

. The higher  , the slower inflation convergence, but less output 
sacrificed. In other words, from (A3.19) it is evident that the two-year ahead inflation 
tt |2  will coincide with the target 
* only if the one-period ahead output gap equals 
zero ) 0( * 1|1   ttt yy . As long as the central bank considers output fluctuations and 
opts for minimizing the sacrifice ratio ) 0(  , tt |2  will exceed 
*  if the output gap is 
negative, and vice versa. Namely, if the current output is expected to be below the 
trend-line in period t+1, then the central bank will ease the monetary policy stance by 
lowering the interest rate and hence support the economic activity. This policy will lead 
to higher inflation at t+2 than otherwise, thus raising the inflation forecast for t+2 made 
today. Consequently, if the central bank takes into account the output-gap movements, 
than it is optimal to gradually adjust the inflation forecast to the inflation target and 
hence reduce output fluctuations or minimize the sacrifice ratio. The higher the λ, the 
higher the influence of the expected output gap on the inflation forecast and the more 
gradual the adjustment process will be.  
Now, we want to derive the interest-rate rule. We start by reproducing (A3.5): 
)())(1()1( 211121
*
1122   tttttttt ryy   
Whereby the expected value of )( 2111   ttt  is zero. Further rearrangement 
gives: 
)())(1( 21
*
11|2 ttttttt ryy      (A3.20) 
From (4.3): ttttt yy    )(
*
1111 , the output gap could be set as: 
1
|1|2*
1|1

 tttt
ttt yy



       (A3.21) 
Which, if substituted in (A3.19), yields: 
PhD Thesis 
Appendix 3 
 
 348 
)( |1|22
1
*
|2
1
|1|2
1
*
|2
tttttt
tttt
tt




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     (A3.22) 
Multiplying from both sides by  21  and rearranging yields: 
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To both sides a term * is added and then rearranging gives: 
)())((
)()()(
 )(
 )(
*
|1
*
|2
2
1
*
|1
*2
1|2
2
1
*
|1
**2
1|2
2
1
*
|1
*2
1
*
|2
2
1












tttt
tttt
tttt
tttt
 
For the purpose of deriving the interest-rate rule under flexible IT, further 
rearrangement gives: 
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From the last-row equation, it follows: 
)( *|12
1
*
|2 


 

  tttt  
)( *|1
*
|2    tttt c   
)( *|1
*
|2    tttt c       (A3.23) 
Where 10 and 
2
1


 cc


, since under flexible IT, 0  and hence, c must be 
positive but less than unity. 
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Now, equating (A3.20) and (A3.23) yields: 
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Which rearranged and given (4.3): )( *1|1 ttttt yy   , yields: 
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And, from the last-row equation, it follows: 
)()( **2
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1 ttttt yyr        (A3.25) 
Where, 
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



cc 


 . From (A3.25) it follows that it is optimal for the 
flexible ITs, similarly to strict ITs, to adjust the nominal interest rate upward to reflect 
current inflation (the coefficient in front is equal to one, thus the adjustment will be to a 
full extent), the difference between the current inflation and the target, as well as the 
increase in the output gap. Svensson (1997) argues that the inclusion of the current 
inflation rate and the current output gap in (A3.25) helps in predicting future inflation. 
However, the extent to which those will shape the interest rates, differently from the 
case of strict IT, now depends on the weight attached to stabilizing output  , because 
it defines c and it is an ingredient of 
2
1*
2
21
*
1
1
 ;
1





cc 


 . Comparing these to 
2
1
2
21
1
1
;
1






  in (A3.16), it is evident that *11    and 
*
22    when 0c (i.e. 
when  0 , with the bank as a strict inflation targeter). Accordingly, when the current 
inflation exceeds the target or the current output exceeds the potential (overheating of 
the economy), the instrument must respond positively (an increase of the interest rate).  
If equation (A3.25) is compared to (A3.16): 
 )()( *2
*
1 ttttt yyr   , the
* s are smaller than  s, for some proportion 
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of c, and this is due to the positive weight attached on the output gap in the loss 
function. The higher the weight on output, the longer the period required to bring 
inflation on target. Consequently, the length of the target horizon depends not only on 
the magnitude and persistence of the shock, but also on the relative weight attached on 
the output gap. In times of shocks, flexible IT provides a trade-off between inflation 
volatility and output-gap volatility. Fuhrer (1997a, cited in Agénor, 2002) states that by 
varying the relative weight that the central bank puts on the output gap in the loss 
function, an optimal policy frontier is designed, which comprises the set of efficient 
combinations of inflation volatility and output-gap volatility attainable by policymakers. 
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APPENDIX 4 – Printouts 
A4.1. Growth regression printouts 
Specification with time dummies and interaction terms 
 
xtabond2 growth l.growth lgdp75 life1 inf l.inf educ l.educ lfertil l.lfertil to l.to 
gccugdp l.gccugdp invgdp l.invgdp dem l.dem dem2 rr1 rr2 rr3 rr5 d.lpopul eurer 
survivor latcar sahar r1inf r1to r1gc r1inv r1educ r1fertil r1dem r2inf r2to r2gc 
r2inv r2educ r2fertil r2dem r3inf r3to r3gc r3inv r3educ r3fertil r3dem r5inf r5to 
r5gc r5inv r5educ r5fertil r5dem _Iyear_*, gmm(l.growth lgdp75 life1 l.inf l.educ 
l.lfertil l.to l.gccugdp l.invgdp l.dem l.dem2 l.rr1 l.rr2 l.rr3 l.rr5 l.r1inf l.r1to 
l.r1gc l.r1inv l.r1educ l.r1fertil l.r1dem l.r2inf l.r2to l.r2gc l.r2inv l.r2educ 
l.r2fertil l.r2dem l.r3inf l.r3to l.r3gc l.r3inv l.r3educ l.r3fertil l.r3dem l.r5inf 
l.r5to l.r5gc l.r5inv l.r5educ l.r5fertil l.r5dem , eq(diff) laglimits(1 1) collapse) 
gmm(l.growth lgdp75 life1 inf educ lfertil to gccugdp invgdp dem dem2 rr2 rr3 rr1 
rr5, eq(level) laglimits(1 1) collapse) iv(d.lpopul lavgdp70 eurer survivor latcar 
sahar _Iyear_*) twostep robust 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =      1551 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        87 
Number of instruments = 81                      Obs per group: min =         0 
Wald chi2(72) =   1616.10                                      avg =     17.83 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        21 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      growth | 
         L1. |   .0204268   .1213502     0.17   0.866    -.2174152    .2582688 
      lgdp75 |  -4.465656   7.857754    -0.57   0.570    -19.86657    10.93526 
       life1 |   13.20673     26.116     0.51   0.613    -37.97969    64.39314 
         inf | 
         --. |  -92.89865   184.6196    -0.50   0.615    -454.7465    268.9492 
         L1. |   10.79553   11.84017     0.91   0.362    -12.41078    34.00185 
        educ |   -6.42222   9.894161    -0.65   0.516    -25.81442    12.96998 
     lfertil | 
         --. |  -63.81266     73.171    -0.87   0.383    -207.2252    79.59986 
         L1. |   35.59316   68.17779     0.52   0.602    -98.03285    169.2192 
          to | 
         --. |  -140.8733   134.1978    -1.05   0.294    -403.8962    122.1497 
         L1. |   16.61851   25.88024     0.64   0.521    -34.10583    67.34285 
     gccugdp | 
         --. |  -374.6865      369.3    -1.01   0.310    -1098.501    349.1282 
         L1. |   17.46299    78.6266     0.22   0.824    -136.6423    171.5683 
      invgdp | 
         --. |  -104.9467   201.6556    -0.52   0.603    -500.1845     290.291 
         L1. |  -4.093005   16.00626    -0.26   0.798    -35.46471     27.2787 
         dem | 
         --. |  -11.37066   9.148401    -1.24   0.214     -29.3012    6.559876 
         L1. |   4.242734   4.656541     0.91   0.362    -4.883918    13.36939 
        dem2 |   -.526038    .805318    -0.65   0.514    -2.104432    1.052356 
         rr1 |  -184.1669   159.6873    -1.15   0.249    -497.1483    128.8144 
         rr2 |  -209.8411   171.2775    -1.23   0.221    -545.5388    125.8567 
         rr3 |   -207.834   179.8857    -1.16   0.248    -560.4034    144.7355 
     rr5dual |   -214.493   157.8882    -1.36   0.174    -523.9482    94.96229 
      lpopul | 
         D1. |  -14.67682    75.8417    -0.19   0.847    -163.3238    133.9702 
      eurerm |  -.0213094   5.160612    -0.00   0.997    -10.13592     10.0933 
    survivor |   2.476342   6.118129     0.40   0.686    -9.514971    14.46765 
      latcar |   2.862662   2.477502     1.16   0.248    -1.993152    7.718476 
       sahar |  -.8353853   5.234332    -0.16   0.873    -11.09449    9.423716 
       r1inf |   64.63787   156.4418     0.41   0.679    -241.9824    371.2581 
        r1to |   141.2791   155.6891     0.91   0.364    -163.8659     446.424 
        r1gc |    258.116   329.1026     0.78   0.433    -386.9132    903.1451 
       r1inv |   112.5153   215.0188     0.52   0.601    -308.9138    533.9445 
      r1educ |   9.195518   11.44236     0.80   0.422     -13.2311    31.62214 
    r1fertil |   14.41324    32.1017     0.45   0.653    -48.50492    77.33141 
       r1dem |   12.12052    10.6185     1.14   0.254    -8.691354     32.9324 
       r2inf |   71.70851   165.2431     0.43   0.664     -252.162     395.579 
        r2to |   152.9376   162.4393     0.94   0.346    -165.4376    471.3129 
        r2gc |   348.7935   348.9397     1.00   0.318    -335.1157    1032.703 
       r2inv |   109.3529   203.1247     0.54   0.590    -288.7642    507.4699 
      r2educ |   9.083781   10.59779     0.86   0.391    -11.68751    29.85508 
    r2fertil |   23.25287    30.5509     0.76   0.447    -36.62579    83.13154 
       r2dem |   10.98389    10.5144     1.04   0.296    -9.623957    31.59173 
       r3inf |   56.24166   151.6192     0.37   0.711    -240.9264    353.4097 
        r3to |   136.2669   143.8417     0.95   0.343    -145.6576    418.1915 
        r3gc |   376.5448   359.6336     1.05   0.295    -328.3242    1081.414 
       r3inv |   109.6923    203.102     0.54   0.589    -288.3803     507.765 
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      r3educ |   8.878792   11.52905     0.77   0.441    -13.71772    31.47531 
    r3fertil |   25.96557   40.82479     0.64   0.525    -54.04956    105.9807 
       r3dem |   10.00239   9.269315     1.08   0.281    -8.165131    28.16992 
       r5inf |   72.35263    170.221     0.43   0.671    -261.2744    405.9796 
        r5to |   158.0861   192.1082     0.82   0.411    -218.4391    534.6113 
        r5gc |   324.6476   318.8463     1.02   0.309    -300.2796    949.5748 
       r5inv |   180.4118   180.7891     1.00   0.318    -173.9283    534.7519 
      r5educ |   6.890094   8.552162     0.81   0.420    -9.871835    23.65202 
    r5fertil |   18.36015    24.0717     0.76   0.446    -28.81951    65.53981 
       r5dem |   12.63984   11.77288     1.07   0.283    -10.43458    35.71426 
 _Iyear_1986 |   3.083226    3.19916     0.96   0.335    -3.187013    9.353465 
 _Iyear_1987 |   4.865101   3.224863     1.51   0.131    -1.455514    11.18572 
 _Iyear_1988 |   5.172513   3.667326     1.41   0.158    -2.015314    12.36034 
 _Iyear_1989 |   4.560782   3.231844     1.41   0.158    -1.773516    10.89508 
 _Iyear_1990 |  -.2633832   5.102673    -0.05   0.959    -10.26444    9.737672 
 _Iyear_1991 |   1.647697   3.649218     0.45   0.652     -5.50464    8.800034 
 _Iyear_1992 |   1.447226   2.540581     0.57   0.569    -3.532221    6.426674 
 _Iyear_1993 |   1.495559   2.411159     0.62   0.535    -3.230225    6.221343 
 _Iyear_1994 |   2.841962   2.707124     1.05   0.294    -2.463904    8.147827 
 _Iyear_1995 |  -2.858247   5.960762    -0.48   0.632    -14.54113    8.824632 
 _Iyear_1996 |   .1332359   2.012694     0.07   0.947    -3.811572    4.078044 
 _Iyear_1997 |   .3946018   1.894589     0.21   0.835    -3.318724    4.107928 
 _Iyear_1998 |   .5992573   2.416609     0.25   0.804     -4.13721    5.335725 
 _Iyear_1999 |  -.2734299    1.48858    -0.18   0.854    -3.190994    2.644134 
 _Iyear_2000 |  -3.156475   5.289748    -0.60   0.551    -13.52419     7.21124 
 _Iyear_2001 |  -1.841228   1.490806    -1.24   0.217    -4.763154    1.080697 
 _Iyear_2002 |  -1.487039   1.586289    -0.94   0.349    -4.596109    1.622031 
 _Iyear_2003 |  -.7343514   1.366409    -0.54   0.591    -3.412463     1.94376 
       _cons |   204.4602   176.4763     1.16   0.247    -141.4269    550.3474 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
 Standard 
  D.(D.lpopul lavgdp70 eurerm survivor latcar sahar _Iyear_1980 _Iyear_1981 
  _Iyear_1982 _Iyear_1983 _Iyear_1984 _Iyear_1985 _Iyear_1986 _Iyear_1987 
  _Iyear_1988 _Iyear_1989 _Iyear_1990 _Iyear_1991 _Iyear_1992 _Iyear_1993 
  _Iyear_1994 _Iyear_1995 _Iyear_1996 _Iyear_1997 _Iyear_1998 _Iyear_1999 
  _Iyear_2000 _Iyear_2001 _Iyear_2002 _Iyear_2003 _Iyear_2004) 
 GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
  L.(L.growth lgdp75 life1 L.inf L.educ L.lfertil L.to L.gccugdp L.invgdp 
  L.dem L.dem2 L.rr1 L.rr2 L.rr3 L.rr5dual L.r1inf L.r1to L.r1gc L.r1inv 
  L.r1educ L.r1fertil L.r1dem L.r2inf L.r2to L.r2gc L.r2inv L.r2educ 
  L.r2fertil L.r2dem L.r3inf L.r3to L.r3gc L.r3inv L.r3educ L.r3fertil 
  L.r3dem L.r5inf L.r5to L.r5gc L.r5inv L.r5educ L.r5fertil L.r5dem) 
  collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
 Standard 
  _cons 
  D.lpopul lavgdp70 eurerm survivor latcar sahar _Iyear_1980 _Iyear_1981 
  _Iyear_1982 _Iyear_1983 _Iyear_1984 _Iyear_1985 _Iyear_1986 _Iyear_1987 
  _Iyear_1988 _Iyear_1989 _Iyear_1990 _Iyear_1991 _Iyear_1992 _Iyear_1993 
  _Iyear_1994 _Iyear_1995 _Iyear_1996 _Iyear_1997 _Iyear_1998 _Iyear_1999 
  _Iyear_2000 _Iyear_2001 _Iyear_2002 _Iyear_2003 _Iyear_2004 
 GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
  DL.(L.growth lgdp75 life1 inf educ lfertil to gccugdp invgdp dem dem2 rr2 
  rr3 rr1 rr5dual) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -1.81 Pr > z = 0.071 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  0.88 Pr > z = 0.380 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)  = 11.70 Prob > chi2 = 0.165 
 (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)  =  9.59 Prob > chi2 = 0.295 
 (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
F-test for interaction terms 
 
test r1inf= r1to= r1gc= r1inv= r1educ=r1fertil=r1dem=0 
 
           chi2(  7) =    2.94 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.8908 
 
. test r2inf= r2to= r2gc= r2inv= r2educ=r2fertil=r2dem=0 
 
           chi2(  7) =    1.93 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.9634 
 
. test r3inf= r3to= r3gc= r3inv= r3educ=r3fertil=r3dem=0 
 
           chi2(  7) =    2.54 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.9239 
 
. test r5inf= r5to= r5gc= r5inv= r5educ=r5fertil=r5dem=0 
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           chi2(  7) =    2.35 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.9378 
 
. test inf= to= gccugdp= invgdp= educ=lfertil=dem=0 
 
           chi2(  7) =    2.56 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.9223 
 
Specification without interaction terms (de-facto RR classification) 
 
xtabond2 growth l.growth  lgdp75 life1 inf l.inf educ l.educ lfertil l.lfertil to 
l.to gccugdp l.gccugdp invgdp l.invgdp dem l.dem dem2 rr1 rr2 rr3 rr5 d.lpopul eurer 
survivor latcar sahar _Iyear_*, gmm(l.growth  lgdp75 life1 l.inf l.educ l.lfertil 
l.to l.gccugdp l.invgdp l.dem l.dem2 l.rr1  l.rr2 l.rr3 l.rr5 , eq(diff) laglimits(1 
1) collapse) gmm(l.growth  lgdp75 life1  inf educ lfertil to gccugdp invgdp dem dem2 
rr2 rr3 rr1 rr5, eq(level) laglimits(1 1) collapse) iv(d.lpopul lavgdp70 eurer 
survivor latcar sahar _Iyear_*)  twostep  robust 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =      1551 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        87 
Number of instruments = 53                      Obs per group: min =         0 
Wald chi2(44) =    295.01                                      avg =     17.83 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        21 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      growth | 
         L1. |   .0850736    .070237     1.21   0.226    -.0525885    .2227356 
      lgdp75 |   2.791713   2.450683     1.14   0.255    -2.011537    7.594963 
       life1 |   27.30191   13.10951     2.08   0.037     1.607739    52.99609 
         inf | 
         --. |  -12.22831   12.11183    -1.01   0.313    -35.96705    11.51043 
         L1. |    6.30297   4.006636     1.57   0.116    -1.549892    14.15583 
        educ |   1.174668   1.287328     0.91   0.362    -1.348449    3.697785 
     lfertil | 
         --. |  -43.56409   78.56853    -0.55   0.579    -197.5556    110.4274 
         L1. |   37.91972   76.24811     0.50   0.619    -111.5238    187.3633 
          to | 
         --. |   5.970802   20.83483     0.29   0.774    -34.86472    46.80632 
         L1. |   3.881833   23.44902     0.17   0.869    -42.07739    49.84106 
     gccugdp | 
         --. |  -51.25583   51.84778    -0.99   0.323    -152.8756    50.36394 
         L1. |   12.20547   57.55679     0.21   0.832    -100.6038    125.0147 
      invgdp | 
         --. |   3.019572   3.952988     0.76   0.445    -4.728141    10.76729 
         L1. |   -2.83827   4.017825    -0.71   0.480    -10.71306    5.036522 
         dem | 
         --. |  -3.860626   4.294121    -0.90   0.369    -12.27695    4.555696 
         L1. |   4.496814   3.041513     1.48   0.139    -1.464443    10.45807 
        dem2 |  -.1659347   .2413933    -0.69   0.492    -.6390568    .3071874 
         rr1 |   5.843016   3.323309     1.76   0.079    -.6705494    12.35658 
         rr2 |    1.42875   2.919395     0.49   0.625    -4.293159    7.150658 
         rr3 |    2.59103    3.72789     0.70   0.487    -4.715499     9.89756 
     rr5dual |   1.833908   4.050956     0.45   0.651    -6.105821    9.773636 
      lpopul | 
         D1. |  -65.59398   50.45261    -1.30   0.194    -164.4793    33.29132 
      eurerm |  -2.195756   2.131029    -1.03   0.303    -6.372497    1.980984 
    survivor |   .5414071   1.962011     0.28   0.783    -3.304064    4.386878 
      latcar |  -.2256889   2.127854    -0.11   0.916    -4.396205    3.944828 
       sahar |   -3.51957   3.987861    -0.88   0.377    -11.33564    4.296494 
 _Iyear_1986 |    2.01008   1.137122     1.77   0.077     -.218638    4.238798 
 _Iyear_1987 |   2.406846   1.213432     1.98   0.047     .0285618    4.785129 
 _Iyear_1988 |    3.54987   1.158776     3.06   0.002     1.278711     5.82103 
 _Iyear_1989 |   3.058588   1.250282     2.45   0.014     .6080793    5.509096 
 _Iyear_1990 |  -1.784663   5.288525    -0.34   0.736    -12.14998    8.580655 
 _Iyear_1991 |   1.023119   1.110616     0.92   0.357    -1.153648    3.199887 
 _Iyear_1992 |   .5016838   1.002173     0.50   0.617    -1.462539    2.465907 
 _Iyear_1993 |   .9558411   1.024726     0.93   0.351    -1.052585    2.964267 
 _Iyear_1994 |    1.51945   1.050971     1.45   0.148    -.5404149    3.579314 
 _Iyear_1995 |   -2.91591   7.626334    -0.38   0.702    -17.86325    12.03143 
 _Iyear_1996 |   .4369994   .8534914     0.51   0.609    -1.235813    2.109812 
 _Iyear_1997 |   .8750481   .7283663     1.20   0.230    -.5525237     2.30262 
 _Iyear_1998 |  -.8130091   .8599013    -0.95   0.344    -2.498385    .8723665 
 _Iyear_1999 |  -.4458285    .749215    -0.60   0.552    -1.914263    1.022606 
 _Iyear_2000 |  -4.140452   6.431053    -0.64   0.520    -16.74509     8.46418 
 _Iyear_2001 |   -1.57208   .7843578    -2.00   0.045    -3.109393   -.0347675 
 _Iyear_2002 |  -1.893396   .7687484    -2.46   0.014    -3.400115   -.3866767 
 _Iyear_2003 |  -.8745451   .6112307    -1.43   0.152    -2.072535     .323445 
       _cons |  -59.29174    35.0665    -1.69   0.091    -128.0208    9.437348 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(D.lpopul lavgdp70 eurerm survivor latcar sahar _Iyear_1980 _Iyear_1981 
    _Iyear_1982 _Iyear_1983 _Iyear_1984 _Iyear_1985 _Iyear_1986 _Iyear_1987 
    _Iyear_1988 _Iyear_1989 _Iyear_1990 _Iyear_1991 _Iyear_1992 _Iyear_1993 
    _Iyear_1994 _Iyear_1995 _Iyear_1996 _Iyear_1997 _Iyear_1998 _Iyear_1999 
    _Iyear_2000 _Iyear_2001 _Iyear_2002 _Iyear_2003 _Iyear_2004) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.(L.growth lgdp75 life1 L.inf L.educ L.lfertil L.to L.gccugdp L.invgdp 
    L.dem L.dem2 L.rr1 L.rr2 L.rr3 L.rr5dual) collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    D.lpopul lavgdp70 eurerm survivor latcar sahar _Iyear_1980 _Iyear_1981 
    _Iyear_1982 _Iyear_1983 _Iyear_1984 _Iyear_1985 _Iyear_1986 _Iyear_1987 
    _Iyear_1988 _Iyear_1989 _Iyear_1990 _Iyear_1991 _Iyear_1992 _Iyear_1993 
    _Iyear_1994 _Iyear_1995 _Iyear_1996 _Iyear_1997 _Iyear_1998 _Iyear_1999 
    _Iyear_2000 _Iyear_2001 _Iyear_2002 _Iyear_2003 _Iyear_2004 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.(L.growth lgdp75 life1 inf educ lfertil to gccugdp invgdp dem dem2 rr2 
    rr3 rr1 rr5dual) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.45  Pr > z =  0.001 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.85  Pr > z =  0.396 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =   9.55  Prob > chi2 =  0.298 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(8)    =   5.17  Prob > chi2 =  0.739 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
 
test l.inf=l.lfertil=l.to=l.gccugdp=l.invgdp=0 
 
           chi2(  5) =    5.71 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.3352 
 
 
 
Specification without lags – final specification (de-facto RR classification) 
 
xtabond2 growth l.growth  lgdp75 life1 inf educ lfertil  to  gccugdp invgdp dem dem2 
rr1 rr2 rr3 rr5 d.lpopul eurer survivor latcar sahar   _Iyear_*, gmm(l.growth  lgdp75 
life1 l.inf l.educ l.lfertil l.to l.gccugdp l.invgdp l.dem l.dem2 l.rr1 l.rr2 l.rr3 
l.rr5, eq(diff) laglimits(1 1) collapse) gmm(l.growth  lgdp75 life1  inf educ lfertil 
to gccugdp invgdp dem dem2 rr2 rr3 rr1 rr5, eq(level) laglimits(1 1) collapse) 
iv(d.lpopul lavgdp70 eurer survivor latcar sahar _Iyear_*)  twostep  robust 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =      1638 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        87 
Number of instruments = 54                      Obs per group: min =         0 
Wald chi2(40) =    530.99                                      avg =     18.83 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        22 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      growth | 
         L1. |   .1576417   .0646995     2.44   0.015     .0308329    .2844504 
      lgdp75 |  -2.469407   2.932618    -0.84   0.400    -8.217233    3.278419 
       life1 |   33.27618   22.37026     1.49   0.137    -10.56873    77.12109 
         inf |  -2.649208   2.523829    -1.05   0.294    -7.595822    2.297407 
        educ |   2.254954   1.541335     1.46   0.143    -.7660083    5.275915 
     lfertil |  -11.97876   5.813957    -2.06   0.039    -23.37391   -.5836185 
          to |   8.272352   3.477286     2.38   0.017     1.456996    15.08771 
     gccugdp |    13.4368    22.1126     0.61   0.543    -29.90309     56.7767 
      invgdp |   .7757353     .47501     1.63   0.102    -.1552673    1.706738 
         dem |  -.7859954   1.866554    -0.42   0.674    -4.444373    2.872382 
        dem2 |    .073584   .2236193     0.33   0.742    -.3647018    .5118698 
         rr1 |   2.317676   2.358146     0.98   0.326    -2.304204    6.939557 
         rr2 |  -.1834732   2.211403    -0.08   0.934    -4.517744    4.150797 
         rr3 |   1.134327   2.384588     0.48   0.634    -3.539379    5.808033 
     rr5dual |   .1246945   2.667043     0.05   0.963    -5.102613    5.352002 
      lpopul | 
         D1. |  -.0750599    57.6579    -0.00   0.999    -113.0825    112.9323 
      eurerm |  -1.788558   2.212495    -0.81   0.419    -6.124969    2.547852 
    survivor |   1.641992   1.544854     1.06   0.288    -1.385865     4.66985 
      latcar |    3.69878   2.176253     1.70   0.089    -.5665972    7.964158 
       sahar |  -2.704982   3.590996    -0.75   0.451    -9.743204     4.33324 
 _Iyear_1985 |   3.183549   1.617514     1.97   0.049     .0132787    6.353819 
 _Iyear_1986 |   2.896078   1.459794     1.98   0.047     .0349347    5.757221 
 _Iyear_1987 |   3.456481   1.447029     2.39   0.017     .6203557    6.292606 
 _Iyear_1988 |   4.360919    1.45204     3.00   0.003     1.514972    7.206865 
 _Iyear_1989 |   3.808642   1.490599     2.56   0.011     .8871212    6.730163 
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 _Iyear_1990 |   2.022084   1.146014     1.76   0.078    -.2240615    4.268229 
 _Iyear_1991 |   1.683368   1.052354     1.60   0.110    -.3792073    3.745944 
 _Iyear_1992 |   1.070778   .8593248     1.25   0.213    -.6134676    2.755024 
 _Iyear_1993 |   1.406502    .918046     1.53   0.126    -.3928347    3.205839 
 _Iyear_1994 |   2.260815   .9816273     2.30   0.021     .3368612    4.184769 
 _Iyear_1995 |   1.590724   .6783359     2.35   0.019     .2612105    2.920238 
 _Iyear_1996 |     1.4373   .7689297     1.87   0.062    -.0697742    2.944375 
 _Iyear_1997 |   1.636294   .8357944     1.96   0.050    -.0018328    3.274421 
 _Iyear_1998 |   .0106262   .7889931     0.01   0.989    -1.535772    1.557024 
 _Iyear_1999 |   .4869201   .6408507     0.76   0.447    -.7691243    1.742964 
 _Iyear_2000 |  -.2444096   .5185544    -0.47   0.637    -1.260758    .7719383 
 _Iyear_2001 |  -1.751747   .5457568    -3.21   0.001    -2.821411   -.6820836 
 _Iyear_2002 |  -1.486249   .5482959    -2.71   0.007    -2.560889   -.4116084 
 _Iyear_2003 |  -.5366942   .4311561    -1.24   0.213    -1.381745    .3083562 
 _Iyear_2004 |    .408314   .4157776     0.98   0.326    -.4065952    1.223223 
       _cons |  -35.44042   49.26198    -0.72   0.472    -131.9921     61.1113 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(D.lpopul lavgdp70 eurerm survivor latcar sahar _Iyear_1980 _Iyear_1981 
    _Iyear_1982 _Iyear_1983 _Iyear_1984 _Iyear_1985 _Iyear_1986 _Iyear_1987 
    _Iyear_1988 _Iyear_1989 _Iyear_1990 _Iyear_1991 _Iyear_1992 _Iyear_1993 
    _Iyear_1994 _Iyear_1995 _Iyear_1996 _Iyear_1997 _Iyear_1998 _Iyear_1999 
    _Iyear_2000 _Iyear_2001 _Iyear_2002 _Iyear_2003 _Iyear_2004) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.(L.growth lgdp75 life1 L.inf L.educ L.lfertil L.to L.gccugdp L.invgdp 
    L.dem L.dem2 L.rr1 L.rr2 L.rr3 L.rr5dual) collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    D.lpopul lavgdp70 eurerm survivor latcar sahar _Iyear_1980 _Iyear_1981 
    _Iyear_1982 _Iyear_1983 _Iyear_1984 _Iyear_1985 _Iyear_1986 _Iyear_1987 
    _Iyear_1988 _Iyear_1989 _Iyear_1990 _Iyear_1991 _Iyear_1992 _Iyear_1993 
    _Iyear_1994 _Iyear_1995 _Iyear_1996 _Iyear_1997 _Iyear_1998 _Iyear_1999 
    _Iyear_2000 _Iyear_2001 _Iyear_2002 _Iyear_2003 _Iyear_2004 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.(L.growth lgdp75 life1 inf educ lfertil to gccugdp invgdp dem dem2 rr2 
    rr3 rr1 rr5dual) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.24  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.18  Pr > z =  0.860 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(13)   =  27.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.012 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(13)   =  10.58  Prob > chi2 =  0.646 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.789 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =  10.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.572 
  gmm(L.growth lgdp75 life1 inf educ lfertil to gccugdp invgdp dem dem2 rr2 rr3 rr1 
rr5dual, collapse eq(level) lag(1 1 
> )) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.789 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =  10.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.572 
 
 
test rr1=rr2=rr3=rr5dual=0 
 
           chi2(  4) =    6.39 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.1720 
 
 
Developing (including transition) countries 
 
xtabond2 growth l.growth  lgdp75 life1 inf educ lfertil  to  gccugdp invgdp dem dem2 
rr1 rr2 rr3 rr5 d.lpopul eurer survivor latcar sahar   _Iyear_*, gmm(l.growth  lgdp75 
life1 l.inf l.educ l.lfertil l.to l.gccugdp l.invgdp l.dem l.dem2 l.rr1 l.rr2 l.rr3 
l.rr5, eq(diff) laglimits(1 1) collapse) gmm(l.growth  lgdp75 life1  inf educ lfertil 
to gccugdp invgdp dem dem2 rr1 rr2 rr3 rr5, eq(level) laglimits(1 1) collapse) 
iv(d.lpopul lavgdp70 eurer survivor latcar sahar _Iyear_*)  twostep  robust 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =      1189 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        64 
Number of instruments = 52                      Obs per group: min =         3 
Wald chi2(38) =    782.53                                      avg =     18.58 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        22 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      growth | 
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         L1. |   .1638806   .0680192     2.41   0.016     .0305654    .2971958 
      lgdp75 |  -.4554574   2.095039    -0.22   0.828    -4.561659    3.650744 
       life1 |   14.42425   12.43096     1.16   0.246    -9.939978    38.78848 
         inf |  -3.367305   1.741387    -1.93   0.053    -6.780362    .0457513 
        educ |    1.92597   .9186728     2.10   0.036      .125404    3.726535 
     lfertil |   4.153891   9.812219     0.42   0.672     -15.0777    23.38549 
          to |   12.88066   3.044816     4.23   0.000      6.91293    18.84839 
     gccugdp |   18.38933   20.16548     0.91   0.362    -21.13428    57.91295 
      invgdp |   .8708282   .6064255     1.44   0.151     -.317744      2.0594 
         dem |  -1.162889   1.939909    -0.60   0.549    -4.965042    2.639263 
        dem2 |   .1551581   .2485625     0.62   0.532    -.3320155    .6423316 
         rr1 |   -1.56471   2.171514    -0.72   0.471    -5.820798    2.691379 
         rr2 |  -3.004516   2.527935    -1.19   0.235    -7.959177    1.950145 
         rr3 |  -.1107522   2.305268    -0.05   0.962    -4.628994     4.40749 
     rr5dual |  -1.543039   1.891917    -0.82   0.415    -5.251129    2.165051 
      lpopul | 
         D1. |  -117.3905   93.20553    -1.26   0.208      -300.07    65.28896 
    survivor |   1.504545   1.311923     1.15   0.251    -1.066777    4.075868 
      latcar |  -.1478497   2.327732    -0.06   0.949    -4.710121    4.414422 
       sahar |  -5.159645   3.507965    -1.47   0.141    -12.03513    1.715839 
 _Iyear_1985 |  -.5427019   2.509579    -0.22   0.829    -5.461386    4.375982 
 _Iyear_1986 |  -.7748481   2.224223    -0.35   0.728    -5.134245    3.584549 
 _Iyear_1987 |   -.723306   2.392194    -0.30   0.762    -5.411921    3.965309 
 _Iyear_1988 |   .2919206   2.315002     0.13   0.900    -4.245401    4.829242 
 _Iyear_1989 |  -.0814047   2.605293    -0.03   0.975    -5.187686    5.024876 
 _Iyear_1990 |   .1362924   1.542524     0.09   0.930       -2.887    3.159585 
 _Iyear_1991 |   .1053363   1.514031     0.07   0.945     -2.86211    3.072783 
 _Iyear_1992 |  -.6844128   1.444169    -0.47   0.636    -3.514931    2.146106 
 _Iyear_1993 |  -.2406934   1.356676    -0.18   0.859     -2.89973    2.418343 
 _Iyear_1994 |   .4458894   1.456505     0.31   0.760    -2.408808    3.300587 
 _Iyear_1995 |   1.295651   .6473045     2.00   0.045     .0269577    2.564345 
 _Iyear_1996 |   1.492531   .6678492     2.23   0.025     .1835703    2.801491 
 _Iyear_1997 |   1.474256   .6538632     2.25   0.024     .1927074    2.755804 
 _Iyear_1999 |  -.2820741   .6952377    -0.41   0.685    -1.644715    1.080567 
 _Iyear_2000 |   .3045961   .8539075     0.36   0.721    -1.369032    1.978224 
 _Iyear_2001 |  -.9824817   .7012765    -1.40   0.161    -2.356958    .3919951 
 _Iyear_2002 |  -.9574084   .9192766    -1.04   0.298    -2.759158    .8443406 
 _Iyear_2003 |   .1696565   .6627793     0.26   0.798    -1.129367     1.46868 
 _Iyear_2004 |    .899055    .661299     1.36   0.174    -.3970673    2.195177 
       _cons |  -30.20294   28.88464    -1.05   0.296     -86.8158    26.40992 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(D.lpopul lavgdp70 eurerm survivor latcar sahar _Iyear_1978 _Iyear_1979 
    _Iyear_1980 _Iyear_1981 _Iyear_1982 _Iyear_1983 _Iyear_1984 _Iyear_1985 
    _Iyear_1986 _Iyear_1987 _Iyear_1988 _Iyear_1989 _Iyear_1990 _Iyear_1991 
    _Iyear_1992 _Iyear_1993 _Iyear_1994 _Iyear_1995 _Iyear_1996 _Iyear_1997 
    _Iyear_1999 _Iyear_2000 _Iyear_2001 _Iyear_2002 _Iyear_2003 _Iyear_2004) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.(L.growth lgdp75 life1 L.inf L.educ L.lfertil L.to L.gccugdp L.invgdp 
    L.dem L.dem2 L.rr1 L.rr2 L.rr3 L.rr5dual) collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    D.lpopul lavgdp70 eurerm survivor latcar sahar _Iyear_1978 _Iyear_1979 
    _Iyear_1980 _Iyear_1981 _Iyear_1982 _Iyear_1983 _Iyear_1984 _Iyear_1985 
    _Iyear_1986 _Iyear_1987 _Iyear_1988 _Iyear_1989 _Iyear_1990 _Iyear_1991 
    _Iyear_1992 _Iyear_1993 _Iyear_1994 _Iyear_1995 _Iyear_1996 _Iyear_1997 
    _Iyear_1999 _Iyear_2000 _Iyear_2001 _Iyear_2002 _Iyear_2003 _Iyear_2004 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.(L.growth lgdp75 life1 inf educ lfertil to gccugdp invgdp dem dem2 rr1 
    rr2 rr3 rr5dual) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.94  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.61  Pr > z =  0.539 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(13)   =  19.95  Prob > chi2 =  0.096 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(13)   =  10.39  Prob > chi2 =  0.662 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.168 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =   8.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.746 
  gmm(L.growth lgdp75 life1 inf educ lfertil to gccugdp invgdp dem dem2 rr1 rr2 rr3 
rr5dual, collapse eq(level) lag(1 1 
> )) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.168 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =   8.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.746 
 
Differentiating two sub-periods 
1976-1990 
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xtabond2 growth l.growth  lgdp75 life1 inf educ lfertil  to  gccugdp invgdp dem dem2 
rr1 rr2 rr3 rr5 d.lpopul eurer survivor latcar sahar   _Iyear_*, gmm(l.growth  lgdp75 
life1 l.inf l.educ l.lfertil l.to l.gccugdp l.invgdp l.dem l.dem2 l.rr1 l.rr2 l.rr3 
l.rr5, eq(diff) laglimits(1 1) collapse) gmm(l.growth  lgdp75 life1  inf educ lfertil 
to gccugdp invgdp dem dem2 rr1 rr2 rr3 rr5 , eq(level) laglimits(1 1) collapse) 
iv(d.lpopul lavgdp70 eurer survivor latcar sahar _Iyear_*)  twostep  robust 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       394 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        72 
Number of instruments = 36                      Obs per group: min =         0 
Wald chi2(23) =    107.78                                      avg =      5.47 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         6 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      growth | 
         L1. |   .1673612   .1627922     1.03   0.304    -.1517057     .486428 
      lgdp75 |    3.87525   8.522809     0.45   0.649    -12.82915    20.57965 
       life1 |   10.70798    35.8855     0.30   0.765    -59.62631    81.04226 
         inf |   4.820007   7.410979     0.65   0.515    -9.705245    19.34526 
        educ |  -2.650123   3.003918    -0.88   0.378    -8.537695    3.237448 
     lfertil |  -6.831154   16.68621    -0.41   0.682    -39.53552    25.87321 
          to |   7.384357   22.86781     0.32   0.747    -37.43573    52.20445 
     gccugdp |   13.80709   95.28091     0.14   0.885    -172.9401    200.5542 
      invgdp |  -.4469774   2.600862    -0.17   0.864    -5.544573    4.650618 
         dem |  -3.666674    4.23725    -0.87   0.387    -11.97153    4.638183 
        dem2 |   .4922229   .4931981     1.00   0.318    -.4744276    1.458873 
         rr1 |   .4152406   6.748236     0.06   0.951    -12.81106    13.64154 
         rr2 |   2.572224   6.809878     0.38   0.706    -10.77489    15.91934 
         rr3 |  -1.090872   5.643442    -0.19   0.847    -12.15182    9.970071 
     rr5dual |  -3.670618   7.260636    -0.51   0.613     -17.9012    10.55997 
      lpopul | 
         D1. |  -99.67973   202.2265    -0.49   0.622    -496.0363    296.6769 
      eurerm |  -2.081596   6.638764    -0.31   0.754    -15.09333    10.93014 
      latcar |  -.1027174   5.063944    -0.02   0.984    -10.02787    9.822431 
       sahar |  -.7573995   6.165235    -0.12   0.902    -12.84104    11.32624 
 _Iyear_1985 |  -.3804164   1.177993    -0.32   0.747     -2.68924    1.928408 
 _Iyear_1986 |   .0452853   .5527584     0.08   0.935    -1.038101    1.128672 
 _Iyear_1988 |   1.506036   .8430804     1.79   0.074     -.146371    3.158444 
 _Iyear_1989 |   .0595408   1.598595     0.04   0.970    -3.073647    3.192729 
       _cons |     -22.53   91.79738    -0.25   0.806    -202.4496    157.3896 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(D.lpopul lavgdp70 eurerm survivor latcar sahar _Iyear_1977 _Iyear_1978 
    _Iyear_1979 _Iyear_1980 _Iyear_1981 _Iyear_1982 _Iyear_1983 _Iyear_1984 
    _Iyear_1985 _Iyear_1986 _Iyear_1988 _Iyear_1989) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.(L.growth lgdp75 life1 L.inf L.educ L.lfertil L.to L.gccugdp L.invgdp 
    L.dem L.dem2 L.rr1 L.rr2 L.rr3 L.rr5dual) collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    D.lpopul lavgdp70 eurerm survivor latcar sahar _Iyear_1977 _Iyear_1978 
    _Iyear_1979 _Iyear_1980 _Iyear_1981 _Iyear_1982 _Iyear_1983 _Iyear_1984 
    _Iyear_1985 _Iyear_1986 _Iyear_1988 _Iyear_1989 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.(L.growth lgdp75 life1 inf educ lfertil to gccugdp invgdp dem dem2 rr1 
    rr2 rr3 rr5dual) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.45  Pr > z =  0.014 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.57  Pr > z =  0.565 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(12)   =  27.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.006 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(12)   =   9.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.617 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.66  Prob > chi2 =  0.197 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(11)   =   8.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.684 
  gmm(L.growth lgdp75 life1 inf educ lfertil to gccugdp invgdp dem dem2 rr1 rr2 rr3 
rr5dual, collapse eq(level) lag(1 1 
> )) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.66  Prob > chi2 =  0.197 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(11)   =   8.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.684 
  iv(D.lpopul lavgdp70 eurerm survivor latcar sahar _Iyear_1977 _Iyear_1978 
_Iyear_1979 _Iyear_1980 _Iyear_1981 _Iyear_ 
> 1982 _Iyear_1983 _Iyear_1984 _Iyear_1985 _Iyear_1986 _Iyear_1988 _Iyear_1989) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   4.65  Prob > chi2 =  0.199 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(9)    =   5.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.804 
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1991-2006 
 
xtabond2 growth l.growth  lgdp90 life2 inf educ lfertil  to  gccugdp invgdp dem dem2 
rr1 rr2 rr3 rr5 d.lpopul eurer survivor latcar sahar   _Iyear_*, gmm(l.growth  lgdp90 
life2 l.inf l.educ l.lfertil l.to l.gccugdp l.invgdp l.dem l.dem2 l.rr1 l.rr2 l.rr3 
l.rr5, eq(diff) laglimits(1 1) collapse) gmm(l.growth  lgdp90 life2  inf educ lfertil 
to gccugdp invgdp dem dem2 rr1 rr2 rr3 rr5 , eq(level) laglimits(1 1) collapse) 
iv(d.lpopul lgdp89 eurer survivor latcar sahar  _Iyear_*)  twostep  robust 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =      1215 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        90 
Number of instruments = 48                      Obs per group: min =         0 
Wald chi2(34) =    324.41                                      avg =     13.50 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        15 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      growth | 
         L1. |   .2953373   .0678485     4.35   0.000     .1623567    .4283178 
      lgdp90 |  -1.945849   2.418417    -0.80   0.421     -6.68586    2.794162 
       life2 |  -6.976495   8.605581    -0.81   0.418    -23.84312    9.890133 
         inf |   3.107425   4.232827     0.73   0.463    -5.188763    11.40361 
        educ |   .0378753   .7909321     0.05   0.962    -1.512323    1.588074 
     lfertil |  -.3948023   5.063776    -0.08   0.938    -10.31962    9.530015 
          to |   .2101951   2.617462     0.08   0.936    -4.919937    5.340327 
     gccugdp |   .5611915   21.13497     0.03   0.979    -40.86259    41.98497 
      invgdp |   .1967963   .2880482     0.68   0.494    -.3677678    .7613603 
         dem |   -.229194   1.955076    -0.12   0.907    -4.061073    3.602685 
        dem2 |   .0282113   .2683391     0.11   0.916    -.4977237    .5541462 
         rr1 |   1.160023   3.743128     0.31   0.757    -6.176373    8.496419 
         rr2 |  -.3558274   3.538937    -0.10   0.920    -7.292017    6.580363 
         rr3 |   .0251301   4.142625     0.01   0.995    -8.094266    8.144526 
     rr5dual |  -2.672263   4.700805    -0.57   0.570    -11.88567    6.541146 
      lpopul | 
         D1. |  -80.72933   36.94586    -2.19   0.029    -153.1419   -8.316781 
      eurerm |  -1.865697   2.375626    -0.79   0.432    -6.521839    2.790445 
    survivor |  -.4388171   1.970914    -0.22   0.824    -4.301738    3.424104 
      latcar |  -.4142723    1.49864    -0.28   0.782    -3.351552    2.523008 
       sahar |   1.288917   3.639637     0.35   0.723     -5.84464    8.422474 
 _Iyear_1992 |  -.7364563   .9022368    -0.82   0.414    -2.504808    1.031895 
 _Iyear_1993 |  -1.506088   1.035626    -1.45   0.146    -3.535878    .5237012 
 _Iyear_1994 |  -.1331699   .9984994    -0.13   0.894    -2.090193    1.823853 
 _Iyear_1995 |  -.5040582   .6593938    -0.76   0.445    -1.796446      .78833 
 _Iyear_1996 |  -.8045503   .7835588    -1.03   0.305    -2.340297    .7311967 
 _Iyear_1997 |  -.8598281   .7849734    -1.10   0.273    -2.398348    .6786915 
 _Iyear_1998 |  -2.016188   .6679209    -3.02   0.003    -3.325289   -.7070873 
 _Iyear_1999 |  -1.109312   .6632234    -1.67   0.094    -2.409206    .1905819 
 _Iyear_2000 |  -.5412304   .4195414    -1.29   0.197    -1.363516    .2810557 
 _Iyear_2001 |  -1.999051   .4710802    -4.24   0.000    -2.922351   -1.075751 
 _Iyear_2002 |  -1.611864   .4903975    -3.29   0.001    -2.573025   -.6507021 
 _Iyear_2003 |  -.7153633   .4590388    -1.56   0.119    -1.615063    .1843362 
 _Iyear_2004 |  -.1683772   .3533443    -0.48   0.634    -.8609193     .524165 
 _Iyear_2005 |  -.7173341   .3104961    -2.31   0.021    -1.325895    -.108773 
       _cons |   30.02713   29.86249     1.01   0.315    -28.50227    88.55653 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(D.lpopul lgdp89 eurerm survivor latcar sahar _Iyear_1992 _Iyear_1993 
    _Iyear_1994 _Iyear_1995 _Iyear_1996 _Iyear_1997 _Iyear_1998 _Iyear_1999 
    _Iyear_2000 _Iyear_2001 _Iyear_2002 _Iyear_2003 _Iyear_2004 _Iyear_2005 
    _Iyear_2006) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.(L.growth lgdp90 life2 L.inf L.educ L.lfertil L.to L.gccugdp L.invgdp 
    L.dem L.dem2 L.rr1 L.rr2 L.rr3 L.rr5dual) collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    D.lpopul lgdp89 eurerm survivor latcar sahar _Iyear_1992 _Iyear_1993 
    _Iyear_1994 _Iyear_1995 _Iyear_1996 _Iyear_1997 _Iyear_1998 _Iyear_1999 
    _Iyear_2000 _Iyear_2001 _Iyear_2002 _Iyear_2003 _Iyear_2004 _Iyear_2005 
    _Iyear_2006 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.(L.growth lgdp90 life2 inf educ lfertil to gccugdp invgdp dem dem2 rr1 
    rr2 rr3 rr5dual) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.21  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.12  Pr > z =  0.901 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(13)   =  24.16  Prob > chi2 =  0.030 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(13)   =  14.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.308 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
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Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.365 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =  14.17  Prob > chi2 =  0.290 
  gmm(L.growth lgdp90 life2 inf educ lfertil to gccugdp invgdp dem dem2 rr1 rr2 rr3 
rr5dual, collapse eq(level) lag(1 1 
> )) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.365 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =  14.17  Prob > chi2 =  0.290 
 
 
Final specification (de-jure IMF classification) 
 
xtabond2 growth l.growth  lgdp75 life1 inf educ lfertil  to  gccugdp invgdp dem dem2 
imf1 imf2 imf3 imfot d.lpopul eurer survivor latcar sahar   _Iyear_*, gmm(l.growth  
lgdp75 life1 l.inf l.educ l.lfertil l.to l.gccugdp l.invgdp l.dem l.dem2 l.imf1 
l.imf2 l.imf3 l.imfot, eq(diff) laglimits(1 1) collapse) gmm(l.growth  lgdp75 life1  
inf educ lfertil to gccugdp invgdp dem dem2 imf2 imf3 imf1 imfot, eq(level) 
laglimits(1 1) collapse) iv(d.lpopul lavgdp70 eurer survivor latcar sahar _Iyear_*)  
twostep  robust 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =      1572 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        86 
Number of instruments = 54                      Obs per group: min =         0 
Wald chi2(40) =   2115.34                                      avg =     18.28 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        22 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      growth | 
         L1. |   .2194743   .0889813     2.47   0.014     .0450741    .3938745 
      lgdp75 |   .8278055   2.008179     0.41   0.680    -3.108153    4.763764 
       life1 |   15.06778    9.94521     1.52   0.130    -4.424474    34.56003 
         inf |   .6747789   2.449872     0.28   0.783    -4.126883    5.476441 
        educ |   .9265513   .7830165     1.18   0.237    -.6081329    2.461236 
     lfertil |  -3.878844   4.211111    -0.92   0.357    -12.13247    4.374782 
          to |   5.541247   4.905784     1.13   0.259    -4.073913    15.15641 
     gccugdp |  -34.08573   23.09088    -1.48   0.140    -79.34302    11.17157 
      invgdp |   .0542639   .3151791     0.17   0.863    -.5634758    .6720036 
         dem |  -.3070279   1.872672    -0.16   0.870    -3.977398    3.363342 
        dem2 |  -.0165983   .2317589    -0.07   0.943    -.4708374    .4376407 
        imf1 |   3.884106   1.967853     1.97   0.048     .0271858    7.741027 
        imf2 |   1.128414   1.557652     0.72   0.469    -1.924527    4.181356 
        imf3 |   2.166728   1.271682     1.70   0.088    -.3257238    4.659179 
       imfot |     -8.252   8.769239    -0.94   0.347    -25.43939    8.935394 
      lpopul | 
         D1. |  -49.79773   41.77885    -1.19   0.233    -131.6828    32.08731 
      eurerm |  -1.266001   1.292554    -0.98   0.327    -3.799361    1.267358 
    survivor |   .1272281   1.288206     0.10   0.921     -2.39761    2.652066 
      latcar |   -.693221   1.748526    -0.40   0.692    -4.120269    2.733827 
       sahar |  -1.367847   2.030865    -0.67   0.501    -5.348269    2.612576 
 _Iyear_1985 |   .6885317   1.095963     0.63   0.530    -1.459517    2.836581 
 _Iyear_1986 |    .957867    .936421     1.02   0.306    -.8774843    2.793218 
 _Iyear_1987 |   1.302504   .9871247     1.32   0.187    -.6322254    3.237232 
 _Iyear_1988 |   1.710531   1.142117     1.50   0.134    -.5279769    3.949039 
 _Iyear_1989 |   1.604601   1.249326     1.28   0.199    -.8440332    4.053234 
 _Iyear_1990 |   .2314261   .9650298     0.24   0.810    -1.659998     2.12285 
 _Iyear_1991 |   .2061933   .9429268     0.22   0.827    -1.641909    2.054296 
 _Iyear_1992 |   .3483641    .855336     0.41   0.684    -1.328064    2.024792 
 _Iyear_1993 |   .7235556   .9544494     0.76   0.448    -1.147131    2.594242 
 _Iyear_1994 |   1.338351   1.039831     1.29   0.198    -.6996796    3.376381 
 _Iyear_1995 |   1.579079   .6430584     2.46   0.014     .3187082    2.839451 
 _Iyear_1996 |   1.039449   .7629419     1.36   0.173    -.4558899    2.534787 
 _Iyear_1997 |   1.326498   .7536729     1.76   0.078    -.1506737     2.80367 
 _Iyear_1998 |  -.5848857   .8171948    -0.72   0.474    -2.186558    1.016787 
 _Iyear_1999 |    .075724   .5343827     0.14   0.887    -.9716468    1.123095 
 _Iyear_2000 |   .2102241   .5014947     0.42   0.675    -.7726875    1.193136 
 _Iyear_2001 |    -1.4727   .5469504    -2.69   0.007    -2.544703   -.4006973 
 _Iyear_2002 |  -.9936467    .519907    -1.91   0.056    -2.012646    .0253524 
 _Iyear_2003 |   .0900593   .4105079     0.22   0.826    -.7145214    .8946401 
 _Iyear_2004 |   .7603141   .4168512     1.82   0.068    -.0566993    1.577327 
       _cons |  -25.06393    23.0104    -1.09   0.276    -70.16348    20.03563 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(D.lpopul lavgdp70 eurerm survivor latcar sahar _Iyear_1980 _Iyear_1981 
    _Iyear_1982 _Iyear_1983 _Iyear_1984 _Iyear_1985 _Iyear_1986 _Iyear_1987 
    _Iyear_1988 _Iyear_1989 _Iyear_1990 _Iyear_1991 _Iyear_1992 _Iyear_1993 
    _Iyear_1994 _Iyear_1995 _Iyear_1996 _Iyear_1997 _Iyear_1998 _Iyear_1999 
    _Iyear_2000 _Iyear_2001 _Iyear_2002 _Iyear_2003 _Iyear_2004) 
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  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.(L.growth lgdp75 life1 L.inf L.educ L.lfertil L.to L.gccugdp L.invgdp 
    L.dem L.dem2 L.imf1 L.imf2 L.imf3 L.imfot) collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    D.lpopul lavgdp70 eurerm survivor latcar sahar _Iyear_1980 _Iyear_1981 
    _Iyear_1982 _Iyear_1983 _Iyear_1984 _Iyear_1985 _Iyear_1986 _Iyear_1987 
    _Iyear_1988 _Iyear_1989 _Iyear_1990 _Iyear_1991 _Iyear_1992 _Iyear_1993 
    _Iyear_1994 _Iyear_1995 _Iyear_1996 _Iyear_1997 _Iyear_1998 _Iyear_1999 
    _Iyear_2000 _Iyear_2001 _Iyear_2002 _Iyear_2003 _Iyear_2004 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.(L.growth lgdp75 life1 inf educ lfertil to gccugdp invgdp dem dem2 imf2 
    imf3 imf1 imfot) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.32  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.35  Pr > z =  0.724 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(13)   =  41.96  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(13)   =  17.20  Prob > chi2 =  0.191 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.898 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =  17.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.143 
  gmm(L.growth lgdp75 life1 inf educ lfertil to gccugdp invgdp dem dem2 imf2 imf3 
imf1 imfot, collapse eq(level) lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.898 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =  17.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.143 
 
 
test imf2=imf3=imf1=imfot=0 
 
 
           chi2(  4) =    6.13 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.1898 
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A4.2. Output volatility regressions printouts 
Hausman-Taylor estimates for three measures of volatility (1976-2006) 
 
xthtaylor volatsd growth totvolsd100 msvolsd100 gcvolsd100 civil d.fingdp to foind 
inf rr1 rr2 rr3 rr5dual r1totsd r2totsd r3totsd  r5totsd latcar sahar  _Iyear_*, 
endog( msvolsd100 gcvolsd100  civil  d.fingdp inf rr1 rr2 rr3 rr5dual  ) 
varying(growth totvolsd100 msvolsd100 gcvolsd100 civil d.fingdp rr1 rr2 rr3 rr5dual 
r1totsd r2totsd r3totsd r5totsd to foind inf _Iyear_* ) 
 
Hausman-Taylor estimation                       Number of obs      =      2052 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =       129 
 
                                                Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =      15.9 
                                                               max =        27 
 
Random effects u_i ~ i.i.d.                     Wald chi2(43)      =    403.89 
                                                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     volatsd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TVexogenous  | 
      growth |   .0161366   .0103654     1.56   0.120    -.0041792    .0364524 
 totvolsd100 |   .0352159   .0318297     1.11   0.269    -.0271692     .097601 
          to |   .0246036   .0057912     4.25   0.000     .0132531    .0359542 
       foind |   .2805979   .0539944     5.20   0.000     .1747708    .3864251 
     r1totsd |   .0362099   .0346484     1.05   0.296    -.0316998    .1041195 
     r2totsd |   -.042855    .035312    -1.21   0.225    -.1120654    .0263553 
     r3totsd |  -.0072881   .0325713    -0.22   0.823    -.0711267    .0565504 
     r5totsd |  -.0773263   .0364607    -2.12   0.034     -.148788   -.0058647 
 _Iyear_1981 |   .1256204   .3316646     0.38   0.705    -.5244304    .7756711 
 _Iyear_1982 |   .3306229   .3300923     1.00   0.317    -.3163461    .9775918 
 _Iyear_1983 |   .0126231   .3269598     0.04   0.969    -.6282062    .6534525 
 _Iyear_1984 |  -.2138578   .3169846    -0.67   0.500    -.8351361    .4074205 
 _Iyear_1985 |  -.2893101   .3114235    -0.93   0.353    -.8996889    .3210687 
 _Iyear_1986 |  -.2707929   .3056947    -0.89   0.376    -.8699435    .3283577 
 _Iyear_1987 |  -.3709663    .303069    -1.22   0.221    -.9649707     .223038 
 _Iyear_1988 |  -.6081487   .3027825    -2.01   0.045    -1.201592    -.014706 
 _Iyear_1989 |  -.7276043   .3014378    -2.41   0.016    -1.318411   -.1367972 
 _Iyear_1990 |  -.3254499   .2951088    -1.10   0.270    -.9038525    .2529528 
 _Iyear_1991 |   -.636421   .2917382    -2.18   0.029    -1.208217   -.0646247 
 _Iyear_1992 |  -.9569084   .2913576    -3.28   0.001    -1.527959   -.3858579 
 _Iyear_1993 |  -.9099945   .2881175    -3.16   0.002    -1.474694   -.3452946 
 _Iyear_1994 |  -1.145879   .2857969    -4.01   0.000    -1.706031   -.5857278 
 _Iyear_1995 |  -1.351215    .283585    -4.76   0.000    -1.907032   -.7953989 
 _Iyear_1996 |  -.9458284   .2767273    -3.42   0.001    -1.488204   -.4034529 
 _Iyear_1997 |  -.9624422   .2779665    -3.46   0.001    -1.507247   -.4176379 
 _Iyear_1998 |  -1.192634   .2693907    -4.43   0.000     -1.72063   -.6646384 
 _Iyear_1999 |  -1.077165   .2662273    -4.05   0.000    -1.598961   -.5553685 
 _Iyear_2000 |  -1.246204   .2637962    -4.72   0.000    -1.763235   -.7291729 
 _Iyear_2001 |  -1.469153   .2650858    -5.54   0.000    -1.988711   -.9495942 
 _Iyear_2002 |  -1.510875   .2650719    -5.70   0.000    -2.030407   -.9913439 
 _Iyear_2003 |  -1.423085   .2662026    -5.35   0.000    -1.944833   -.9013374 
 _Iyear_2004 |   -1.60953   .2705089    -5.95   0.000    -2.139717   -1.079342 
TVendogenous | 
  msvolsd100 |   .0031079   .0024229     1.28   0.200    -.0016408    .0078566 
  gcvolsd100 |   .1098179   .0105627    10.40   0.000     .0891153    .1305204 
       civil |   .0737059   .0584728     1.26   0.207    -.0408986    .1883104 
      fingdp | 
         D1. |  -.8543121   .5170652    -1.65   0.098    -1.867741     .159117 
         inf |   .3361092   .2793674     1.20   0.229    -.2114408    .8836592 
         rr1 |  -.7738789   .4755187    -1.63   0.104    -1.705878    .1581207 
         rr2 |    .000167   .4461784     0.00   1.000    -.8743266    .8746607 
         rr3 |   .1970633   .4454229     0.44   0.658    -.6759496    1.070076 
     rr5dual |   1.530518   .4951627     3.09   0.002     .5600173    2.501019 
TIexogenous  | 
      latcar |   -.069541   .5674378    -0.12   0.902    -1.181699    1.042617 
       sahar |   -.529274   .4465045    -1.19   0.236    -1.404407    .3458588 
             | 
       _cons |   2.405103   .6629228     3.63   0.000     1.105798    3.704407 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.9987171 
     sigma_e |  1.8801432 
         rho |  .53054071   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note:  TV refers to time varying; TI refers to time invariant. 
 
 
 
. xthtaylor volatdev growth totvoldev100 msvoldev100 gcvoldev100 civil d.fingdp to 
foind inf rr1 rr2 rr3 rr5dual r1totdev r2totdev r3totdev  r5totdev latcar sahar  
_Iyear_*, endog( msvoldev100 gcvoldev100  civil  d.fingdp inf rr1 rr2 rr3 rr5dual  ) 
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varying(growth totvoldev100 msvoldev100 gcvoldev100 civil d.fingdp rr1 rr2 rr3 
rr5dual r1totdev r2totdev r3totdev r5totdev to foind inf _Iyear_* ) 
 
Hausman-Taylor estimation                       Number of obs      =      2170 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =       127 
 
                                                Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =      17.1 
                                                               max =        30 
 
Random effects u_i ~ i.i.d.                     Wald chi2(43)      =    146.08 
                                                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    volatdev |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TVexogenous  | 
      growth |   .0131716   .0150841     0.87   0.383    -.0163928     .042736 
totvoldev100 |  -.0110854   .0535066    -0.21   0.836    -.1159565    .0937857 
          to |   .0080751   .0070704     1.14   0.253    -.0057825    .0219327 
       foind |   .0992517   .0682822     1.45   0.146    -.0345791    .2330824 
    r1totdev |   .0500013   .0555444     0.90   0.368    -.0588637    .1588663 
    r2totdev |  -.0008481    .056418    -0.02   0.988    -.1114254    .1097292 
    r3totdev |   .0319985   .0546876     0.59   0.558    -.0751871    .1391842 
    r5totdev |   .0436489   .0599352     0.73   0.466     -.073822    .1611198 
 _Iyear_1981 |   .1370119   .4603864     0.30   0.766    -.7653289    1.039353 
 _Iyear_1982 |   .3845036   .4565112     0.84   0.400    -.5102419    1.279249 
 _Iyear_1983 |  -.0024293   .4540751    -0.01   0.996    -.8924002    .8875416 
 _Iyear_1984 |  -.4996811   .4433616    -1.13   0.260    -1.368654    .3692915 
 _Iyear_1985 |  -.6440204   .4308085    -1.49   0.135    -1.488389    .2003486 
 _Iyear_1986 |  -.4104425   .4189002    -0.98   0.327    -1.231472    .4105868 
 _Iyear_1987 |  -.4369728   .4077236    -1.07   0.284    -1.236096    .3621508 
 _Iyear_1988 |   .3298857   .4068812     0.81   0.417    -.4675868    1.127358 
 _Iyear_1989 |  -.4299546   .4033791    -1.07   0.286    -1.220563    .3606539 
 _Iyear_1990 |  -.4686322   .3998963    -1.17   0.241    -1.252415    .3151502 
 _Iyear_1991 |   .0657426    .383662     0.17   0.864    -.6862211    .8177063 
 _Iyear_1992 |  -.2164577   .3862003    -0.56   0.575    -.9733964     .540481 
 _Iyear_1993 |  -.4530186   .3792376    -1.19   0.232    -1.196311    .2902734 
 _Iyear_1994 |  -.7438445   .3720922    -2.00   0.046    -1.473132   -.0145572 
 _Iyear_1995 |  -.9800695   .3691337    -2.66   0.008    -1.703558   -.2565808 
 _Iyear_1996 |  -1.080225   .3546933    -3.05   0.002    -1.775411   -.3850385 
 _Iyear_1997 |  -.5711766   .3579347    -1.60   0.111    -1.272716    .1303625 
 _Iyear_1998 |  -.3858063   .3319594    -1.16   0.245    -1.036435    .2648221 
 _Iyear_1999 |  -.7321611   .3314418    -2.21   0.027    -1.381775   -.0825472 
 _Iyear_2000 |  -1.042782   .3152082    -3.31   0.001    -1.660579   -.4249855 
 _Iyear_2001 |  -.4884882    .319825    -1.53   0.127    -1.115334    .1383573 
 _Iyear_2002 |  -.9310125   .3135564    -2.97   0.003    -1.545572   -.3164533 
 _Iyear_2003 |  -.7136547   .3144104    -2.27   0.023    -1.329888   -.0974217 
 _Iyear_2004 |  -.2769415   .3198099    -0.87   0.387    -.9037574    .3498744 
TVendogenous | 
 msvoldev100 |    .006079   .0033459     1.82   0.069    -.0004789    .0126369 
 gcvoldev100 |   .0615928   .0100997     6.10   0.000     .0417976    .0813879 
       civil |   .2290875    .076291     3.00   0.003     .0795598    .3786152 
      fingdp | 
         D1. |   -2.32604   .9043214    -2.57   0.010    -4.098477   -.5536029 
         inf |   .9864196   .5531487     1.78   0.075     -.097732    2.070571 
         rr1 |   -.811773   .5768911    -1.41   0.159    -1.942459    .3189129 
         rr2 |  -.5147532   .5513833    -0.93   0.351    -1.595445    .5659382 
         rr3 |  -.7671578   .5575111    -1.38   0.169    -1.859859    .3255439 
     rr5dual |  -.1387915   .6358668    -0.22   0.827    -1.385068    1.107485 
TIexogenous  | 
      latcar |  -.1297731   .5049493    -0.26   0.797    -1.119456    .8599095 
       sahar |  -.4668217   .3911723    -1.19   0.233    -1.233505    .2998619 
             | 
       _cons |   2.665003   .7293685     3.65   0.000     1.235467    4.094539 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.5811338 
     sigma_e |  2.8095993 
         rho |  .24052573   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note:  TV refers to time varying; TI refers to time invariant. 
 
 
xthtaylor volathp growth totvolhp100 msvolhp100 gcvolhp100 civil d.fingdp to foind 
inf rr1 rr2 rr3 rr5dual r1tothp r2tothp r3tothp  r5tothp latcar sahar  _Iyear_*, 
endog( msvolhp100 gcvolhp100  civil  d.fingdp inf rr1 rr2 rr3 rr5dual  ) 
varying(growth totvolhp100 msvolhp100 gcvolhp100 civil d.fingdp rr1 rr2 rr3 rr5dual 
r1tothp r2tothp r3tothp r5tothp to foind inf _Iyear_* ) 
 
Hausman-Taylor estimation                       Number of obs      =      1750 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        97 
 
                                                Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =      18.0 
                                                               max =        29 
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Random effects u_i ~ i.i.d.                     Wald chi2(43)      =   1645.38 
                                                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     volathp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TVexogenous  | 
      growth |  -.4004587   .0105452   -37.98   0.000     -.421127   -.3797904 
 totvolhp100 |  -.0629619     .04059    -1.55   0.121    -.1425168     .016593 
          to |   .0115999   .0050532     2.30   0.022     .0016958     .021504 
       foind |   .1397809   .0495754     2.82   0.005      .042615    .2369469 
     r1tothp |   .0495223   .0419199     1.18   0.237    -.0326391    .1316837 
     r2tothp |   .0698026   .0424476     1.64   0.100    -.0133931    .1529983 
     r3tothp |   .0746256   .0421202     1.77   0.076    -.0079285    .1571796 
     r5tothp |   .0344199   .0485574     0.71   0.478    -.0607509    .1295907 
 _Iyear_1981 |   .0216034   .2903513     0.07   0.941    -.5474747    .5906815 
 _Iyear_1982 |   .1470353   .2912025     0.50   0.614    -.4237111    .7177818 
 _Iyear_1983 |  -.2577459   .2853443    -0.90   0.366    -.8170104    .3015187 
 _Iyear_1984 |  -.0425337   .2772691    -0.15   0.878    -.5859711    .5009038 
 _Iyear_1985 |  -.2416713   .2735122    -0.88   0.377    -.7777454    .2944028 
 _Iyear_1986 |  -.1170016   .2638579    -0.44   0.657    -.6341536    .4001504 
 _Iyear_1987 |   .1020148   .2616183     0.39   0.697    -.4107476    .6147772 
 _Iyear_1988 |   .6683828   .2606581     2.56   0.010     .1575023    1.179263 
 _Iyear_1989 |   .1607878   .2554101     0.63   0.529    -.3398067    .6613824 
 _Iyear_1990 |  -.2695747   .2486612    -1.08   0.278    -.7569418    .2177924 
 _Iyear_1991 |  -.3161209   .2424479    -1.30   0.192      -.79131    .1590683 
 _Iyear_1992 |  -.0321772   .2419876    -0.13   0.894    -.5064642    .4421099 
 _Iyear_1993 |  -.2702818   .2374353    -1.14   0.255    -.7356464    .1950829 
 _Iyear_1994 |  -.5260939   .2294909    -2.29   0.022    -.9758879   -.0762999 
 _Iyear_1995 |  -.3802183   .2277668    -1.67   0.095     -.826633    .0661963 
 _Iyear_1996 |   -.570086   .2258211    -2.52   0.012    -1.012687   -.1274848 
 _Iyear_1997 |  -.3213427   .2275652    -1.41   0.158    -.7673623     .124677 
 _Iyear_1998 |   .3065628   .2291661     1.34   0.181    -.1425945    .7557201 
 _Iyear_1999 |  -.2053541   .2276499    -0.90   0.367    -.6515397    .2408315 
 _Iyear_2000 |  -.3222185   .2203307    -1.46   0.144    -.7540587    .1096217 
 _Iyear_2001 |  -.6464651   .2247703    -2.88   0.004    -1.087007   -.2059233 
 _Iyear_2002 |  -.6492166     .22975    -2.83   0.005    -1.099518   -.1989148 
 _Iyear_2003 |  -.5989777   .2275672    -2.63   0.008    -1.045001   -.1529543 
 _Iyear_2004 |  -.4924458   .2308845    -2.13   0.033     -.944971   -.0399206 
TVendogenous | 
  msvolhp100 |  -.0007571   .0036153    -0.21   0.834    -.0078431    .0063288 
  gcvolhp100 |  -.0137125   .0082296    -1.67   0.096    -.0298422    .0024172 
       civil |   .1034484   .0575926     1.80   0.072    -.0094309    .2163278 
      fingdp | 
         D1. |   -.200524   .4010431    -0.50   0.617    -.9865541    .5855061 
         inf |   .2790544   .2602489     1.07   0.284    -.2310241    .7891328 
         rr1 |  -.4576044   .3697975    -1.24   0.216    -1.182394    .2671854 
         rr2 |  -.6208199   .3619339    -1.72   0.086    -1.330197    .0885576 
         rr3 |  -.6170708   .3663506    -1.68   0.092    -1.335105    .1009633 
     rr5dual |  -.0473278    .427517    -0.11   0.912    -.8852457      .79059 
TIexogenous  | 
      latcar |  -1.166718   .5536562    -2.11   0.035    -2.251864    -.081572 
       sahar |  -1.321989   .4703121    -2.81   0.005    -2.243784   -.4001944 
             | 
       _cons |   3.893723   .6118559     6.36   0.000     2.694507    5.092938 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.6097363 
     sigma_e |  1.6299225 
         rho |  .49376927   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note:  TV refers to time varying; TI refers to time invariant. 
 
xthtaylor volathp growth totvolhp100 msvolhp100 gcvolhp100 civil d.fingdp to foind 
inf rr11 rr12 rr13 rr2 rr3 rr5dual r11tothp r12tothp r13tothp r2tothp r3tothp  
r5tothp latcar sahar  _Iyear_*, endog( msvolhp100 gcvolhp100  civil  d.fingdp inf 
rr11 rr12 rr13 rr2 rr3 rr5dual  ) varying(growth totvolhp100 msvolhp100 gcvolhp100 
civil d.fingdp rr11 rr12 rr13 rr2 rr3 rr5dual r11tothp r12tothp r13tothp r2tothp 
r3tothp r5tothp to foind inf _Iyear_* ) 
 
Hausman-Taylor estimation                       Number of obs      =      1750 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        97 
 
                                                Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =      18.0 
                                                               max =        29 
 
Random effects u_i ~ i.i.d.                     Wald chi2(47)      =   1690.89 
                                                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     volathp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TVexogenous  | 
      growth |  -.4024313   .0104759   -38.42   0.000    -.4229636    -.381899 
 totvolhp100 |  -.0633966   .0402622    -1.57   0.115    -.1423091    .0155158 
          to |   .0104741   .0050913     2.06   0.040     .0004953     .020453 
       foind |   .1507236   .0503833     2.99   0.003     .0519742    .2494731 
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    r11tothp |   .0454729   .0530628     0.86   0.391    -.0585283    .1494741 
    r12tothp |    .120736   .0457256     2.64   0.000    -1.008884    .1703565 
    r13tothp |   .0427135   .0422702     1.01   0.312    -.0401346    .1255615 
     r2tothp |   .0693006   .0421067     1.65   0.100     -.013227    .1518282 
     r3tothp |   .0751716   .0417798     1.80   0.072    -.0067154    .1570586 
     r5tothp |   .0367132   .0481729     0.76   0.446    -.0577039    .1311303 
 _Iyear_1981 |   .1255887   .2935006     0.43   0.669    -.4496619    .7008393 
 _Iyear_1982 |   .2277147     .29429     0.77   0.439    -.3490832    .8045125 
 _Iyear_1983 |  -.1881393    .288465    -0.65   0.514    -.7535203    .3772417 
 _Iyear_1984 |   .0223556   .2799545     0.08   0.936    -.5263452    .5710563 
 _Iyear_1985 |  -.1770145   .2764876    -0.64   0.522    -.7189203    .3648912 
 _Iyear_1986 |   .0132088    .263913     0.05   0.960    -.5040511    .5304687 
 _Iyear_1987 |   .2051125   .2611445     0.79   0.432    -.3067213    .7169464 
 _Iyear_1988 |    .797957   .2607127     3.06   0.002     .2869694    1.308945 
 _Iyear_1989 |   .2842285   .2555841     1.11   0.266    -.2167071    .7851641 
 _Iyear_1990 |  -.1615384   .2484632    -0.65   0.516    -.6485173    .3254405 
 _Iyear_1991 |  -.2241242   .2422678    -0.93   0.355    -.6989604    .2507121 
 _Iyear_1992 |   .0745952   .2417034     0.31   0.758    -.3991348    .5483251 
 _Iyear_1993 |  -.1585813   .2377032    -0.67   0.505     -.624471    .3073084 
 _Iyear_1994 |  -.4234425   .2298806    -1.84   0.065    -.8740002    .0271152 
 _Iyear_1995 |  -.2749615   .2285297    -1.20   0.229    -.7228715    .1729484 
 _Iyear_1996 |  -.4522483   .2261769    -2.00   0.046    -.8955468   -.0089499 
 _Iyear_1997 |  -.2161056    .227771    -0.95   0.343    -.6625286    .2303174 
 _Iyear_1998 |   .3957489    .228899     1.73   0.084    -.0528848    .8443827 
 _Iyear_1999 |  -.0976828   .2276479    -0.43   0.668    -.5438646     .348499 
 _Iyear_2000 |  -.1942774   .2215505    -0.88   0.381    -.6285083    .2399536 
 _Iyear_2001 |  -.5052051   .2262116    -2.23   0.026    -.9485718   -.0618385 
 _Iyear_2002 |  -.5006814   .2310236    -2.17   0.030    -.9534792   -.0478835 
 _Iyear_2003 |  -.4493591    .228922    -1.96   0.050     -.898038   -.0006803 
 _Iyear_2004 |  -.3050917    .233537    -1.31   0.191    -.7628157    .1526323 
TVendogenous | 
  msvolhp100 |  -.0008471   .0035955    -0.24   0.814    -.0078942    .0061999 
  gcvolhp100 |  -.0129727   .0081851    -1.58   0.113    -.0290152    .0030698 
       civil |   .0902557   .0580546     1.55   0.120    -.0235292    .2040405 
      fingdp | 
         D1. |  -.2607259   .3980884    -0.65   0.513    -1.040965     .519513 
         inf |   .1909317    .258702     0.74   0.460    -.3161149    .6979783 
        rr11 |  -.1313927    .394971    -0.33   0.739    -.9055216    .6427361 
        rr12 |  -.8905324   .4040013    -2.20   0.028     -1.68236   -.0987043 
        rr13 |  -.9708096   .3988315    -2.43   0.015    -1.752505   -.1891142 
         rr2 |  -.6146491   .3609419    -1.70   0.089    -1.322082    .0927841 
         rr3 |  -.6281152   .3649746    -1.72   0.085    -1.343452    .0872219 
     rr5dual |  -.0024492   .4253938    -0.01   0.995    -.8362058    .8313074 
TIexogenous  | 
      latcar |  -1.085689   .5882484    -1.85   0.065    -2.238635    .0672565 
       sahar |  -1.236594   .4998101    -2.47   0.013    -2.216204   -.2569845 
             | 
       _cons |   3.910165   .6280593     6.23   0.000     2.679192    5.141139 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   1.727472 
     sigma_e |  1.6189334 
         rho |   .5324003   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note:  TV refers to time varying; TI refers to time invariant. 
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A4.3. Switching regressions printouts 
Basic regression 
 
IV homoskedasticity only 
 
xtivreg2 r after l.r _Iyear_* (e_inf gap der after_switch e_inf_a gap_a der_a e_inf_s 
gap_s der_s e_inf_a_s gap_a_s der_a_s = l3.inf l3.gap l3.der l6.inf l6.gap l6.der 
l9.inf l9.gap l9.der l12.inf l12.gap l12.der l3.inf_a l3.inf_s l3.inf_a_s l3.gap_a 
l3.gap_s l3.gap_a_s l3.der_a l3.der_s l3.der_a_s l6.inf_a l6.inf_s l6.inf_a_s 
l6.gap_a l6.gap_s l6.gap_a_s l6.der_a l6.der_s l6.der_a_s l9.inf_a l9.inf_s 
l9.inf_a_s l9.gap_a l9.gap_s l9.gap_a_s l9.der_a l9.der_s l9.der_a_s l12.inf_a 
l12.inf_s l12.inf_a_s l12.gap_a l12.gap_s l12.gap_a_s l12.der_a l12.der_s l12.der_a_s 
l15.inf_a l15.inf_s l15.inf_a_s l15.gap_a l15.gap_s l15.gap_a_s l15.der_a l15.der_s 
l15.der_a_s l18.inf_a l18.inf_s l18.inf_a_s l18.gap_a l18.gap_s l18.gap_a_s l18.der_a 
l18.der_s l18.der_a_s l21.inf_a l21.inf_s l21.inf_a_s l21.gap_a l21.gap_s l21.gap_a_s 
l21.der_a l21.der_s l21.der_a_s l24.inf_a l24.inf_s l24.inf_a_s l24.gap_a l24.gap_s 
l24.gap_a_s l24.der_a l24.der_s l24.der_a_s dc100 ccg nfa l.dc100 l.ccg l.nfa), fe 
endog(after_switch) 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        18                    Obs per group: min =        41 
                                                               avg =     136.2 
                                                               max =       180 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
-------------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only 
Statistics consistent for homoskedasticity only 
 
                                                      Number of obs =     2452 
                                                      F( 29,  2405) =   287.39 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  99242.51041                Centered R2   =   0.7740 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  99242.51041                Uncentered R2 =   0.7740 
Residual SS             =  22427.71601                Root MSE      =    3.036 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       e_inf |   .0565392   .0650692     0.87   0.385    -.0709941    .1840724 
         gap |   .0758336    .061095     1.24   0.215    -.0439104    .1955775 
         der |   .0409555   .0304274     1.35   0.178     -.018681    .1005921 
after_switch |   2.441524   .9130426     2.67   0.007     .6519935    4.231055 
     e_inf_a |  -.0712767   .0479194    -1.49   0.137    -.1651969    .0226436 
       gap_a |  -.0627625   .0706048    -0.89   0.374    -.2011454    .0756203 
       der_a |  -.0597113   .0309756    -1.93   0.054    -.1204224    .0009997 
     e_inf_s |   .2077425   .0797179     2.61   0.009     .0514984    .3639867 
       gap_s |   -.011509   .0730101    -0.16   0.875    -.1546061    .1315882 
       der_s |  -.0368791   .0347495    -1.06   0.289    -.1049869    .0312287 
   e_inf_a_s |  -.2791675   .1278478    -2.18   0.029    -.5297446   -.0285905 
     gap_a_s |  -.0023572   .0856387    -0.03   0.978    -.1702059    .1654916 
     der_a_s |   .0735808   .0408172     1.80   0.071    -.0064195    .1535811 
       after |  -.5697832   .6046884    -0.94   0.346    -1.754951    .6153844 
           r | 
         L1. |   .8343646   .0179872    46.39   0.000     .7991104    .8696188 
 _Iyear_1994 |  -.5755603   .7176559    -0.80   0.423     -1.98214    .8310194 
 _Iyear_1995 |   .5467629    .684184     0.80   0.424     -.794213    1.887739 
 _Iyear_1996 |   .3084017   .6524683     0.47   0.636    -.9704127    1.587216 
 _Iyear_1997 |   .4587732   .5929105     0.77   0.439      -.70331    1.620856 
 _Iyear_1998 |   .9986886   .5401742     1.85   0.064    -.0600333    2.057411 
 _Iyear_1999 |   .5924236   .5095372     1.16   0.245     -.406251    1.591098 
 _Iyear_2000 |   .1299194    .371698     0.35   0.727    -.5985953    .8584341 
 _Iyear_2001 |   .7467648   .3611649     2.07   0.039     .0388945    1.454635 
 _Iyear_2002 |   .1633176   .3522378     0.46   0.643    -.5270558     .853691 
 _Iyear_2003 |  -.3387977   .3453492    -0.98   0.327     -1.01567    .3380742 
 _Iyear_2004 |  -.1901523   .3374616    -0.56   0.573    -.8515648    .4712603 
 _Iyear_2005 |  -.1560589   .3469617    -0.45   0.653    -.8360913    .5239735 
 _Iyear_2006 |  -.1280612   .3545921    -0.36   0.718    -.8230489    .5669265 
 _Iyear_2007 |   .0666193   .4295894     0.16   0.877    -.7753605     .908599 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):         309.210 
                                                   Chi-sq(78) P-val =   0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):                3.764 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):          81.386 
                                                   Chi-sq(77) P-val =   0.3444 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                              13.654 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0002 
Regressors tested:    after_switch 
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IV –HAC  
 
xtivreg2 r after  l.r   _Iyear_* (e_inf gap der after_switch e_inf_a gap_a der_a 
e_inf_s gap_s der_s e_inf_a_s gap_a_s der_a_s = l3.inf l3.gap l3.der l6.inf l6.gap 
l6.der l9.inf l9.gap l9.der l12.inf l12.gap l12.der l3.inf_a l3.inf_s l3.inf_a_s 
l3.gap_a l3.gap_s l3.gap_a_s l3.der_a l3.der_s l3.der_a_s l6.inf_a l6.inf_s 
l6.inf_a_s l6.gap_a l6.gap_s l6.gap_a_s l6.der_a l6.der_s l6.der_a_s l9.inf_a 
l9.inf_s l9.inf_a_s l9.gap_a l9.gap_s l9.gap_a_s l9.der_a l9.der_s l9.der_a_s 
l12.inf_a l12.inf_s l12.inf_a_s l12.gap_a l12.gap_s l12.gap_a_s l12.der_a l12.der_s 
l12.der_a_s l15.inf_a l15.inf_s l15.inf_a_s l15.gap_a l15.gap_s l15.gap_a_s l15.der_a 
l15.der_s l15.der_a_s l18.inf_a l18.inf_s l18.inf_a_s l18.gap_a l18.gap_s l18.gap_a_s 
l18.der_a l18.der_s l18.der_a_s l21.inf_a l21.inf_s l21.inf_a_s l21.gap_a l21.gap_s 
l21.gap_a_s l21.der_a l21.der_s l21.der_a_s l24.inf_a l24.inf_s l24.inf_a_s l24.gap_a 
l24.gap_s l24.gap_a_s l24.der_a l24.der_s l24.der_a_s dc100 ccg nfa l.dc100 l.ccg  
l.nfa), fe endog(after_switch) robust bw(1) 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        18                    Obs per group: min =        41 
                                                               avg =     136.2 
                                                               max =       180 
 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
-------------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only 
Statistics robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
  kernel=Bartlett; bandwidth=     1 
  time variable (t):  . 
  group variable (i): country 
 
                                                      Number of obs =     2452 
                                                      F( 29,  2405) =   372.38 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  99242.51041                Centered R2   =   0.7740 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  99242.51041                Uncentered R2 =   0.7740 
Residual SS             =  22427.71601                Root MSE      =    3.036 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
           r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       e_inf |   .0565392   .0984188     0.57   0.566     -.136358    .2494364 
         gap |   .0758336    .060356     1.26   0.209    -.0424621    .1941292 
         der |   .0409555   .0581664     0.70   0.481    -.0730486    .1549596 
after_switch |   2.441524   1.304728     1.87   0.061    -.1156967    4.998745 
     e_inf_a |  -.0712767   .1166452    -0.61   0.541    -.2998971    .1573438 
       gap_a |  -.0627625   .0671539    -0.93   0.350    -.1943818    .0688568 
       der_a |  -.0597113   .0628795    -0.95   0.342    -.1829528    .0635301 
     e_inf_s |   .2077425   .1110233     1.87   0.061     -.009859    .4253441 
       gap_s |   -.011509   .0764974    -0.15   0.880    -.1614412    .1384232 
       der_s |  -.0368791   .0543724    -0.68   0.498     -.143447    .0696888 
   e_inf_a_s |  -.2791675   .1448441    -1.93   0.054    -.5630567    .0047216 
     gap_a_s |  -.0023572   .0829223    -0.03   0.977    -.1648818    .1601675 
     der_a_s |   .0735808   .0619832     1.19   0.235     -.047904    .1950656 
       after |  -.5697832   .6743843    -0.84   0.398    -1.891552    .7519859 
           r | 
         L1. |   .8343646   .0505545    16.50   0.000     .7352796    .9334496 
 _Iyear_1994 |  -.5755603   .9075057    -0.63   0.526    -2.354239    1.203118 
 _Iyear_1995 |   .5467629   .8784753     0.62   0.534    -1.175017    2.268543 
 _Iyear_1996 |   .3084017   .7459593     0.41   0.679    -1.153652    1.770455 
 _Iyear_1997 |   .4587732   .6111996     0.75   0.453    -.7391561    1.656703 
 _Iyear_1998 |   .9986886   .6502953     1.54   0.125    -.2758667    2.273244 
 _Iyear_1999 |   .5924236   .4173832     1.42   0.156    -.2256325     1.41048 
 _Iyear_2000 |   .1299194   .2151695     0.60   0.546    -.2918052    .5516439 
 _Iyear_2001 |   .7467648    .509635     1.47   0.143    -.2521015    1.745631 
 _Iyear_2002 |   .1633176    .233407     0.70   0.484    -.2941517     .620787 
 _Iyear_2003 |  -.3387977   .1307466    -2.59   0.010    -.5950562   -.0825392 
 _Iyear_2004 |  -.1901523   .1455122    -1.31   0.191    -.4753509    .0950463 
 _Iyear_2005 |  -.1560589   .1742358    -0.90   0.370    -.4975548     .185437 
 _Iyear_2006 |  -.1280612   .2241398    -0.57   0.568    -.5673673    .3112448 
 _Iyear_2007 |   .0666193    .383146     0.17   0.862    -.6843331    .8175717 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):            271.811 
                                                   Chi-sq(78) P-val =   0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic):          3.822 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):        90.875 
                                                   Chi-sq(77) P-val =   0.1335 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                               6.443 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0111 
Regressors tested:    after_switch 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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GMM 
 
xtivreg2 r after  l.r  _Iyear_*  (e_inf gap der after_switch e_inf_a gap_a der_a 
e_inf_s gap_s der_s e_inf_a_s gap_a_s der_a_s = l3.inf l3.gap l3.der l6.inf l6.gap 
l6.der l9.inf l9.gap l9.der l12.inf l12.gap l12.der l3.inf_a l3.inf_s l3.inf_a_s 
l3.gap_a l3.gap_s l3.gap_a_s l3.der_a l3.der_s l3.der_a_s l6.inf_a l6.inf_s 
l6.inf_a_s l6.gap_a l6.gap_s l6.gap_a_s l6.der_a l6.der_s l6.der_a_s l9.inf_a 
l9.inf_s l9.inf_a_s l9.gap_a l9.gap_s l9.gap_a_s l9.der_a l9.der_s l9.der_a_s 
l12.inf_a l12.inf_s l12.inf_a_s l12.gap_a l12.gap_s l12.gap_a_s l12.der_a l12.der_s 
l12.der_a_s l15.inf_a l15.inf_s l15.inf_a_s l15.gap_a l15.gap_s l15.gap_a_s l15.der_a 
l15.der_s l15.der_a_s l18.inf_a l18.inf_s l18.inf_a_s l18.gap_a l18.gap_s l18.gap_a_s 
l18.der_a l18.der_s l18.der_a_s l21.inf_a l21.inf_s l21.inf_a_s l21.gap_a l21.gap_s 
l21.gap_a_s l21.der_a l21.der_s l21.der_a_s l24.inf_a l24.inf_s l24.inf_a_s l24.gap_a 
l24.gap_s l24.gap_a_s l24.der_a l24.der_s l24.der_a_s dc100 ccg nfa l.dc100 l.ccg  
l.nfa), fe endog(after_switch) gmm bw(1) 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        18                    Obs per group: min =        41 
                                                               avg =     136.2 
                                                               max =       180 
 
2-Step GMM estimation 
--------------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for arbitrary autocorrelation 
Statistics robust to autocorrelation 
  kernel=Bartlett; bandwidth=     1 
  time variable (t):  . 
  group variable (i): country 
 
                                                      Number of obs =     2452 
                                                      F( 29,  2405) =   287.39 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  99242.51041                Centered R2   =   0.7740 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  99242.51041                Uncentered R2 =   0.7740 
Residual SS             =  22427.71601                Root MSE      =    3.036 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       e_inf |   .0565392   .0650692     0.87   0.385    -.0709941    .1840724 
         gap |   .0758336    .061095     1.24   0.215    -.0439104    .1955775 
         der |   .0409555   .0304274     1.35   0.178     -.018681    .1005921 
after_switch |   2.441524   .9130426     2.67   0.007     .6519935    4.231055 
     e_inf_a |  -.0712767   .0479194    -1.49   0.137    -.1651969    .0226436 
       gap_a |  -.0627625   .0706048    -0.89   0.374    -.2011454    .0756203 
       der_a |  -.0597113   .0309756    -1.93   0.054    -.1204224    .0009997 
     e_inf_s |   .2077425   .0797179     2.61   0.009     .0514984    .3639867 
       gap_s |   -.011509   .0730101    -0.16   0.875    -.1546061    .1315882 
       der_s |  -.0368791   .0347495    -1.06   0.289    -.1049869    .0312287 
   e_inf_a_s |  -.2791675   .1278478    -2.18   0.029    -.5297446   -.0285905 
     gap_a_s |  -.0023572   .0856387    -0.03   0.978    -.1702059    .1654916 
     der_a_s |   .0735808   .0408172     1.80   0.071    -.0064195    .1535811 
       after |  -.5697832   .6046884    -0.94   0.346    -1.754951    .6153844 
           r | 
         L1. |   .8343646   .0179872    46.39   0.000     .7991104    .8696188 
 _Iyear_1994 |  -.5755603   .7176559    -0.80   0.423     -1.98214    .8310194 
 _Iyear_1995 |   .5467629    .684184     0.80   0.424     -.794213    1.887739 
 _Iyear_1996 |   .3084017   .6524683     0.47   0.636    -.9704127    1.587216 
 _Iyear_1997 |   .4587732   .5929105     0.77   0.439      -.70331    1.620856 
 _Iyear_1998 |   .9986886   .5401742     1.85   0.064    -.0600333    2.057411 
 _Iyear_1999 |   .5924236   .5095372     1.16   0.245     -.406251    1.591098 
 _Iyear_2000 |   .1299194    .371698     0.35   0.727    -.5985953    .8584341 
 _Iyear_2001 |   .7467648   .3611649     2.07   0.039     .0388945    1.454635 
 _Iyear_2002 |   .1633176   .3522378     0.46   0.643    -.5270558     .853691 
 _Iyear_2003 |  -.3387977   .3453492    -0.98   0.327     -1.01567    .3380742 
 _Iyear_2004 |  -.1901523   .3374616    -0.56   0.573    -.8515648    .4712603 
 _Iyear_2005 |  -.1560589   .3469617    -0.45   0.653    -.8360913    .5239735 
 _Iyear_2006 |  -.1280612   .3545921    -0.36   0.718    -.8230489    .5669265 
 _Iyear_2007 |   .0666193   .4295894     0.16   0.877    -.7753605     .908599 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):            309.210 
                                                   Chi-sq(78) P-val =   0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic):          3.764 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):          81.386 
                                                   Chi-sq(77) P-val =   0.3444 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                              13.654 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0002 
Regressors tested:    after_switch 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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CUE 
 
xtivreg2 r after l.r _Iyear_* (e_inf gap der after_switch e_inf_a gap_a der_a e_inf_s 
gap_s der_s e_inf_a_s gap_a_s der_a_s = l3.inf l3.gap l3.der l6.inf l6.gap l6.der 
l9.inf l9.gap l9.der l12.inf l12.gap l12.der l3.inf_a l3.inf_s l3.inf_a_s l3.gap_a 
l3.gap_s l3.gap_a_s l3.der_a l3.der_s l3.der_a_s l6.inf_a l6.inf_s l6.inf_a_s 
l6.gap_a l6.gap_s l6.gap_a_s l6.der_a l6.der_s l6.der_a_s l9.inf_a l9.inf_s 
l9.inf_a_s l9.gap_a l9.gap_s l9.gap_a_s l9.der_a l9.der_s l9.der_a_s l12.inf_a 
l12.inf_s l12.inf_a_s l12.gap_a l12.gap_s l12.gap_a_s l12.der_a l12.der_s l12.der_a_s 
l15.inf_a l15.inf_s l15.inf_a_s l15.gap_a l15.gap_s l15.gap_a_s l15.der_a l15.der_s 
l15.der_a_s l18.inf_a l18.inf_s l18.inf_a_s l18.gap_a l18.gap_s l18.gap_a_s l18.der_a 
l18.der_s l18.der_a_s l21.inf_a l21.inf_s l21.inf_a_s l21.gap_a l21.gap_s l21.gap_a_s 
l21.der_a l21.der_s l21.der_a_s l24.inf_a l24.inf_s l24.inf_a_s l24.gap_a l24.gap_s 
l24.gap_a_s l24.der_a l24.der_s l24.der_a_s dc100 ccg nfa l.dc100 l.ccg l.nfa), fe 
endog(after_switch) cue 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        18                    Obs per group: min =        41 
                                                               avg =     136.2 
                                                               max =       180 
 
CUE estimation 
-------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only 
Statistics consistent for homoskedasticity only 
 
                                                      Number of obs =     2452 
                                                      F( 29,  2405) =   282.59 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  99242.51041                Centered R2   =   0.7700 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  99242.51041                Uncentered R2 =   0.7700 
Residual SS             =  22830.12785                Root MSE      =    3.063 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       e_inf |   .0422352   .0656503     0.64   0.520    -.0864371    .1709075 
         gap |   .0806449   .0616406     1.31   0.191    -.0401685    .2014583 
         der |   .0514163   .0306991     1.67   0.094    -.0087529    .1115854 
after_switch |   2.900872   .9211974     3.15   0.002     1.095358    4.706385 
     e_inf_a |  -.0798512   .0483474    -1.65   0.099    -.1746103     .014908 
       gap_a |  -.0644475   .0712354    -0.90   0.366    -.2040663    .0751713 
       der_a |  -.0707892   .0312523    -2.27   0.024    -.1320425   -.0095359 
     e_inf_s |   .2415401   .0804299     3.00   0.003     .0839004    .3991797 
       gap_s |  -.0087647   .0736622    -0.12   0.905      -.15314    .1356105 
       der_s |  -.0497422   .0350599    -1.42   0.156    -.1184583    .0189739 
   e_inf_a_s |  -.3396117   .1289896    -2.63   0.008    -.5924268   -.0867967 
     gap_a_s |   -.011375   .0864036    -0.13   0.895    -.1807228    .1579729 
     der_a_s |   .0904354   .0411818     2.20   0.028     .0097206    .1711502 
       after |  -.6438018   .6100892    -1.06   0.291    -1.839555     .551951 
           r | 
         L1. |   .8391771   .0181478    46.24   0.000     .8036081    .8747462 
 _Iyear_1994 |  -.6897322   .7240656    -0.95   0.341    -2.108875    .7294103 
 _Iyear_1995 |   .4620096   .6902947     0.67   0.503    -.8909431    1.814962 
 _Iyear_1996 |   .2687289   .6582958     0.41   0.683    -1.021507    1.558965 
 _Iyear_1997 |   .4273716   .5982061     0.71   0.475    -.7450908    1.599834 
 _Iyear_1998 |   1.008089   .5449987     1.85   0.064    -.0600891    2.076266 
 _Iyear_1999 |   .6490213   .5140881     1.26   0.207    -.3585729    1.656616 
 _Iyear_2000 |   .1856068   .3750178     0.49   0.621    -.5494146    .9206281 
 _Iyear_2001 |   .7834308   .3643907     2.15   0.032     .0692382    1.497623 
 _Iyear_2002 |   .1667879   .3553838     0.47   0.639    -.5297515    .8633274 
 _Iyear_2003 |  -.3227113   .3484336    -0.93   0.354    -1.005629     .360206 
 _Iyear_2004 |   -.146293   .3404756    -0.43   0.667    -.8136129    .5210269 
 _Iyear_2005 |  -.1011491   .3500605    -0.29   0.773    -.7872551     .584957 
 _Iyear_2006 |  -.0662629   .3577591    -0.19   0.853    -.7674579     .634932 
 _Iyear_2007 |   .2323528   .4334262     0.54   0.592     -.617147    1.081853 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):         309.210 
                                                   Chi-sq(78) P-val =   0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):                3.764 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):          80.726 
                                                   Chi-sq(77) P-val =   0.3635 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                              13.654 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0002 
Regressors tested:    after_switch 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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CUE - HAC 
 
xtivreg2 r after  l.r  _Iyear_* (e_inf gap der after_switch e_inf_a gap_a der_a 
e_inf_s gap_s der_s e_inf_a_s gap_a_s der_a_s = l3.inf l3.gap l3.der l6.inf l6.gap 
l6.der l9.inf l9.gap l9.der l12.inf l12.gap l12.der l3.inf_a l3.inf_s l3.inf_a_s 
l3.gap_a l3.gap_s l3.gap_a_s l3.der_a l3.der_s l3.der_a_s l6.inf_a l6.inf_s 
l6.inf_a_s l6.gap_a l6.gap_s l6.gap_a_s l6.der_a l6.der_s l6.der_a_s l9.inf_a 
l9.inf_s l9.inf_a_s l9.gap_a l9.gap_s l9.gap_a_s l9.der_a l9.der_s l9.der_a_s 
l12.inf_a l12.inf_s l12.inf_a_s l12.gap_a l12.gap_s l12.gap_a_s l12.der_a l12.der_s 
l12.der_a_s l15.inf_a l15.inf_s l15.inf_a_s l15.gap_a l15.gap_s l15.gap_a_s l15.der_a 
l15.der_s l15.der_a_s l18.inf_a l18.inf_s l18.inf_a_s l18.gap_a l18.gap_s l18.gap_a_s 
l18.der_a l18.der_s l18.der_a_s l21.inf_a l21.inf_s l21.inf_a_s l21.gap_a l21.gap_s 
l21.gap_a_s l21.der_a l21.der_s l21.der_a_s l24.inf_a l24.inf_s l24.inf_a_s l24.gap_a 
l24.gap_s l24.gap_a_s l24.der_a l24.der_s l24.der_a_s dc100 ccg nfa l.dc100 l.ccg  
l.nfa), fe endog(after_switch) cue robust bw(1) 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        18                    Obs per group: min =        41 
                                                               avg =     136.2 
                                                               max =       180 
 
CUE estimation 
-------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
Statistics robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
  kernel=Bartlett; bandwidth=     1 
  time variable (t):  . 
  group variable (i): country 
 
                                                      Number of obs =     2452 
                                                      F( 29,  2405) =  1094.82 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  99242.51041                Centered R2   =   0.7607 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  99242.51041                Uncentered R2 =   0.7607 
Residual SS             =  23751.47247                Root MSE      =    3.124 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
           r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       e_inf |   -.016242   .0528959    -0.31   0.759     -.119916    .0874321 
         gap |   .0714766   .0373982     1.91   0.056    -.0018226    .1447758 
         der |  -.0327877   .0256742    -1.28   0.202    -.0831081    .0175328 
after_switch |   1.369531   .4532136     3.02   0.003     .4812483    2.257813 
     e_inf_a |   .0854806   .0485059     1.76   0.078    -.0095891    .1805504 
       gap_a |  -.0429056   .0399902    -1.07   0.283    -.1212849    .0354737 
       der_a |   .0604902   .0312054     1.94   0.053    -.0006712    .1216515 
     e_inf_s |   .0859971   .0615276     1.40   0.162    -.0345949    .2065891 
       gap_s |   .0405186    .049573     0.82   0.414    -.0566428    .1376799 
       der_s |   .0184291   .0276208     0.67   0.505    -.0357067    .0725649 
   e_inf_a_s |  -.1827443   .0593231    -3.08   0.002    -.2990154   -.0664731 
     gap_a_s |  -.0626761   .0511112    -1.23   0.220    -.1628523       .0375 
     der_a_s |  -.0292964   .0341586    -0.86   0.391    -.0962461    .0376532 
       after |  -.6240062   .3270267    -1.91   0.056    -1.264967    .0169543 
           r | 
         L1. |   .9375405   .0205506    45.62   0.000      .897262     .977819 
 _Iyear_1994 |   .3493746   .5089196     0.69   0.492    -.6480895    1.346839 
 _Iyear_1995 |   .4189108   .5287187     0.79   0.428    -.6173587     1.45518 
 _Iyear_1996 |   .0210794   .3931964     0.05   0.957    -.7495713    .7917302 
 _Iyear_1997 |   .1158844   .3348574     0.35   0.729     -.540424    .7721927 
 _Iyear_1998 |   .4771454     .30377     1.57   0.116    -.1182329    1.072524 
 _Iyear_1999 |  -.2039649   .2057046    -0.99   0.321    -.6071386    .1992088 
 _Iyear_2000 |   .0249157   .1378781     0.18   0.857    -.2453204    .2951518 
 _Iyear_2001 |  -.0072555    .164611    -0.04   0.965    -.3298872    .3153762 
 _Iyear_2002 |  -.1336665   .0923995    -1.45   0.148    -.3147662    .0474332 
 _Iyear_2003 |  -.2500574   .0807378    -3.10   0.002    -.4083006   -.0918142 
 _Iyear_2004 |  -.1413168   .0792864    -1.78   0.075    -.2967154    .0140818 
 _Iyear_2005 |  -.1618444   .0875732    -1.85   0.065    -.3334846    .0097959 
 _Iyear_2006 |  -.2530223   .1075852    -2.35   0.019    -.4638855   -.0421592 
 _Iyear_2007 |  -.2333339    .158815    -1.47   0.142    -.5446056    .0779377 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):            271.811 
                                                   Chi-sq(78) P-val =   0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic):          3.822 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):        86.056 
                                                   Chi-sq(77) P-val =   0.2248 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                               6.443 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0111 
Regressors tested:    after_switch 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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LIML 
 
xtivreg2 r after l.r  _Iyear_* (e_inf gap der after_switch e_inf_a gap_a der_a 
e_inf_s gap_s der_s e_inf_a_s gap_a_s der_a_s = l3.inf l3.gap l3.der l6.inf l6.gap 
l6.der l9.inf l9.gap l9.der l12.inf l12.gap l12.der l3.inf_a l3.inf_s l3.inf_a_s 
l3.gap_a l3.gap_s l3.gap_a_s l3.der_a l3.der_s l3.der_a_s l6.inf_a l6.inf_s 
l6.inf_a_s l6.gap_a l6.gap_s l6.gap_a_s l6.der_a l6.der_s l6.der_a_s l9.inf_a 
l9.inf_s l9.inf_a_s l9.gap_a l9.gap_s l9.gap_a_s l9.der_a l9.der_s l9.der_a_s 
l12.inf_a l12.inf_s l12.inf_a_s l12.gap_a l12.gap_s l12.gap_a_s l12.der_a l12.der_s 
l12.der_a_s l15.inf_a l15.inf_s l15.inf_a_s l15.gap_a l15.gap_s l15.gap_a_s l15.der_a 
l15.der_s l15.der_a_s l18.inf_a l18.inf_s l18.inf_a_s l18.gap_a l18.gap_s l18.gap_a_s 
l18.der_a l18.der_s l18.der_a_s l21.inf_a l21.inf_s l21.inf_a_s l21.gap_a l21.gap_s 
l21.gap_a_s l21.der_a l21.der_s l21.der_a_s l24.inf_a l24.inf_s l24.inf_a_s l24.gap_a 
l24.gap_s l24.gap_a_s l24.der_a l24.der_s l24.der_a_s dc100 ccg nfa l.dc100 l.ccg 
l.nfa), fe endog(after_switch) liml bw(1) robust 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        18                    Obs per group: min =        41 
                                                               avg =     136.2 
 
LIML estimation 
--------------- 
k               =1.03430 
lambda          =1.03430 
 
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only 
Statistics robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
  kernel=Bartlett; bandwidth=     1 
  time variable (t):  . 
  group variable (i): country 
 
                                                      Number of obs =     2452 
                                                      F( 29,  2405) =   357.22 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  99242.51041                Centered R2   =   0.7700 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  99242.51041                Uncentered R2 =   0.7700 
Residual SS             =  22830.12784                Root MSE      =    3.063 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
           r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       e_inf |   .0422352   .1118862     0.38   0.706    -.1770576     .261528 
         gap |   .0806449   .0686636     1.17   0.240    -.0539333    .2152231 
         der |   .0514163   .0664627     0.77   0.439    -.0788482    .1816807 
after_switch |   2.900872   1.456692     1.99   0.046      .045807    5.755936 
     e_inf_a |  -.0798512   .1318197    -0.61   0.545    -.3382131    .1785108 
       gap_a |  -.0644475   .0765669    -0.84   0.400    -.2145159    .0856208 
       der_a |  -.0707892   .0706573    -1.00   0.316     -.209275    .0676966 
     e_inf_s |   .2415401   .1230334     1.96   0.050     .0003991     .482681 
       gap_s |  -.0087647   .0854587    -0.10   0.918    -.1762608    .1587313 
       der_s |  -.0497422   .0616615    -0.81   0.420    -.1705965    .0711122 
   e_inf_a_s |  -.3396117   .1634682    -2.08   0.038    -.6600036   -.0192199 
     gap_a_s |   -.011375   .0931469    -0.12   0.903    -.1939395    .1711896 
     der_a_s |   .0904354   .0693432     1.30   0.192    -.0454748    .2263457 
       after |  -.6438018   .7448607    -0.86   0.387    -2.103702    .8160983 
           r | 
         L1. |   .8391771   .0504666    16.63   0.000     .7402644    .9380898 
 _Iyear_1994 |  -.6897322   .9605085    -0.72   0.473    -2.572294     1.19283 
 _Iyear_1995 |   .4620096   .9085149     0.51   0.611    -1.318647    2.242666 
 _Iyear_1996 |   .2687289   .7606725     0.35   0.724    -1.222162     1.75962 
 _Iyear_1997 |   .4273716   .6187609     0.69   0.490    -.7853775    1.640121 
 _Iyear_1998 |   1.008089   .6670345     1.51   0.131    -.2992749    2.315452 
 _Iyear_1999 |   .6490213   .4446991     1.46   0.144    -.2225729    1.520616 
 _Iyear_2000 |   .1856067   .2114853     0.88   0.380    -.2288968    .6001103 
 _Iyear_2001 |   .7834308   .5154993     1.52   0.129    -.2269292    1.793791 
 _Iyear_2002 |   .1667879   .2338662     0.71   0.476    -.2915814    .6251573 
 _Iyear_2003 |  -.3227113   .1408731    -2.29   0.022    -.5988175   -.0466052 
 _Iyear_2004 |   -.146293   .1599343    -0.91   0.360    -.4597584    .1671725 
 _Iyear_2005 |  -.1011491   .1964331    -0.51   0.607    -.4861509    .2838527 
 _Iyear_2006 |  -.0662629   .2541286    -0.26   0.794    -.5643457    .4318199 
 _Iyear_2007 |   .2323528   .4576128     0.51   0.612    -.6645517    1.129257 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):            271.811 
                                                   Chi-sq(78) P-val =   0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic):          3.822 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):        88.717 
                                                   Chi-sq(77) P-val =   0.1702 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                               6.305 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0120 
Regressors tested:    after_switch 
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GMM estimates – ―robustness-checks‖ regressions I 
 
After_switch “quadrant” only 
 
xtivreg2 r after  l.r  _Iyear_* (e_inf gap der after_switch e_inf_a_s gap_a_s der_a_s 
= l3.inf l3.gap l3.der l6.inf l6. 
> gap l6.der l9.inf l9.gap l9.der l12.inf l12.gap l12.der l3.inf_a_s  l12.inf_a_s 
l12.gap_a_s l12.der_a_s  l15.inf_a_s  l 
> 15.gap_a_s  l15.der_a_s l18.inf_a_s l18.gap_a_s l18.der_a_s  l21.inf_a_s  
l21.gap_a_s l21.der_a_s l24.inf_a_s  l24.gap_ 
> a_s l24.der_a_s l27.inf_a_s  l27.gap_a_s l27.der_a_s l30.inf_a_s  l30.gap_a_s 
l30.der_a_s l33.inf_a_s  l33.gap_a_s l33. 
> der_a_s l36.inf_a_s  l36.gap_a_s l36.der_a_s dc100 ccg nfa l.dc100 l.ccg  l.nfa), 
fe endog(after_switch) cue robust bw( 
> 1) 
Warning - collinearities detected 
Vars dropped:  _Iyear_1991 _Iyear_1992 _Iyear_1993 _Iyear_1994 _Iyear_2008 
               _Iyear_2009 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        18                    Obs per group: min =        29 
                                                               avg =     124.9 
                                                               max =       168 
 
CUE estimation 
-------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
Statistics robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
  kernel=Bartlett; bandwidth=     1 
  time variable (t):  . 
  group variable (i): country 
 
                                                      Number of obs =     2248 
                                                      F( 22,  2208) =   949.68 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  90296.59228                Centered R2   =   0.7788 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  90296.59228                Uncentered R2 =   0.7788 
Residual SS             =  19969.90611                Root MSE      =    2.993 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
           r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       e_inf |   .1933189   .0378617     5.11   0.000     .1191113    .2675265 
         gap |   .0675573   .0197228     3.43   0.001     .0289013    .1062132 
         der |   .0138749   .0135978     1.02   0.308    -.0127763    .0405261 
after_switch |   2.930189    .663961     4.41   0.000     1.628849    4.231529 
   e_inf_a_s |  -.1625092   .0477142    -3.41   0.001    -.2560274    -.068991 
     gap_a_s |   -.059799   .0204107    -2.93   0.003    -.0998031   -.0197948 
     der_a_s |   .0134926   .0167025     0.81   0.419    -.0192437     .046229 
       after |  -1.404494   .4534395    -3.10   0.002    -2.293219   -.5157688 
             | 
           r | 
         L1. |   .8121522   .0317916    25.55   0.000     .7498418    .8744626 
             | 
 _Iyear_1995 |   .8141696   .5675453     1.43   0.151    -.2981988    1.926538 
 _Iyear_1996 |    1.08234   .4613681     2.35   0.019     .1780753    1.986605 
 _Iyear_1997 |   .8555109   .4280516     2.00   0.046     .0165451    1.694477 
 _Iyear_1998 |   1.130341   .3461705     3.27   0.001     .4518596    1.808823 
 _Iyear_1999 |  -.0446805   .2500268    -0.18   0.858     -.534724    .4453629 
 _Iyear_2000 |   .2996502   .1784013     1.68   0.093      -.05001    .6493104 
 _Iyear_2001 |    .320913   .2439045     1.32   0.188    -.1571309     .798957 
 _Iyear_2002 |  -.0690745    .159515    -0.43   0.665    -.3817182    .2435692 
 _Iyear_2003 |   -.456908   .1123573    -4.07   0.000    -.6771243   -.2366917 
 _Iyear_2004 |  -.4489974   .1223526    -3.67   0.000    -.6888041   -.2091908 
 _Iyear_2005 |  -.3851688   .1202138    -3.20   0.001    -.6207836   -.1495541 
 _Iyear_2006 |  -.5212211   .1360137    -3.83   0.000     -.787803   -.2546392 
 _Iyear_2007 |  -.7976512   .1935957    -4.12   0.000    -1.177092   -.4182107 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):            132.634 
                                                   Chi-sq(40) P-val =   0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic):          3.747 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):        34.561 
                                                   Chi-sq(39) P-val =   0.6725 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                               8.564 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0034 
Regressors tested:    after_switch 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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After_switch exogenous 
 
xtivreg2 r c l.r after switch after_switch  _Iyear_* (e_inf gap der e_inf_a gap_a 
der_a e_inf_s gap_s der_s e_inf_a_s gap_a_s der_a_s = l3.inf l3.gap l3.der l6.inf 
l6.gap l6.der l9.inf l9.gap l9.der l12.inf l12.gap l12.der l3.inf_a l3.inf_s 
l3.inf_a_s l3.gap_a l3.gap_s l3.gap_a_s l3.der_a l3.der_s l3.der_a_s l6.inf_a 
l6.inf_s l6.inf_a_s l6.gap_a l6.gap_s l6.gap_a_s l6.der_a l6.der_s l6.der_a_s 
l9.inf_a l9.inf_s l9.inf_a_s l9.gap_a l9.gap_s l9.gap_a_s l9.der_a l9.der_s 
l9.der_a_s l12.inf_a l12.inf_s l12.inf_a_s l12.gap_a l12.gap_s l12.gap_a_s l12.der_a 
l12.der_s l12.der_a_s l15.inf_a l15.inf_s l15.inf_a_s l15.gap_a l15.gap_s l15.gap_a_s 
l15.der_a l15.der_s l15.der_a_s l18.inf_a l18.inf_s l18.inf_a_s l18.gap_a l18.gap_s 
l18.gap_a_s l18.der_a l18.der_s l18.der_a_s l21.inf_a l21.inf_s l21.inf_a_s l21.gap_a 
l21.gap_s l21.gap_a_s l21.der_a l21.der_s l21.der_a_s l24.inf_a l24.inf_s l24.inf_a_s 
l24.gap_a l24.gap_s l24.gap_a_s l24.der_a l24.der_s l24.der_a_s l27.inf_a l27.inf_s 
l27.inf_a_s l27.gap_a l27.gap_s l27.gap_a_s l27.der_a l27.der_s l27.der_a_s l30.inf_a 
l30.inf_s l30.inf_a_s l30.gap_a l30.gap_s l30.gap_a_s l30.der_a l30.der_s l30.der_a_s 
), fe orthog(after_switch) cue robust bw(1) 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        18                    Obs per group: min =        35 
                                                               avg =     131.1 
                                                               max =       174 
 
CUE estimation 
-------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
Statistics robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
  kernel=Bartlett; bandwidth=     1 
  time variable (t):  . 
  group variable (i): country 
 
                                                      Number of obs =     2359 
                                                      F( 29,  2312) =  1259.68 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  93674.52029                Centered R2   =   0.7637 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  93674.52029                Uncentered R2 =   0.7637 
Residual SS             =  22136.88584                Root MSE      =    3.075 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
           r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       e_inf |   .0484907   .0475815     1.02   0.308    -.0447673    .1417487 
         gap |   .1070285   .0431413     2.48   0.013     .0224731     .191584 
         der |  -.0308811   .0196678    -1.57   0.116    -.0694292     .007667 
     e_inf_a |  -.0111401   .0475542    -0.23   0.815    -.1043446    .0820644 
       gap_a |  -.0828618   .0446271    -1.86   0.063    -.1703294    .0046057 
       der_a |   .0412749   .0228988     1.80   0.071    -.0036059    .0861557 
     e_inf_s |  -.0107179   .0519654    -0.21   0.837    -.1125682    .0911325 
       gap_s |   .0416637   .0546739     0.76   0.446    -.0654953    .1488226 
       der_s |   .0160991   .0205793     0.78   0.434    -.0242356    .0564338 
   e_inf_a_s |  -.0383372   .0541301    -0.71   0.479    -.1444303    .0677559 
     gap_a_s |  -.0579538   .0559951    -1.03   0.301    -.1677021    .0517945 
     der_a_s |  -.0129844   .0243196    -0.53   0.593    -.0606498    .0346811 
             | 
           r | 
         L1. |   .9856345   .0160638    61.36   0.000       .95415    1.017119 
             | 
       after |  -.3495629   .2321004    -1.51   0.132    -.8044714    .1053456 
after_switch |   .4949307   .3366998     1.47   0.142    -.1649889     1.15485 
 _Iyear_1994 |   .0283532   .4714565     0.06   0.952    -.8956846    .9523909 
 _Iyear_1995 |  -.3362268   .4888693    -0.69   0.492    -1.294393    .6219395 
 _Iyear_1996 |  -.4434084   .3721019    -1.19   0.233    -1.172715    .2858978 
 _Iyear_1997 |  -.1602535   .3000475    -0.53   0.593    -.7483358    .4278288 
 _Iyear_1998 |   .0056439   .2722193     0.02   0.983    -.5278961     .539184 
 _Iyear_1999 |  -.2020056   .1920803    -1.05   0.293    -.5784761    .1744649 
 _Iyear_2000 |  -.1975097   .1185606    -1.67   0.096    -.4298843    .0348649 
 _Iyear_2001 |  -.2272853   .1297946    -1.75   0.080    -.4816781    .0271075 
 _Iyear_2002 |  -.1506014   .0809322    -1.86   0.063    -.3092256    .0080227 
 _Iyear_2003 |  -.2012373   .0701514    -2.87   0.004    -.3387315   -.0637432 
 _Iyear_2004 |  -.0588007   .0630252    -0.93   0.351    -.1823278    .0647265 
 _Iyear_2005 |  -.0738361   .0679721    -1.09   0.277     -.207059    .0593867 
 _Iyear_2006 |  -.1277928   .0826168    -1.55   0.122    -.2897186    .0341331 
 _Iyear_2007 |  -.1478904   .1120434    -1.32   0.187    -.3674915    .0717107 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):            271.450 
                                                   Chi-sq(91) P-val =   0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic):          3.623 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):        97.017 
                                                   Chi-sq(90) P-val =   0.2879 
-orthog- option: 
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Hansen J statistic (eqn. excluding suspect orthog. conditions):         85.676 
                                                   Chi-sq(89) P-val =   0.5801 
C statistic (exogeneity/orthogonality of suspect instruments):          11.341 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0008 
Instruments tested:   after_switch 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
 
After_switch exogenous and gap period of 3 years 
 
xtivreg2 r l.r after after_switch2  _Iyear_* (e_inf gap der e_inf_a gap_a der_a 
e_inf_s2 gap_s2 der_s2 e_inf_a2_s2 gap_a2_s2 der_a2_s2 = l3.inf l3.gap l3.der l6.inf 
l6.gap l6.der l9.inf l9.gap l9.der l12.inf l12.gap l12.der   l12.inf_a l12.inf_s2 
l12.inf_a2_s2 l12.gap_a l12.gap_s2 l12.gap_a2_s2 l12.der_a l12.der_s2 l12.der_a2_s2 
l18.inf_a l18.inf_s2 l18.inf_a2_s2 l18.gap_a l18.gap_s2 l18.gap_a2_s2 l18.der_a 
l18.der_s2 l18.der_a2_s2    l24.inf_a l24.inf_s2 l24.inf_a2_s2 l24.gap_a l24.gap_s2 
l24.gap_a2_s2 l24.der_a l24.der_s2 l24.der_a2_s2 l30.inf_a l30.inf_s2 l30.inf_a2_s2 
l30.gap_a l30.gap_s2 l30.gap_a2_s2 l30.der_a l30.der_s2 l30.der_a2_s2 l36.inf_a 
l36.inf_s2 l36.inf_a2_s2 l36.gap_a l36.gap_s2 l36.gap_a2_s2 l36.der_a l36.der_s2 
l36.der_a2_s2), fe orthog(after_switch2) cue robust bw(1) 
               _Iyear_2009 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        18                    Obs per group: min =        29 
                                                               avg =     125.4 
                                                               max =       168 
 
CUE estimation 
-------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
Statistics robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
  kernel=Bartlett; bandwidth=     1 
  time variable (t):  . 
  group variable (i): country 
 
                                                      Number of obs =     2257 
                                                      F( 28,  2211) =   956.48 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  90483.13272                Centered R2   =   0.7658 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  90483.13272                Uncentered R2 =   0.7658 
Residual SS             =   21191.3221                Root MSE      =    3.076 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
           r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       e_inf |   .0723671   .0644057     1.12   0.261    -.0538657    .1985999 
         gap |   .1406312   .0487746     2.88   0.004     .0450347    .2362277 
         der |   .0425641   .0383653     1.11   0.267    -.0326306    .1177588 
     e_inf_a |  -.0934091   .0676086    -1.38   0.167    -.2259196    .0391014 
       gap_a |  -.1385905   .0496972    -2.79   0.005    -.2359952   -.0411858 
       der_a |  -.0570708    .040128    -1.42   0.155    -.1357203    .0215787 
    e_inf_s2 |  -.0800971   .0718242    -1.12   0.265    -.2208699    .0606756 
      gap_s2 |  -.0481618   .1177997    -0.41   0.683     -.279045    .1827214 
      der_s2 |  -.0234911   .0542067    -0.43   0.665    -.1297343    .0827522 
 e_inf_a2_s2 |   .0842237   .0775486     1.09   0.277    -.0677688    .2362163 
   gap_a2_s2 |   .0486834   .1177939     0.41   0.679    -.1821885    .2795553 
   der_a2_s2 |   .0499085   .0553942     0.90   0.368    -.0586622    .1584793 
             | 
           r | 
         L1. |   .9902524   .0189664    52.21   0.000     .9530791    1.027426 
             | 
       after |   .4025657   .3214809     1.25   0.210    -.2275254    1.032657 
after_swit~2 |  -.0531238   .1990859    -0.27   0.790     -.443325    .3370773 
 _Iyear_1995 |   .3491062   .5189275     0.67   0.501     -.667973    1.366185 
 _Iyear_1996 |   .0927187    .455372     0.20   0.839    -.7997941    .9852315 
 _Iyear_1997 |   .3615707   .4412597     0.82   0.413    -.5032824    1.226424 
 _Iyear_1998 |  -.1681852   .3342351    -0.50   0.615    -.8232739    .4869035 
 _Iyear_1999 |   .1019094   .2666036     0.38   0.702     -.420624    .6244428 
 _Iyear_2000 |  -.2027861   .1628018    -1.25   0.213    -.5218718    .1162997 
 _Iyear_2001 |  -.3850583   .1635646    -2.35   0.019     -.705639   -.0644777 
 _Iyear_2002 |  -.1032703   .1093149    -0.94   0.345    -.3175236    .1109829 
 _Iyear_2003 |  -.2108777   .0729754    -2.89   0.004    -.3539069   -.0678486 
 _Iyear_2004 |  -.0355701   .0514003    -0.69   0.489    -.1363127    .0651725 
 _Iyear_2005 |  -.0142028   .0583046    -0.24   0.808    -.1284777     .100072 
 _Iyear_2006 |  -.0036997   .0748192    -0.05   0.961    -.1503427    .1429433 
 _Iyear_2007 |   .0395849   .1076549     0.37   0.713    -.1714148    .2505846 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):             94.701 
                                                   Chi-sq(46) P-val =   0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic):          1.801 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):        54.769 
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                                                   Chi-sq(45) P-val =   0.1509 
-orthog- option: 
Hansen J statistic (eqn. excluding suspect orthog. conditions):         53.973 
                                                   Chi-sq(44) P-val =   0.1441 
C statistic (exogeneity/orthogonality of suspect instruments):           0.796 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.3723 
Instruments tested:   after_switch2 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
SAMPLE SIZE 
 
xtivreg2 r after  l.r  _Iyear_* (e_inf gap der after_switch e_inf_a gap_a der_a 
e_inf_s gap_s der_s e_inf_a_s gap_a_s der_a_s = l3.inf l3.gap l3.der l6.inf l6.gap 
l6.der l9.inf l9.gap l9.der l12.inf l12.gap l12.der l15.inf l15.gap l15.der l18.inf 
l18.gap l18.der l21.inf l21.gap l21.der l24.inf l24.gap l24.der l3.inf_a l3.inf_s 
l3.inf_a_s l3.gap_a l3.gap_s l3.gap_a_s l3.der_a l3.der_s l3.der_a_s l6.inf_a 
l6.inf_s l6.inf_a_s l6.gap_a l6.gap_s l6.gap_a_s l6.der_a l6.der_s l6.der_a_s 
l9.inf_a l9.inf_s l9.inf_a_s l9.gap_a l9.gap_s l9.gap_a_s l9.der_a l9.der_s 
l9.der_a_s l12.inf_a l12.inf_s l12.inf_a_s l12.gap_a l12.gap_s l12.gap_a_s l12.der_a 
l12.der_s l12.der_a_s l15.inf_a l15.inf_s l15.inf_a_s l15.gap_a l15.gap_s l15.gap_a_s 
l15.der_a l15.der_s l15.der_a_s l24.inf_a l24.inf_s l24.inf_a_s l24.gap_a l24.gap_s 
l24.gap_a_s l24.der_a l24.der_s l24.der_a_s dc100 l.dc100 ccg l.ccg nfa l.nfa), fe 
endog(after_switch) cue robust bw(1) 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        14                    Obs per group: min =        41 
                                                               avg =     127.6 
                                                               max =       180 
 
CUE estimation 
-------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
Statistics robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
  kernel=Bartlett; bandwidth=     1 
  time variable (t):  . 
  group variable (i): country 
 
                                                      Number of obs =     1787 
                                                      F( 29,  1744) =  1360.73 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  65870.76538                Centered R2   =   0.7216 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  65870.76538                Uncentered R2 =   0.7216 
Residual SS             =  18341.41835                Root MSE      =    3.216 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
           r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       e_inf |   .0057717   .0300317     0.19   0.848    -.0530893    .0646327 
         gap |   .0419571   .0269427     1.56   0.119    -.0108497    .0947639 
         der |   .0062262   .0209196     0.30   0.766    -.0347754    .0472278 
after_switch |   .5982343   .2810261     2.13   0.033     .0474333    1.149035 
     e_inf_a |   .0282807    .031112     0.91   0.363    -.0326976     .089259 
       gap_a |  -.0165373   .0298891    -0.55   0.580    -.0751189    .0420443 
       der_a |   .0155443   .0258956     0.60   0.548    -.0352101    .0662987 
     e_inf_s |   .0752214   .0311973     2.41   0.016     .0140758    .1363671 
       gap_s |   .0578428   .0381085     1.52   0.129    -.0168485    .1325342 
       der_s |  -.0347541   .0244576    -1.42   0.155    -.0826901    .0131819 
   e_inf_a_s |  -.1278614   .0369175    -3.46   0.001    -.2002184   -.0555044 
     gap_a_s |  -.0765738   .0402281    -1.90   0.057    -.1554194    .0022717 
     der_a_s |   .0292213   .0295141     0.99   0.322    -.0286252    .0870678 
       after |  -.2615189   .2673879    -1.73   0.084    -.9855895    .0625518 
             | 
           r | 
         L1. |   .9480729    .016362    57.94   0.000      .916004    .9801417 
             | 
 _Iyear_1994 |  -.5494123   .5048207    -1.09   0.276    -1.538843    .4400182 
 _Iyear_1995 |   .3379422   .3794811     0.89   0.373    -.4058271    1.081712 
 _Iyear_1996 |   -.430576   .2896362    -1.49   0.137    -.9982526    .1371006 
 _Iyear_1997 |  -.3321357   .3246092    -1.02   0.306     -.968358    .3040866 
 _Iyear_1998 |   .1858124   .2513628     0.74   0.460    -.3068496    .6784744 
 _Iyear_1999 |  -.4450535    .176917    -2.52   0.012    -.7918045   -.0983026 
 _Iyear_2000 |  -.0144689   .1180912    -0.12   0.902    -.2459234    .2169856 
 _Iyear_2001 |   .0321105   .1510851     0.21   0.832    -.2640109    .3282319 
 _Iyear_2002 |  -.0301583   .1101476    -0.27   0.784    -.2460436     .185727 
 _Iyear_2003 |  -.2071146   .0939262    -2.21   0.027    -.3912066   -.0230226 
 _Iyear_2004 |  -.0704117   .0884742    -0.80   0.426    -.2438179    .1029946 
 _Iyear_2005 |  -.0786768   .0946999    -0.83   0.406    -.2642851    .1069316 
 _Iyear_2006 |  -.1267556   .1126541    -1.13   0.261    -.3475537    .0940424 
 _Iyear_2007 |  -.1311223   .1493654    -0.88   0.380    -.4238731    .1616286 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):            190.645 
                                                   Chi-sq(72) P-val =   0.0000 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic):          3.766 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):        85.854 
                                                   Chi-sq(71) P-val =   0.1105 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                               2.645 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.1097 
Regressors tested:    after_switch 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
GMM estimates – ―robustness-checks‖ regressions II 
 
LAGGED INFLATION 
 
xtivreg2 r l.r l12.inf l12.inf_a l12.inf_s l12.inf_a_s after  _Iyear_* (e_inf gap der 
after_switch e_inf_a gap_a der_a e_inf_s gap_s der_s e_inf_a_s gap_a_s der_a_s = 
l3.inf l3.gap l3.der l6.inf l6.gap l6.der l9.inf l9.gap l9.der l12.inf l12.gap 
l12.der l3.inf_a l3.inf_s l3.inf_a_s l3.gap_a l3.gap_s l3.gap_a_s l3.der_a l3.der_s 
l3.der_a_s l6.inf_a l6.inf_s l6.inf_a_s l6.gap_a l6.gap_s l6.gap_a_s l6.der_a 
l6.der_s l6.der_a_s l9.inf_a l9.inf_s l9.inf_a_s l9.gap_a l9.gap_s l9.gap_a_s 
l9.der_a l9.der_s l9.der_a_s l12.inf_a l12.inf_s l12.inf_a_s l12.gap_a l12.gap_s 
l12.gap_a_s l12.der_a l12.der_s l12.der_a_s l15.inf_a l15.inf_s l15.inf_a_s l15.gap_a 
l15.gap_s l15.gap_a_s l15.der_a l15.der_s l15.der_a_s l18.inf_a l18.inf_s l18.inf_a_s 
l18.gap_a l18.gap_s l18.gap_a_s l18.der_a l18.der_s l18.der_a_s l21.inf_a l21.inf_s 
l21.inf_a_s l21.gap_a l21.gap_s l21.gap_a_s l21.der_a l21.der_s l21.der_a_s l24.inf_a 
l24.inf_s l24.inf_a_s l24.gap_a l24.gap_s l24.gap_a_s l24.der_a l24.der_s l24.der_a_s 
dc100 l.dc100 ccg l.ccg nfa l.nfa), fe endog(after_switch) cue robust bw(1) 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        18                    Obs per group: min =        41 
                                                               avg =     136.2 
                                                               max =       180 
 
CUE estimation 
-------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
Statistics robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
  kernel=Bartlett; bandwidth=     1 
  time variable (t):  . 
  group variable (i): country 
 
                                                      Number of obs =     2452 
                                                      F( 33,  2401) =   932.92 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  99242.51041                Centered R2   =   0.7609 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  99242.51041                Uncentered R2 =   0.7609 
Residual SS             =  23730.70806                Root MSE      =    3.122 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
           r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       e_inf |   .0521272   .0718221     0.73   0.468    -.0886415    .1928959 
         gap |   .0841295   .0391897     2.15   0.032     .0073191    .1609399 
         der |  -.0312143   .0279493    -1.12   0.264    -.0859939    .0235654 
after_switch |    1.50783   .5448341     2.77   0.006     .4399749    2.575685 
     e_inf_a |   .0164649    .055291     0.30   0.766    -.0919034    .1248332 
       gap_a |  -.0559134   .0415959    -1.34   0.179    -.1374399    .0256132 
       der_a |   .0493481   .0342202     1.44   0.149    -.0177223    .1164185 
     e_inf_s |   .0471199    .087027     0.54   0.588    -.1234498    .2176896 
       gap_s |    .037979   .0524694     0.72   0.469    -.0648591    .1408172 
       der_s |   .0124925   .0305704     0.41   0.683    -.0474243    .0724093 
   e_inf_a_s |  -.1764988   .0786448    -2.24   0.025    -.3306399   -.0223578 
     gap_a_s |  -.0611875   .0537647    -1.14   0.255    -.1665644    .0441894 
     der_a_s |  -.0154348   .0378543    -0.41   0.683    -.0896278    .0587582 
             | 
           r | 
         L1. |   .9643444    .021525    44.80   0.000     .9221562    1.006533 
             | 
         inf | 
        L12. |   -1.88119     3.6973    -0.51   0.611    -9.127766    5.365386 
             | 
       inf_a | 
        L12. |   2.894436     4.0852     0.71   0.479     -5.11241    10.90128 
             | 
       inf_s | 
        L12. |  -.0186438   .0471386    -0.40   0.692    -.1110338    .0737462 
             | 
     inf_a_s | 
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        L12. |  -.0208243   .0472718    -0.44   0.660    -.1134753    .0718268 
             | 
       after |  -.6552752   .4601981    -1.42   0.154    -1.557247    .2466966 
 _Iyear_1994 |    .132265   .5163486     0.26   0.798    -.8797598     1.14429 
 _Iyear_1995 |   .0526487   .5421019     0.10   0.923    -1.009851    1.115149 
 _Iyear_1996 |  -.0529808   .4026701    -0.13   0.895    -.8421997    .7362381 
 _Iyear_1997 |   .2241468   .3563067     0.63   0.529    -.4742016    .9224951 
 _Iyear_1998 |   .4815466   .3753262     1.28   0.199    -.2540792    1.217172 
 _Iyear_1999 |   .0829931   .2570684     0.32   0.747    -.4208518     .586838 
 _Iyear_2000 |   .0441149   .1431534     0.31   0.758    -.2364606    .3246905 
 _Iyear_2001 |  -.0439393   .1711787    -0.26   0.797    -.3794433    .2915647 
 _Iyear_2002 |  -.0513015   .0997062    -0.51   0.607    -.2467219     .144119 
 _Iyear_2003 |  -.2034887    .083622    -2.43   0.015    -.3673849   -.0395925 
 _Iyear_2004 |  -.0472262   .0840784    -0.56   0.574    -.2120169    .1175645 
 _Iyear_2005 |  -.0939503   .0924143    -1.02   0.309    -.2750789    .0871784 
 _Iyear_2006 |   -.181795   .1189085    -1.53   0.126    -.4148514    .0512613 
 _Iyear_2007 |  -.1402084   .1814569    -0.77   0.440    -.4958573    .2154406 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):            226.548 
                                                   Chi-sq(74) P-val =   0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic):          3.504 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):        80.757 
                                                   Chi-sq(73) P-val =   0.2497 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                               6.167 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0130 
Regressors tested:    after_switch 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
RESERVES GROWTH 
 
xtivreg2 r l.r after _Iyear_* (e_inf gap der dres after_switch e_inf_a gap_a der_a 
dres_a e_inf_s gap_s der_s dres_s e_inf_a_s gap_a_s der_a_s dres_a_s = l3.inf l3.gap 
l3.der l3.dres l6.inf l6.gap l6.der l6.dres l9.inf l9.gap l9.der l9.dres l12.inf 
l12.gap l12.der l12.dres l3.inf_a l3.inf_s l3.inf_a_s l3.gap_a l3.gap_s l3.gap_a_s 
l3.der_a l3.der_s l3.der_a_s l3.dres_a l3.dres_s l3.dres_a_s l6.inf_a l6.inf_s 
l6.inf_a_s l6.gap_a l6.gap_s l6.gap_a_s l6.der_a l6.der_s l6.der_a_s l6.dres_a 
l6.dres_s l6.dres_a_s l9.inf_a l9.inf_s l9.inf_a_s l9.gap_a l9.gap_s l9.gap_a_s 
l9.der_a l9.der_s l9.der_a_s l9.dres_a l9.dres_s l9.dres_a_s l12.inf_a l12.inf_s 
l12.inf_a_s l12.gap_a l12.gap_s l12.gap_a_s l12.der_a l12.der_s l12.der_a_s 
l12.dres_a l12.dres_s l12.dres_a_s l15.inf_a l15.inf_s l15.inf_a_s l15.gap_a 
l15.gap_s l15.gap_a_s l15.der_a l15.der_s l15.der_a_s l15.dres_a l15.dres_s 
l15.dres_a_s l18.inf_a l18.inf_s l18.inf_a_s l18.gap_a l18.gap_s l18.gap_a_s 
l18.der_a l18.der_s l18.der_a_s l18.dres_a l18.dres_s l18.dres_a_s l21.inf_a 
l21.inf_s l21.inf_a_s l21.gap_a l21.gap_s l21.gap_a_s l21.der_a l21.der_s l21.der_a_s 
l21.dres_a l21.dres_s l21.dres_a_s l24.inf_a l24.inf_s l24.inf_a_s l24.gap_a 
l24.gap_s l24.gap_a_s l24.der_a l24.der_s l24.der_a_s l24.dres_a l24.dres_s 
l24.dres_a_s dc100 l.dc100 ccg l.ccg nfa l.nfa), fe endog(after_switch) cue robust 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        18                    Obs per group: min =        41 
                                                               avg =     136.2 
                                                               max =       180 
 
CUE estimation 
-------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
Statistics robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
  kernel=Bartlett; bandwidth=     1 
  time variable (t):  . 
  group variable (i): country 
 
                                                      Number of obs =     2452 
                                                      F( 33,  2405) =  1244.07 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  99242.51041                Centered R2   =   0.7580 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  99242.51041                Uncentered R2 =   0.7580 
Residual SS             =   24020.1389                Root MSE      =    3.141 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
           r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       e_inf |   .1674617   .0593858     2.82   0.005     .0510677    .2838558 
         gap |   .0885429   .0269093     3.29   0.001     .0358016    .1412842 
         der |  -.0013716   .0175316    -0.08   0.938    -.0357328    .0329896 
        dres |  -.0386779   .0101854    -3.80   0.000    -.0586409   -.0187149 
after_switch |   1.992909   .5232932     3.81   0.000      .967273    3.018544 
     e_inf_a |  -.1513319   .0508437    -2.98   0.003    -.2509836   -.0516801 
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       gap_a |  -.0592448   .0294365    -2.01   0.044    -.1169393   -.0015503 
       der_a |   .0159584   .0207085     0.77   0.441    -.0246295    .0565463 
      dres_a |   .0438545   .0106117     4.13   0.000      .023056     .064653 
     e_inf_s |  -.1269311   .0667783    -1.90   0.057    -.2578141    .0039519 
       gap_s |   .1297136   .0387916     3.34   0.001     .0536835    .2057436 
       der_s |   .0228311   .0224871     1.02   0.310    -.0212427    .0669049 
      dres_s |   .0398755   .0120994     3.30   0.001     .0161611      .06359 
   e_inf_a_s |   .0308215   .0637418     0.48   0.629    -.0941101    .1557531 
     gap_a_s |  -.1443775   .0386089    -3.74   0.000    -.2200496   -.0687053 
     der_a_s |  -.0255862   .0255559    -1.00   0.317    -.0756749    .0245025 
    dres_a_s |  -.0469041   .0127117    -3.69   0.000    -.0718187   -.0219896 
           r | 
         L1. |    .969786   .0114535    84.67   0.000     .9473376    .9922344 
       after |   -1.39131   .3561964    -3.91   0.000    -2.089442   -.6931777 
 _Iyear_1994 |   .0283532   .4714565     0.06   0.952    -.8956846    .9523909 
 _Iyear_1995 |  -.3362268   .4888693    -0.69   0.492    -1.294393    .6219395 
 _Iyear_1996 |  -.4434084   .3721019    -1.19   0.233    -1.172715    .2858978 
 _Iyear_1997 |  -.1602535   .3000475    -0.53   0.593    -.7483358    .4278288 
 _Iyear_1998 |   .0056439   .2722193     0.02   0.983    -.5278961     .539184 
 _Iyear_1999 |  -.2020056   .1920803    -1.05   0.293    -.5784761    .1744649 
 _Iyear_2000 |  -.1975097   .1185606    -1.67   0.096    -.4298843    .0348649 
 _Iyear_2001 |  -.2272853   .1297946    -1.75   0.080    -.4816781    .0271075 
 _Iyear_2002 |  -.1506014   .0809322    -1.86   0.063    -.3092256    .0080227 
 _Iyear_2003 |  -.2012373   .0701514    -2.87   0.004    -.3387315   -.0637432 
 _Iyear_2004 |  -.0588007   .0630252    -0.93   0.351    -.1823278    .0647265 
 _Iyear_2005 |  -.0738361   .0679721    -1.09   0.277     -.207059    .0593867 
 _Iyear_2006 |  -.1277928   .0826168    -1.55   0.122    -.2897186    .0341331 
 _Iyear_2007 |  -.1478904   .1120434    -1.32   0.187    -.3674915    .0717107 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):            181.335 
                                                   Chi-sq(102) P-val =  0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic):          3.208 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):       114.562 
                                                   Chi-sq(101) P-val =  0.2899 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                               5.734 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0086 
Regressors tested:    after_switch 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
NFA to GDP 
 
xtivreg2 r l.r nfa nfa_a nfa_s nfa_a_s after  _Iyear_* (e_inf gap der after_switch 
e_inf_a gap_a der_a e_inf_s gap_s der_s e_inf_a_s gap_a_s der_a_s = l3.inf l3.gap 
l3.der l6.inf l6.gap l6.der l9.inf l9.gap l9.der l12.inf l12.gap l12.der l3.inf_a 
l3.inf_s l3.inf_a_s l3.gap_a l3.gap_s l3.gap_a_s l3.der_a l3.der_s l3.der_a_s 
l6.inf_a l6.inf_s l6.inf_a_s l6.gap_a l6.gap_s l6.gap_a_s l6.der_a l6.der_s 
l6.der_a_s l9.inf_a l9.inf_s l9.inf_a_s l9.gap_a l9.gap_s l9.gap_a_s l9.der_a 
l9.der_s l9.der_a_s l12.inf_a l12.inf_s l12.inf_a_s l12.gap_a l12.gap_s l12.gap_a_s 
l12.der_a l12.der_s l12.der_a_s l15.inf_a l15.inf_s l15.inf_a_s l15.gap_a l15.gap_s 
l15.gap_a_s l15.der_a l15.der_s l15.der_a_s l18.inf_a l18.inf_s l18.inf_a_s l18.gap_a 
l18.gap_s l18.gap_a_s l18.der_a l18.der_s l18.der_a_s l21.inf_a l21.inf_s l21.inf_a_s 
l21.gap_a l21.gap_s l21.gap_a_s l21.der_a l21.der_s l21.der_a_s l24.inf_a l24.inf_s 
l24.inf_a_s l24.gap_a l24.gap_s l24.gap_a_s l24.der_a l24.der_s l24.der_a_s dc100 
l.dc100 ccg l.ccg), fe endog(after_switch) cue robust bw(1) 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        18                    Obs per group: min =        41 
                                                               avg =     136.2 
                                                               max =       180 
 
CUE estimation 
-------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
Statistics robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
  kernel=Bartlett; bandwidth=     1 
  time variable (t):  . 
  group variable (i): country 
 
                                                      Number of obs =     2452 
                                                      F( 33,  2401) =  1039.88 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  99242.51041                Centered R2   =   0.7553 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  99242.51041                Uncentered R2 =   0.7553 
Residual SS             =   24286.0814                Root MSE      =    3.159 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
           r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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       e_inf |  -.0141061   .0621169    -0.23   0.820     -.135853    .1076409 
         gap |   .0536146   .0411094     1.30   0.192    -.0269583    .1341876 
         der |  -.0578651    .027255    -2.12   0.034    -.1112839   -.0044463 
after_switch |   1.648584   1.085824     1.52   0.100    -.4795918     3.77676 
     e_inf_a |    .118276   .0547081     2.16   0.031     .0110502    .2255019 
       gap_a |  -.0290845   .0432228    -0.67   0.501    -.1137995    .0556306 
       der_a |   .1064348   .0338234     3.15   0.002     .0401422    .1727274 
     e_inf_s |   .0939065   .0823302     1.14   0.254    -.0674577    .2552707 
       gap_s |   .0445108    .052239     0.85   0.394    -.0578758    .1468975 
       der_s |   .0480307   .0284629     1.69   0.092    -.0077555     .103817 
   e_inf_a_s |  -.2112366   .0721198    -2.93   0.003    -.3525889   -.0698843 
     gap_a_s |   -.062316   .0539531    -1.16   0.248    -.1680621    .0434301 
     der_a_s |  -.0823177    .036154    -2.28   0.023    -.1531782   -.0114572 
           r | 
         L1. |     .91239    .022348    40.83   0.000     .8685889    .9561912 
         nfa |  -.0059718   .0977674    -0.06   0.951    -.1975925    .1856488 
       nfa_a |   .0141338    .092836     0.15   0.879    -.1678215    .1960891 
       nfa_s |   .0115406   .1019342     0.11   0.910    -.1882468    .2113281 
     nfa_a_s |  -.0239091   .1052692    -0.23   0.820     -.230233    .1824147 
       after |  -.6222634   .7108014    -0.88   0.381    -2.015408    .7708817 
 _Iyear_1994 |   .5809987   .6471196     0.90   0.369    -.6873323     1.84933 
 _Iyear_1995 |   .8353883   .6243122     1.34   0.181    -.3882412    2.059018 
 _Iyear_1996 |    .349432   .4852784     0.72   0.471    -.6016962     1.30056 
 _Iyear_1997 |   .4086554   .3967321     1.03   0.303    -.3689252    1.186236 
 _Iyear_1998 |   .6557616   .3434665     1.91   0.056    -.0174205    1.328944 
 _Iyear_1999 |  -.0559234   .2079532    -0.27   0.788    -.4635043    .3516574 
 _Iyear_2000 |   .0606224   .1478614     0.41   0.682    -.2291807    .3504255 
 _Iyear_2001 |   .0164078   .1696396     0.10   0.923    -.3160797    .3488953 
 _Iyear_2002 |   -.174255   .0932936    -1.87   0.062    -.3571071    .0085972 
 _Iyear_2003 |  -.2740596   .0872068    -3.14   0.002    -.4449817   -.1031374 
 _Iyear_2004 |  -.2446399   .0822991    -2.97   0.003    -.4059432   -.0833367 
 _Iyear_2005 |  -.2665909   .0948105    -2.81   0.005     -.452416   -.0807658 
 _Iyear_2006 |  -.3747586   .1221032    -3.07   0.002    -.6140765   -.1354406 
 _Iyear_2007 |   -.400261   .1829405    -2.19   0.029    -.7588177   -.0417043 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):            173.018 
                                                   Chi-sq(76) P-val =   0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic):          3.344 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):        90.832 
                                                   Chi-sq(75) P-val =   0.1029 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                               7.515 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0061 
Regressors tested:    after_switch 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
MONEY GROWTH 
 
xtivreg2 r l.r after  _Iyear_* (e_inf gap der dm2 after_switch e_inf_a gap_a der_a 
dm2_a e_inf_s gap_s der_s dm2_s e_inf_a_s gap_a_s der_a_s dm2_a_s = l3.inf l3.gap 
l3.der l3.dm2 l6.inf l6.gap l6.der l6.dm2 l9.inf l9.gap l9.der l9.dm2 l12.inf l12.gap 
l12.der l12.dm2 l3.inf_a l3.inf_s l3.inf_a_s l3.gap_a l3.gap_s l3.gap_a_s l3.der_a 
l3.der_s l3.der_a_s l3.dm2_a l3.dm2_s l3.dm2_a_s l6.inf_a l6.inf_s l6.inf_a_s 
l6.gap_a l6.gap_s l6.gap_a_s l6.der_a l6.der_s l6.der_a_s l6.dm2_a l6.dm2_s 
l6.dm2_a_s l9.inf_a l9.inf_s l9.inf_a_s l9.gap_a l9.gap_s l9.gap_a_s l9.der_a 
l9.der_s l9.der_a_s l9.dm2_a l9.dm2_s l9.dm2_a_s l12.inf_a l12.inf_s l12.inf_a_s 
l12.gap_a l12.gap_s l12.gap_a_s l12.der_a l12.der_s l12.der_a_s l12.dm2_a l12.dm2_s 
l12.dm2_a_s l15.inf_a l15.inf_s l15.inf_a_s l15.gap_a l15.gap_s l15.gap_a_s l15.der_a 
l15.der_s l15.der_a_s l15.dm2_a l15.dm2_s l15.dm2_a_s l18.inf_a l18.inf_s l18.inf_a_s 
l18.gap_a l18.gap_s l18.gap_a_s l18.der_a l18.der_s l18.der_a_s l18.dm2_a l18.dm2_s 
l18.dm2_a_s l21.inf_a l21.inf_s l21.inf_a_s l21.gap_a l21.gap_s l21.gap_a_s l21.der_a 
l21.der_s l21.der_a_s l21.dm2_a l21.dm2_s l21.dm2_a_s l24.inf_a l24.inf_s l24.inf_a_s 
l24.gap_a l24.gap_s l24.gap_a_s l24.der_a l24.der_s l24.der_a_s l24.dm2_a l24.dm2_s 
l24.dm2_a_s dc100 l.dc100 ccg l.ccg nfa l.nfa), fe endog(after_switch) cue robust 
bw(1) 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        18                    Obs per group: min =        41 
                                                               avg =     127.6 
                                                               max =       180 
 
CUE estimation 
-------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
Statistics robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
  kernel=Bartlett; bandwidth=     1 
  time variable (t):  . 
  group variable (i): country 
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                                                      Number of obs =     2297 
                                                      F( 33,  2246) =  1099.59 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  96688.54277                Centered R2   =   0.7554 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  96688.54277                Uncentered R2 =   0.7554 
Residual SS             =  23650.71604                Root MSE      =    3.221 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
           r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       e_inf |   .0251985   .0583834     0.43   0.666    -.0892309    .1396279 
         gap |   .0692428   .0474402     1.46   0.144    -.0237383    .1622239 
         der |  -.1110365   .0496666    -2.24   0.025    -.2083812   -.0136919 
         dm2 |  -.0719158   .0332678    -1.16   0.131    -.1371194   -.0067121 
after_switch |   3.242678   1.033742     3.14   0.002     1.216581    5.268775 
     e_inf_a |   .0232634   .0432436     0.54   0.591    -.0614925    .1080194 
       gap_a |  -.0465438   .0489274    -0.95   0.341    -.1424397    .0493521 
       der_a |   .1268657   .0508038     2.50   0.013     .0272921    .2264393 
       dm2_a |   .0768671    .034176     2.25   0.025     .0098835    .1438508 
     e_inf_s |   .0027383   .0678933     0.04   0.968    -.1303301    .1358067 
       gap_s |   .0412204   .0581355     0.71   0.478     -.072723    .1551638 
       der_s |   .1046936    .050463     2.07   0.038     .0057881    .2035992 
       dm2_s |   .0820515    .035473     2.31   0.021     .0125257    .1515774 
   e_inf_a_s |  -.0503366   .0596022    -0.84   0.398    -.1671548    .0664816 
     gap_a_s |  -.0566336   .0596451    -0.95   0.342    -.1735359    .0602687 
     der_a_s |  -.1044122   .0521626    -2.00   0.045    -.2066491   -.0021753 
     dm2_a_s |  -.0724188   .0369583    -1.96   0.050    -.1448557    .0000181 
             | 
           r | 
         L1. |    .962427   .0171398    56.15   0.000     .9288336    .9960204 
             | 
       after |  -2.567001    .936698    -3.30   0.001    -4.926888   -1.255099 
 _Iyear_1994 |   .4116847   .4901422     0.84   0.401    -.5489765    1.372346 
 _Iyear_1995 |   .1843655   .4857189     0.38   0.704     -.767626    1.136357 
 _Iyear_1996 |  -.2034662   .4031923    -0.50   0.614    -.9937085    .5867761 
 _Iyear_1997 |   .0001176   .3413668     0.00   1.000     -.668949    .6691841 
 _Iyear_1998 |   .0851775   .3049933     0.28   0.780    -.5125984    .6829534 
 _Iyear_1999 |  -.5618891   .2154762    -2.61   0.009    -.9842147   -.1395635 
 _Iyear_2000 |  -.1105133   .1440825    -0.77   0.443    -.3929099    .1718832 
 _Iyear_2001 |  -.1611231   .1256749    -1.28   0.200    -.4074414    .0851952 
 _Iyear_2002 |  -.1510089   .0828991    -1.82   0.069    -.3134882    .0114704 
 _Iyear_2003 |  -.2116441   .0751998    -2.81   0.005     -.359033   -.0642552 
 _Iyear_2004 |  -.0769201   .0713052    -1.08   0.281    -.2166757    .0628355 
 _Iyear_2005 |  -.1244375   .0768399    -1.62   0.105    -.2750408    .0261659 
 _Iyear_2006 |   -.204704    .097006    -2.11   0.035    -.3948324   -.0145757 
 _Iyear_2007 |  -.2072578   .1462973    -1.42   0.157    -.4939952    .0794796 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):            289.690 
                                                   Chi-sq(102) P-val =  0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic):          3.599 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):       102.503 
                                                   Chi-sq(101) P-val =  0.4395 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                               3.033 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0816 
Regressors tested:    after_switch 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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A4.4. Markov-switching regressions printouts 
BRAZIL 
 
---------- EM algorithm converged  ----------------- 
 
EQ( 1) MSIAH(2)-VAR(2) model of (R,INF,GAP,DER) 
       Estimation sample: 1997 (3) - 2009 (11) 
 
no. obs. per eq. :        153    in the system :        612     
no. parameters   :         94    linear system :         46     
no. restrictions :         46 
no. nuisance p.  :          2 
 
log-likelihood   : -1018.6374    linear system : -1324.4120   
 
AIC criterion    :    14.5443    linear system :    17.9139  
HQ  criterion    :    15.3006    linear system :    18.2840  
SC  criterion    :    16.4061    linear system :    18.8250 
 
LR linearity test:   611.5492    Chi(46) =[0.0000] **  Chi(48)=[0.0000] **  
DAVIES=[0.0000] **   
 
 
---------- matrix of transition probabilities ------ 
 
          Regime 1  Regime 2 
Regime 1    0.9280    0.0720 
Regime 2    0.3055    0.6945 
 
 
---------- regime properties ---------------------- 
 
              nObs     Prob.  Duration 
Regime 1     123.3    0.8092     13.88 
Regime 2      29.7    0.1908      3.27 
 
---------- coefficients ---------------------------- 
 
Regime 1 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.1)   0.033154   0.168361  -0.553003   1.534342 
R_1            1.512062   0.069416   0.335569   1.003813 
R_2           -0.525981  -0.058649  -0.220665  -0.783839 
INF_1          0.175150   1.437353   0.074139  -3.569524 
INF_2         -0.151178  -0.498899  -0.294670   2.715308 
GAP_1          0.002934   0.011779   0.923980  -0.086204 
GAP_2          0.023590  -0.000248  -0.095653   0.030469 
DER_1          0.000792   0.008877  -0.058029   1.043764 
DER_2         -0.000830  -0.002336   0.042139  -0.094434 
  SE (Reg.1)   0.248176   0.305073   1.926828   6.422228 
 
Regime 2 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.2)  14.862039   0.115156  12.522609  17.386301 
R_1            0.929438   0.000072  -0.198798  -0.883794 
R_2           -0.330997  -0.012328  -0.141222   0.823676 
INF_1         -0.676104   1.469799   1.837244   7.341208 
INF_2          0.196058  -0.485726  -2.223535  -8.580672 
GAP_1          0.174028   0.026013   0.083472  -1.620546 
GAP_2          0.400754  -0.003094  -0.440230   1.384143 
DER_1          0.103100   0.014683  -0.079141   0.660120 
DER_2         -0.114843   0.005402  -0.015969  -0.066849 
  SE (Reg.2)   4.399023   0.524573   2.035960  12.752958 
 
---------- contemporaneous correlation ------------- 
 
Regime 1 
            R       INF       GAP       DER 
R      1.0000   -0.0863    0.0518    0.1825 
INF   -0.0863    1.0000    0.1560    0.0816 
GAP    0.0518    0.1560    1.0000    0.0053 
DER    0.1825    0.0816    0.0053    1.0000 
 
Regime 2 
            R       INF       GAP       DER 
R      1.0000    0.0447   -0.4031    0.0449 
INF    0.0447    1.0000   -0.1612    0.2965 
GAP   -0.4031   -0.1612    1.0000   -0.1629 
DER    0.0449    0.2965   -0.1629    1.0000 
 
---------- standard errors ------------------------- 
 
Regime 0 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
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Const(Reg.1)     0.0989     0.1204     0.7558     2.5523 
R_1              0.0354     0.0453     0.2726     1.0342 
R_2              0.0298     0.0384     0.2293     0.8772 
INF_1            0.0547     0.0665     0.4172     1.4799 
INF_2            0.0505     0.0612     0.3841     1.3336 
GAP_1            0.0084     0.0103     0.0648     0.2166 
GAP_2            0.0087     0.0107     0.0672     0.2255 
DER_1            0.0030     0.0036     0.0229     0.0828 
DER_2            0.0031     0.0039     0.0241     0.0865 
 
Regime 1 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.2)     4.8523     0.5705     2.2252    13.8530 
R_1              0.1679     0.0199     0.0772     0.4846 
R_2              0.1667     0.0197     0.0766     0.4786 
INF_1            2.1196     0.2430     0.9518     5.8957 
INF_2            2.2424     0.2571     1.0062     6.2375 
GAP_1            0.5176     0.0615     0.2391     1.4850 
GAP_2            0.5321     0.0627     0.2461     1.5184 
DER_1            0.0814     0.0095     0.0371     0.2297 
DER_2            0.0741     0.0088     0.0342     0.2192 
 
---------- t - values ------------------------------ 
 
Regime 0 
                     R       INF       GAP       DER 
Const(Reg.1)    0.3352    1.3983   -0.7316    0.6012 
R_1            42.7170    1.5328    1.2310    0.9707 
R_2           -17.6645   -1.5266   -0.9624   -0.8935 
INF_1           3.2013   21.6214    0.1777   -2.4120 
INF_2          -2.9925   -8.1576   -0.7671    2.0360 
GAP_1           0.3513    1.1462   14.2687   -0.3981 
GAP_2           2.7239   -0.0233   -1.4240    0.1351 
DER_1           0.2663    2.4326   -2.5373   12.6130 
DER_2          -0.2642   -0.6039    1.7464   -1.0922 
 
Regime 1 
                     R       INF       GAP       DER 
Const(Reg.2)    3.0629    0.2018    5.6275    1.2551 
R_1             5.5343    0.0036   -2.5753   -1.8236 
R_2            -1.9855   -0.6255   -1.8445    1.7211 
INF_1          -0.3190    6.0495    1.9304    1.2452 
INF_2           0.0874   -1.8891   -2.2099   -1.3757 
GAP_1           0.3362    0.4232    0.3492   -1.0913 
GAP_2           0.7532   -0.0493   -1.7887    0.9116 
DER_1           1.2666    1.5475   -2.1311    2.8741 
DER_2          -1.5504    0.6143   -0.4667   -0.3049 
 
IsConverged=1 
 
---------- regime classification ------------------- 
 
Regime 1 
1997:3 - 1997:4 [0.9393] 
1997:7 - 1997:9 [0.9725] 
1998:2 - 1998:2 [0.9618] 
1998:4 - 1998:8 [0.9877] 
1999:6 - 1999:6 [0.6554] 
1999:8 - 1999:12 [0.9958] 
2000:2 - 2002:8 [0.9900] 
2003:3 - 2003:7 [0.9934] 
2003:12 - 2009:6 [0.9998] 
2009:8 - 2009:11 [1.0000] 
 
Regime 2 
1997:5 - 1997:6 [0.9999] 
1997:10 - 1998:1 [0.9998] 
1998:3 - 1998:3 [1.0000] 
1998:9 - 1999:5 [1.0000] 
1999:7 - 1999:7 [1.0000] 
2000:1 - 2000:1 [1.0000] 
2002:9 - 2003:2 [0.9712] 
2003:8 - 2003:11 [0.9683] 
2009:7 - 2009:7 [1.0000] 
 
 
CHILE 
 
---------- EM algorithm converged  ----------------- 
 
EQ( 1) MSIAH(2)-VAR(4) model of (R,INF,GAP,DER) 
       Estimation sample: 1993 (8) - 2009 (9) 
 
no. obs. per eq. :        194    in the system :        776     
no. parameters   :        158    linear system :         78     
no. restrictions :         78 
no. nuisance p.  :          2 
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log-likelihood   : -1398.0468    linear system : -1697.4480   
 
AIC criterion    :    16.0417    linear system :    18.3036  
HQ  criterion    :    17.1194    linear system :    18.8356  
SC  criterion    :    18.7032    linear system :    19.6175 
 
LR linearity test:   598.8023    Chi(78) =[0.0000] **  Chi(80)=[0.0000] **  
DAVIES=[0.0000] **   
 
 
---------- matrix of transition probabilities ------ 
 
          Regime 1  Regime 2 
Regime 1    0.9789    0.0211 
Regime 2    0.0307    0.9693 
 
 
---------- regime properties ---------------------- 
 
              nObs     Prob.  Duration 
Regime 1      97.0    0.5923     47.38 
Regime 2      97.0    0.4077     32.60 
 
---------- coefficients ---------------------------- 
 
Regime 1 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.1)   0.162446   0.146435  -1.423734  -1.899264 
R_1            1.295433   0.073070   0.668934   1.689308 
R_2           -0.338370   0.007786   0.246740  -1.038803 
R_3            0.012893   0.005382  -0.600803  -0.961447 
R_4           -0.036513  -0.044700  -0.088817   0.819377 
INF_1          0.062332   1.433005   1.345915  -0.748706 
INF_2          0.124440  -0.677350  -0.089926   0.774987 
INF_3         -0.116034   0.458350  -0.396762  -0.046729 
INF_4         -0.039266  -0.309833  -0.725640  -0.044634 
GAP_1          0.000698   0.009022  -0.097964   0.058513 
GAP_2         -0.001666   0.014211  -0.206828  -0.064805 
GAP_3         -0.005072   0.026684  -0.033524  -0.061558 
GAP_4          0.000379   0.007014  -0.088040   0.042092 
DER_1          0.002668   0.023957  -0.064619   0.930231 
DER_2         -0.011314  -0.038696  -0.039908  -0.105443 
DER_3          0.004187   0.001614  -0.023827   0.163747 
DER_4         -0.002651   0.010685   0.064647  -0.120503 
  SE (Reg.1)   0.245623   0.373258   3.737806   4.303944 
 
Regime 2 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.2)   4.078628   0.039574   3.010390   0.507673 
R_1            0.290697  -0.005983   0.027774   0.052490 
R_2           -0.138903   0.014418   0.024721   0.025464 
R_3           -0.022474  -0.005021  -0.297730   0.034019 
R_4           -0.053854   0.015943  -0.121018  -0.066913 
INF_1          6.143691   0.778663   0.083658   0.013349 
INF_2         -9.183264   0.441691  -0.081504  -0.197786 
INF_3          4.369789  -0.305859  -0.219648   0.093126 
INF_4         -0.098668   0.026040   0.522694  -0.016148 
GAP_1          0.354301   0.010630  -0.197267  -0.087983 
GAP_2         -0.041634   0.009751   0.084325  -0.002281 
GAP_3          0.269890   0.008609   0.030634   0.028090 
GAP_4          0.208652   0.001724   0.112954   0.054772 
DER_1          0.111242  -0.033027  -0.047554   1.024177 
DER_2         -0.091054   0.000689   0.149937  -0.029211 
DER_3         -0.405194   0.021119  -0.067711  -0.277449 
DER_4          0.435177   0.008444  -0.059334   0.224412 
  SE (Reg.2)   3.705405   0.437924   3.318219   2.267827 
 
---------- contemporaneous correlation ------------- 
 
Regime 1 
            R       INF       GAP       DER 
R      1.0000    0.0733    0.0914    0.0806 
INF    0.0733    1.0000    0.0573    0.1339 
GAP    0.0914    0.0573    1.0000    0.0589 
DER    0.0806    0.1339    0.0589    1.0000 
 
Regime 2 
            R       INF       GAP       DER 
R      1.0000   -0.1225   -0.1858   -0.0797 
INF   -0.1225    1.0000    0.0918   -0.1577 
GAP   -0.1858    0.0918    1.0000   -0.1183 
DER   -0.0797   -0.1577   -0.1183    1.0000 
 
---------- standard errors ------------------------- 
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Regime 0 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.1)     0.0727     0.1104     1.1057     1.2734 
R_1              0.0739     0.1109     1.1062     1.2736 
R_2              0.0764     0.1155     1.1533     1.3278 
R_3              0.0382     0.0580     0.5805     0.6685 
R_4              0.0378     0.0574     0.5745     0.6615 
INF_1            0.0635     0.0965     0.9660     1.1124 
INF_2            0.1123     0.1707     1.7085     1.9674 
INF_3            0.1107     0.1683     1.6839     1.9391 
INF_4            0.0648     0.0984     0.9852     1.1345 
GAP_1            0.0066     0.0100     0.1005     0.1157 
GAP_2            0.0066     0.0101     0.1009     0.1162 
GAP_3            0.0066     0.0101     0.1009     0.1162 
GAP_4            0.0067     0.0102     0.1019     0.1173 
DER_1            0.0059     0.0089     0.0892     0.1028 
DER_2            0.0080     0.0121     0.1213     0.1397 
DER_3            0.0085     0.0129     0.1291     0.1487 
DER_4            0.0064     0.0097     0.0970     0.1117 
 
Regime 1 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.2)     1.2639     0.1493     1.1314     0.7732 
R_1              0.0949     0.0112     0.0849     0.0581 
R_2              0.0926     0.0109     0.0828     0.0566 
R_3              0.0808     0.0095     0.0723     0.0494 
R_4              0.0771     0.0091     0.0690     0.0472 
INF_1            0.8691     0.1027     0.7780     0.5318 
INF_2            1.4419     0.1702     1.2892     0.8816 
INF_3            1.5255     0.1802     1.3650     0.9332 
INF_4            0.9589     0.1133     0.8583     0.5866 
GAP_1            0.1068     0.0126     0.0955     0.0653 
GAP_2            0.1107     0.0130     0.0987     0.0675 
GAP_3            0.1078     0.0127     0.0965     0.0659 
GAP_4            0.1087     0.0128     0.0973     0.0665 
DER_1            0.1635     0.0193     0.1459     0.0997 
DER_2            0.2298     0.0270     0.2048     0.1400 
DER_3            0.2324     0.0274     0.2079     0.1421 
DER_4            0.1607     0.0190     0.1438     0.0983 
 
---------- t - values ------------------------------ 
 
Regime 0 
                     R       INF       GAP       DER 
Const(Reg.1)    2.2353    1.3259   -1.2876   -1.4915 
R_1            17.5358    0.6587    0.6047    1.3264 
R_2            -4.4291    0.0674    0.2139   -0.7823 
R_3             0.3373    0.0928   -1.0350   -1.4381 
R_4            -0.9664   -0.7790   -0.1546    1.2386 
INF_1           0.9815   14.8473    1.3932   -0.6730 
INF_2           1.1080   -3.9674   -0.0526    0.3939 
INF_3          -1.0482    2.7242   -0.2356   -0.0241 
INF_4          -0.6063   -3.1483   -0.7365   -0.0393 
GAP_1           0.1056    0.8988   -0.9746    0.5056 
GAP_2          -0.2511    1.4100   -2.0494   -0.5577 
GAP_3          -0.7649    2.6481   -0.3322   -0.5298 
GAP_4           0.0566    0.6895   -0.8644    0.3589 
DER_1           0.4548    2.6883   -0.7241    9.0533 
DER_2          -1.4189   -3.1943   -0.3290   -0.7549 
DER_3           0.4935    0.1252   -0.1846    1.1015 
DER_4          -0.4160    1.1033    0.6666   -1.0792 
 
Regime 1 
                     R       INF       GAP       DER 
Const(Reg.2)    3.2270    0.2650    2.6609    0.6566 
R_1             3.0635   -0.5336    0.3270    0.9040 
R_2            -1.5007    1.3200    0.2987    0.4502 
R_3            -0.2781   -0.5261   -4.1167    0.6883 
R_4            -0.6984    1.7496   -1.7526   -1.4179 
INF_1           7.0690    7.5828    0.1075    0.0251 
INF_2          -6.3687    2.5945   -0.0632   -0.2243 
INF_3           2.8645   -1.6973   -0.1609    0.0998 
INF_4          -0.1029    0.2299    0.6090   -0.0275 
GAP_1           3.3183    0.8435   -2.0658   -1.3482 
GAP_2          -0.3762    0.7485    0.8545   -0.0338 
GAP_3           2.5038    0.6762    0.3176    0.4261 
GAP_4           1.9189    0.1344    1.1614    0.8242 
DER_1           0.6804   -1.7154   -0.3260   10.2735 
DER_2          -0.3963    0.0255    0.7322   -0.2087 
DER_3          -1.7434    0.7697   -0.3256   -1.9526 
DER_4           2.7086    0.4451   -0.4126    2.2838 
 
IsConverged=1 
 
---------- regime classification ------------------- 
 
Regime 1 
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1994:12 - 1994:12 [0.9991] 
2001:9 - 2009:2 [1.0000] 
2009:4 - 2009:9 [0.9972] 
 
Regime 2 
1993:8 - 1994:11 [1.0000] 
1995:1 - 2001:8 [1.0000] 
2009:3 - 2009:3 [1.0000] 
 
 
COLOMBIA 
 
---------- EM algorithm converged  ----------------- 
 
EQ( 1) MSIAH(2)-VAR(1) model of (R,INF,GAP,DER) 
       Estimation sample: 1995 (4) - 2005 (9) 
 
no. obs. per eq. :        126    in the system :        504     
no. parameters   :         62    linear system :         30     
no. restrictions :         30 
no. nuisance p.  :          2 
 
log-likelihood   :  -998.5176    linear system : -1152.3439   
 
AIC criterion    :    16.8336    linear system :    18.7674  
HQ  criterion    :    17.4006    linear system :    19.0417  
SC  criterion    :    18.2292    linear system :    19.4427 
 
LR linearity test:   307.6526    Chi(30) =[0.0000] **  Chi(32)=[0.0000] **  
DAVIES=[0.0000] **   
 
 
---------- matrix of transition probabilities ------ 
 
          Regime 1  Regime 2 
Regime 1    0.9835    0.0165 
Regime 2    0.0360    0.9640 
 
 
---------- regime properties ---------------------- 
 
              nObs     Prob.  Duration 
Regime 1      68.6    0.6856     60.54 
Regime 2      57.4    0.3144     27.76 
 
---------- coefficients ---------------------------- 
 
Regime 1 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.1)  -0.432691   0.862899   3.363104  -0.784719 
R_1            0.827747  -0.016555  -0.018561  -0.323775 
INF_1          0.258493   0.869323  -0.448843   0.490376 
GAP_1          0.009349   0.018955   0.385327  -0.073296 
DER_1         -0.001463   0.009499   0.003895   0.945245 
  SE (Reg.1)   0.374601   0.274588   5.910542   3.650831 
 
Regime 2 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.2)  -3.372419   0.081117  -4.634652   5.807489 
R_1            0.532668  -0.001506   0.023793  -0.019850 
INF_1          0.801896   0.989202   0.203021  -0.232067 
GAP_1          0.169324   0.008189   0.469286   0.084054 
DER_1          0.147971   0.002653   0.042153   0.895744 
  SE (Reg.2)   4.805365   0.523741   6.270731   3.025401 
 
---------- contemporaneous correlation ------------- 
 
Regime 1 
            R       INF       GAP       DER 
R      1.0000    0.1150    0.0708   -0.2593 
INF    0.1150    1.0000    0.2256    0.0722 
GAP    0.0708    0.2256    1.0000    0.0761 
DER   -0.2593    0.0722    0.0761    1.0000 
 
Regime 2 
            R       INF       GAP       DER 
R      1.0000   -0.0584   -0.0856    0.0073 
INF   -0.0584    1.0000    0.1168    0.0611 
GAP   -0.0856    0.1168    1.0000    0.2042 
DER    0.0073    0.0611    0.2042    1.0000 
 
---------- standard errors ------------------------- 
 
Regime 0 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.1)     0.3192     0.2386     5.0036     3.0947 
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R_1              0.0429     0.0322     0.6730     0.4167 
INF_1            0.0970     0.0730     1.5225     0.9418 
GAP_1            0.0074     0.0052     0.1109     0.0697 
DER_1            0.0061     0.0045     0.0954     0.0591 
 
Regime 1 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.2)     4.0947     0.4480     5.3997     2.6033 
R_1              0.0996     0.0109     0.1302     0.0630 
INF_1            0.2563     0.0280     0.3363     0.1619 
GAP_1            0.0980     0.0107     0.1285     0.0618 
DER_1            0.0837     0.0091     0.1097     0.0528 
 
---------- t - values ------------------------------ 
 
Regime 0 
                     R       INF       GAP       DER 
Const(Reg.1)   -1.3556    3.6166    0.6721   -0.2536 
R_1            19.3081   -0.5149   -0.0276   -0.7769 
INF_1           2.6654   11.9135   -0.2948    0.5207 
GAP_1           1.2657    3.6741    3.4753   -1.0519 
DER_1          -0.2401    2.1253    0.0408   15.9856 
 
Regime 1 
                     R       INF       GAP       DER 
Const(Reg.2)   -0.8236    0.1811   -0.8583    2.2308 
R_1             5.3455   -0.1387    0.1827   -0.3150 
INF_1           3.1282   35.3161    0.6037   -1.4332 
GAP_1           1.7271    0.7635    3.6514    1.3595 
DER_1           1.7670    0.2902    0.3841   16.9688 
 
IsConverged=1 
 
---------- regime classification ------------------- 
 
Regime 1 
1999:3 - 1999:5 [0.9956] 
2000:4 - 2005:9 [0.9944] 
 
Regime 2 
1995:4 - 1999:2 [1.0000] 
1999:6 - 2000:3 [0.9983] 
 
 
CZECH 
 
---------- EM algorithm converged  ----------------- 
 
EQ( 1) MSIAH(2)-VAR(2) model of (R,INF,GAP,DER) 
       Estimation sample: 1994 (3) - 2009 (10) 
 
no. obs. per eq. :        188    in the system :        752     
no. parameters   :         94    linear system :         46     
no. restrictions :         46 
no. nuisance p.  :          2 
 
log-likelihood   : -1256.5186    linear system : -1515.7929   
 
AIC criterion    :    14.3672    linear system :    16.6148  
HQ  criterion    :    15.0229    linear system :    16.9357  
SC  criterion    :    15.9854    linear system :    17.4067 
 
LR linearity test:   518.5487    Chi(46) =[0.0000] **  Chi(48)=[0.0000] **  
DAVIES=[0.0000] **   
 
 
---------- matrix of transition probabilities ------ 
 
                  Regime 1     Regime 2 
Regime 1             1.000   5.440e-008 
Regime 2           0.01638       0.9836 
 
 
---------- regime properties ---------------------- 
 
              nObs     Prob.  Duration 
Regime 1     127.9    1.000018383601.56 
Regime 2      60.1    0.0000     61.05 
 
---------- coefficients ---------------------------- 
 
Regime 1 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.1)   0.052035   0.122742  -4.368178  -1.328240 
R_1            1.212877   0.191626   7.183373   0.039800 
R_2           -0.252567  -0.177182  -6.252171   0.307170 
INF_1          0.161700   1.255024   1.636866  -0.517747 
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INF_2         -0.140667  -0.315635  -1.506281   0.373422 
GAP_1          0.001214  -0.001616   0.227115   0.015018 
GAP_2         -0.004002   0.010767  -0.299982  -0.073323 
DER_1          0.002568   0.006965  -0.168028   0.985742 
DER_2         -0.002163  -0.003791  -0.084143  -0.102940 
  SE (Reg.1)   0.147055   0.463423   6.152891   3.365823 
 
Regime 2 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.2)   3.048601   1.144398  -0.256085  15.004977 
R_1            0.944082   0.079930  -0.146227  -0.048885 
R_2           -0.249077  -0.080944  -0.166032   0.071670 
INF_1         -0.160763   1.109506  -0.306908  -1.029129 
INF_2          0.232093  -0.252258   0.757042  -0.693919 
GAP_1          0.016322   0.000903   0.235262  -0.053232 
GAP_2          0.039993  -0.001198  -0.183919   0.026776 
DER_1          0.159914   0.005679   0.112372   0.524718 
DER_2         -0.092651   0.041681   0.140360   0.497614 
  SE (Reg.2)   1.635872   0.646400   4.903218   2.725536 
 
---------- contemporaneous correlation ------------- 
 
Regime 1 
            R       INF       GAP       DER 
R      1.0000    0.2017    0.2521   -0.2012 
INF    0.2017    1.0000    0.2793   -0.1796 
GAP    0.2521    0.2793    1.0000   -0.1874 
DER   -0.2012   -0.1796   -0.1874    1.0000 
 
Regime 2 
            R       INF       GAP       DER 
R      1.0000   -0.2663    0.1256    0.1459 
INF   -0.2663    1.0000   -0.0404    0.0656 
GAP    0.1256   -0.0404    1.0000    0.0395 
DER    0.1459    0.0656    0.0395    1.0000 
 
---------- standard errors ------------------------- 
 
Regime 0 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.1)     0.0394     0.1228     1.6288     0.8936 
R_1              0.0837     0.2622     3.4780     1.9050 
R_2              0.0792     0.2483     3.2930     1.8032 
INF_1            0.0284     0.0892     1.1839     0.6478 
INF_2            0.0283     0.0890     1.1817     0.6467 
GAP_1            0.0022     0.0068     0.0904     0.0495 
GAP_2            0.0021     0.0065     0.0860     0.0471 
DER_1            0.0039     0.0123     0.1629     0.0892 
DER_2            0.0039     0.0122     0.1623     0.0889 
 
Regime 1 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.2)     1.9346     0.7622     5.7700     3.1875 
R_1              0.1270     0.0502     0.3804     0.2113 
R_2              0.1245     0.0492     0.3730     0.2073 
INF_1            0.3203     0.1265     0.9594     0.5328 
INF_2            0.3351     0.1324     1.0042     0.5581 
GAP_1            0.0417     0.0165     0.1250     0.0695 
GAP_2            0.0412     0.0163     0.1233     0.0685 
DER_1            0.0689     0.0272     0.2064     0.1147 
DER_2            0.0730     0.0288     0.2187     0.1216 
 
---------- t - values ------------------------------ 
 
Regime 0 
                     R       INF       GAP       DER 
Const(Reg.1)    1.3212    0.9999   -2.6819   -1.4865 
R_1            14.4915    0.7308    2.0653    0.0209 
R_2            -3.1906   -0.7137   -1.8986    0.1703 
INF_1           5.7026   14.0713    1.3826   -0.7992 
INF_2          -4.9643   -3.5451   -1.2747    0.5775 
GAP_1           0.5611   -0.2373    2.5117    0.3035 
GAP_2          -1.9412    1.6619   -3.4878   -1.5573 
DER_1           0.6582    0.5677   -1.0316   11.0551 
DER_2          -0.5551   -0.3101   -0.5185   -1.1575 
 
Regime 1 
                     R       INF       GAP       DER 
Const(Reg.2)    1.5758    1.5015   -0.0444    4.7074 
R_1             7.4342    1.5934   -0.3844   -0.2313 
R_2            -2.0013   -1.6460   -0.4451    0.3457 
INF_1          -0.5018    8.7708   -0.3199   -1.9315 
INF_2           0.6925   -1.9056    0.7539   -1.2433 
GAP_1           0.3913    0.0548    1.8817   -0.7660 
GAP_2           0.9718   -0.0737   -1.4912    0.3906 
DER_1           2.3206    0.2086    0.5443    4.5748 
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DER_2          -1.2698    1.4457    0.6418    4.0934 
 
IsConverged=1 
 
---------- regime classification ------------------- 
 
Regime 1 
1999:3 - 2009:10 [0.9994] 
 
Regime 2 
1994:3 - 1999:2 [1.0000] 
 
 
HUNGARY 
 
---------- EM algorithm converged  ----------------- 
 
EQ( 1) MSIAH(2)-VAR(3) model of (R,INF,GAP,DER) 
       Estimation sample: 1992 (4) - 2009 (10) 
 
no. obs. per eq. :        211    in the system :        844     
no. parameters   :        126    linear system :         62     
no. restrictions :         62 
no. nuisance p.  :          2 
 
log-likelihood   : -1453.7083    linear system : -1620.1860   
 
AIC criterion    :    14.9735    linear system :    15.9449  
HQ  criterion    :    15.7826    linear system :    16.3430  
SC  criterion    :    16.9751    linear system :    16.9298 
 
LR linearity test:   332.9554    Chi(62) =[0.0000] **  Chi(64)=[0.0000] **  
DAVIES=[0.0000] **   
 
 
---------- matrix of transition probabilities ------ 
 
          Regime 1  Regime 2 
Regime 1    0.9494    0.0506 
Regime 2    0.3178    0.6822 
 
 
---------- regime properties ---------------------- 
 
              nObs     Prob.  Duration 
Regime 1     181.4    0.8626     19.75 
Regime 2      29.6    0.1374      3.15 
 
---------- coefficients ---------------------------- 
 
Regime 1 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.1)   0.089962   0.124427   0.858185  -1.353430 
R_1            1.034452   0.027533   0.897602   0.126418 
R_2            0.024086   0.062394  -2.200737  -0.469870 
R_3           -0.109985  -0.079365   0.836976   0.483922 
INF_1          0.006424   1.117123  -0.175089  -0.041619 
INF_2          0.083231  -0.174790   1.974650  -0.829296 
INF_3         -0.044941   0.013913  -1.217658   0.812777 
GAP_1          0.000048   0.006611   0.426556  -0.072512 
GAP_2         -0.008030  -0.007587  -0.271203   0.066542 
GAP_3         -0.001458   0.001623   0.069028   0.005113 
DER_1          0.008533   0.008882  -0.106174   0.876142 
DER_2         -0.014505  -0.024491   0.052231   0.058005 
DER_3          0.009513   0.029552  -0.026692  -0.003996 
  SE (Reg.1)   0.328746   0.477206   5.809366   3.030896 
 
Regime 2 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.2)   7.007296  -0.739133   4.511950   7.595300 
R_1            0.775233   0.647392  -1.687852   1.484594 
R_2            0.153492  -1.036440   0.884958   0.762592 
R_3           -0.132151   0.561017   1.418036  -2.284381 
INF_1         -0.038149   1.237302   0.317176  -0.370763 
INF_2         -0.071939   0.052310  -0.332545   0.209197 
INF_3         -0.081831  -0.351668  -0.919306   0.148653 
GAP_1          0.000466  -0.153463   0.423355  -0.003898 
GAP_2          0.016227   0.163512  -0.010953   0.235740 
GAP_3          0.144486   0.020893   0.378735   0.565074 
DER_1         -0.021704   0.039001  -0.139622   0.536348 
DER_2          0.138117  -0.115150   0.145551   0.466792 
DER_3          0.014005  -0.064317  -0.053712  -0.451810 
  SE (Reg.2)   0.685224   0.930096   2.617174   2.486991 
 
---------- contemporaneous correlation ------------- 
 
Regime 1 
PhD Thesis 
Appendix 4 
 
 388 
            R       INF       GAP       DER 
R      1.0000    0.2890    0.1428    0.0025 
INF    0.2890    1.0000    0.0799    0.0470 
GAP    0.1428    0.0799    1.0000   -0.0866 
DER    0.0025    0.0470   -0.0866    1.0000 
 
Regime 2 
            R       INF       GAP       DER 
R      1.0000    0.3175    0.1771   -0.2549 
INF    0.3175    1.0000    0.3554   -0.0737 
GAP    0.1771    0.3554    1.0000    0.4720 
DER   -0.2549   -0.0737    0.4720    1.0000 
 
---------- standard errors ------------------------- 
 
Regime 0 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.1)     0.0847     0.1201     1.4490     0.7567 
R_1              0.0467     0.0678     0.8248     0.4294 
R_2              0.0658     0.0954     1.1589     0.6044 
R_3              0.0451     0.0653     0.7922     0.4142 
INF_1            0.0451     0.0660     0.7937     0.4143 
INF_2            0.0675     0.0979     1.1831     0.6175 
INF_3            0.0436     0.0631     0.7596     0.3982 
GAP_1            0.0043     0.0063     0.0767     0.0400 
GAP_2            0.0046     0.0067     0.0817     0.0426 
GAP_3            0.0043     0.0063     0.0759     0.0396 
DER_1            0.0079     0.0116     0.1398     0.0729 
DER_2            0.0106     0.0154     0.1862     0.0972 
DER_3            0.0080     0.0115     0.1397     0.0732 
 
Regime 1 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.2)     0.9413     1.2865     3.5694     3.3726 
R_1              0.1656     0.2235     0.6317     0.6104 
R_2              0.2490     0.3397     0.9507     0.9027 
R_3              0.2066     0.2868     0.7871     0.7552 
INF_1            0.1287     0.1749     0.4925     0.4671 
INF_2            0.1973     0.2692     0.7530     0.7162 
INF_3            0.1330     0.1802     0.5069     0.4799 
GAP_1            0.0321     0.0445     0.1229     0.1161 
GAP_2            0.0406     0.0551     0.1562     0.1490 
GAP_3            0.0375     0.0506     0.1434     0.1365 
DER_1            0.0444     0.0600     0.1726     0.1607 
DER_2            0.0523     0.0718     0.2014     0.1897 
DER_3            0.0423     0.0582     0.1611     0.1530 
 
---------- t - values ------------------------------ 
 
Regime 0 
                     R       INF       GAP       DER 
Const(Reg.1)    1.0616    1.0361    0.5923   -1.7887 
R_1            22.1291    0.4058    1.0883    0.2944 
R_2             0.3660    0.6543   -1.8990   -0.7774 
R_3            -2.4402   -1.2161    1.0566    1.1684 
INF_1           0.1423   16.9309   -0.2206   -0.1005 
INF_2           1.2338   -1.7859    1.6690   -1.3430 
INF_3          -1.0318    0.2203   -1.6029    2.0412 
GAP_1           0.0110    1.0452    5.5638   -1.8116 
GAP_2          -1.7318   -1.1265   -3.3202    1.5613 
GAP_3          -0.3389    0.2588    0.9089    0.1290 
DER_1           1.0789    0.7670   -0.7594   12.0158 
DER_2          -1.3654   -1.5930    0.2805    0.5967 
DER_3           1.1827    2.5602   -0.1910   -0.0546 
 
Regime 1 
                     R       INF       GAP       DER 
Const(Reg.2)    7.4446   -0.5745    1.2641    2.2521 
R_1             4.6824    2.8969   -2.6720    2.4323 
R_2             0.6163   -3.0510    0.9308    0.8448 
R_3            -0.6396    1.9558    1.8017   -3.0250 
INF_1          -0.2965    7.0759    0.6440   -0.7937 
INF_2          -0.3647    0.1943   -0.4416    0.2921 
INF_3          -0.6155   -1.9513   -1.8137    0.3098 
GAP_1           0.0145   -3.4463    3.4450   -0.0336 
GAP_2           0.3992    2.9669   -0.0701    1.5821 
GAP_3           3.8547    0.4131    2.6410    4.1395 
DER_1          -0.4889    0.6500   -0.8092    3.3381 
DER_2           2.6385   -1.6027    0.7228    2.4612 
DER_3           0.3308   -1.1046   -0.3333   -2.9529 
 
IsConverged=1 
 
---------- regime classification ------------------- 
 
Regime 1 
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1992:4 - 1992:6 [0.9953] 
1993:2 - 1993:7 [0.9976] 
1993:10 - 1993:12 [0.9999] 
1994:2 - 1994:5 [0.9987] 
1995:6 - 1996:2 [0.9913] 
1996:6 - 1996:8 [0.8695] 
1996:11 - 2003:5 [0.9993] 
2003:7 - 2003:10 [1.0000] 
2003:12 - 2008:9 [1.0000] 
2008:11 - 2009:10 [1.0000] 
 
Regime 2 
1992:7 - 1993:1 [0.9934] 
1993:8 - 1993:9 [0.9466] 
1994:1 - 1994:1 [1.0000] 
1994:6 - 1995:5 [0.9876] 
1996:3 - 1996:5 [0.9574] 
1996:9 - 1996:10 [0.7222] 
2003:6 - 2003:6 [1.0000] 
2003:11 - 2003:11 [1.0000] 
2008:10 - 2008:10 [1.0000] 
 
 
ISRAEL 
 
---------- EM algorithm converged  ----------------- 
 
EQ( 1) MSIAH(2)-VAR(2) model of (R,INF,GAP,DER) 
       Estimation sample: 1992 (3) - 2009 (10) 
 
no. obs. per eq. :        212    in the system :        848     
no. parameters   :         94    linear system :         46     
no. restrictions :         46 
no. nuisance p.  :          2 
 
log-likelihood   : -1084.6432    linear system : -1207.8938   
 
AIC criterion    :    11.1193    linear system :    11.8292  
HQ  criterion    :    11.7208    linear system :    12.1236  
SC  criterion    :    12.6076    linear system :    12.5575 
 
LR linearity test:   246.5013    Chi(46) =[0.0000] **  Chi(48)=[0.0000] **  
DAVIES=[0.0000] **   
 
 
---------- matrix of transition probabilities ------ 
 
          Regime 1  Regime 2 
Regime 1    0.9817    0.0183 
Regime 2    0.0289    0.9711 
 
 
---------- regime properties ---------------------- 
 
              nObs     Prob.  Duration 
Regime 1     110.0    0.6126     54.71 
Regime 2     102.0    0.3874     34.60 
 
---------- coefficients ---------------------------- 
 
Regime 1 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.1)   0.012114   0.349781  -0.553198   0.778580 
R_1            1.619894   0.290740   1.179942  -2.753320 
R_2           -0.630860  -0.328981  -1.038249   2.549408 
INF_1          0.080224   1.266832   0.300609  -0.215586 
INF_2         -0.076236  -0.356674  -0.305687   0.034031 
GAP_1          0.013261   0.017876   0.392462  -0.346234 
GAP_2         -0.006707   0.005745   0.340316  -0.117301 
DER_1         -0.000717   0.064286  -0.037899   0.712747 
DER_2          0.006679  -0.069913  -0.009624  -0.048607 
  SE (Reg.1)   0.159190   0.450600   1.859682   2.878094 
 
Regime 2 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.2)   0.311138   0.795295   0.345798   6.222172 
R_1            1.320606  -0.084877  -0.025337  -0.037883 
R_2           -0.373197   0.091349  -0.075528  -0.261821 
INF_1          0.328450   1.479186   0.202810  -0.600279 
INF_2         -0.292531  -0.575039  -0.045511   0.509145 
GAP_1          0.011706   0.055474   0.363277  -0.096452 
GAP_2          0.046266   0.027213  -0.002264  -0.078146 
DER_1          0.001504   0.027354  -0.019586   0.901050 
DER_2          0.006381  -0.028467  -0.077564  -0.111543 
  SE (Reg.2)   0.556210   0.559785   1.129631   2.190280 
 
---------- contemporaneous correlation ------------- 
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Regime 1 
            R       INF       GAP       DER 
R      1.0000    0.0662   -0.0167   -0.0353 
INF    0.0662    1.0000    0.0219    0.2190 
GAP   -0.0167    0.0219    1.0000   -0.0248 
DER   -0.0353    0.2190   -0.0248    1.0000 
 
Regime 2 
            R       INF       GAP       DER 
R      1.0000   -0.0075   -0.0035   -0.0262 
INF   -0.0075    1.0000   -0.0799    0.2592 
GAP   -0.0035   -0.0799    1.0000   -0.0343 
DER   -0.0262    0.2592   -0.0343    1.0000 
 
---------- standard errors ------------------------- 
 
Regime 0 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.1)     0.0403     0.1112     0.4638     0.7290 
R_1              0.0687     0.1918     0.7966     1.2308 
R_2              0.0672     0.1871     0.7785     1.2015 
INF_1            0.0277     0.0775     0.3210     0.4971 
INF_2            0.0263     0.0744     0.3058     0.4781 
GAP_1            0.0077     0.0218     0.0899     0.1392 
GAP_2            0.0081     0.0230     0.0947     0.1478 
DER_1            0.0053     0.0150     0.0616     0.0988 
DER_2            0.0049     0.0138     0.0572     0.0886 
 
Regime 1 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.2)     0.3362     0.3490     0.6852     1.3437 
R_1              0.0792     0.0800     0.1619     0.3124 
R_2              0.0798     0.0811     0.1643     0.3161 
INF_1            0.0777     0.0784     0.1579     0.3073 
INF_2            0.0776     0.0785     0.1579     0.3084 
GAP_1            0.0482     0.0487     0.0981     0.1901 
GAP_2            0.0483     0.0493     0.0984     0.1936 
DER_1            0.0248     0.0262     0.0511     0.0989 
DER_2            0.0245     0.0258     0.0515     0.0976 
 
---------- t - values ------------------------------ 
 
Regime 0 
                     R       INF       GAP       DER 
Const(Reg.1)    0.3005    3.1468   -1.1926    1.0681 
R_1            23.5675    1.5157    1.4812   -2.2370 
R_2            -9.3848   -1.7581   -1.3337    2.1218 
INF_1           2.9005   16.3474    0.9366   -0.4337 
INF_2          -2.9031   -4.7954   -0.9996    0.0712 
GAP_1           1.7222    0.8211    4.3662   -2.4880 
GAP_2          -0.8261    0.2497    3.5949   -0.7934 
DER_1          -0.1354    4.2826   -0.6157    7.2109 
DER_2           1.3556   -5.0542   -0.1683   -0.5485 
 
Regime 1 
                     R       INF       GAP       DER 
Const(Reg.2)    0.9255    2.2785    0.5047    4.6306 
R_1            16.6727   -1.0608   -0.1565   -0.1213 
R_2            -4.6755    1.1261   -0.4596   -0.8283 
INF_1           4.2279   18.8697    1.2845   -1.9535 
INF_2          -3.7716   -7.3228   -0.2882    1.6507 
GAP_1           0.2426    1.1380    3.7041   -0.5074 
GAP_2           0.9586    0.5523   -0.0230   -0.4036 
DER_1           0.0606    1.0456   -0.3830    9.1108 
DER_2           0.2600   -1.1020   -1.5070   -1.1423 
 
IsConverged=1 
 
---------- regime classification ------------------- 
 
Regime 1 
1998:5 - 1998:7 [0.8631] 
1999:9 - 2001:11 [0.9921] 
2003:3 - 2009:10 [0.9987] 
 
Regime 2 
1992:3 - 1998:4 [0.9992] 
1998:8 - 1999:8 [0.9978] 
2001:12 - 2003:2 [0.9548] 
 
 
PHILIPPINES 
 
---------- EM algorithm converged  ----------------- 
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EQ( 1) MSIAH(2)-VAR(1) model of (R,INF,GAP,DER) 
       Estimation sample: 1992 (2) - 2008 (12) 
 
no. obs. per eq. :        203    in the system :        812     
no. parameters   :         62    linear system :         30     
no. restrictions :         30 
no. nuisance p.  :          2 
 
log-likelihood   : -1565.2874    linear system : -1855.1659   
 
AIC criterion    :    16.0324    linear system :    18.5731  
HQ  criterion    :    16.4418    linear system :    18.7712  
SC  criterion    :    17.0443    linear system :    19.0627 
 
LR linearity test:   579.7570    Chi(30) =[0.0000] **  Chi(32)=[0.0000] **  
DAVIES=[0.0000] **   
 
 
---------- matrix of transition probabilities ------ 
 
          Regime 1  Regime 2 
Regime 1    0.9594    0.0406 
Regime 2    0.0734    0.9266 
 
 
---------- regime properties ---------------------- 
 
              nObs     Prob.  Duration 
Regime 1     123.2    0.6439     24.63 
Regime 2      79.8    0.3561     13.62 
 
---------- coefficients ---------------------------- 
 
Regime 1 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.1)   0.359499   0.623138  -2.303412   3.096238 
R_1            0.953614  -0.077159   0.081550  -0.337616 
INF_1         -0.012288   0.982791   0.279586  -0.064154 
GAP_1          0.002252  -0.004342   0.444946  -0.061866 
DER_1          0.006469   0.005401   0.053574   0.927909 
  SE (Reg.1)   0.287280   0.750651   4.294077   2.726255 
 
Regime 2 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.2)  10.564590   1.295270   2.856996   5.331146 
R_1            0.352042   0.007161   0.056120  -0.019999 
INF_1         -0.185601   0.807258  -0.481639  -0.561927 
GAP_1         -0.089179  -0.006990   0.272487   0.210313 
DER_1          0.018973   0.020703   0.001555   0.921992 
  SE (Reg.2)   4.002760   0.692561   2.318877   4.957797 
 
---------- contemporaneous correlation ------------- 
 
Regime 1 
            R       INF       GAP       DER 
R      1.0000    0.0463    0.3196   -0.0876 
INF    0.0463    1.0000    0.1397   -0.1022 
GAP    0.3196    0.1397    1.0000   -0.1548 
DER   -0.0876   -0.1022   -0.1548    1.0000 
 
Regime 2 
            R       INF       GAP       DER 
R      1.0000   -0.0405    0.0859    0.0862 
INF   -0.0405    1.0000   -0.1964   -0.0686 
GAP    0.0859   -0.1964    1.0000    0.1006 
DER    0.0862   -0.0686    0.1006    1.0000 
 
---------- standard errors ------------------------- 
 
Regime 0 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.1)     0.1452     0.3282     1.8317     1.2307 
R_1              0.0171     0.0376     0.2102     0.1409 
INF_1            0.0101     0.0261     0.1480     0.0951 
GAP_1            0.0057     0.0144     0.0821     0.0524 
DER_1            0.0034     0.0086     0.0492     0.0327 
 
Regime 1 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.2)     2.4582     0.4341     1.4572     3.0388 
R_1              0.1067     0.0189     0.0618     0.1319 
INF_1            0.2622     0.0476     0.1573     0.3251 
GAP_1            0.1986     0.0362     0.1200     0.2450 
DER_1            0.0331     0.0058     0.0195     0.0412 
 
---------- t - values ------------------------------ 
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Regime 0 
                     R       INF       GAP       DER 
Const(Reg.1)    2.4752    1.8989   -1.2575    2.5158 
R_1            55.7769   -2.0536    0.3879   -2.3968 
INF_1          -1.2139   37.6625    1.8896   -0.6746 
GAP_1           0.3957   -0.3023    5.4204   -1.1797 
DER_1           1.8875    0.6250    1.0881   28.3951 
 
Regime 1 
                     R       INF       GAP       DER 
Const(Reg.2)    4.2977    2.9837    1.9606    1.7544 
R_1             3.2989    0.3794    0.9078   -0.1516 
INF_1          -0.7079   16.9682   -3.0618   -1.7285 
GAP_1          -0.4489   -0.1929    2.2702    0.8584 
DER_1           0.5732    3.5484    0.0798   22.3980 
 
IsConverged=1 
 
---------- regime classification ------------------- 
 
Regime 1 
1993:4 - 1993:6 [0.9121] 
1996:1 - 1996:5 [0.9746] 
1997:1 - 1997:4 [0.9878] 
1999:6 - 2000:9 [0.9764] 
2001:3 - 2008:12 [0.9987] 
 
Regime 2 
1992:2 - 1993:3 [0.9911] 
1993:7 - 1995:12 [0.9963] 
1996:6 - 1996:12 [0.7902] 
1997:5 - 1999:5 [0.9815] 
2000:10 - 2001:2 [0.9955] 
 
 
POLAND 
 
---------- EM algorithm converged  ----------------- 
 
EQ( 1) MSIAH(2)-VAR(4) model of (R,INF,GAP,DER) 
       Estimation sample: 1992 (5) - 2009 (11) 
 
no. obs. per eq. :        211    in the system :        844     
no. parameters   :        158    linear system :         78     
no. restrictions :         78 
no. nuisance p.  :          2 
 
log-likelihood   : -1536.6853    linear system : -1772.9723   
 
AIC criterion    :    16.0634    linear system :    17.5448  
HQ  criterion    :    17.0779    linear system :    18.0456  
SC  criterion    :    18.5733    linear system :    18.7838 
 
LR linearity test:   472.5740    Chi(78) =[0.0000] **  Chi(80)=[0.0000] **  
DAVIES=[0.0000] **   
 
 
---------- matrix of transition probabilities ------ 
 
          Regime 1  Regime 2 
Regime 1    0.9810    0.0190 
Regime 2    0.0308    0.9692 
 
 
---------- regime properties ---------------------- 
 
              nObs     Prob.  Duration 
Regime 1     111.9    0.6193     52.75 
Regime 2      99.1    0.3807     32.42 
 
---------- coefficients ---------------------------- 
 
Regime 1 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.1)   0.163159   0.208500  -0.227999  -0.295522 
R_1            0.518820   0.001954   0.893076  -1.722181 
R_2            0.469980   0.043870   0.251882   0.794238 
R_3           -0.017807  -0.015093  -1.661788   0.424408 
R_4           -0.039924  -0.038466   0.476898   0.394976 
INF_1          0.296692   1.409632   2.985640  -2.289210 
INF_2         -0.422659  -0.624564  -4.057186   3.853082 
INF_3          0.418312   0.053018   2.339991  -0.730478 
INF_4         -0.250930   0.111770  -1.086415  -0.682669 
GAP_1          0.015007   0.010558   0.307382  -0.099775 
GAP_2         -0.000776   0.003948  -0.293982   0.030369 
GAP_3          0.005858   0.005204   0.111184   0.020180 
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GAP_4         -0.002083   0.012964  -0.225294  -0.004444 
DER_1         -0.022937  -0.002968  -0.103947   1.097990 
DER_2          0.009710   0.020072  -0.125492  -0.209308 
DER_3          0.021742  -0.013940  -0.025377   0.264052 
DER_4         -0.012175   0.005411   0.174801  -0.278171 
  SE (Reg.1)   0.394239   0.308321   4.966850   3.850361 
 
Regime 2 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.2)   5.159735   1.151682   3.442008   0.322823 
R_1            0.360282  -0.190178   0.001316   0.142256 
R_2            0.165781   0.010636  -0.038695  -0.130782 
R_3            0.356581   0.032098   0.003189   0.060918 
R_4           -0.210942   0.087787  -0.026494  -0.120097 
INF_1         -0.162885   1.114759  -0.127027   0.209058 
INF_2          0.084996  -0.567713   0.255245   0.187401 
INF_3         -0.188623   0.361812   0.046884  -0.276813 
INF_4          0.335317   0.040891  -0.271566  -0.044619 
GAP_1          0.090562  -0.012889   0.165895   0.139988 
GAP_2         -0.020648   0.021337  -0.167190  -0.321225 
GAP_3          0.107938  -0.021194   0.069053  -0.135867 
GAP_4          0.026140   0.032207  -0.535510  -0.144311 
DER_1         -0.014096   0.056293  -0.149096   0.929172 
DER_2          0.097235  -0.061399   0.122858  -0.070382 
DER_3         -0.071533   0.065927   0.093914  -0.146386 
DER_4          0.009294  -0.005699  -0.033672   0.207842 
  SE (Reg.2)   1.857119   0.890701   2.366833   2.620592 
 
---------- contemporaneous correlation ------------- 
 
Regime 1 
            R       INF       GAP       DER 
R      1.0000    0.1862    0.1306   -0.1169 
INF    0.1862    1.0000    0.2131   -0.1291 
GAP    0.1306    0.2131    1.0000   -0.0265 
DER   -0.1169   -0.1291   -0.0265    1.0000 
 
Regime 2 
            R       INF       GAP       DER 
R      1.0000    0.1733    0.1102    0.0394 
INF    0.1733    1.0000    0.0175    0.0119 
GAP    0.1102    0.0175    1.0000   -0.1043 
DER    0.0394    0.0119   -0.1043    1.0000 
 
---------- standard errors ------------------------- 
 
Regime 0 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.1)     0.0910     0.0670     1.0533     0.8279 
R_1              0.0712     0.0553     0.8773     0.6829 
R_2              0.0802     0.0621     0.9993     0.7761 
R_3              0.0729     0.0569     0.9191     0.7094 
R_4              0.0636     0.0479     0.7689     0.5938 
INF_1            0.1221     0.0929     1.4901     1.1733 
INF_2            0.2132     0.1588     2.5435     2.0162 
INF_3            0.2060     0.1614     2.5814     2.0030 
INF_4            0.1243     0.0968     1.5339     1.1986 
GAP_1            0.0075     0.0058     0.0931     0.0724 
GAP_2            0.0078     0.0061     0.0978     0.0758 
GAP_3            0.0079     0.0061     0.0981     0.0764 
GAP_4            0.0076     0.0059     0.0948     0.0736 
DER_1            0.0096     0.0075     0.1202     0.0936 
DER_2            0.0151     0.0116     0.1868     0.1459 
DER_3            0.0155     0.0119     0.1919     0.1498 
DER_4            0.0102     0.0079     0.1274     0.0990 
 
Regime 1 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.2)     1.2277     0.5886     1.5915     1.7432 
R_1              0.1009     0.0484     0.1286     0.1424 
R_2              0.1071     0.0513     0.1367     0.1516 
R_3              0.1013     0.0486     0.1292     0.1429 
R_4              0.0951     0.0455     0.1211     0.1351 
INF_1            0.2061     0.0988     0.2632     0.2909 
INF_2            0.2991     0.1434     0.3814     0.4261 
INF_3            0.2942     0.1411     0.3752     0.4167 
INF_4            0.1944     0.0931     0.2479     0.2743 
GAP_1            0.0676     0.0324     0.0869     0.0979 
GAP_2            0.0681     0.0327     0.0872     0.0965 
GAP_3            0.0734     0.0352     0.0940     0.1058 
GAP_4            0.0736     0.0352     0.0942     0.1084 
DER_1            0.0664     0.0318     0.0846     0.0961 
DER_2            0.0883     0.0423     0.1125     0.1284 
DER_3            0.0902     0.0431     0.1149     0.1344 
DER_4            0.0596     0.0286     0.0760     0.0858 
 
---------- t - values ------------------------------ 
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Regime 0 
                     R       INF       GAP       DER 
Const(Reg.1)    1.7933    3.1142   -0.2165   -0.3570 
R_1             7.2902    0.0354    1.0180   -2.5218 
R_2             5.8631    0.7062    0.2521    1.0233 
R_3            -0.2444   -0.2655   -1.8081    0.5983 
R_4            -0.6279   -0.8027    0.6203    0.6651 
INF_1           2.4290   15.1656    2.0037   -1.9511 
INF_2          -1.9824   -3.9327   -1.5951    1.9111 
INF_3           2.0306    0.3285    0.9065   -0.3647 
INF_4          -2.0186    1.1547   -0.7083   -0.5696 
GAP_1           2.0138    1.8220    3.3000   -1.3778 
GAP_2          -0.0998    0.6503   -3.0063    0.4005 
GAP_3           0.7412    0.8508    1.1332    0.2640 
GAP_4          -0.2757    2.1994   -2.3755   -0.0603 
DER_1          -2.3778   -0.3965   -0.8650   11.7263 
DER_2           0.6434    1.7282   -0.6718   -1.4345 
DER_3           1.4059   -1.1685   -0.1322    1.7629 
DER_4          -1.1991    0.6835    1.3723   -2.8110 
 
Regime 1 
                     R       INF       GAP       DER 
Const(Reg.2)    4.2027    1.9565    2.1628    0.1852 
R_1             3.5724   -3.9321    0.0102    0.9988 
R_2             1.5478    0.2072   -0.2831   -0.8629 
R_3             3.5205    0.6610    0.0247    0.4262 
R_4            -2.2186    1.9273   -0.2188   -0.8891 
INF_1          -0.7905   11.2796   -0.4826    0.7186 
INF_2           0.2842   -3.9601    0.6693    0.4398 
INF_3          -0.6410    2.5648    0.1250   -0.6643 
INF_4           1.7251    0.4390   -1.0955   -0.1627 
GAP_1           1.3401   -0.3979    1.9084    1.4304 
GAP_2          -0.3031    0.6527   -1.9180   -3.3288 
GAP_3           1.4713   -0.6028    0.7343   -1.2836 
GAP_4           0.3550    0.9138   -5.6862   -1.3313 
DER_1          -0.2123    1.7704   -1.7619    9.6724 
DER_2           1.1015   -1.4528    1.0919   -0.5479 
DER_3          -0.7928    1.5283    0.8171   -1.0894 
DER_4           0.1559   -0.1996   -0.4430    2.4222 
 
IsConverged=1 
 
---------- regime classification ------------------- 
 
Regime 1 
1998:8 - 1999:7 [0.9905] 
2001:3 - 2001:7 [0.9757] 
2002:1 - 2009:11 [1.0000] 
 
Regime 2 
1992:5 - 1998:7 [0.9980] 
1999:8 - 2001:2 [0.9988] 
2001:8 - 2001:12 [0.9989] 
 
 
THAILAND 
 
---------- EM algorithm converged  ----------------- 
 
EQ( 1) MSIAH(2)-VAR(1) model of (R,INF,GAP,DER) 
       Estimation sample: 1992 (2) - 2009 (11) 
 
no. obs. per eq. :        214    in the system :        856     
no. parameters   :         62    linear system :         30     
no. restrictions :         30 
no. nuisance p.  :          2 
 
log-likelihood   : -1715.6325    linear system : -2002.3743   
 
AIC criterion    :    16.6134    linear system :    18.9942  
HQ  criterion    :    17.0075    linear system :    19.1848  
SC  criterion    :    17.5886    linear system :    19.4660 
 
LR linearity test:   573.4836    Chi(30) =[0.0000] **  Chi(32)=[0.0000] **  
DAVIES=[0.0000] **   
 
 
---------- matrix of transition probabilities ------ 
 
                  Regime 1     Regime 2 
Regime 1             1.000   5.186e-007 
Regime 2           0.01177       0.9882 
 
 
---------- regime properties ---------------------- 
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              nObs     Prob.  Duration 
Regime 1     130.0    1.00001928403.90 
Regime 2      84.0    0.0000     84.99 
 
---------- coefficients ---------------------------- 
 
Regime 1 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.1)   0.086295   0.247307   2.846755   2.552441 
R_1            0.910334  -0.048312  -1.998159  -1.289946 
INF_1          0.048445   0.932922   0.903525   0.278426 
GAP_1          0.002617   0.012130   0.631791  -0.005389 
DER_1         -0.006226   0.005023  -0.126947   0.582040 
  SE (Reg.1)   0.221017   0.703523  11.053750   2.756053 
 
Regime 2 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.2)   2.579828   0.454148  -1.736207  -2.276469 
R_1            0.762461   0.051891   0.492429   0.748444 
INF_1         -0.111336   0.800181  -0.431303  -0.888873 
GAP_1          0.061913  -0.001445   0.532460   0.094530 
DER_1          0.052507   0.008892  -0.185733   0.862492 
  SE (Reg.2)   2.356980   0.520691   5.777604   5.523107 
 
---------- contemporaneous correlation ------------- 
 
Regime 1 
            R       INF       GAP       DER 
R      1.0000    0.1665    0.1648   -0.0624 
INF    0.1665    1.0000    0.1410    0.0848 
GAP    0.1648    0.1410    1.0000   -0.0660 
DER   -0.0624    0.0848   -0.0660    1.0000 
 
Regime 2 
            R       INF       GAP       DER 
R      1.0000    0.1301    0.0716    0.3630 
INF    0.1301    1.0000    0.1224    0.2600 
GAP    0.0716    0.1224    1.0000    0.0521 
DER    0.3630    0.2600    0.0521    1.0000 
 
---------- standard errors ------------------------- 
 
Regime 0 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.1)     0.0493     0.1569     2.4651     0.6165 
R_1              0.0248     0.0790     1.2406     0.3106 
INF_1            0.0120     0.0382     0.5996     0.1496 
GAP_1            0.0014     0.0044     0.0694     0.0173 
DER_1            0.0038     0.0121     0.1908     0.0477 
 
Regime 1 
                      R        INF        GAP        DER 
Const(Reg.2)     1.2577     0.2778     3.0835     2.9477 
R_1              0.0953     0.0211     0.2336     0.2234 
INF_1            0.2171     0.0480     0.5322     0.5087 
GAP_1            0.0357     0.0079     0.0876     0.0837 
DER_1            0.0326     0.0072     0.0798     0.0764 
 
---------- t - values ------------------------------ 
 
Regime 0 
                     R       INF       GAP       DER 
Const(Reg.1)    1.7493    1.5764    1.1548    4.1399 
R_1            36.6545   -0.6119   -1.6106   -4.1525 
INF_1           4.0400   24.4474    1.5069    1.8605 
GAP_1           1.8860    2.7465    9.1044   -0.3114 
DER_1          -1.6320    0.4137   -0.6655   12.1909 
 
Regime 1 
                     R       INF       GAP       DER 
Const(Reg.2)    2.0512    1.6347   -0.5631   -0.7723 
R_1             8.0005    2.4647    2.1078    3.3504 
INF_1          -0.5129   16.6868   -0.8105   -1.7473 
GAP_1           1.7334   -0.1831    6.0817    1.1288 
DER_1           1.6125    1.2362   -2.3265   11.2889 
 
IsConverged=1 
 
---------- regime classification ------------------- 
 
Regime 1 
1999:2 - 2009:11 [1.0000] 
 
Regime 2 
1992:2 - 1999:1 [1.0000] 
